Rucker v. Shelby County Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

TIKEILA RUCKER, RACHAEL SPRIGGS, )

DAMON CURRY-MORRIS, AMBER )

SHERMAN AND LAJUANA ABRAHAM, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:23-cv-02358-SHL-cgc

)

SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, CAROLYN JACKSON, in her )

official capacity as Chief of Safety and )

Security for the SHELBY COUNTY BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendants Shelby County Board of Education (“SCBOE”) and

Carolyn Jackson, in her official capacity as Chief of Safety and Security for the Shelby County

Board of Education’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs Tikeila Rucker, Rachael

Spriggs, Damon Curry-Morris, Amber Sherman, and Lajuana Abraham, filed May 31, 2024.

(ECF No. 56.) Plaintiffs filed their response on June 28, 2024. (ECF No. 58.) Defendants

replied on July 26, 2024. (ECF No. 61.)

Plaintiffs previously sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from banning

them from attending SCBOE meetings and coming onto its properties. (ECF No. 8.) The Court

held a hearing on that Motion on July 13, 2023 (ECF No. 30), and denied it on August 4, 2023

(ECF No. 38). That Order explained that, at that point, Plaintiffs did not show a strong

likelihood of prevailing on their claims. (ECF No. 38 at PageID 414.) (Id.) However, it also

explained that “[w]hether a plaintiff’s ban from school board property is constitutional is a

highly fact intensive inquiry that requires a court to examine the plaintiff’s conduct, the board’s

response, and whether the board’s response is justified in light of the severity of the plaintiff’s

conduct, i.e., whether it is narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interests of

preserving order at board meetings and ensuring the safety of those present.” The Court

concluded that “[t]here remain questions of fact surrounding many aspects of this case.” (Id.)

Now, even with a fully developed record, genuine issues of material facts remain. Because they

do, and as described in more detail below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND1

This case involves events that took place at the May 9, 2023 SCBOE meeting and in its

wake. (ECF No. 58-1 at PageID 754.) 2 One of the topics addressed at the meeting was

SCBOE’s ongoing efforts to hire a superintendent. (Id.) Plaintiffs, who had been critical of the

SCBOE’s superintendent search process, attended the meeting and had the opportunity to speak

during the time set aside for public comments. (Id. at PageID 754–55.)

Under the SCBOE’s rules governing public comments, “[s]peakers are asked to refrain

from using names of personnel or names of persons connected with the school system,

particularly when lodging a complaint.” (ECF No. 56-10 at PageID 673.) Under the policy,

“[t]he Chair shall have the authority to terminate the remarks of any individual who is disruptive

1 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are undisputed and are taken from the Parties’

undisputed material facts.

2 In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs filed two video exhibits.

(ECF No. 57.) One is the entirety of the May 9 meeting and the second is narrated security

footage capturing the discharge of the sound alarms, which is described in more detail below.

The briefing on the motion relies on the video footage, as do the Parties’ statements of

undisputed material facts and the responses thereto. This Order relies on it as well.

or does not adhere to Board rules.” (Id.) During the May 9 meeting, Spriggs made a statement

referencing Shelby County’s interim superintendent. (ECF No. 58-1 at PageID 755.) Spriggs

was warned about the rule violation, and referenced the name of the interim superintendent a

second time. (Id. at PageID 756.) The SCBOE Chair then told Spriggs to conclude her remarks

and cut off her microphone. (Id.)

Spriggs remained at the podium with Rucker nearby, and Curry-Morris and Sherman

joined them. (Id. at PageID 756–57.) Security personnel sought to have Plaintiffs take their

seats and briefly made physical contact with Curry-Morris. (Id. at PageID 757–58.) Curry-

Morris asserts that a school resource officer grabbed and assaulted him. (Id. at PageID 758.)

Later, Curry-Morris addressed the meeting from the podium, claimed that the SCBOE’s

superintendent search had been a farce, criticized SCBOE’s leadership, and stated “[s]o, look at

yourselves and look at the people. Because you’ve got to give the people what they want. If you

don’t give it to us, just like Ms. Sherman just said, we going to take it.” (ECF No. 61-1 at

PageID 977–78.)

When the SCBOE announced at the meeting that the search for its new superintendent

was being paused, activist Sarah Carpenter, who spoke earlier in the meeting, began loudly

shouting for about sixty seconds, which prevented the meeting from continuing. (Id. at PageID

978.) Less than a minute later, Abraham and Sherman dropped audible panic alarms on the

floor, causing them to emit a very loud and concussive noise. (ECF No. 58-1 at PageID 760.)3

Security personnel retrieved the devices, attempted to silence them, and removed the devices

3 Plaintiffs suggest that Abraham and Sherman dropped the alarms to protect themselves

and out of a fear for their own personal safety. (ECF No. 58 at PageID 747.) Although

immaterial for the purposes of ruling on this Motion, the video from the meeting does not

support that assertion. Instead, it appears that the two unhurriedly rose from their seats and

nonchalantly dropped the alarms as they made their ways out of the meeting room.

from the room and building. (Id.) Carpenter, whose interruption of the meeting lasted almost

twice as long as the body alarm incident with Sherman and Abraham, was not punished. (ECF

No. 61-1 at PageID 978.)

As Chief of Safety and Security for the SCBOE, Jackson is responsible for the safety of

the public, employees, and anyone else who attends SCBOE meetings. (ECF No. 58-1 at PageID

760.) Based on Plaintiffs’ conduct at the meeting, Jackson requested the issuance of

Authorizations of Agency (“AoAs”) to temporarily prohibit Plaintiffs from accessing SCBOE

property. (Id. at PageID 760–61.) Jackson requested the AoAs because she believed Plaintiffs

posed a significant safety risk to the SCBOE. (Id. at PageID 761–62.)

The issuance of the AoAs did not prevent Plaintiffs from engaging in other forms of

communication with the SCBOE, as Rucker and Curry-Morris maintained direct communication

with SCBOE members during the ban and Plaintiffs met with SCBOE member Sheleah Harris

via Zoom to discuss the AoAs. (Id. at PageID 762.)

Plaintiffs eventually received letters from Jackson that outlined the reasons for the

temporary bans. (Id. at PageID 762–63.) Abraham, Sherman, and Spriggs received text

messages containing links to the letters. (Id. at PageID 763.) The letters discussed the incidents

that led to the issuance of the AoAs and specifically mentioned the incident that occurred at the

podium during Spriggs’ allotted speaking time at the May 9 meeting. (Id.) The letter to Spriggs

also included details of the Board policy she was alleged to have violated. (Id.)

Jackson’s letters to Rucker, Spriggs, Abraham, and Sherman explained that the

deployment of panic alarm devices was a serious issue and was the justification to restrict their

access to SCBOE property. (Id. at PageID 764.) Jackson’s letter to Curry-Morris stated that he

prevented security personnel from reaching the podium and made a false police report, alleging

that security had assaulted him. (Id.) Each of Jackson’s letters offered to have in-person

discussions with the recipients. (Id. at PageID 764–65.)

On May 30, 2023, Abraham, Sherman, Spriggs, and Curry-Morris ignored the temporary

ban from SCBOE property and came on to the property to try to attend a school board meeting,

but were stopped at the metal detectors. (Id. at PageID 765.) Coming onto SCBOE property and

attempting to enter the meeting was a violation of the AoAs. (Id.) Instead of seeking to arrest

Plaintiffs, Jackson extended the length of their bans. (Id.) Jackson sent letters to each Plaintiff,

dated May 31, 2023, that updated them as to the AoAs, and sent the letters via text message to

Abraham, Curry-Morris, and Spriggs. (Id. at PageID 766.)

The only difference between the first set of letters Jackson sent and the letters dated May

31, was an additional paragraph specifying the updated length of the bans from SCBOE property.

(Id.) Each of the Plaintiffs was banned an additional thirty days beyond their original ban. (Id.)

Rucker’s ban extended until June 11, 2023, Curry-Morris and Spriggs’s ban extended until July

11, 2023, and Abraham and Sherman’s until August 10, 2023. (Id. at PageID 766–67.)

Jackson’s letters included her email address and an invitation to meet to discuss the bans. (Id. at

PageID 767.) The AoAs issued against all Plaintiffs have expired and they are permitted to

freely access SCBOE property and attend school board meetings, as long as their behavior is not

disruptive or a breach of safety. (Id. at PageID 768.)

Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their Amended

Complaint:

• All assert that their First Amendment right of access was infringed upon when they

were prohibited from attending SCBOE meetings. (ECF No. 52 at PageID 513–14.)

• All assert that their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

were violated when they were not provided any right to appeal or provided a

mechanism to review their ban from the SCBOE meetings. (Id. at PageID 514–16.)

• All assert that their First Amendment right to freedom of expression was infringed

upon when they were prevented from attending, recording, or speaking at SCBOE

meetings, and when different rules were applied to them. (Id. at PageID 516–17.)

• Curry-Morris asserts that he was retaliated against for exercising his First

Amendment rights when he was banned from SCBOE meetings for filing a police

report alleging he was assaulted at the May 9 meeting. (Id. at PageID 517–18.)

• Spriggs and Rucker also assert that they were retaliated against for exercising their

First Amendment rights as they merely talked with and associated with Abraham and

Sherman, who set off the noisemakers. (Id. at PageID 518–19.)

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment as to all the claims. They

argue that there were no First Amendment violations because Plaintiffs’ bans from SCBOE

property were content-neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,

and they allowed Plaintiffs alternate methods of communication. (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 543.)

Defendants also contend that there is no evidence in the record that suggests the bans were based

on Plaintiffs’ critical viewpoints of SCBOE’s search for a new superintendent. (Id.) Finally,

Defendants assert that “no express policy, practice, or custom enforced by Defendant caused the

alleged constitutional violations,” which makes it impossible to establish so-called Monell

liability. (Id. at PageID 543–44.) Ultimately, Defendants argue that, “[a]lthough framed as a

First Amendment case, in reality, this litigation is really about deplorable and disruptive conduct

which is not protected by the Constitution.” (ECF No. 61 at PageID 968.)4

Plaintiffs counter that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants

violated their First Amendment rights. They assert that the restrictions put in place against them

were content-based and that banning Plaintiffs from all MSCS property infringed on their First

Amendment rights.

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The moving party can prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing

that there is a lack of evidence to support the non-moving party’s cause. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Although the court views all evidence and factual inferences

in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, “the mere existence of some alleged factual

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).

The movant has the initial burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to go

4 Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs had ample channels of communication with the

SCBOE available to them, but they do so in the context of whether the terms of the AoAs

represented appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. The Motion for

Summary Judgment does not address Count II of the Amended Complaint, which asserts that

Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when

they were not provided any right to appeal or provided a mechanism to review their ban from the

SCBOE meetings. To the extent Defendants seek summary judgment as to Count II, their motion

is DENIED.

beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at

324 (quotations omitted). Ultimately, in evaluating the appropriateness of summary judgment,

the court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

II. Claims Under § 1983

Plaintiffs allege several § 1983 claims, based on different constitutional provisions.

“Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides ‘a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Schalk v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, No. 14-CV-2220-

SHL-tmp, 2015 WL 11019255, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2015) (quoting Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). To assert a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove he “was

deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States’ and that such

deprivation was ‘caused by a person acting under color of state law.’” Littler v. Ohio Ass’n of

Pub. Sch. Emps., 88 F.4th 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584,

590 (6th Cir. 2003)).

At the same time, “[t]o prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must

show that the alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.”

Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A plaintiff may take “at least four avenues . . . to

prove the existence of a municipality’s illegal policy or custom.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at

694). Those include “(1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official agency policies;

(2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate

training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.”

Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.) Each constitutional claim at issue in Defendants’ Motion is

considered below.

A. First Amendment Claims

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the

freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “Content-based laws—those that target speech based

on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if

the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed

v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395

(1992)). “Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech

because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Id. (citations omitted).

However, “[t]he right to free speech is not absolute, especially when a would-be speaker

seeks access to government property as a platform for his speech.” Lowery v. Jefferson Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 586 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2009). School board meetings are considered

“designated” and “limited” public fora. Id. They are not traditional public fora, like parks and

streets, where the government’s regulatory powers are at their weakest. Id. (citing Hague v.

Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). Nor are they nonpublic fora, like military

bases, where the Government has broad discretion to regulate speech. Id. (citing Cornelius v.

NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). In a limited public forum,

“the State is not required to . . . allow persons to engage in every type of speech,” but instead

“may regulate the time, place and manner of speech so long as the regulation is (1) content-

neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leaves open

ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Id. (citations and quotations

omitted) (cleaned up).

Defendants contend that the AoAs were content neutral because they were issued after

Plaintiffs engaged in disruptive behavior at the May 9 meeting and “did not restrict in any way

to whom or what topics Plaintiffs could communicate to SCBOE board members or other

SCBOE personnel.” (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 555.) They assert that the AoAs were narrowly

tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest, namely maintaining safety and order during

school board meetings. (Id. at PageID 555–57.) Finally, they contend that, although Plaintiffs

were temporarily prevented from accessing SCBOE property, Plaintiffs had ample means of

communicating with the SCBOE’s members, and Plaintiffs did so while the AoAs were in place,

and, although Jackson extended invitations to meet with her to discuss them, none of the

Plaintiffs took her up on the offer. (Id. at PageID 557–58.) Because the applicable facts as to

Curry-Morris are different than the other Plaintiffs, his claim is considered first below, followed

by the others.

1. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Defendants’ Actions

Against Curry-Morris Constituted Content-Based Infringements on his Speech

The AoA issued to Curry-Morris informed him that, during the May 9 meeting, he left his

“seat and joined a group at the podium that became loud, argumentative, and confrontational

when the Board Chair requested the next speaker. This raised safety concerns, causing security

to intervene and restore order.” (ECF No. 56-16 at 708.) The AoA also accused him of filing a

false police report. (Id. at PageID 709.)

In her deposition, Jackson explained that she viewed Curry-Morris’s statements at the

podium during the May 9 meeting as threats of violence. (ECF No. 58-7 at PageID 900–03.)

Curry-Morris told the SCBOE at the meeting, “[s]o, look at yourselves and look at the people.

Because you’ve got to give the people what they want. If you don’t give it to us, just like Ms.

Sherman just said, we going to take it.” (ECF No. 61-1 at PageID 977–78.) Jackson also stated

at the preliminary injunction hearing that her “officers told [her] he made threats to them as he

was leaving.” (ECF No. 37 at PageID 324.) Plaintiffs assert that there is a question of fact as to

whether the AoA issued to Curry-Morris was a punishment based on the content of his speech,

and was thus unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that “objective threats of violence contribute nothing to public

discourse and enjoy no First Amendment protection.” (ECF No. 58 at PageID 742 (citing

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992)). However, Plaintiffs assert that Curry-

Morris’s speech amounted to political hyperbole, which is entitled to full constitutional

protection. (Id. at PageID 742–43 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).) In

any event, Plaintiffs contend that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Curry-

Morris’s ban from SCBOE meetings and property stemmed from the content of his speech, and

that such a ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.

There is an issue of material fact as to whether the AoA was issued against Curry-Morris

based on the content of his protected speech at the May 9 meeting. The statements “[b]ecause

you’ve got to give the people what they want” and “[i]f you don’t give it to us, just like Ms.

Sherman just said, we going to take it,” do not, on their face, amount to threats that exist outside

the realm of First Amendment protection. And, even if they were, it cannot be said as a matter of

law that the restrictions placed upon Curry-Morris through the AoA were narrowly tailored to

serve a compelling governmental interest. Curry-Morris was banished from all MSCS property,

which prevented him from going to work at his job as a transportation provider for the schools,

picking up his children from school, or attending his nephew’s eighth grade graduation. (ECF

No. 58-2 at PageID 789–90.) As Defendants suggest, the initial decision to remove a person

from a board meeting may be considered narrowly tailored to promote public safety and order.

(ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 554 (citing Sandefur v. Vill. of Hanover Park, Ill., 862 F. Supp. 2d

840, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (finding the decision to remove a very animated person with a

concealed firearm from a village board meeting to be narrowly tailored, where the defendants

were unaware he was a law enforcement officer)). However, in this case, Curry-Morris left the

May 9 meeting on his own volition and his subsequent ban from all MSCS property cannot be

said, as a matter of law, to be narrowly tailored.5

Given the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Curry-Morris’s

claims is DENIED.

2. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Defendants’ Actions

Against the Remaining Defendants Were Valid Time, Place, and Manner

Restrictions

Defendants’ arguments for summary judgment as to the claims of the remaining

Defendants echo those they make regarding Curry-Morris. That is, they assert that the AoAs

were content-neutral, as they were prompted by concerns about safety. They argue that the

AoAs were narrowly tailored because they banned Plaintiffs from the SCBOE and MSCS

properties for brief periods of time ranging from thirty to ninety days. And they contend that the

AoAs did not otherwise impose restrictions upon any information Plaintiffs could communicate

5 Defendants also assert that, “[t]he fact that the AOAs were narrowly tailored and served

a significant governmental interest demonstrates the claim of retaliation by Plaintiff Curry-

Morris is meritless.” (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 556.) Defendants argue that the video of the

May 9 board meeting conclusively demonstrates that Curry-Morris filed a false police report

when he claimed that he was assaulted by SCBOE police officers, and Defendants imply that the

police report was not made in good faith. (Id.) The record does not support that conclusion and,

nevertheless, the same previously identified questions of material fact exist as to Curry-Morris’s

claim for retaliation. Therefore, summary judgment is DENIED as to Curry-Morris’s retaliation

claim.

Defendants also do not directly address Rucker and Spriggs’s retaliation claims under the

First Amendment. Absent any such argument, and because Rucker and Spriggs’s First

Amendment claims survive the Motion for Summary Judgment as described herein, summary

judgment is DENIED as to those claims.

to the SCBOE, demonstrating there were ample alternative channels for communication.

Plaintiffs contend that, even when intermediate scrutiny is applied, there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Defendants infringed on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, because a

blanket ban from SCBOE meetings, and all MSCS property, including properties where the

public is routinely permitted to gather, even for a limited duration, is not narrowly tailored and is

“categorically unconstitutional.” (ECF No. 58 at PageID 746.)

To be considered narrowly tailored, “[a] restriction must not burden ‘substantially more

speech than necessary to achieve the [government]’s asserted interests.’” Lexington H-L Servs.,

Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 879 F.3d 224, 229 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting

McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 490 (2014)). Still, “the regulation ‘need not be the least

restrictive or least intrusive means’ of promoting a substantial governmental interest, nor is there

any ‘stringent duty of calibration.’” Id. (quoting Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398

F.3d 814, 823 (6th Cir. 2005)). Ultimately, “the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so

long as the . . . substantial government interest would be achieved less effectively absent the

regulation.” Id. (citation omitted) (cleaned up).

In its Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Court explained

that “future, or prospective bans are not categorically prohibited” and that “a temporary

prospective exclusion may be justified.” (ECF No. 38 at PageID 410.) At the same time,

though, the Sixth Circuit and other courts “have invalidated laws that prohibit future expressive

activity in retaliation for past unlawful conduct.” Polaris Amphitheater Concerts, Inc. v. City of

Westerville, 267 F.3d 503, 507 (6th Cir. 2001). The SCBOE has a significant interest in the

orderly and efficient conduct of its business, including preventing the disruption of public

meetings. See Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 43 F.3d 1472, 1994 WL

622153 (6th Cir. 1994) (table). However, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the SCBOE’s ban was justified. Part of that is based upon what Plaintiffs—and the

record—have demonstrated is a question of inconsistent application of the SCBOE’s standards.

To be sure, there is a distinction between interrupting a school board meeting by

dropping body alarms, as Abraham and Sherman did, and shouting loudly for about a minute, as

activist Sarah Carpenter did at the same meeting. That distinction is a matter of degree and not

of kind, however. The sort of disruption attributed to Spriggs and the other Plaintiffs who joined

her at the podium during the meeting, though it lasted longer than Abraham, Sherman, and

Carpenter’s interruptions, was arguably something less disruptive, and less severe. But the fact

that Carpenter appears to have avoided receiving an AoA for similarly disruptive actions she

took at the very same meeting that prompted Plaintiffs’ receipt of the AoAs, at least raises the

question as to whether the bans placed upon Plaintiffs burdened substantially more speech than

necessary to achieve the SCBOE’s asserted interests. See Lexington H-L Servs., 879 F.3d at

229. Although the SCBOE was not required to take the least restrictive or least intrusive means

when implementing the time, place, and manner restrictions it placed on Plaintiffs (see id.), the

expansive gap between, on the one hand, taking no action against Carpenter, and, on the other

hand, banning Plaintiffs from all MSCS property, even for a limited time, illustrates that a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiffs’ bans were narrowly tailored.

As a result, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the First Amendment

claims against all other Plaintiffs is DENIED.

B. Monell Liability

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to establish Monell liability, because there is

no genuine issue of material fact as to whether SCBOE has a policy, custom, or practice that

resulted in the constitutional violations. Defendants argue “the SCBOE’s policies governing

school board meetings and the conduct of visitors on SCBOE property are content-neutral.”

(ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 558.) They also contend that Plaintiffs can point to no “‘practice or

custom’” that satisfies Monell because . . . members of the public, including four (4) out of the

(5) Plaintiffs, were allowed to voice concerns and opinions critical of the SCBOE unimpeded.”

(Id.) The policy at issue, according to Plaintiffs, is not the one governing who can speak at board

meetings, but instead the safety policies that led to the implementation of the bans. They argue

that, “[i]n other words, the record clearly establishes that Chief Jackson carried out the policy of

SCBoE in instituting the bans, the SCBoE [k]new about it, and endorsed it.” (ECF No. 58 at

PageID 749.)

Defendants do not dispute that Jackson implements the safety policies for MSCS and that

she was carrying out MSCS policies when she issued the AoAs and banned Plaintiffs from

MSCS properties. Based on the actions taken by Jackson and endorsed by the SCBOE, a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to both whether the SCBOE’s official agency policies

were unlawful and whether actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority were

as well.6 Because those questions exist, Defendants may be subject to liability under Monell.

The Motion for Summary Judgment based on Monell is also DENIED.

6 There is also the question as to whether the SCBOE’s policies, even if they are content-

neutral on their face, can nevertheless constitute potential constitutional violations through their

means of execution. In Polaris, the court evaluated a noise ordinance and determined that it was

content-neutral and did not permit unfettered official discretion in its enforcement. However, in

that context, the court nevertheless explained that, “when a regulation fails to place appropriate

limits on the discretion of public officials to administer the law in a manner that is abusive of

speech, the result should be no different than if the law had brazenly set out to discriminate on

the basis of content. At stake is the risk that in the absence of ‘narrowly drawn, reasonable and

definite standards for the officials to follow,’ the law invites opportunities for the

unconstitutional suppression of speech.” Polaris, 267 F.3d at 509 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting

C. Claims Against Jackson in her Official Capacity

Finally, Defendants seek summary judgment for the claims against Jackson in her official

capacity as Chief of Safety and Security for the Shelby County Board of Education, arguing that

the claims against her are duplicative of the claims against SCBOE. (ECF No. 56-1.) Plaintiffs

counter that when a party is charged with implementation of a discretionary policy, “the Sixth

Circuit has permitted cases against individuals in their official capacity to move forward.” (ECF

No. 58 at PageID 750.)

Plaintiffs are mistaken and their reliance on Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d

1241 (6th Cir. 1989), is misplaced. In that case, the court explained that, consistent with

Defendants’ position, “[a] suit against an individual ‘in his official capacity’ has been held to be

essentially a suit directly against the local government unit and can result in that unit's liability to

respond to the injured party for his injuries.” Leach, 891 F.2d at 1245. The court concluded that

the “suit against the Mayor and the Sheriff of Shelby County in their official capacities is,

therefore, essentially and for all purposes, a suit against the County itself.” Leach, 891 F.2d at

1245–46; see also Grace v. City of Ripley, Tennessee, No. 2:16-cv-02395-JPM-dkv, 2017 WL

835206, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2017) (collecting cases that stand for the proposition that,

“when a complaint asserts a claim against an officer or employee of a governmental entity, in his

or her official capacity, and against the governmental entity itself, a district court may dismiss

the official-capacity claim”); Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x 322, 327

(6th Cir. 2013) (finding a claim against a township’s deputy police chief in his official capacity

“superfluous” when the township itself was also sued); Kraemer v. Luttrell, 189 F. App’x 361,

Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951)). Jackson was implementing SCBOE’s

policies and not enforcing laws, but similar concerns are present here.

366 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[s]uing a municipal officer in his official capacity for a constitutional

violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the same as suing the municipality itself”).

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the claims against Jackson in her official capacity are

equivalent to claims against the SCBOE. Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED as to the claims against Jackson in her official capacity.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED as to the claims against Jackson in her official capacity, and DENIED as to all the

remaining claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 10th day of October, 2024.

s/ Sheryl H. Lipman

SHERYL H. LIPMAN

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE