Harris v. State of Tennessee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

QUANNAH HARRIS

D/B/A LAST MINUTE CUTS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-2478-MSN-tmp

JURY DEMAND

STATE OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF THE

SECRETARY OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURES DIVISION, and

JUDGE MATTIELYN WILLIAMS,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

______________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court is Chief Magistrate Judge Pham’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No.

15, “Report”), which recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10, “Motion”)

be granted based on Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity and Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 7, “Amended Complaint”) be dismissed

with prejudice; or, in the alternative, that the Motion be granted based on Younger abstention and

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint dismissed without prejudice. (See ECF No. 15 at PageID 181.)

Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report (ECF No. 16), and Defendants timely responded to

the objections (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff also filed a reply to Defendants’ response, without seeking

leave to do so. In the interest of justice, the Court will nevertheless consider Plaintiff’s

unauthorized reply. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s objections to the Report are

OVERRULED, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by

permitting the assignment of district court duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis,

237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869–70 (1989));

see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). For dispositive matters, “[t]he

district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). After reviewing the

evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s proposed findings or

recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court is not required to review—under a de

novo or any other standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection

is made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the

magistrate judge’s findings and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. See id. at 151.

Objections to any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition “must be clear enough to enable

the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50

F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 147 (stating that the purpose of the rule is

to “focus attention on those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”). Each objection

to the magistrate judge’s recommendation should include how the analysis is wrong, why it was

wrong, and how de novo review will obtain a different result on that particular issue. See Howard

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A general objection, or

one that merely restates the arguments previously presented and addressed by the magistrate judge,

does not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the report and recommendation. Id. When an

objection reiterates the arguments presented to the magistrate judge, the report and

recommendation should be reviewed for clear error. Verdone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-

14178, 2018 WL 1516918, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2018) (citing Ramirez v. United States, 898

F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Dolgencorp,

LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 932, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).

FINDINGS OF FACT & BACKGROUND

Plaintiff made no objections to the Report’s Proposed Findings of Fact. In fact, she copied

them and included them in her objections as her “Statement of Relevant Facts.” (See ECF No. 16

at PageID 188–91.) The Court therefore ADOPTS the Report’s Proposed Findings of Fact.

As a brief background, Plaintiff Quannah Harris (“Harris”) is a barber in Memphis,

Tennessee and owner of Last Minute Cuts School of Barbering and Cosmetology (“Last Minute

Cuts”). For several years, she has been involved in a dispute regarding the licensure of Last Minute

Cuts. The Tennessee Board of Cosmetology and Barbering (the “Board”) first initiated

administrative proceedings against Harris in 2017. These proceedings culminated in a hearing

before the Board on December 6, 2021. Following an unfavorable ruling there, Harris appealed

to the Shelby County Chancery Court, naming the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department

of Commerce and Insurance, the Office of the Secretary of State Administrative Procedures

Division (the “APD”), and the Board as defendants. The Chancery Court dismissed the APD,

finding that “the APD’s only role in the case below was to provide an administrative judge.” Less

than a month later, Harris filed her initial complaint in this matter—her third federal lawsuit arising

from her dispute with the Board. At the time Harris filed her initial complaint, her claims in the

Chancery Court remained pending.

DISCUSSION

In the objections’ introduction, Harris states that she objects to the Report on the following

grounds:

(1) there is no immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because that immunity “is

precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment,” (see ECF No. 16 at PageID 183);

(2) Administrative Law Judge Williams (“ALJ Williams”) is not entitled to judicial

immunity because she was acting “outside [her] judicial capacity and in the complete absence of

all jurisdiction,” (id. at PageID 184);

(3) ALJ Williams is not entitled to judicial immunity because “she did not act as a

disinterested judicial adjudicator,” but as an “enforcer or administrator of a statue,” (ECF No. 16

at PageID 184, 187, 194–96);

(4) Younger abstention does not apply because there were no ongoing judicial proceedings

when the complaint was filed, the Chancery Court dismissed the APD, Harris was not afforded an

adequate opportunity to raise her constitutional claims, and Harris has alleged harassment (id. at

PageID 184, 188, 197–98; see also ECF No. 18 at PageID 226); and

(5) Chief Magistrate Judge Pham did not apply the correct standard under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “by failing to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

[Harris] and making reasonable inferences in favor of [Harris]” (ECF No. 16 at PageID 184, 192–

93: ECF No. 18 at PageID 226).

Elsewhere in her objections and reply, Harris also appears to make the following objection:

(6) the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to her claims,

(ECF No. 16 at PageID 186, 193; ECF No. 18 at PageID 224–25).

As set forth below, after a de novo review of the record and each objected-to issue, the

Court accepts and adopts the Report’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment guarantees that “nonconsenting States may not be sued by

private individuals in federal court.” Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 936 (6th Cir. 2019). And

“[t]he sovereign immunity guaranteed by this Amendment deprives federal courts of subject-

matter jurisdiction when a citizen sues his own State.” Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d

1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015). A plaintiff may sue a State for damages in federal court, however,

when a State expressly consents to suit or if the case concerns a federal statute that was passed by

Congress pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and expresses a clear congressional

intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55

(1996); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999).

Here, Tennessee has not waived its immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102; Berndt v.

Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, the federal statute invoked in this

case, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, did not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1979).

In sum, the APD is an agency of the State and is an entitled to immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED.

2. Non-Judicial Acts and Absence of Jurisdiction Exceptions to Judicial Immunity

First, the Court uses a two-prong test to determine whether the non-judicial acts exception

applies, which considers (1) “whether the act in question is a function that is ‘normally performed

by a judge,’” and (2) “whether the parties dealt with the judge in . . . her judicial capacity.”

Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Here, ALJ Williams

acted in an adjudicatory capacity when she presided over the hearing before the Board, and Harris

dealt with ALJ Williams in her judicial capacity. Therefore, the exception does not apply.

Second, a judge acts “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction ‘only when the matter upon

which [she] acts is clearly outside the subject matter of the court over which [she] presides.’” Id.

at 623 (quoting Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1997)). Here, ALJ Williams acted

in accordance with the jurisdiction granted to her by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act,

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 et seq. Thus, this exception also does not apply.

For the reasons set forth above, the non-judicial acts and absence of all jurisdiction

exceptions to judicial immunity do not apply. Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED.

3. Judicial Immunity for Declaratory Relief

As the Report explains, whether declaratory relief is available against ALJ Williams turns

on whether she was acting in an adjudicatory capacity or as an enforcer or administrator of a

statute. (See ECF No. 15 at PageID 170–72.) Plaintiff’s objections do not explain how ALJ

Williams acted as an enforcer or administrator, or how the Report’s analysis on this issue erred.

On de novo review, this Court concludes that ALJ Williams acted in an adjudicatory capacity.

ALJ Williams did not initiate the action against Plaintiff; the Board did. Further, ALJ Williams

performed purely adjudicatory functions, such as ruling on the admissibility of evidence and

procedural questions of law; swearing witnesses; and advising agency members as to the law of

the case. Therefore, no case or controversy exists between Plaintiff and ALJ Williams, and this

Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s objection is therefore OVERRULED.

4. Standard of Review

Throughout her objections, Plaintiff alleges that the Chief Magistrate Judge “failed to

follow the standard of review for a motion to dismiss” because he did not “view the facts and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor” of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 16 at PageID 192–94.) Plaintiff does

not, however, specifically identify (1) what facts the Chief Magistrate Judge did not accept as true,

or (2) what reasonable inferences he should have drawn. The crux of her argument appears to

relate to her claims against ALJ Williams because she repeats her allegations that ALJ Williams

“acted in corruption”; “failed to impartially oversee hearing”; “asked personal favors and/or

special accommodations from the Board’s attorney”; and “had secret meetings and or

conversations regarding Harris’ case.” (ECF No. 16 at PageID 195.)

The Chief Magistrate Judge included Plaintiff’s allegations about ALJ Williams in the

Report’s Proposed Findings of Fact, which this Court has adopted. Nowhere in the Report does

the Chief Magistrate Judge state or otherwise imply that he has disregarded these allegations. Nor

is the Report’s conclusion about judicial immunity inconsistent with these allegations: Unless one

of the exceptions discussed in the Report applies, judicial immunity extends even “to acts

performed maliciously and corruptly as well as acts performed in bad faith or with malice as has

been alleged in this case.” Brookings, 389 F.3d at 617. Plaintiff’s objection is therefore

OVERRULED.

5. Ex parte Young Exception

One exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

“Under Ex parte Young, ‘suits against state officials seeking equitable relief for ongoing violations

of federal law are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’” Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the

Supreme Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax

Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)). The Ex parte Young exception “applies only when

the plaintiff sues for ‘prospective [injunctive] relief to end a continuing violation of federal law.’”

Id. (citing Diaz v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 964 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)). It

does not apply to past acts, and the complaint must clearly state the allegedly ongoing violations.

Id. (quoting Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 412 (6th Cir. 2017) and Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d

758, 776 (6th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff’s reliance on Ex parte Young is misplaced.

First, as to the APD, it is immune from injunctive relief “because it is an arm of the state

and the state has not waived the [APD’s] sovereign immunity, nor has Congress removed it.”

Morgan, 63 F.4th at 517 (citing Thiokol Corp., 987 F.2d at 381 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-

102(a)).

Second, as to ALJ Williams, putting aside whether she is a state official or entitled to

judicial immunity, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply because Plaintiff does not seek

prospective injunctive relief against ALJ Williams. The Amended Complaint describes only past

actions and does not clearly allege any ongoing constitutional violations committed by ALJ

Williams.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED.

6. Younger Abstention

As set forth above, the Court has overruled Plaintiff’s objections regarding Eleventh

Amendment and judicial immunity. The Court will therefore grant the Motion on those bases and

need not reach the alternative recommendation based on Younger abstention.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court ADOPTS the Report’s Proposed Findings of

Fact and Proposed Conclusions of Law as to Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity. The

Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10), and Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 7) is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 31st day of August, 2023.

s/ Mark S. Norris

MARK S. NORRIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE