Halliburton v. Weirich

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL CORY HALLIBURTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:21-cv-02210-SHL-atc

)

AMY WEIRICH in her official and individual )

capacities, and SHELBY COUNTY, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT SHELBY COUNTY’S AND

DEFENDANT AMY WEIRICH’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”), filed July 30, 2024. (ECF No. 22.) In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge addresses

Defendant Shelby County’s motion to dismiss, filed on December 16, 2023 (ECF No. 13), and

Defendant Amy Weirich’s motion to dismiss, filed on December 26, 2023 (ECF No. 17), which

were responded to by pro se Plaintiff Michael Cory Halliburton on February 1, 2024 (ECF No.

18). Weirich replied on February 5, 2024. (ECF No. 19.) As explained in the R&R, the

Magistrate Judge recommends granting both motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) Halliburton

filed an objection to the R&R on August 13, 2024 (ECF No. 23),1 which Weirich responded to

on August 27, 2024 (ECF No. 24). Defendant Shelby County filed no response.

1 Halliburton also filed a Notice of Evidence of Defendant’s Participation in a Conspiracy with

Roger Page and Notice of Pervasive Bias on September 13, 2024. (ECF No. 25.) However,

because this Notice was not filed before with the Magistrate Judge, it cannot be considered now.

Even if it were considered, the conclusion reached here would not change.

As outlined below, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. The motions to

dismiss filed by Defendant Shelby County and Defendant Weirich are GRANTED and this

matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Halliburton was convicted of one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder,

two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault by a jury on May 9, 2015.

State v. Halliburton, No. 1404181, 2015 WL 13694110, at *1–4 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Nov. 02,

2015). Here, in his amended complaint, he raises three 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to that

criminal conviction: (1) a claim “[a]gainst Shelby County—Ms. Weirich in Her Official

Capacity” for unconstitutional practices in accordance with Shelby County’s policies and

customs; (2) a claim against Weirich in her individual capacity for colluding with others to deny

Halliburton due process; and (3) a claim against Weirich in her individual capacity for filing a

press release in retaliation against Halliburton. (ECF No. 8.)2

Defendants both seek dismissal of the Amended Complaint, arguing that it is untimely

(ECF No. 17), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address the claims (id.), and

Halliburton fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted (id.; ECF No. 13). On July 30,

2024, Magistrate Judge Annie T. Christoff filed an R&R recommending dismissal because (1)

Halliburton’s amended complaint is untimely according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(ECF No. 22 at PageID 225–26); (2) Halliburton failed to state an individual capacity claim

against Weirich since he cannot challenge his conviction’s validity in this matter and Weirich has

absolute immunity for actions related to her prosecutorial duties (id. at PageID 230–32); (3)

2 For more background, see the “Proposed Findings of Fact” section of the R&R. (ECF No. 22

at PageID 221.) No specific objections were lodged as to these facts.

Halliburton fails to state an individual-capacity claim against Weirich based on First Amendment

violations (id. at PageID 232–37); (4) Halliburton fails to state a claim against Shelby County

because his official capacity and alleged collusion claims relate to Weirich’s work as a state

employee, rather than as a county employee (id. at PageID 226); (5) Halliburton fails to state an

official-capacity collusion claim against Weirich because his claim is barred by Tennessee’s

sovereign immunity (id. at PageID 226–29); and (6) Halliburton fails to state a claim against the

state of Tennessee because his request for injunctive relief is barred by Tennessee’s sovereign

immunity (id. at PageID 229).

Halliburton objected to some parts of the R&R on August 13, 2024 (ECF No. 23), and

Weirich replied to those objections on August 27, 2024 (ECF No. 24).

ANALYSIS

A judge may designate a magistrate judge to prepare proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for ruling on motions to dismiss. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Parties can then

serve and file “specific” objections to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations within 14 days after being served with the R&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Per well-settled case law,

[a] general objection to the entirety of the magistrate's report has the same effects

as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on

any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the

magistrate useless. The functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as

both the magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks. This duplication

of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs

contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act.

Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

When a party objects to an R&R, their objections must be specific. Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140, 151 (1985); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty. Sch., 47 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674

(W.D. Tenn. 2014). Even though pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings are more “liberally construed” and

evaluated with a less stringent standard than those filed by counsel, the substance of their

submissions remains important. Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir.

2020) (internal citations omitted); Freeman v. Sullivan, 954 F. Supp. 2d 730, 745 (W.D. Tenn.

2013), aff’d (Dec. 27, 2013) (internal citations omitted). Pro se litigants must also abide by

pleading requirements. Wright v. Penguin Random House, 783 F. App’x 578, 581 (6th Cir.

2019) (internal citations omitted); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

A district court reviews de novo only those proposed findings of fact or conclusions of

law to which a party specifically objects; the rest are reviewed for clear error. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Each recommendation in the R&R is reviewed below, using

the appropriate standard based on whether Halliburton specifically objected.

I. Timeliness of Halliburton’s Amended Complaint

The R&R recommends granting the Motions to Dismiss based on the untimeliness of the

Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 225–26.) Halliburton objects, arguing that his

amended complaint was timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). (ECF No. 23 at PageID 248–49.) He

also expresses frustration that an unpublished case was used to support the recommendation on

this issue. (ECF No. 23 at PageID 248.) Weirich responds that Halliburton misrepresents Fed.

R. Civ. P. 6(d), his amended complaint remains untimely, and the determination in the R&R

should be upheld. (ECF No. 24 at PageID 273–74.) The Court reviews this recommendation de

novo.

The Court’s Order Modifying the Docket, Dismissing the Complaint Without Prejudice,

Granting Leave to Amend, and Denying Pending Motions granted Halliburton one chance to

amend his complaint. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 72.) The Order emphasized that “[a]n amended

pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and if “[Halliburton] fails to

amend his complaint in a timely manner, the Court will dismiss this case in its entirety and enter

judgment.” (Id.) The Order specified that any amendments “must be filed within twenty-one

days” of the Order’s entry. (Id. at PageID 75.) Since the Order was filed on August 9, 2023

(id.), Halliburton’s deadline was August 30, 2023. However, while he mailed the document to

the Court on August 30, it was not filed until August 31, 2023—a day late. (ECF No. 8.) Given

Halliburton’s delayed submission, the R&R recommends that his complaint be dismissed as

untimely. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 225–26.)

Halliburton relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) to argue that his submission was timely. (ECF

No. 23 at PageID 248–49.) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), “[w]hen a party may or must act within a

specified time after being served and service is made” by mail, by the clerk, or by other

consensual means, “3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire[.]” However, in

the Order granting permission to amend, the Court did not direct Halliburton to file any

amendments to his complaint “within a specific time after being served.” (See ECF No. 7 at

PageID 72.) Rather, the Court explicitly directed him to file within twenty-one days of the

Order’s entry. (Id. at Page ID 75.) Halliburton’s attempt to invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) as a

defense is misplaced and inappropriate.

Regarding Halliburton’s concerns about unpublished cases, a Federal Appendix case was

cited and relied on in assessing the amended complaint’s timeliness. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 225

(citing Hillside Prods., Inc. v. Cnty. of Macomb, 448 F. App’x 592, 593 (6th Cir. 2012)).) But

the Sixth Circuit allows references to unpublished opinions as appropriate. See Keene Grp., Inc.

v. City of Cincinnati, 998 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2021). Even though the case referenced,

Hillside Prods., Inc., did not address amended complaints specifically, the case discusses Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(d)’s applicability to a filing deadline. 448 App’x at 593. The reference to Hillside

Prods., Inc. is appropriate.

The Magistrate Judge’s determination that Halliburton’s amended complaint is untimely

is ADOPTED. Though the Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal on this basis, the Court

will consider the remainder of the R&R and Halliburton’s objections.

II. 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim Against Weirich Individually for Denial of Halliburton’s Due

Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment

The R&R recommends dismissal of the due process §1983 claim against Weirich in her

individual capacity because Halliburton cannot challenge his state court conviction using §1983

and because Weirich is absolutely immune from claims based on her prosecutorial acts. (ECF

No. 22 at PageID 230–32.) Halliburton attacks these conclusions, arguing that Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar his claim and that his criminal conviction was

suspect. (ECF No. 23 at PageID 238–39, 256–57.) Weirich agrees with the R&R’s assessment

because (a) Halliburton inappropriately challenges the validity of his criminal conviction in the

matter at hand and (b) Weirich has absolute immunity to act within the scope of her prosecution

duties. (ECF No. 24 at PageID 274–76.) Both issues are discussed below.

A. Challenging a Criminal Conviction Based on a 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim

In his objection, Halliburton asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s use of Heck is “another

spasm of bad faith in a long line of bad-faith judicial spasms.” (ECF No. 23 at PageID 256–57.)

He argues that the omnipresent corruption that permeates Tennessee courts renders Heck’s

holding irrelevant. (See id.) In her reply, Weirich argues that Heck is applicable to assessing

Halliburton’s claim. (ECF No. 24 at PageID 274.) This conclusion is reviewed de novo.

In his Amended Complaint, Halliburton seeks damages against Weirich, in her individual

capacity, for “false imprisonment,” presumably based on his criminal conviction. (ECF No. 8 at

PageID 102.). In the R&R, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), is relied on to suggest that

“where a successful claim would necessarily lead to a shorter sentence or imply the invalidity of

a sentence or conviction, the claim must be brought through habeas,” not 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(ECF No. 22 at PageID 230 (citing Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525, 544 (6th Cir. 2024)).)

Because Halliburton challenges his sentence with the due process claim here, under Heck and its

progeny, this claim should be dismissed. (Id. at PageID 231.)

In his objection, Halliburton questions the merits of his conviction. (ECF No. 23 at

PageID 238–39.) He asserts that “I did not try to murder my wife.” (Id. at PageID 238.) Thus,

even though the claim here is a civil one under § 1983, he does not separate this matter from his

criminal case. (See generally id.) Challenges to his conviction, according to Heck v. Humphrey

and its well-established progeny, must be raised through a habeas corpus claim instead of a §

1983 claim. See 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 490 (1994); Chaney-Snell v. Young, 98 F.4th 699, 707

(6th Cir. 2024); Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525, 544 (6th Cir. 2024). This part of the R&R is

ADOPTED, and Halliburton’s request for relief based on a false-imprisonment claim is

DISMISSED.

B. Weirich’s Absolute Immunity to Act Within the Scope of Her Prosecutorial

Duties

Halliburton does not respond directly to the conclusion in the R&R that Weirich has

absolute immunity when acting as an advocate within the scope of her duties as a prosecutor

(ECF No. 22 at PageID 231–32 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976); Cremeans

v. Taczak, No. 22-3730, 2023 WL 5206437, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023); Holloway v. Brush,

220 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2000)). Instead, he attempts to discredit the judicial process and

accuse multiple professions of behaving inappropriately, which has deprived him of access to a

fair tribunal. (See generally ECF No. 23.) Despite his concerns about Weirich colluding with

judges, by the time the R&R was issued, Halliburton had not offered evidence that, if taken as

true, could concretely show a plausible conspiracy between Weirich and judges in Tennessee. In

her response, Weirich questions the specificity of Halliburton’s objection, among other things.

(ECF No. 24 at PageID 275–76.)

While Halliburton says a lot about collusion and corruption in the Shelby County judicial

system, he offers no rebuttal to the legal reasoning underpinning the analyses in the R&R (see

generally ECF No. 23) regarding sovereign immunity and Weirich’s work as a prosecutor (ECF

No. 22 at PageID 226–29). Given the objection’s lack of specificity, the Court reviews only for

plain error. Finding none, this aspect of the R&R is ADOPTED, and Weirich’s Motion to

Dismiss this claim is GRANTED. Halliburton’s individual-capacity claim against Weirich for

violating his due process rights under § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

III. 42 U.S.C. §1983 Individual-Capacity Claim Against Weirich for First Amendment

Violations

The R&R recommends dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Weirich for violation of the

First Amendment in connection with a press release she issued based on qualified immunity.

(ECF No. 22 at PageID 232–37.) Halliburton objects, arguing that absolute immunity does not

apply to Weirich’s statements to the media. (ECF No. 23 at PageID 249.) He also argues that

the “narrow” interpretation of Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999), used in

analyzing his First Amendment retaliation claim, ignores precedent. (See ECF No. 23 at PageID

249–55.) Again, the Court reviews this part of the R&R de novo.

First, Halliburton mischaracterizes the R&R’s discussion of qualified immunity. As to

this claim, the recommendation is that qualified immunity applies, not absolute immunity. (ECF

No. 22 at PageID 231, 236–37.) Qualified immunity is not the same as absolute immunity. See

Price v. Montgomery Cnty., 72 F.4th 711, 719–20 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2499

(2024) (“Conduct that falls outside the cloak of absolute immunity includes instances where the

prosecutor's actions are not intimately associated with the judicial process. . . . In those and

similar settings, prosecutors receive only qualified immunity.”). These immunity defenses are

different, and were appropriately applied in different parts of the R&R. (Compare ECF No. 22 at

PageID 231–32 with id. at PageID 232–37.) Halliburton’s contention that absolute immunity

does not apply to this claim is correct but not responsive to the R&R.

As for Weirich’s qualified immunity analysis defense, Halliburton has the burden of

showing that qualified immunity does not apply. Rieves v. Town of Smyrna, Tenn., 959 F.3d

678, 695 (6th Cir. 2020). As outlined in the R&R, there is a two-step analysis to determine “(1)

whether the alleged facts, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, show that the official’s

conduct violated a constitutional right [when communicating with the press], and (2) whether

that constitutional right was ‘clearly established.’” 959 F.3d at 695 (citing Rieves, 959 F.3d at

695). (Id. at PageID 232–37.)

To begin, the question is first whether Halliburton pled a claim of First Amendment

retaliation, or a “constitutional violation” as required by step one of the qualified immunity

analysis. The elements of this claim include that:

(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse action was taken

against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing to engage in the conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between

elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part

by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.

(ECF No. 22 at PageID 233 (quoting Richards v. Perttu, 96 F.4th 911, 917 (6th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999))).) As for the first element,

because Halliburton is a prisoner accusing Weirich of “attempting to chill all of his litigation

activity related to his criminal prosecution, not just his parole efforts,” it appears that he has met

the first element.

The second element—an adverse action taken against the plaintiff that would deter an

ordinary purpose from engaging in the conduct—“is not an overly difficult one for the plaintiff

to meet.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175

F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir. 1999)). Staying within the four corners of the amended complaint

deferentially and generously, Halliburton pleads that Weirich may have taken an adverse action

that would chill an “ordinary” individual from exercising First Amendment rights. (See ECF No.

8 at PageID 92, 101–02; ECF No. 18 at PageID 182.). “[U]nless the claimed retaliatory action is

truly ‘inconsequential,’ the plaintiff's claim should go to the jury.” Kennedy v. Bonevelle, 413

F. App’x 836, 840 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)).

Thus, Halliburton has met the second element.

Lastly, Halliburton must have plausibly pled a causal connection between the first and

second elements. Causation is usually an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. See Richards v.

Perttu, 96 F.4th 911, 918–19 (6th Cir. 2024). By alleging that Weirich’s press release intended

to dissuade him from the protected activity, based on the content of the press statement itself,

Halliburton—with this generous and deferential standard—presents a connection between these

two elements. (See ECF No. 8 at PageID 92, 99–100.) Thus, Halliburton met all three elements

for pleading a constitutional claim.

The next question for qualified immunity is whether the claim pled was clearly

established. Here, Halliburton takes issue (ECF No. 23 at PageID 249–55) with the conclusion

that Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999), did not establish that “an official

retaliates against a prisoner in violation of the First Amendment by publicly stating that the

prisoner should serve his entire sentence, while referencing complaints the prisoner has made

against attorneys and judges” (ECF No. 22 at PageId 236). However, the Thaddeus-X fact

pattern involving “[h]arassment, physical threats, and transfer” to a part of a prison with

“mentally disturbed inmates,” 174 F.3d at 398, is too different from the situation at hand—a

prosecutor speaking to press—to make out a “clearly established” right. Though Halliburton is

correct that Thaddeus X remains good law, his usage of the precedent here does not support what

he argues it supports.3 He has failed to meet his burden of proving that Weirich violated a

“clearly established right.” The determination that Weirich is entitled to qualified immunity is

ADOPTED.

This part of Weirich’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Halliburton’s individual

capacity claim against Weirich for violating his First Amendment Rights is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IV. The 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim Against Shelby County, Official-Capacity 42 U.S.C.

§1983 Claim Against Weirich, and Request for Injunctive Relief from the State of

Tennessee

Halliburton does not object to the R&R’s conclusion that the official-capacity claim

against Shelby County based on Weirich’s actions should be dismissed because Weirich is a state

employee under Tennessee law. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 226 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-4-

1101(2); White ex rel. Swafford v. Gerbitz, 860 F.2d 661, 663 n.2 (6th Cir. 1988)).) He also

does not object to the R&R’s conclusion that the official-capacity claim against Weirich should

be barred because his accusations do not meet the exceptions for sovereign immunity under Ex

3 Although Halliburton did not rely on McDaniel v. Rhodes, 512 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ohio 1981)

(ECF No. 8 at PageID 102), in his objection, the fact pattern in McDaniel also differs too wildly

from the situation at hand. See McDaniel, 512 F. Supp. at 118 (discussing a plaintiff prisoner’s

experience with abuse, harassment, and parole revocation on false charges).

parte Young and its progeny. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 226–27 (citing In re Flint Water Cases,

960 F.3d 303, 334 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977));

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)).) Finally, he does not object to the R&R’s

conclusion that his presumed request for injunctive relief against the State of Tennessee is barred

by sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 22 at PageID 229 (citing Stanley v. W. Mich. Univ., 105 F.4th

856, 863 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590,

598 (6th Cir. 2016))).)

The Court reviews these recommendations for clear error. Finding none, the conclusions

that Halliburton has failed to state a claim against Shelby County, has failed to state an official-

capacity claim against Weirich, and has inappropriately requested injunctive relief from the state

of Tennessee are ADOPTED. Shelby County’s Motion to Dismiss and this final aspect of

Weirich’s Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED. Halliburton’s claim against Shelby County,

official-capacity claim against Weirich, and request for injunctive relief against Tennessee are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, GRANTS both

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and DISMISSES the amended complaint WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of September, 2024.

s/ Sheryl H. Lipman

SHERYL H. LIPMAN

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE