Hegel v. TDOC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

)

JAMES FREDERICK HEGEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-01088-JDB-tmp

)

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL,

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND CLAIMS IN CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT,

DENYING REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,

AND

DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY THE DOCKET

_____________________________________________________________________________

On April 15, 2024, the Plaintiff, James Frederick Hegel, Tennessee Department of

Corrections (“TDOC”) number 456745, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.) At the time the complaint was filed, he was incarcerated at the

Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee. That same date, he

moved for appointment of counsel. (D.E. 2.) On May 7, 2024, the Court ordered Hegel to comply

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis or paying the civil

filing fee. (D.E. 4.) On May 28, 2024, he filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (D.E.

5), along with an amended complaint (D.E. 6). On June 3, 2024, the Court granted the application

and assessed the $350.00 civil filing fee. (D.E. 7.) On July 15 and August 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed

change of address notices (D.E. 8-9) advising the Court of his transfer from NWCX to Morgan

County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”) in Wartburg, Tennessee.1 The complaint, amended

complaint, and motion to appoint counsel are pending before the Court. The complaint and

amended complaint are consolidated (the “Consolidated Complaint”) for the purpose of screening

Hegel’s claims pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the

“PLRA”).

The Consolidated Complaint is based upon incidents that occurred on or about March 4,

2024, when sexual abuse allegations against Hegel were investigated by the Sexual Abuse

Response Team (“SART”) at NWCX. The Consolidated Complaint is liberally construed to assert

claims for violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and of TDOC policy. The suit

names as Defendants TDOC; Jerrie Avery, NWCX internal affairs and SART team member; Anna

Parson, Assistant NWCX Warden of Treatment and Prison Rape Elimination Act Coordinator;

Brandon Watwood, NWCX Warden; John Walton, NWCX Assistant Warden of Security; Alicca

Lyons, NWCX Compliance Manager; Jason Rogers, NWCX Investigative Unit Lieutenant;

Russell Stray, Counselor, NWCX; and Frank Strada, TDOC Commissioner. Plaintiff does not

specify in which capacity he is suing each Defendant. He seeks appointment of counsel; issuance

of process upon the Defendants; his removal as a sexual aggressor from the Tennessee Offender

Management Information System (“TOMIS”); timely transfer back to NWCX Site 2, L-12

Veteran’s Unit; return of his personal property; freedom from retaliation; a compensatory and

punitive damages judgment in amounts to be determined by a jury; costs of this action; further and

other general relief to which he may be entitled; a restraining order against TDOC staff; policy

changes requiring a hearing to substantiate inmate claims; and trial by jury.

1See https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/details.jsp (last accessed Oct. 3, 2024).

The Clerk shall MODIFY the docket to add the State of Tennessee as Defendant.

For the reasons explained below, the Court (1) DENIES AS MOOT Hegel’s motion to

appoint counsel, (2) DISMISSES the Consolidated Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure

to state a claim to relief against Defendants, (3) GRANTS leave to amend the claims dismissed

without prejudice, and (4) DENIES injunctive relief.

I. BACKGROUND.

The Court assumes Plaintiff’s allegations are true for purposes of screening the

Consolidated Complaint. On or around March 4, 2024, at NWCX, Hegel alleges his due process

rights were violated by SART team Defendants Watwood, Parson, Walton, Lyon, Rogers, Avery,

and Stray. He refers collectively to the Defendants and does not allege any specific conduct by an

individual. Plaintiff avers that four other NWCX inmates made false allegations of sexual abuse

against him, that Defendants acted in violation of TDOC policy when they “authorized the

misleading allegations” for sexual misconduct or harassment to be entered into TOMIS without

providing him a disciplinary hearing, caused him to be labeled a “sexual aggressor” and

“incompatible offender,” and that he has suffered “a retaliatory transfer, financial damages, injury,

. . . and no contact isolation in a cell without hot water, television or radio signal.” (D.E. 6 at

PageID 28.) Defendants have also caused him the loss of personal property and privileges, and

separation from his inmate son, church group, and pastor. Finally, he alleges that he has been

retaliated against at MCCX since his transfer from NWCX.

II. SCREENING.

A. LEGAL STANDARD.

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint — (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In assessing whether the complaint states a claim

on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009); Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), and Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th

Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual

allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement

to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).

The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and

all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 provides guidance on this issue, requiring a complaint to contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It also requires

factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints

than to those drafted by lawyers. Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally

construed.” Id. (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Such litigants are

not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however. Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612,

613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique

pleading requirements” and stating, “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not

spelled out in his pleading’”).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983.

As noted above, this action has been brought under § 1983. To state a claim under the statute,

a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the

United States and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting under color of state law. Adickes

v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS.

Plaintiff does not specify whether he is suing the Defendants in their official or individual

capacities. The Sixth Circuit requires plaintiffs to “set forth clearly in their pleading that they are

suing the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages, not simply in their capacity as

state officials.” Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. “Absent a specification of capacity, it is presumed that a

state official is sued in his official capacity.” Northcott v. Plunkett, 42 F. App’x 795, 796 (6th Cir.

2002) (citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 593). The Court will therefore presume that Hegel is suing

Defendants in their official capacities.

The official capacity claims contained in the Consolidated Complaint are treated as claims

against the Defendants’ employer. See Jones v. Union Cty., Tennessee, 296 F.3d 417, 421 (6th

Cir. 2002) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)). Hegel alleges that

Defendants are employed by TDOC, which is construed as an allegation that they are employed

by the State of Tennessee. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see

also https://www.tn.gov/correction/state-prisons/state-prison-list/northwest-correctional-

complex.html (last accessed Oct. 3, 2024).)

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.

Const. amend. XI. The amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own

states in federal court. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472

(1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Virginia

Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2011) (“A State may waive its

sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by

appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a

private person’s suit against a State.” (internal citation and footnote omitted)). Tennessee has not

waived its sovereign immunity and therefore may not be sued for damages. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 20-13-102(a). A state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents

of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Hegel does not state a claim to relief against Defendants in their official capacities or the

State of Tennessee. Therefore, those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure

to state a claim to relief.

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief also fails to state a claim. The United States

Supreme Court has clarified that “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for

injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective

relief are not treated as actions against the State.’” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985), and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)); see

also Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he [eleventh]

amendment does not preclude actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for

prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.”

To proceed with official capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against State

employees such as Defendants, Hegel must allege that the State of Tennessee was responsible for

the violation of his constitutional rights because of a practiced custom or policy. Graham, 473

U.S. at 166; Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The Sixth Circuit has held

that, to establish the requisite causal link between a constitutional violation and a policy, a plaintiff

must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [entity] itself and show that the particular injury

was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't., 8 F.3d

358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993). The custom or policy must be the “moving force” behind the deprivation

of the plaintiff's rights. Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 606-07 (6th

Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was

injured due to an unconstitutional policy or custom of the State of Tennessee, he has failed to state

a claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Defendants.

The Consolidated Complaint’s claim for injunctive relief against the Defendants in their

official capacities is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA.

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every

other circuit to have reached the issue, that under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 15(a) a district court can allow

a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the

PLRA”)); see also Brown v. Rhode Island, 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam)

(“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an

opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not

required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31,

37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without

prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that . . . amending

the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d

1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a

meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does

not infringe the right of access to the courts”). The Court GRANTS leave to amend the

Consolidated Complaint under the conditions set forth below.

V. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set forth above:

A. The Consolidated Complaint (D.E. 1, 6) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

in its entirety for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

B. Leave to amend the complaint is GRANTED. Amended claims must be filed

within twenty-one days of the entry of this order. An amended pleading must

comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including, but not limited to Rule

8’s requirement of a short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims. An amended

complaint supersedes the Consolidated Complaint and must be complete in itself

without reference to the prior pleadings. Hegel or his counsel must sign the

amended complaint, and the text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient

facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any

exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and

must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint

must arise from the facts alleged in the Consolidated Complaint. Each claim for

relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued on

that count. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified,

the Court will dismiss the Consolidated Complaint with prejudice and enter

judgment. For § 1915(g) analysis, the Court recommends that any such dismissal

should be treated as a strike pursuant to that statute. See Simons v. Washington,

996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021). The “three strikes” provision of § 1915(g)

prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on

3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g).

C. Because the Consolidated Complaint is being dismissed, the motion to appoint

counsel (D.E. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT subject to Hegel’s right to re-file if the

case proceeds.

D. The request for injunctive relief is DENIED.

E. If Hegel is transferred to a different prison, released, or changes his address, he is

ORDERED to notify the Court immediately, in writing, of his current address. If

he fails to provide the Court with his current address or fails to follow any other

requirements of this order, the Court may impose appropriate sanctions, up to and

including dismissal of this action, without any additional notice or hearing by the

Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of October 2024.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE