The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
)
MILTON KEITH PERKINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
)
)
v. ) No. 1:23-cv-01178-SHM-tmp
)
CORECIVIC and OLLIE HERRON, )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INSTRUCT PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL
TO BEGIN COMMUNICATING WITH PLAINTIFF
Before the Court is Plaintiff Milton Keith Perkins’s January
16, 2024 Motion to Instruct Plaintiff’s Counsel of Record to Begin
Communicating With Plaintiff (the “Motion”). (ECF No. 101.) For
the reasons below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. A telephone
conference will be scheduled to clarify the status of Plaintiff’s
representation and his request for relief.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on November 8,
2022, proceeding pro se. (ECF No. 50.) Plaintiff, then
incarcerated at the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution
(“Riverbend”) in Nashville, Tennessee, alleges that Riverbend has
denied him medical treatment for a tumor on his temple and for his
progressive loss of vision1. (Id.) On June 21, 2022, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF No.
14.) Jacob Webster Brown entered an appearance on Plaintiff’s
behalf on February 8, 2023. (ECF No. 76.)
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on January 16, 2024. (ECF
No. 101.) Plaintiff asserts that his last telephone conversation
with Brown was in February 2023 and that Plaintiff has sent Brown
nine letters that have gone unanswered. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s
family members have tried to reach Brown, but their telephone calls
and text messages have gone unanswered. (Id. at 3-4.)
In November 2023, Plaintiff requested a docket sheet and
learned, for the first time, that his case had been transferred to
this Court from the Middle District of Tennessee, and that parts
of his Second Amended Complaint had been dismissed. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff represents that he has sent multiple letters to the Clerk
of Court seeking a copy of the docket in his case, but has not
received any response. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff has since been
released from custody, but at the time he filed this Motion, he
represented that he was still being denied proper medical treatment
for his vision loss and had recently begun experiencing new health
problems related to a lump in his throat. (Id.)
1 Plaintiff was released from custody on May 13, 2024. (ECF
No. 110.)
Plaintiff asks the Court to order Brown to communicate with
him or, if Brown no longer wants to represent Plaintiff, to appoint
new counsel. (Id. at 5.)
Sara Katherine McKinney, who works at the same law firm as
Brown, entered an appearance on Plaintiff’s behalf on May 8, 2024.
(ECF Nos. 76, 109.)
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiff has filed the instant pro se motion while
represented by counsel, and “[c]ounseled parties . . . typically
lack any basis to make a pro se filing.” Wright v. Louisville
Metro Gov., No. 3:21-CV-308-BJB, 2022 WL 586777, at *1 n.1 (W.D.
Ky. Feb. 25, 2022); ABN ABRO Mortg. Grp., Inc., v. Smith, No.
1:06-cv-36, 2006 WL 2035542, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 18, 2006)
(collecting cases). Where a counseled litigant files a pro se
motion to address counsel’s performance, however, courts routinely
schedule hearings and conferences to hear from the parties and
discuss whether plaintiff seeks to proceed pro se, seek new
counsel, or continue with his current attorney. Lotus Indus., LLC
v. City of Detroit, No. 2:17-cv-13482, 2020 WL 532396, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 3, 2020); O’dell v. Hope Network W. Mich./Mich. Educ.
Corps., No. 20-cv-11192, 2022 WL 2194660, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June
17, 2022).
There is no right to representation in civil cases and the
standards of effectiveness in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) do not apply in the civil context. Keenan v. Parker,
23 Fed. App’x 386, 386-87 (6th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Kayser, 8
Fed. App’x 475 (6th Cir. 2001). The Tennessee Rules of
Professional Conduct establish relevant standards for an
attorney’s performance, and Rule 8(5) requires attorneys to
“maintain communication with [their] client[s].”
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s Motion addresses internal disputes between
Plaintiff and his attorneys. The Court will not interfere in
Plaintiff’s private relationship with counsel.
Although Plaintiff’s Motion is not styled a motion to
terminate representation, Plaintiff has written that, if Brown is
“too busy to fulfill his obligations” to Plaintiff, Plaintiff wants
the Court to appoint new counsel. (ECF No. 101 at 5.) Since
Plaintiff filed this Motion, a second lawyer from Brown’s firm has
entered an appearance on Plaintiff’s behalf, the parties have held
a telephone scheduling conference, and the Court has entered a
scheduling order. (ECF Nos. 104, 105, 108, 109.) Counsel’s
communication with the Court over the past two months suggests
that counsel has not abandoned Plaintiff’s case. However, the
Court finds that a status conference would clarify Plaintiff’s
request for relief. See, e.g., Lotus Indus., 1010 WL 532396 at *3
(holding a hearing in response to plaintiff’s request to terminate
counsel); O’dell, 2022 WL 2194660 at *1. Plaintiff’s motion asking
the Court to instruct counsel to communicate with him is DENIED,
but a status conference will be scheduled to clarify any remaining
factual issues.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. A
status conference will be scheduled by setting letter.
SO ORDERED this 5th day of August, 2024.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE