“[W]e hold, like every other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]e hold, like every other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”
- “We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts”
- “This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”
- “A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in the statutory text ... and will not be implied.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JONATHAN ATHA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 1:23-cv-01240-SHM-tmp
) No. 1:23-cv-01281-SHM-tmp
CORECIVIC, ET AL., )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET, DENYING FIRST MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE, DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART SECOND MOTION
TO CONSOLIDATE, CONSOLIDATING CIVIL NUMBERS 23-1240 AND 23-1281,
DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST IMMUNE DEFENDANTS WITH PREJUDICE,
DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS IN THE CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff Jonathan Atha (“Atha” or “Plaintiff”), who was then
incarcerated at Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”), a CoreCivic prison in
Whiteville, Tennessee,1 filed a document styled “PREA2 Complaint Against CoreCivic, Damon
Hinniegar, & Patrick Swindell For Genocide, Drug Traffic[k]ing, RICO3 Viola[tion,] Murder,
Torture, and Kidnapping Agg Sexual Battery By Authority Figure & Violation of RLUIPA!4 And
‘The Nelson Mandel[]a Rules.’” (See “Initial Complaint,” Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 1.) The
1 See Tennessee Department of Correction, State Prison List (tn.gov) (last accessed July
12, 2024).
2 See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (“PREA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601, et seq.
3 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68.
4 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc, et seq.
Court construes this case as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Atha attached a Grievance Hearing
Summary from August 20, 2019, and an inmate grievance from 2019. (See ECF No. 1-1.)
In addition to his two pending cases in this Court: 1) Atha v. CoreCivic, et al., Civil No.
23-1240; and 2) Atha v. CoreCivic, et al., No. 23-12815, Atha has two closed cases that were filed
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Atha v. Washburn, et al.,
No. 3:19-cv-0544, and Atha v. CoreCivic, No. 3:23-cv-01363. (See Civ. No. 3:19-0544 (M.D.
Tenn.), ECF No. 108 at PageID 918.)
On November 30, 2023, Atha filed a “Motion to Consolidate to Righteous Court” which
contained additional allegations and sought to consolidate all of Atha’s cases. (“First Motion to
Consolidate,” Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5.) On December 15, 2023, the Court granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the $350.00 filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the “PLRA”). (ECF No. 6.) On January 11, 2024, Atha
filed a second document, which was docketed as a Motion to Consolidate, asking why he had so
many case numbers. (See “Second Motion to Consolidate”, Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 7.) Atha
has filed multiple attachments and grievances. (See ECF Nos. 8-12.)
For the reasons explained below, the First Motion to Consolidate is DENIED; the Second
Motion to Consolidate is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and Civil Nos. 23-1240
and 23-1281 are CONSOLIDATED under Civ. No. 23-1240.
For purposes of screening the case under the PLRA, the Court will address Civil No. 23-
1240, ECF Nos. 1 and 5, and Civil No. 23-1281, ECF No. 1, as the “Consolidated Complaint.”
The claims in the Consolidated Complaint against Defendants the United States of America, the
State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Judiciary, and Lucifer are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
5 The Court also construes this case as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
all other claims in the Consolidated Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
In Civil No. 23-1240, Atha does not use the form for filing a § 1983 complaint. CoreCivic,
Damon Hinniegar, and Patrick Swindell have been named as Defendants based on the pro se
handwritten complaint. (Civil No. 23-1240, ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.)
Atha alleges that he has been “strip searched by homosexuals who made me bend over,
spread my butt cheeks, and cough repea[t]edly.” (Id.) He asserts that he was sexually battered by
an authority figure. (Id.) Atha contends that Hinniegar encourages this behavior. (Id.)
Atha alleges that Hinniegar lets fentanyl be smuggled into the facility “by untrained staff
who under his direct order by way of ‘RICO’ order deceased, suicide, & drug overdose[d] victims
to be cremated ‘against Gods law’ and the RLUIPA.” (Id.) Atha alleges:
[t]hey are killing believers of the God of Abraham, Isaac, & Jacob at an alarming
rate in TN, committing genocide and hiding the # of deaths by sending the dead to
the (hospital or life flight) to cover where the person actually died at. Not to
mention filing a claim and rec[ei]ving insurance money from inmates/slaves,
Swindell banks owns policies on.
(Id.) Atha alleges that Hinniegar and CoreCivic are violating RLUIPA by: 1) cremating inmates
without consent; 2) serving pork, Jello, and pudding without giving notice; 3) refusing to adhere
to TDOC policy for religious services; and 4) refusing to notify next of kin when inmates die and
that “they are receiving money and refusing to bury inmates, with insurance proceeds.” (Id. at
PageID 2.)
Atha includes a document that appears to be instructions about filing a lawsuit when a case
is time-barred and filing a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request for a district attorney’s
file. (Id. at PageID 3-4.) He says, “Here is new evidence/coram nobis.” (Id. at PageID 3.) Atha
alleges that “a star chamber will not suffice” and that “any conviction under the Moonshine
Goddess on the TN judiciary seal cannot stand.” (Id.) He asserts that his FOIA request was denied.
(Id. at PageID 4.)
Atha attaches a grievance hearing summary and grievance form about his life being
threatened. (ECF No. 1-1.) On the inmate grievance form, Atha alleges that “[o]fficers in HSA
are working in concert to get me stabbed by gang members and assaulted.” (Id. at PageID 6.) He
contends that inmates have keys to the cells and master locks and that “staff shares this
knowledge.” (Id.) Atha asserts that inmates in C-Pod have lied and manipulated staff into
believing that Atha “owes everybody in the Pod.” (Id. at PageID 7.) He complains that SCO
Ackerman and CO Hubbard are working in concert with gang members to get him stabbed,
assaulted, and have his property stolen. (Id.)
On November 30, 2023, Atha filed a document styled Motion to Consolidate to Righteous
Court” in which he asks the Court to consolidate Civ. No. 23-1240 with No. 3:19-cv-00544 and
seeks an order to preserve all camera footage at HCCF from May 20, 2020 to November 29, 2023.
(See First Motion to Consolidate, Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID 17, 21). Atha alleges
that he is being tortured daily and in fear of great bodily harm from HCCF staff, that he is being
sexually battered and harassed, that his rights to religious freedom and to access to the courts have
been violated, and that his legal mail is being stolen. (Id. at PageID 17-19, 21). Atha contends
that staff “routinely cover up death and deny inmates basic human rights.” (Id. at PageID 17.) He
alleges that Hinniegar and Swindell are trying to have him killed. (Id. at PageID 18.)
Atha asserts that the Tennessee Judiciary is violating his religious rights by “stamping all
my judgments with a ‘foreign goddess dike’” in violation of the Tennessee Constitution, Tennessee
Code Ann. §§ 4-1-404 and 407, and the “Supreme Law of the Land, and sea as presented on the
Supreme Court building in the District of Columbia.” (Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID
20.)
Atha alleges retaliation from filing a lawsuit while at Trousdale Turner Correctional Center
that “got me shipped” to South Central Correctional Facility (“SCCF”), a CoreCivic prison.6 (Id.
at PageID 21.) He alleges that he was segregated for almost a year at SCCF and is daily refused
recreation. (Id. at PageID 21, 26.) He refers to CoreCivic as a “death camp.” (Id. at PageID 23,
26.) He contends that he receives inheritance payments of $25.00 per month and that CoreCivic
is taking half of the money. (Id. at PageID 26.)
Atha asserts that he seeks “the relief of policy change and reserve[s] the right to change
relief if attacks on myself continue.” (Id. at PageID 21.) Atha contends that the prison should be
audited by an independent audit team. (Id. at PageID 22.)
Atha asks the Court to add the following Defendants because they are colluding against
him: 1) Sevier County; 2) the State of Tennessee Judiciary; 3) Knox County; 4) the United States
of America; and 5) the State of Tennessee.7 (Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID 19.) Atha
refers to these entities as “corp[o]ration[s].” (See id. at PageID 19-20.) He alleges that he was
sentenced by a county corporation to TDOC, a Tennessee state corporation, which sold him to
CoreCivic and that “this was not part of my contract” with Knox County. (Id. at PageID 20.)
On January 11, 2024, Atha filed a document in both Memphis cases asking that the cases
in the Western District of Tennessee be consolidated with the closed cases in the Middle District
6 See CoreCivic, South Central Correctional Center (corecivic.com) (last accessed July 12,
2024).
7 The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket in Civ. No. 23-1240 and add the State of
Tennessee, Knox County, Sevier County, and the United States of America as Defendants. Knox
County, Sevier County, and the United States of America are also Defendants in Civ. No. 23-1281.
of Tennessee. (See Second Motion to Consolidate, ECF No. 7; see also Civil No. 23-1281, ECF
No. 6.)
II. MOTIONS TO CONSOLIDATE
In the First Motion to Consolidate, Atha asks the Court to consolidate Civ. No. 23-1240
with Atha v. Washburn, et al., No. 3:19-cv-0544 (M.D. Tenn.). (Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at
PageID 17.) In the Second Motion to Consolidate, Atha asks that cases in the Western District of
Tennessee be consolidated with the closed cases in the Middle District of Tennessee. (See Civ.
No. 23-1240, ECF No. 7; see Civ. No. 23-1281, ECF No. 6.)
Atha v. Washburn, et al., No. 3:19-cv-0544, was closed in 2021. (See Civ. No. 3:19-0544,
ECF Nos. 104; see ECF No. 108 at PageID 918.) Atha filed an amended complaint (see id., ECF
No. 106) and trust account statement (see id., ECF No. 107) after the closure in December 2023.
(See id., ECF Nos. 107 & 108.) The court in Nashville directed the Clerk “to docket the recent
filings made by Plaintiff at Docket Entry Nos. 106 and 107 as a new case and then transfer the
new case to the Western District of Tennessee as related to, or for consideration with, a current
case Plaintiff has pending in the Western District of Tennessee, Atha v. Core Civic et al., Case No.
23-cv-1240-SHM-tmp.” (Civ. No. 3:19-0544, ECF No. 108.) The amended complaint and trust
account statement were filed in Atha v. Core Civic, No. 3:23-cv-01363, ECF Nos. 1 & 2, and the
case was transferred to the Western District of Tennessee on December 26, 2023, and filed as Case
No. 1:23-cv-1281. (See Civ. No. 23-1281, ECF Nos. 1-3.)
Under Federal Rule of Procedure 42(a),
If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
The cases in the Western District of Tennessee cannot be consolidated with closed cases
in the Middle District of Tennessee. For that reason, the First Motion to Consolidate is DENIED,
and the Second Motion to Consolidate is DENIED IN PART to the extent Atha seeks to
consolidate his Western District cases with the closed cases in the Middle District of Tennessee.
The cases in the Western District of Tennessee allege claims about slavery, cruel and
unusual punishment, sexual harassment, retaliation, issues with legal mail, conditions in CoreCivic
prisons, human trafficking, killing inmates, stealing insurance proceeds for deceased inmates,
violation of religious freedoms, taking of Atha’s inheritance money, and complaints about the
Tennessee judiciary and the “goddess dike” on the seal. (See Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 1; see
Civ. No. 23-1281, ECF Nos. 1 & 1-1). Atha names many of the same Defendants in both cases,
with the exception of Lucifer as a Defendant in Civ. No. 23-1281. Atha has filed duplicate
documents in both cases. (See Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF Nos. 8-12; see ECF No. 23-1281, ECF Nos.
7-11.) Because there are common questions of law and fact in these cases, the Second Motion to
Consolidate (Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 7; see Civ. No. 23-1281, ECF No. 6) is GRANTED IN
PART to the extent Atha seeks to consolidate the Western District cases. The Clerk is
DIRECTED TO CONSOLIDATE Civ. Nos. 23-1240 and 23-1281 and file a copy of this Order
in both cases. All future filings shall be in Civ. No. 23-1240.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Screening Requirements
The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of
it, if the complaint —
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court
applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57
(2007); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court
accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and determines whether the
allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory
allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must
be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
provides guidance on this issue. Although Rule 8 only requires a complaint to contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires
factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to complaints
drafted by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d
at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir.
2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading
requirements” and stating, “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out
in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975))).
B. Requirements To State A Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of
rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused
harm while acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970). To succeed, Atha must satisfy both requirements.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Consolidated Complaint fails to state a claim to relief as a matter of law because, as
explained below: (1) Atha alleges claims against Defendants who are immune from suit; and (2)
Atha has failed to state a claim for relief against the Defendants.
A. The United States of America
In the Consolidated Complaint, Atha names the United States of America as a Defendant
and alleges that “[s]lavery was abolished in America even though Joe Biden voted against civil
rights and is a slave owner” and that the United States “[e]mploys several different entities to
enslave/incarcerate upon statute violations” in contradiction to the Declaration of Independence
and the United States Constitution (Section 10, Art. 1). (Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID
19; see id., ECF No. 5-1 at PageID 28; see Civ. No. 23-1281, ECF No. 1 at PageID 4, 11.) Atha
asserts that that United States “has just committed an action of sin [] against a human[] bei[ng] &
person.” (Id. at PageID 11.) He accuses the United States of colluding with a “homegrown
terrorist org[a]nization, such as CoreCivic et al. to buy, sell, or barter humans” and contends that
this is human trafficking and a slave trade. (Id.)
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agent of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
provides a cause of action against federal employees who violate a litigant’s rights under the U.S.
Constitution. Atha has not named a federal employee as a defendant. He sues the United States.
A Bivens claim against the United States is barred by sovereign immunity. Ashbrook v.
Block, 917 F.2d 918, 924 (6th Cir. 1990). Sovereign immunity also bars Bivens actions against
the United States or its agencies for declaratory and injunctive relief. Wolverton v. United States,
No. 96-5224, 1997 WL 85153, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1997)(per curiam); United States v. Rural
Elec. Convenience Co-op. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1991). The United States can be sued
only to the extent it has waived its sovereign immunity. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608
(1990); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586-587 (1941). A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be expressed
unequivocally by Congress. See United States v. Certain Land Situated in the City of Detroit, 361
F.3d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 2004)(“A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed
in the statutory text ... and will not be implied.”)(quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192
(1996)(internal citations omitted). No waiver of sovereign immunity applies in this action.
The Court DISMISSES any Bivens claims against the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915A(b)(2), because Plaintiff seeks relief from a Defendant that is immune from that relief, and
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2), because Plaintiff fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Atha’s claims against the United States of America
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. The State
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been
construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal court. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253
(2011) (“A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances
Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal
courts may not entertain a private person's suit against a State”) (citations omitted).
Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a).
A state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989). Atha’s claims against the State of Tennessee are barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
not cognizable under § 1983, and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Atha’s
claims are against the State of Tennessee are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2).
C. The Tennessee Judiciary
In the Consolidated Complaint, Atha names the Tennessee Judiciary as a Defendant. (See
Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID 19.) He does not identify a specific member of the
judiciary who violated his rights. Atha alleges his religious rights are being violated by the courts
stamping his judgments with a “foreign goddess dike” in violation of the Tennessee Constitution
and the “Supreme Law of the Land, and Sea as Presented on the Supreme Court.” (Id. at PageID
20.) Atha contends that God cannot be removed from the courts of law. (Id.)
Atha appears to be referring to Lady Justice balancing the scales on the Seal of the
Tennessee Judiciary. Atha has not explained how the Seal of the Tennessee Judiciary on his
judgment violates his religious rights.
The judicial immunity doctrine is expansive and provides judges with “immunity from suit,
not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judges,
in the performance of their judicial functions, are absolutely immune from civil
liability. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978); Bright v.
Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2014). Judicial immunity is abrogated only
when a judge is not acting in a judicial capacity, or when the judge acts in the absence of all
jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Lucas v. Holland, No. 16-2309-JDT-cgc, 2017
WL 1088300, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. March 22, 2017), aff'd, No. 17-5425, 2017 WL 4764472, (6th
Cir. Sept. 26, 2017) (actions “during the course of criminal proceedings ... clearly are within ... the
scope of [judges’] judicial function”). If a judge pursued the challenged conduct in the course of
judicial duties, the judge is entitled to judicial immunity. Palazzolo v. Benson, No. 95-1067, 1996
WL 156699, at *4 (6th Cir. April 3, 1996). A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the
action the judge took may have been in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of the judge’s
authority. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). A judge is subject
to financial liability for a judicial act only when the judge has acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57; Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). A judge so acts
only if the matter is clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. King v. Love, 766
F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1985).
Atha’s claims against the Tennessee Judiciary are based entirely on the court’s entering
judgments in its judicial capacity during Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings and are claims
against an immune Defendant.8 Atha has not alleged facts supporting a finding that any Tennessee
court acted without jurisdiction. Atha fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating a claim to relief
against the Tennessee Judiciary. Atha’s claims against the Tennessee Judiciary are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2).
D. CoreCivic
A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts
under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit
has applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations
that operate prisons or provide medical care or food services to prisoners. Id. at 748-49; Street,
102 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 26 F. App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2001); see also
Eads v. Tennessee, No. 1:18-cv-00042, 2018 WL 4283030, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2018). To
prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Atha “must show that a policy or well-settled custom
of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. Braswell v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011).
Atha has not alleged that a policy or custom of CoreCivic was the “moving force” behind
the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The allegations against CoreCivic are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
8 To the extent Atha alleges a claim against a Tennessee judge in that judge’s official
capacity, those allegations are treated as claims against the judge’s employer, the State of
Tennessee. See, e.g., Owens v. Weirich, No. 2:21-cv-2041-MSN-tmp, 2021 WL 4234937, at *2
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2021). The same immunity that applies to the State of Tennessee applies
here.
E. Sevier & Knox Counties
Atha alleges that Sevier and Knox Counties, with other Defendants, are colluding against
him. (Civ. No. 23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID 19.) Atha does not allege facts supporting that
allegation.
Sevier County and Knox County may be held liable only if Atha’s injuries were sustained
pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy of the County. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff
“must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and
(3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving,
330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th
Cir. 1993)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of
the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal
liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1986) (emphasis in original)).
Atha does not allege that he has been deprived of a right because of a policy or custom of
Knox County or Sevier County. Atha seeks relief based on his allegations of collusion, that “this
was not part of my contract”, and that Knox County acted outside its jurisdiction. (See Civ. No.
23-1240, ECF No. 5 at PageID 19-20.) Atha fails to allege any facts about an illegal or
unconstitutional act the counties took against him. Atha fails to identify an official policy or
custom of Knox County or Sevier County that injured him.
For these reasons, Atha’s claims against Sevier County and Knox County are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).
F. Swindell & Hinniegar
Atha does not specify whether he is suing the Defendants Swindell and Hinniegar in their
official or individual capacities. The Sixth Circuit requires plaintiffs to “set forth clearly in their
pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages, not
simply in their capacity as state officials.” Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. “Absent a specification of
capacity, it is presumed that a state official is sued in his official capacity.” Northcott v. Plunkett,
42 F. App’x 795, 796 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Wells, 891 F.2d at 593).
Atha’s claims against Swindell and Hinniegar in their official capacities are treated as
claims against their employer -- i.e., CoreCivic, which is a private company that manages the
HCCF. To prevail on those claims, Atha “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the
company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of Atha’s rights. See Braswell,
419 F. App’x at 627.
Because Atha has not alleged that Swindell and Hinniegar are acting pursuant to a custom
or policy of CoreCivic, he has failed to state a claim for relief. Atha’s claims against Swindell and
Hinniegar are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
G. Lucifer
Atha names as a Defendant “Lucifer, et al., including Satan, THE Devil, Goddess dike or,
Justice” and lists the address as “Unknown, ‘in hiding’.” (Civ. No. 23-1281, ECF No. 1 at PageID
4.) Atha asserts that “Lucifer, working in concert with Damon Hinni[e]g[a]r and, Patrick Swindell
have developed with stockholders a Slave Trade, and Racket[] to commit[] acts of Terror on Home
Soil. This is all paid for with federal grant money, and proceeds from Death, by Design.” (Id. at
PageID 13.) Atha alleges that Lucifer has “started experimenting with ‘GoodSource Solutions’ to
make inmates infertile, and docile with products such as Phenynalyne, or Phenylalanine, and
Phenylketonurics, all against my religious rights, to eat & drink natural foods, without
preservatives (RLUIPA), violation.” (Id.)
Although the Court does not question Atha’s belief, Lucifer, a non-human being, is not a
person who can be sued under § 1983. There is no allegation that Lucifer was acting under color
of state law. Atha has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Lucifer. Atha’s claims against Lucifer
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
V. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint
to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.
2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other
circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to
amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see also
Brown v. Rhode Island, 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before
dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the
deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a
deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to
the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint
would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284
(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless
complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe
the right of access to the courts”).
The Court grants Atha leave to amend under the guidelines set forth below.
VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons explained above:
(1) The United States of America, the State of Tennessee, and the Tennessee Judiciary
are immune from suit, and the claims against those Defendants and Lucifer are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) and § 1915A(b)(2),
(2) As to all other Defendants, the Consolidated Complaint (Civil No. 23-1240, ECF
Nos. 1 and 5, and Civil No. 23-1281, ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to state a claim to relief as a matter of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and
§ 1915A(b)(1); and
(3) Leave to amend is GRANTED. An amended complaint must be filed in Civ. 23-
1240 within twenty-day (21) days of the date of this Order and must comply with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement
of Atha’s claims. The Court grants Plaintiff only one opportunity to amend. An amended
complaint supersedes the Consolidated Complaint and must be complete in itself without reference
to the prior pleadings. Atha must sign the amended complaint, and the text of the amended
complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous
document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and
must be attached to the amended complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must
arise from the facts alleged in the Consolidated Complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in
a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. If the Plaintiff chooses to
amend, he must file amended claims in one document on the “Complaint For Violation Of Civil
Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)” form, which is available from the Court’s website.
See https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/sites/tnwd/files/CivilRightsComplaint.pdf (last accessed July
12, 2024).
(4) If Atha fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will
dismiss the Consolidated Complaint with prejudice in its entirety and enter judgment. The Court
recommends that any such dismissal should be treated as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of July, 2024.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE