The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
JERRY LAWLER, as father, next friend and )
Personal Representative/Administrator of )
The Estate of BRIAN CHRISTOPHER )
LAWLER, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:19-cv-01174-STA-tmp
)
HARDEMAN COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOHN )
DOOLEN; LEONARD BROWN; ELLEN )
FUTRELL; WILLIAM GONZALEZ; AND )
JUDY WIGGINS, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 75) filed on
June 20, 2022. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART as follows: the Motion is GRANTED as to Defendants John Doolen and Leonard
Brown and DENIED as to Defendants Ellen Futrell, Judy Wiggins, William Gonzalez, and
Hardeman County, Tennessee.
BACKGROUND
The Court finds there is no genuine dispute as to the following facts, unless otherwise
noted.1
1 The facts are stated for the purpose of deciding this motion only.
At all times relevant, Defendant John Doolen was the Hardeman County Sheriff, Defendant
Leonard Brown was the Hardeman County Jail Administrator, and Defendants Ellen Futrell, Judy
Wiggins, and William Gonzalez were correctional officers in the Hardeman County Jail.
On July 7, 2018, a non-party Hardeman County Sheriff’s Deputy arrested Brian
Christopher Lawler (“Decedent”) and took him to the Jail. Defendant Ellen Futrell booked
Decedent into the Jail. As part of the booking process, Futrell completed a medical questionnaire
form with Decedent. One question on the questionnaire asked “Have you attempted suicide in the
past? If yes, how long ago? If 2 years or less call crisis.” Decedent told Futrell that he had made
multiple suicide attempts more than two years ago.2 Futrell thus wrote “yes” for that question,
which triggered the jail computer system to put Decedent on suicide watch. Futrell then changed
the answer to that question to say “no,” thus removing Decedent from suicide watch.3 Decedent
answered another question on the questionnaire asking if he was “currently thinking about suicide”
“no.” Decedent answered other questions asking if he had “a serious mental health condition that
may need attention while you are here,” “recently taken or been prescribed medication for
emotional problems,” “ever had a closed head injury that required hospitalization,” and
“experienced [delirium tremens] or withdrawals from drugs or alcohol” “yes.” Decedent told
Futrell that he suffered from bipolar disorder, and she put it in the notes of the questionnaire. Upon
finishing the questionnaire, Decedent signed the medical questionnaire form and Futrell submitted
2 Plaintiff alleges Decedent only told Futrell that he had attempted suicide more than two years
ago, while Defendants allege he also told her those attempts were “in his 20s when he was
experimenting.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Fact ¶ 12.
3 Defendants allege that the Jail policy only required an inmate be placed on suicide watch if he
had attempted suicide within the past two years, which is why Futrell changed the answer to that
question to say “no.” Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 6. Plaintiff alleges
that even in that case, Jail policy required Futrell to put in the notes of the questionnaire that the
inmate had previously attempted suicide and that Futrell did not do so. Pl.’s Statement of
Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 7.
the form to the Jail nurse. Futrell never told any other jail staff that Decedent had previously
attempted suicide.
On July 9, 2018, Nurse Jill Shearon saw Decedent for an initial physical evaluation. During
the evaluation, Shearon reviewed the form Futrell had filled out two days prior. It is unclear
whether Decedent told Shearon he had previously attempted suicide.4 Shearon filled out an
Admission Data/History and Physical Form with Decedent, which contained questions asking if
Decedent had ever attempted suicide and had recently considered committing suicide. Shearon
wrote “no” to both questions, and Decedent signed the form. Shearon concluded at the end of her
evaluation that Decedent was not at risk for suicide.
On or about July 21, 2018, Plaintiff drove to the Jail with the intention of bailing Decedent
out and met with Defendant John Doolen.5 Doolen told Plaintiff that bailing Decedent out would
be pointless because Decedent was charged with his third DUI offense, which carried a mandatory
90-day jail sentence, and Decedent would have to go right back to jail to serve his sentence
anyway. Doolen also told him the Jail had a relationship with a rehabilitation facility to manage
substance abuse that Decedent could go to and that he personally would help Decedent.6 Plaintiff
further alleges Doolen offered to get Decedent in drug court.7 At some point during the
4 Defendants assert he did. Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 19. When asked in
her deposition whether Decedent told her he had previously attempted suicide, Shearon first said
Decedent had not, then said he had, then said she could not recall. Shearon Dep. 117-19.
5 Defendants assert this happened “over a week prior to Decedent hanging himself.” Defs.’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 91. Plaintiff asserts it was approximately two weeks
after Decedent was arrested. Lawler Dep. 176:5-8.
6 Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 92. Defendants assert Doolen
told Plaintiff he could not provide Decedent drug rehabilitation services while in the Jail. Defs.’
Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 14.
7 Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 92. Doolen asserts he told
Plaintiff he would talk to the public defender and “try to get drug court” for Decedent. Defs.’
Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 14.
conversation, Decedent joined Plaintiff and Doolen. Doolen noticed Decedent was wearing tennis
shoes with laces and said something to the effect of “we need to get you some of the jail flip
flops.”8 No one removed Decedent’s tennis shoes or his shoestrings. Doolen was not apprised of
Decedent’s mental health diagnoses or his prior suicide attempts.9 Following this conversation,
Plaintiff decided not to bail Decedent out of the Jail.
On July 28, 2018, decedent was involved in a fight with another inmate and received a cut
above his left eye.10 Defendant Judy Wiggins called Shearon to inform her of the incident.
Shearon requested a photograph of Decedent’s cut, and Wiggins sent her a photograph via text
message. Shearon told Wiggins that the cut did not look “that bad” and told Wiggins to clean the
wound and apply a butterfly bandage to it. However, Decedent would not allow Wiggins to clean
his wound or put a bandage on it. Wiggins called Nurse Shearon to inform her of this, and Shearon
came to the Jail to see Decedent herself. Shearon applied a butterfly bandage to Decedent’s cut.
She then evaluated Decedent for a concussion and found he did not have symptoms of a
concussion.11 Shearon believed Decedent did not need to be sent to a hospital for further testing
and instructed Wiggins to house Decedent in an intake cell until Monday, July 30, 2018.12
8 Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 92. Doolen denies telling
Plaintiff he would remove Decedent’s shoestrings. Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Additional
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 14.
9 Plaintiff alleges that while Doolen did not know the specific mental health diagnoses Decedent
had, “he knew [Decedent] needed help.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts ¶ 93.
10 Plaintiff asserts the cut also ran “down the side of his nose,” that this was a “significant” cut,
and that Decedent may have sustained a closed head injury because of the fight. Pl.’s Resp. to
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 34.
11 Plaintiff stresses that while Shearon stated in her deposition that she performed such a test, she
did not chart it. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 42.
12 While Shearon states in her deposition that she told Wiggins to house Decedent in an intake
cell, Wiggins states in her deposition that Shearon told her to house Decedent in an isolation cell.
Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 44.
Following Shearon’s evaluation of Decedent, Wiggins placed him in Cell 90. Decedent
yelled, cursed, and kicked the door of the cell for approximately six to seven hours, demanding to
see a doctor and be placed back in his general population pod.13 Wiggins heard him doing so, but
never checked on him or tried to calm him down. While in Cell 90, Decedent never verbalized a
threat of self-harm, an indication that he no longer wanted to live, or an intention to attempt suicide.
Decedent stopped screaming and kicking the door approximately ten to fifteen minutes before he
was found dead.
That evening, Defendant William Gonzalez took out the trash after dinner. On his way to
take out the trash, Gonzalez stopped by Cell 90. Gonzalez observed what appeared to be Decedent
standing on the cinder block bench in the corner of his cell with a towel hanging over his face and
neck. Gonzalez attempted to speak with Decedent, but he did not respond. Gonzalez could not
see Decedent’s face or head due to the towel. According to Gonzalez, inmates covering their heads
with towels was a “common trend” at the jail and many inmates had tried to hide in the corner in
a similar manner, though he had never seen Decedent do either. He thus did not believe Decedent
was suffering any medical emergency. Gonzalez also testified that he believed Decedent covered
his face because he did not want to be seen due to the cut on his face. Gonzalez then proceeded to
take the trash out.
After taking the trash out, Gonzalez returned to Decedent’s cell and knocked on the cell
door. Gonzalez observed Decedent positioned in the same manner as when he initially stopped
by. When he again did not receive a response from Decedent, Gonzalez called Wiggins to come
to Cell 90 and told her Decedent was not responding. Wiggins ordered Decedent’s cell door
13 Defendants assert that Decedent asked to be seen by a plastic surgeon. Defs.’ Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 47. Plaintiff asserts he also asked to go to a hospital emergency
room. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 47.
opened.14 When the door opened, Gonzalez and Wiggins entered the cell and observed Decedent
hanging from one or both of his shoestrings that was tied to a bolt protruding out of the wall.
Wiggins screamed for someone to bring scissors and attempted to hold Decedent up to relieve the
pressure from the shoestring. Officer Lindsey Bolton ran into the cell with scissors and handed
them to Gonzalez. Gonzalez climbed on the bench and cut Decedent down. After cutting Decedent
down, Gonzalez and Officer Martha Daniel performed CPR on Decedent. Bolton called dispatch
to have EMS dispatched to the Jail. EMS subsequently took over treatment and transported
Decedent to the hospital. Decedent was pronounced dead the following day.
Prior to Decedent’s death, neither Wiggins nor Gonzalez knew that Decedent had
previously attempted suicide. Gonzalez did not know that Decedent suffered from bipolar
disorder, though Wiggins had heard he did. Decedent never told any Jail employee that he was
experiencing suicidal thoughts, desired to commit suicide, or planned to do so.15 Nurse Shearon
never instructed any correctional officers in the Jail to place Decedent on suicide watch. Prior to
Decedent’s death, no inmate had ever harmed himself with the bolts in the walls, which had been
there since the Jail opened in 2010.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 56. A dispute is
genuine if a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
14 Plaintiff contends that Wiggins’s first response to Gonzalez’s call for assistance was that he
was “probably faking.” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 60.
Plaintiff further contends that three to four minutes elapsed from the time Wiggins said Decedent
was “probably faking” and the time the door opened. Id. at ¶ 79.
15 Defendants cite the entire record to support this claim. Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Fact ¶ 3-5. While Plaintiff correctly points out that such a citation is improper, he does
not dispute this fact. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 3-5.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must draw all reasonable factual inferences in
favor of the non-moving party when deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment. Cox v. Ky. Dep’t
of Transp., 53 F. 3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts one claim against each defendant―deliberate indifference to an excessive
risk that Decedent would commit suicide in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has alleged theories of individual liability as to Defendants Futrell,
Wiggins, Gonzalez, Doolen, and Brown, supervisory liability as to Doolen and Brown, and Monell
liability as to Hardeman County.16 Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all claims,
alleging Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants
were deliberately indifferent and that even if he could, the individual Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity. Plaintiff does not oppose entry of summary judgment as to Brown, and the
Motion is therefore GRANTED as to him. The Court will analyze the remaining issues in turn.
I. Deliberate Indifference
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show (1) deprivation of a constitutional right
and (2) that a person acting under color of state law caused the deprivation. Dominguez v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 555 F. 3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009).17
16 Plaintiff has sued Doolen and Brown in both their individual and official capacities as officials
of Hardeman County. Because Hardeman County is also a party in this matter, the official-
capacity claims against them must be dismissed as superfluous, for “[o]fficial-capacity suits are,
for all intents and purposes, treated as suits against the municipality.” Shorts v. Bartholomew,
255 Fed. App’x 46, 49 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007).
17 Although Defendants assert in their Motion that “Plaintiff cannot show that any of the named
individual defendants personally caused said constitutional deprivation,” the Court finds that
their arguments are more aptly characterized as disputing whether Decedent suffered a
constitutional deprivation. Causation is therefore not at issue in this case.
Prisoners have a right to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, which
includes a right to be free from deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs.
Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tenn., 14 F. 4th 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2021). Pretrial detainees have an
analogous right under the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Sixth Circuit has historically
analyzed “under the same rubric” and held includes an objective prong, which requires a showing
that the medical need is sufficiently serious, and a subjective prong, which requires a showing that
an official subjectively knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id.
However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389
(2015) (holding that the differing language of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments necessitates
differing analyses of excessive force claims for prisoners and pretrial detainees) the Sixth Circuit
held that analysis of deliberate indifference claims by prisoners and pretrial detainees is no longer
the same. Id. at 596-97.
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Brawner abrogated the subjective prong for pretrial
detainees, he is wrong. Id. (“Kingsley requires modification”—not elimination—"of the subjective
prong of the deliberate-indifference test for pretrial detainees”). The new subjective component
of the deliberate-indifference analysis for pretrial detainees requires a showing of “something akin
to reckless disregard.” Id. at 596-97. While the subjective component originally asked whether
the jail official subjectively knew that the pretrial detainee faced a risk of harm from a serious
medical need and disregarded it, the new subjective component asks whether (1) the official
recklessly failed to act (2) even though a reasonable official would have known there was a serious
medical need. Trozzi v. Lake Cnty., 29 F. 4th 745, 755-57 (6th Cir. 2022).18 Thus, the complete
deliberate indifference test for pretrial detainees is that
a plaintiff must satisfy three elements for an inadequate-medical-care claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the plaintiff had an objectively serious medical
need; (2) a reasonable officer at the scene (knowing what the particular jail official
knew at the time of the incident) would have understood that the detainee's medical
needs subjected the detainee to an excessive risk of harm; and (3) the prison official
knew that his failure to respond would pose a serious risk to the pretrial detainee
and ignored that risk.
Id. at 757-58.
Defendants do not dispute that Decedent had an objectively serious medical need, focusing
the bulk of their briefing on the subjective prong. “Suicide is a difficult event to predict and
prevent and often occurs without warning.” Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F. 3d 612, 616 (6th Cir.
2005). Pre-Brawner, the Sixth Circuit took this unpredictability into account by holding that in
suicide cases, the subjective prong required a showing that it was “obvious that there was a strong
likelihood an inmate would attempt suicide,” rather than “some possibility of suicide, or even a
likelihood of suicide,” and that the defendant disregarded this risk. Downard for Estate of
Downard v. Martin, 968 F. 3d 594, 600-01 (6th Cir. 2020). The Sixth Circuit has not yet applied
the new subjective prong in a suicide case, and the parties disagree whether the pre-Brawner
standard in suicide cases is still good law following Brawner’s modification of the subjective
prong. The Court finds that it need not answer that question because even under the more rigorous
pre-Brawner standard, Plaintiff has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to Futrell, Wiggins,
18 Plaintiff quotes Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., Ky., 29 F. 4th 721, 730 (6th Cir. 2022) for the
proposition that “the analysis of whether [the Defendant officer] was deliberately indifferent
should be solely an objective consideration.” Plaintiff fails to mention that Westmoreland was a
failure-to-protect case or that Trozzi distinguished it on that basis. Trozzi, 29 F. 4th at 757.
and Gonzalez. On the other hand, even under the more forgiving post-Brawner standard, Plaintiff
has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to Doolen.
Factors that indicate a high risk of suicide include: (1) a history of alcohol and substance
abuse, (2) feeling of hopelessness, (3) impulsive or aggressive tendencies, (4) isolation, (5) access
to methods for suicide, (6) a history of mental illness, particularly clinical depression, and (7) prior
traumatic brain injuries. Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F. 3d 472, 484 (6th Cir.
2020). In analyzing the subjective prong, the Court must evaluate each Defendant individually
and cannot impute knowledge from one defendant to another. Greene v. Crawford Cnty., Mich.,
22 F. 4th 593, 607 (6th Cir. 2022).
i. Futrell
Drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, he has shown that Futrell
knew Decedent had several risk factors for suicide and disregarded them. While she booked him,
Decedent told her he had attempted suicide multiple times in the past, albeit more than two years
ago. He told her he had serious mental illness, specifically bipolar disorder. He told her he had a
traumatic head injury requiring hospitalization in the past. He told her he had experienced delirium
tremens or withdrawals from drugs or alcohol. Not only did Futrell fail to communicate to anyone
else within the Jail that Decedent might be a suicide risk, or even fail to put him on suicide watch,
she intentionally changed the answer to one of the questions on the questionnaire to take him off
suicide watch. It may be that Jail policy dictated she do this because the attempts were more than
two years prior, but Officer Martha Daniel, a fellow guard at the Jail, testified that even in that
case, officers are trained to make a note on the questionnaire about the prior attempts.
Defendants try to get around this issue by arguing that she was justified in failing to tell
anyone of Decedent’s suicide risk because she knew Shearon would evaluate Decedent later.
While it is true that “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their
assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be
chargeable” with deliberate indifference, in each Sixth Circuit case Defendants cite, all defendants
who were granted summary judgment (with the exception of one guard who was sued after a
prisoner died during her first day on the job) at least informed someone of the decedent’s health
issues. See Smith v. County of Lenawee, 505 Fed. App’x 526, 532-37 (6th Cir. 2012); Shaver v.
Brimfield Twp., 628 Fed. App’x 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2015). Futrell failed to tell anyone that
Decedent was a suicide risk, and therefore had reason to believe that he was not being treated for
his suicidal tendencies. Thus, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Futrell recklessly
disregarded an excessive risk that Decedent would commit suicide.
ii. Wiggins
Drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, he has shown Wiggins knew
Decedent had several risk factors for suicide and disregarded them. She listened to Decedent
scream and kick the door of his cell for six to seven hours after she put him in there by himself,
making it readily apparent he had aggressive tendencies and was isolated. She had “heard” he
suffered from bipolar disorder. She knew he had his shoelaces, which she admits she would have
taken if he was on suicide watch. Yet she never checked on him or informed anyone of his drastic
mood swing, even after the screaming and kicking suddenly stopped. Moreover, Plaintiffs have
put forward evidence that her first response to Gonzalez’s call for assistance was that he was
“probably faking,” which allegedly delayed treatment by three to four minutes that could have
been the difference between Decedent being deceased and alive.
Defendants argue Wiggins was also justified in disregarding Decedent’s suicide risk
because she ensured Decedent saw Shearon for his cut and followed her orders in placing him in
Cell 90 away from general population, but this argument again fails. Even if Wiggins was justified
in placing Decedent in Cell 90 based on Shearon’s orders, she listened to him scream and kick the
door of the cell for six to seven hours without even checking on him herself, much less informing
Shearon of this sudden, drastic, and violent mood swing, thereby failing to place him in the
“capable hands” of a medical professional at a time he needed it. Moreover, there is evidence
indicating that when Gonzalez called for assistance upon finding Decedent unresponsive, rather
than ensure Decedent was in “capable hands,” Wiggins blew off his call for help because, in her
words, Decedent was “probably faking.” Plaintiff has thus shown that a reasonable jury could find
she recklessly disregarded a strong likelihood Decedent would die by suicide.
iii. Gonzalez
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Gonzalez looked inside Decedent’s
cell during or just after a suicide attempt and walked away to take out the trash. He saw Decedent
standing on the bench with a towel over his head. He even knocked on the door and received no
response from Decedent before walking away. His explanation for doing so, that it was a “common
trend” at the Jail to cover one’s head with a towel and to hide in the corner of a cell, stretches
credulity. But it is the province of a jury to decide questions of credibility. A reasonable jury
could find that Gonzalez recklessly disregarded a strong risk that Decedent would die by suicide.
iv. Doolen
Plaintiff has failed to show even that a reasonable officer in Doolen’s shoes should have
known Decedent was at risk of suicide. The only allegations Plaintiff makes against Doolen in his
individual capacity are that he told Plaintiff that Decedent would have to go back to jail even if he
bailed him out, misrepresented that there was a drug or alcohol rehabilitation facility connected to
the jail, promised to get Decedent into drug court, and commented on Decedent’s wearing tennis
shoes. Plaintiff does not allege that Doolen knew of any of Decedent’s mental health diagnoses
or past suicide attempts, aside from a vague and conclusory allegation that he “knew [Decedent]
needed help.” The alleged comment about Decedent’s shoes does not indicate Doolen knew or
should have known he might use the laces to hang himself; Doolen could just as easily have been
concerned that Decedent might use them for any number of other improper purposes. Given that
Doolen knew nothing about Decedent’s mental health or suicide history, he cannot reasonably
have been expected to know Decedent was at risk of hanging himself with the shoelaces. At most,
Plaintiff has shown that a reasonable officer in Doolen’s shoes would have known Decedent had
a drug or alcohol problem. He has not shown Doolen should have known that Decedent was at
risk of committing suicide.
Plaintiff’s failure-to-train theory directed at Doolen likewise cannot survive summary
judgment. A supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control, or train a subordinate is not
actionable unless the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other
way directly participated in it. Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F. 3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016).
At minimum, a plaintiff must show the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or
knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. Plaintiff fails
to even argue Doolen did so. His failure-to-train claim directed at Doolen “improperly conflates
a § 1983 claim of individual supervisory liability with one of municipal liability.” Harvey v.
Campbell County, Tenn., 453 Fed. App’x 557, 563 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.,
408 F. 3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (“absent evidence of personal involvement in the underlying
misconduct, failure-to-train claims against individual defendants are properly deemed brought
against them in their official capacities, to be treated as claims against the county”)). Plaintiff
implicitly acknowledges this in Footnote 8 of his Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, in which rather than argue his failure-to-train theory against Doolen, he refers the Court
to his argument for holding the County liable.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED as to Doolen.
II. Qualified Immunity
Having established that Plaintiff has stated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Futrell, Wiggins, and Gonzalez violated Decedent’s constitutional rights, the Court must determine
whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. To do so, the Court must determine whether
Decedent’s constitutional right to be free from deliberate indifference to his suicide risk was clearly
established such that reasonable officials in the defendants’ positions would have understood that
they were violating that right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). For the following
reasons, the Court finds that Decedent’s constitutional right is clearly established, and Futrell,
Wiggins, and Gonzalez are not entitled to qualified immunity.
A right is clearly established when existing precedent has “placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Existing
precedent need not be precisely on point, but it must be clear enough that any reasonable official
under the circumstances would have understood he was violating a constitutional right. Ouza, 969
F. 3d at 279. Plaintiff does not need to show the Court a “fundamentally similar” or “materially
similar” case for a clearly established right to apply. Schultz v. Sillman, 148 Fed. App’x 396, 404
(6th Cir. 2005). The key inquiry is “whether a right is clearly established;” a court should not
“hon[e] in on the specific act” at issue. Linden v. Washtenaw Cnty., 167 Fed. App’x 410, 425 (6th
Cir. 2006). The right of a detainee to be screened for suicidal tendencies and the right to have
steps taken that would have prevented suicide is a particularized right that the Sixth Circuit has
long held is clearly established. Id. (citing Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F. 2d 232, 239-40 (6th
Cir. 1992); Danese v. Asman, 875 F. 2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1989); Molton v. City of Cleveland,
839 F. 2d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 1988). Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
Defendants Futrell, Wiggins, and Gonzalez violated Decedent’s clearly established right to be free
from deliberate indifference to an excessive risk of suicide.
For the foregoing reasons, Futrell, Wiggins, and Gonzalez are not entitled to qualified
immunity, and the Motion is DENIED as to these defendants.
III. Monell Liability
Finally, the Court must determine whether Hardeman County can be held liable for its
employees’ violations of Decedent’s rights. Local government units such as counties are liable
for violations of constitutional rights by their employees where a policy, practice, or custom of the
county causes a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may show a municipality caused a constitutional violation in
one of four ways: the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment, that an official
with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions, the existence of a policy of inadequate
training, or the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F. 3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff first alleges a policy of inadequate training on suicide prevention. A plaintiff may
show a custom of inadequate training or supervision where: (1) the training or supervision was
inadequate for the tasks involved, (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate
indifference, and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or caused the injury. Ouza v. City of
Dearborn Heights, Mich., 969 F. 3d 265, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2020). Defendants allege Plaintiff
cannot show a genuine dispute of material fact as to the first two elements of this test. The Court
disagrees.
Defendants’ assertions that there is no genuine dispute that their suicide prevention training
is adequate because it complies with Tennessee Corrections Institute standards is unconvincing.
Defendants’ assertion that “the Jail’s training included regular training on suicide prevention” fails
to explain what this training consists of, how often this training takes place, or even how many
hours of the Jail’s yearly training consists of suicide prevention training. Moreover, Plaintiffs have
pointed to several instances of jail employees testifying about inadequacies in the Jail’s training.
Futrell testified she was not trained to write a note on the intake questionnaire about Decedent’s
past suicide attempts from more than two years prior.19 Nurse Shearon testified she has had no
suicide risk assessment training since 1984.20 Wiggins testified she was trained that she only
needed to put an inmate on suicide watch if he actually told her “I’m going to kill myself.”21
Gonzalez testified he was not trained to ensure an unresponsive inmate is ok.22 Plaintiff has thus
put forward evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the Jail’s suicide prevention
training was inadequate.
Defendants’ assertion that there is no genuine dispute that Hardeman County was not
deliberately indifferent also falls flat. A plaintiff may prove that the inadequacy was the result of
the municipality’s deliberate indifference in one of two ways: by showing that the municipality
has failed to act when it was aware of repeated prior instances of unconstitutional conduct, or by
showing that “the risk of the constitutional violation is so obvious or foreseeable that it amounts
to deliberate indifference for the [municipality] to fail to prepare officers for it.” Ouza, 969 F. 3d
at 286. Though Plaintiff put forward no evidence of repeated prior constitutional violations,
19 Futrell Depo. 83:12-15.
20 Shearon Depo. 44:19-21.
21 Wiggins Depo. 128-29.
22 Gonzalez Depo. 113-14.
Plaintiff has shown that a reasonable jury could find it was “obvious” to Hardeman County that a
Jail inmate would commit suicide. Though Defendants argue the County was not deliberately
indifferent because it provided suicide training in compliance with TCI standards, the fact that it
provides such training is evidence from which a jury could find it foresaw the possibility of an
inmate attempting suicide and thus foresaw the risk of a constitutional violation in the event its
employees were inadequately trained to handle it. Moreover, it is obvious that a suicidal inmate
who has his shoelaces in a cell with bolts protruding from the wall might hang himself, yet the Jail
did nothing about the bolts for eight years prior to Decedent’s suicide and allowed inmates to keep
their shoelaces unless they were put on suicide watch, which at least one officer (Wiggins) was
allegedly trained to not put inmates on unless the inmate said “I’m going to kill myself,” regardless
of any other suicide risk factors the inmate displayed. Thus, a reasonable jury could find Hardeman
County’s inadequate training was due to deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff also alleges ratification of illegal actions by Hardeman County, but this theory
fails. Mere approval of illegal behavior after the fact cannot establish liability; ratification of an
illegal action must be a “moving force” behind a constitutional violation, meaning it must occur
before the illegal conduct at issue. Buckley v. City of Memphis, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, at
*12 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2004) (“Ratification occurs after the conduct, making the municipality’s
ratification of the incident in question unable to be the moving force before the conduct.”). Thus,
Plaintiff’s argument that “[i]n [Doolen’s] deposition he repeatedly approved of [Futrell’s,
Shearon’s, Wiggins’s, and Gonzalez’s] behavior” is insufficient to establish liability via
ratification.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED as to Hardeman County.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART as follows: the Motion is GRANTED as to John Doolen and Leonard Brown and DENIED
as to Ellen Futrell, Judy Wiggins, William Gonzalez, and Hardeman County, Tennessee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: September 29, 2022.