Moore v. Mount Zion Baptist Church

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

KIARA MOORE, )

\Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00965

) Judge Trauger/Frensley

MOUNT ZION BAPTIST CHURCH, )

ET AL., )

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2022, Kiara Moore (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action in federal district

court. Docket No. 1. On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, asserting

against Mount Zion Baptist Church (“Mount Zion”) violations of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), a breach of contract claim, and an unjust enrichment claim. Docket No. 28, pp. 10-

11, 18-19.1 Furthermore, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Mount Zion,

Bishop Joseph W. Walker, III, and Dr. Stephanie Walker (collectively “Defendants”) violated the

Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and the Equal Pay

Act of 1963 (“EPA”). Id. at 1, 12, 14, 17. On October 24, 2023, the parties executed a formal

settlement agreement. Docket No. 62, p. 5.

This matter is now before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Docket

No. 61. Plaintiff has filed declarations of Kiara Moore, William D. Harris, Christopher C. Sabis,

Jerry E. Martin and Wade B. Cowan in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Docket

Nos. 63, 64, 65, 67, 69. Defendants have filed a Response in Opposition. Docket No. 78. In support

1 The unjust enrichment claim was brought in the alternative to the allegation that Mount Zion

violated the FLSA. Docket No. 28, pp. 14, 19.

of their Response in Opposition, Defendants have filed a declaration of Paige Lyle. Docket No.

82. Plaintiff has filed a Reply. Docket No. 85. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion (Docket No. 61) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Recovery of Fees

“Our legal system generally requires each party to bear his own litigation expenses,

including attorney’s fees, regardless [of] whether he wins or loses.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832

(2011). Therefore, courts do not award “fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory

authority.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W.Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,

602 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The statutes under which Plaintiff

sued—the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12205), FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)), FMLA (29 U.S.C. §

2617(a)(3)), and EPA (29 U.S.C. § 216(b))—provide explicit statutory authority to award Plaintiff

with “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” The ADA provides that “[i]n any action or administrative

proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation

expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The FLSA, the FMLA, and the EPA provide that the

court shall “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee” and other costs “to be paid by the defendant.” 29

U.S.C. § 216(b); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). Defendants have not disputed that there is statutory

authority to award Plaintiff a reasonable attorney’s fee. Likewise, Defendants have not disputed

that Plaintiff is a “prevailing party.” Thus, the Court will only consider the reasonableness of the

requested attorneys’ fees and costs.

B. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

In determining the amount a party must pay in fees, generally “the most useful starting

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). Known as the “lodestar” amount, this calculation provides an “initial estimate of the value

of a lawyer’s services.” Id. “But trial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-

eyeshade accountants.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. “The essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough

justice, not to achieve auditing perfection;” therefore, “trial courts may take into account their

overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.” Id.

Calculating the lodestar is not necessarily the end of the inquiry. After determining the

lodestar amount, “the court may adjust the fee upward or downward to reflect relevant

considerations peculiar to the subject litigation.” NAACP v. Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00365, 2021 WL

4441262, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2021) (emphasis added), quoting Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of

Treasury, 227 F. 3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In either

“determining the basic lodestar fee and/or adjustments thereto,” the district court may consider the

following factors:

(1) the time and labor required by a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly;

(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)

the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the

‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Adcock-Ladd, 227 F. 3d 343, 349 n. 8 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Johnson v Georgia Highway Express,

Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).

Initially, Plaintiff requested an award of $488,748.00 for attorneys’ fees. Docket No. 62,

p. 8. Then, Plaintiff requested an additional award of $3,559.50 for work completed after filing the

initial fee petition. Docket No. 85-2, p. 1. Thus, the fee award Plaintiff seeks totals $492,307.50.

The law firms who represented Plaintiff in this case are Harris Legal Advisers LLC (“HLA”) based

in Columbus, Ohio, and Sherrard Roe Voigt & Harbison, PLC (“SRVH”), which is a local law

firm. Docket No. 69-4, pp. 2, 7. SRVH’s attorneys served as local counsel. Id. at 7. Plaintiff’s

requested fee award includes hours worked by attorneys at both of these law firms, and the Court

considers both the reasonableness of the requested hourly rates and number of hours in the

following sections of this Report and Recommendation.

1. Reasonable Rate

When determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate, “[t]he appropriate rate…is not

necessarily the exact value sought by a particular firm, but is rather the market rate in the venue

sufficient to encourage competent representation.” Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 618

(6th Cir. 2007). The market rate is “defined as the rate that lawyers of comparable skill and

experience can reasonably expect to command within the venue of the court of record.” Geier v.

Sundquist, 372 F. 3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004). When determining the appropriate market rate, “[a]

district court is permitted to ‘rely on a party's submissions, awards in analogous cases, state bar

association guidelines, and its own knowledge and experience in handling similar fee requests.’ ”

Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 821-22 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Van Horn v.

Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436 F. App'x 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2011)).

a. HLA Rates

Concerning HLA’s rates, the Court first considers Plaintiff’s argument regarding which

market rate should apply, Columbus’ or Nashville’s. Despite this case taking place in the Middle

District of Tennessee, Plaintiff contends that the Court should “consider the ‘out-of-market’ rates

of HLA.” Docket No. 62, p. 20. Plaintiff maintains this is proper as she “was required to seek

counsel from outside of the Middle District of Tennessee after multiple local lawyers declined the

representation.” Id.

The Court does not find this argument persuasive. In Plaintiff’s declaration, she states that

she attempted to hire four lawyers in this region prior to seeking HLA’s services. Docket No. 63,

p. 2. The Court does not believe that four lawyers declining the representation is sufficient to

indicate Plaintiff was required to seek services outside of this region; there are far more than four

employment lawyers in Nashville and its surrounding region. Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiff

was later able to secure SRVH attorneys as local counsel who were not merely lawyers to answer

specific questions about rules or issues of law in the Middle District of Tennessee but included

Christopher Sabis, an experienced attorney with expertise in ADA claims who helped with the

case strategy and arguments on the merits, cuts against her argument that she was required to seek

counsel elsewhere. Docket Nos. 67, p. 3; 67-1; 69-4, p. 7. Accordingly, the Court will proceed by

examining the requested rates with reference to the prevailing local market rates in the Nashville

area.

Regarding the specific rates, Plaintiff requests $535.00 per hour for Mr. Harris’ work on

the case. Docket No. 62, p. 18. According to his declaration, Mr. Harris is the managing member

of HLA, has worked in private practice for nearly twenty years, and has prior experience with

employment cases. Docket No. 69-4, pp. 2, 4-5. Furthermore, Mr. Harris states that his rate has

been lowered to $535.00 per hour to match “the average hourly rates of SRVH partner-level

attorneys, excluding the highest and lowest hourly rate.” Id. at 16.

In an attempt to justify a rate of $535.00 per hour, Mr. Harris lists in his declaration three

prior cases where courts approved high hourly rates for his work. Id. at 5. Yet, these cases do not

persuade the Court that a rate of $535.00 per hour is appropriate in this case. These cases did not

occur in this district or region; two of the cases are from the Southern District of New York and

the third case is from the District of New Jersey. Id. Furthermore, these prior cases are not

employment cases, nor are they cases that would require a similar amount of expertise as a single-

plaintiff employment case. Instead, two of these cases appear to be class action lawsuits involving

issues of antitrust law, and the third case appears to be a shareholder derivative suit. See In re

LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Ductile

Iron Pipe Fittings (DIPF) Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. Civ. 12-711, 2014 WL 3971620

(D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2014); Chill v. Calamos Advisors LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 126, 128 (S.D.N.Y.

2016).2

Plaintiff requests $375.00 per hour for Mr. Wagenleitner’s work on the case. Docket No.

62, p. 18. According to Mr. Harris’ declaration, Mr. Wagenleitner is “Of Counsel and eDiscovery

Director for HLA.” Docket No. 69-4, p. 5. He has several years of litigation experience, previously

being a “Litigation Associate and Director of eDiscovery, for a nationally recognized plaintiff’s

firm located in New York City.” Id. According to Mr. Harris, Mr. Wagenleitner’s rate has been

lowered to $375.00 per hour to match “the average hourly rate of associate and of counsel attorneys

at SRVH, excluding the highest and lowest hourly rate for them.” Id. at 16.

In support of the requested rates, Plaintiff has filed declarations by Jerry E. Martin and

Wade B. Cowan. Docket Nos. 64, 65. Yet, these declarations do not help the Court in reaching its

determinations regarding any of the attorney’s rates. See Docket Nos. 64, 65; McMahon v. Metro.

Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tennessee, No. 3:13-CV-00319, 2016 WL 10650816, at *8

2 William Harris in his declaration provided unclear citations to these cases. See Docket 69-4, p. 5.

After completing research, the Court presumes these are the cases to which counsel refers.

(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2016), aff'd, No. 16-6498, 2017 WL 8217669 (6th Cir. June 27, 2017) (taking

issue with supporting affidavits of other plaintiff’s lawyers in Nashville to support the attorney’s

requested rate when “none of these attorneys even stated that a court had awarded them” that rate).

The provided declarations make conclusory statements regarding the reasonableness of the

requested rates and lack specific cases or evidence to support these statements. See Docket Nos.

64, 65. For example, Mr. Martin stated, “[b]ased on the rates that I have been awarded in FLSA

actions, these rates are in-line and consistent with rates typically approved in the Middle District

of Tennessee.” Docket No. 64, p. 7. Yet, Mr. Martin fails to list or provide any of these cases for

the Court’s review. Id.

Regarding Mr. Harris, the Court does not find an hourly rate of $535.00 to be reasonable

in this case and instead recommends that Mr. Harris’ rate be lowered to $450.00 per hour.

Regarding Mr. Wagenleitner, the Court finds the requested rate of $375.00 per hour to be

reasonable. Two years ago, Judge Trauger noted that “recent opinions from within this district

have approved hourly rates in FLSA disputes ranging from $250.00 to $475.00 per hour, with the

most common rate approved being $350.00 per hour.” Howard v. Ellis Moving & Storage, LLC,

No. 3:21-cv-00086, 2022 WL 1005304, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 4, 2022). In Howard, Judge

Trauger found that the requested rates of $475.00 and $450.00 per hour for the plaintiff’s attorneys

were too high, and she lowered the rates to be $400.00 per hour for the more experienced attorney

on the case and $375.00 per hour for the less experienced attorney on the case. Id. Around the

same time, Judge Campbell entered a fee award in McGruder v Metropolitan Government of

Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, approving an award of attorney’s fees at an hourly

rate of $500.00 per hour. 3:17-cv-01547, 2022 WL 2975298 (M. D. Tenn. July 27, 2022). Given

these ruling and considering the rate of inflation since those rulings, a rate of $450.00 per hour

appears reasonable.

As in Howard, the case at bar is an employment case that did not proceed to trial. Id.

Defendants attempt to distinguish Howard from the present case and argue for lower rates than the

approved rates in Howard—as Defendants contend that the attorneys in this case are less

experienced than the Howard attorneys. See id.; Docket No. 78, p. 8. On the other hand, Plaintiff

attempts to distinguish Howard, arguing for higher rates than in Howard because, as Plaintiff

argues, the claims in this case were more complex. See 2022 WL 1005304, at *4-5; Docket No.

62, pp. 20-21.

Considering both Defendants and Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court finds that the adjusted

Howard rates strike the proper balance and should be used for Mr. Harris and Mr. Wagenleitner.

2022 WL 1005304, at *5. As Defendants point out, the attorneys in the current case have fewer

years of experience dealing with employment cases than the Howard attorneys. Id. at 4. Even so,

the Court finds $450 and $375 per hour to be reasonable rates for Mr. Harris and Mr. Wagenleitner.

As in Howard, this is in part due to inflation. Id. at 5. And, as Plaintiff points out, unlike in Howard,

the case at bar was a contested case that involved multiple claims, rather than just a singular,

essentially uncontested, FLSA claim. Id. at 4-5. Thus, while the present attorneys have fewer years

of experience, the claims and case were more intricate than the Howard case. See id.

The Court is confused as to how HLA used its requested rates to calculate its requested

lodestar amount. The Court has not found an explanation for the calculation in the relevant motion,

memorandum, declarations, or billing record. If this explanation is present somewhere, Plaintiff

has not clearly pointed out its location to the Court. Furthermore, HLA has not provided the Court

a total number of hours that each individual attorney worked, which makes the Court’s job of

implementing new rates difficult. Instead, HLA has provided a billing record that includes only

individual daily entries, the total number of hours worked by the attorneys together, the total

amount billed by the attorneys together, and an unexplained blended rate. See Docket No. 66-8.

This billing record includes an individual entry for each day that each attorney worked on the case.

See id. Each individual entry includes (1) the number of hours the attorney worked on the case that

day, (2) the relevant attorney’s rate, and (3) the dollar amount billed by the attorney for that day

(which is the number of hours the attorney worked that day multiplied by that attorney’s rate). See

id.

HLA does provide a blended rate, yet, again, HLA does not explain how this blended rate

was calculated. See id. The initial requested rates were $535.00 per hour and $375.00 per hour,

and HLA claimed a blended rate of $450.00 per hour. See id. Upon the Court’s calculation, the

average of $535 and $375.00 is $455.00, not $450.00. In order to calculate the blended rate, it is

the Court’s guess that HLA has added up all of the individual entries for both attorneys (the amount

HLA billed for each attorney for each day), then divided that number by the total number of hours

worked on the case by both attorneys in order to arrive at the blended rate. Assuming this is how

HLA came up with $450.00 per hour, this allowed the blended rate to reflect the number of hours

each attorney put in. However, it is not reasonable nor appropriate for the Court to redo this type

of calculation, which would require the Court to add up individual entries from 74 pages of a

billing record, in order to implement Mr. Harris’ changed rate. See id. Instead, in an attempt to

mimic the type of blended rate used by HLA, the Court will average $450.00 per hour and $375.00

per hour then subtract five dollars to arrive at a new blended rate. This gives the Court a blended

rate of $407.50 per hour.

b. SRVH Rates

Regarding Christopher Sabis, Plaintiff requests $495.00 per hour for his work on the case.3

Docket No. 62, p. 17. While Mr. Sabis is a seasoned attorney with prior experience investigating

ADA claims, Mr. Sabis’ rate of $495.00 per hour, as Plaintiff concedes, has not been approved in

this context. Id. For the same reasons listed above regarding Mr. Harris, the Court finds that Mr.

Sabis’ rate should be lowered to $450.00 per hour. Mr. Sabis has 20 years of litigation experience

and has prior experience with ADA claims. Docket No. 67, pp. 1-2. While Mr. Sabis does not

claim to have 30 years of employment law experience like the attorney in Howard, this case was

certainly more complex and contained several more claims than Howard. Id.; see Howard, 2022

WL 1005304, at *4. Thus, the Court finds $450.00 an hour to be proper.

For Amy Mohan, SRVH requests $475.00 per hour for 2.9 hours of work and $450.00 per

hour for 1.2 hours of work. Docket No. 67-1, p. 3. Regarding Alice Haston, Plaintiff requests

$315.00 per hour for her work. Id. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient

information regarding these attorneys for the Court to evaluate these rates. See Docket Nos. 67, p.

2; 78, p. 16. Thus, the Court will use lower rates for these attorneys. Cf. Krueger v. Experian Info.

Sols., Inc., No. 19-10581, 2024 WL 497105, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2024) (“Given Plaintiff's

failure to provide adequate information about the paralegals who worked on this case, the Court

finds that Plaintiff should be awarded a rate that is toward the bottom of the scale in this District.”).

The Court will apply a rate of $250.00 per hour for both Amy Mohan and Alice Haston, which

represents the low-end of the typical range of rates in the Middle District of Tennessee for

employment-type actions. Howard, 2022 WL 1005304, at *4 (“[R]ecent opinions from within this

3 Plaintiff requests a lower rate of $475.00 for Christopher Sabis for 1.1 hours. Docket No. 67-1,

p. 3. However, given the new rate provided by the Court is lower than both rates charged by

Christopher Sabis, this difference is not relevant.

district have approved hourly rates in FLSA disputes ranging from $250 to $475 per hour.”).

Finally, for Lindsay Oduor (a paralegal who worked on the case), Plaintiff requests an

hourly rate of $150.00. Docket No. 67-1, p. 3. The Court finds this rate to be reasonable. In 2021,

this Court, while determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee award, assessed a rate of

$125.00 for paralegal work. Hargett, 2021 WL 4441262, at *9. According to Mr. Sabis’

declaration, Ms. Oduor “has a post-graduate Degree in Paralegal Studies from New York

University and has practiced as a paralegal at Nashville law firms for twenty (20) years.” Docket

No. 67, p. 2. Given Ms. Oduor’s experience and that three years’ time has passed since Hargett

(meaning the Court would expect the market-rate to be slightly higher now) the Court finds as

reasonable an hourly rate of $150.00 for Ms. Oduor. See 2021 WL 4441262, at *9.

2. Reasonable Hours

As a preliminary matter, in Plaintiff’s Reply, she maintains that Defendants’ arguments

challenging the reasonableness of the hours spent were made in a “conclusory fashion.” Docket

No. 85, p. 1. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the Court “need only review the billing statement for

fees that are unreasonable on their face.” Id. at 2. The Court disagrees with the characterization of

Defendants’ billing challenges as conclusory and does not find Plaintiff’s position on this matter

persuasive. While in places Defendants certainly could have been more specific (see generally

Docket No. 78), the Court understands that for the most part the issues with billing in this case

were not with specific entries. Instead, the excessiveness and redundancy of the entries taken

together is the most concerning issue. Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization, in

many places Defendants have either pointed to a specific entry or have provided enough

information in their arguments that the Court could easily find the entries Defendants had in mind.4

Docket No. 78. Therefore, the Court will consider the reasonableness of the hours as the Court

would in any other case.

Defendants make numerous arguments explaining why the time expended by Plaintiff’s

attorneys is not reasonable and should be reduced. Id. at 9-18. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

engaged in unnecessary discovery practice, contending that discovery-related time should be

reduced by 75%. Id. at 10. Second, Defendants maintain that the Court should reduce the attorneys’

fees award to exclude the time spent on motions never filed. Id. at 12. Third, Defendants point out

many instances of excessive, duplicative, or redundant time entries. Id. at 13. Specifically,

Defendants maintain the unreasonableness of the time spent on client communications, internal

communications, legal research, the mediation, a deposition of a third-party witness, travel, and

clerical work. Id. at 13-15. Furthermore, Defendants dispute the time spent by Plaintiff’s local

counsel. Id. at 16. Among other arguments made concerning Plaintiff’s local counsel, Defendants

point out redundancy issues between the tasks local counsel completed and HLA completed. Id.

As explained below, the Court sees many of the same issues as Defendants and finds a substantial

number of the hours expended by Plaintiff’s attorneys in this litigation to not be reasonable.

When there are issues in the billing record, such as problems with excessive or duplicative

time entries and accuracy, the Court may impose an across-the-board reduction to the hours

expended. See, e.g., Krueger, 2024 WL 497105, at *7 (“Accordingly, due to the Court's concerns

about block-billing, excessive billing, vagueness, and billing accuracy, a 35 percent reduction is

warranted.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “trial courts need not, and indeed should not,

4 For example, Defendants pointed to specific entries or to a set of entries in the “Time Spent on

Motions Never Filed,” “Mediation,” and “Deposition of a Third-Party Non-Management Witness”

sections of their brief. Docket No. 78, pp. 13-15.

become green-eyeshade accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do

rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. Thus, “trial courts may

take into account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating

an attorney's time.” Id. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has upheld a trial court’s across-the-board 35

percent reduction of hours expended when there was a “lack of specificity and duplication in the

attorneys’ billing records.” Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F. 3d 558, 575-76 (6th Cir.

2019).

“Courts have recognized the impracticality of specifying each and every hour to be

excluded in a…fee application…in which voluminous billing records must be examined, and for

this reason, most circuits, including the Sixth, have authorized across-the-board fee reductions as

an appropriate method of trimming fat from a fee application.” Alicia Ousley v. CG Consulting,

LLC, No. 2:19-CV-1744, 2024 WL 1443280, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2024) (internal quotations

marks and citing reference omitted). When making these types of reductions, the Court needs only

to “provide a ‘clear and concise’ explanation of the reasons for such a reduction, …enumerating

and exemplifying the type of deficiencies present in Plaintiff's billing records.” Krueger, 2024 WL

497105, at *7 (citing Minor v. Comm'r of Soc Sec., 826 F.3d 878, 884 (6th Cir. 2016)).

The billing records include numerous problematic entries that warrant an across-the-board

reduction to the hours expended. See generally Docket Nos. 66-8, 67-1. First, the Court has found

repeated accuracy issues throughout HLA’s billing record. See Docket No. 66-8. Second, the

billing records contain many instances of both excessive billing and redundancy. See id.; Docket

No. 67-1. In the sections below, the Court provides examples that typify these billing deficiencies.

a. Accuracy Issues

While not raised by Defendants, the Court is troubled by the mathematical errors found

throughout HLA’s billing record. To start, the very first entry on HLA’s billing record includes a

mathematical error. Docket No. 66-8, p. 3. From what is visible to the Court, on November 30,

2021, Mr. Harris completed 1.7 hours of work, yet he billed 3.7 hours for that day. Id. Likewise,

on February 5, 2023, Mr. Harris appears to have worked for .5 hours, yet he billed .7 hours for that

day. Id. at 12. And again, on March 6, 2023, the record indicates Mr. Harris completed 1.3 hours

of work, yet he billed 1.5 hours for that day. Id. at 17. On May 21, 2023, Mr. Harris completed 5.1

hours of work, but he billed for 5.6 hours. Id. at 39. The aforementioned entries are only the

instances the Court has noticed upon its review of the billing record; there very likely are more.

To be fair to Mr. Harris, sometimes when he incorrectly added up the hours, he ended up

billing less hours than what the record indicates he actually worked.5 Examples of this include

entries on March 24, 2023, and April 21, 2023. Id. at 21, 28. All of these mathematical errors

(regardless of whether they resulted in an upwards or downwards change in hours) give the Court

concern about the accuracy of the billing record as a whole.

b. Redundant and Excessive Billing

Furthermore, the Court finds that both the HLA and SRVH billing records contain issues

of redundant and excessive billing. Docket Nos. 67-1; 66-8. For example, the records reflect that

the attorneys spent an excessive amount of time corresponding with one another. Docket Nos. 67-

1; 66-8. Between May 8, 2023, and May 31, 2023, William Harris and Christopher Sabis had ten

conferences or discussions about “strategy” or “discovery.” Docket No. 67-1, p. 7. In almost all

instances, both William Harris and Christopher Sabis billed for this time. Id.; Docket No. 66-8, pp.

5 These instances do not appear to the Court to be entries where Mr. Harris was attempting to give

a billing discount. Rather, in the context of the billing record, it seems to the Court that these were

mere mathematical errors.

34-43.6 The Court considers ten strategy and discovery-related conferences or discussions during

this short time period between two partner-level attorneys to be an example of redundant billing,

especially given this was a single-plaintiff employment case. Furthermore, during this same exact

time period, both Ryan Wagenleitner and William Harris also billed for many conferences or

correspondences with each other about strategy or discovery-related issues. See Docket No. 66-8,

pp. 35-43.

The aforementioned communications are not the only instances of the attorneys excessively

communicating with one another. As an example from a different time period in the case, page ten

of HLA’s billing record contains billing for 11 days’ worth of billing. Id. at 10. And, on this page

of the billing record alone, William Harris billed for six separate conference calls with Christopher

Sabis. Id. During this same time period, William Harris also billed for three correspondences with

Christopher Sabis. Id. SRVH’s billing record reflects that Christopher Sabis billed for many of

these same communications. Docket No. 67-1, p. 4. The undersigned could point out several other

instances of excessive billing for communication among the attorneys but believes that these

examples adequately demonstrate the point.

Similarly, the attorneys spent a significant amount of time communicating with Plaintiff,

their client. For example, during April 2023 alone, HLA’s billing record contains at least 15 entries

for either “correspondence[s]” or conferences with Plaintiff. Docket No. 66-8, pp. 23-32. On six

occasions (April 1, 4, 5, 19, 20, and 24), William Harris billed half an hour or more for that day’s

“correspondence” with Plaintiff. Id. at 23-24. Furthermore, April 2023 is just one instance; several

6 It appears that Christopher Sabis often describes communications between the attorneys as

discussions, while William Harris describes these same communications as correspondences, but

it appears the two attorneys are billing for the same communications. See Docket Nos. 67-1, p. 7;

66-8, pp. 34-43.

other months also contain an excessive amount of billing for client communications (e.g., March

2023 included 16 entries for client communications, May 2023 included 17, and June 2023

included 10).7 Id. at 16-23, 32-54. There is no individual entry that is problematic in the Court’s

eyes but taken together, the Court finds the attorneys have billed an excessive amount for client

communications. The Court of course understands and expects that attorneys will communicate

with their clients regarding their cases, but this case’s billing record exceeds what the Court views

as an appropriate level of billing for client communications.

Likewise, often times multiple attorneys completed tasks that could have been completed

by one attorney—which supports a reduction in fees, especially considering this was a single-

plaintiff employment case and it was multiple experienced attorneys who were completing the

same tasks. See Howard, 2022 WL 1005304, at *5 (“[I]t was unnecessary and redundant for both

attorneys to attend court conferences, depositions, and meetings and for both to review

correspondence and court filings.”). For example, several times William Harris and Ryan

Wagenleitner both billed for the client conferences. See generally Docket No. 66-8. To provide a

specific example, on April 7, 2023, a conference call with Plaintiff lasted 1.8 hours, and both

William Harris and Ryan Wagenleitner attended and billed for that call. Id. at 25. Likewise, on

June 7, 2023, both William Harris and Ryan Wagenleitner billed for a 2.1-hour conference with

Plaintiff. Id. at 46. While multiple attorneys attending conferences calls is not per se unreasonable,

given the frequency and length of the communications with Plaintiff in general, the Court views

multiple attorneys attending these calls to be unreasonable.

7 These calculations include entries for both attorneys when both attorneys billed for the relevant

communications.

c. Miscellaneous Issues

As the final set of problematic examples, the Court has found several instances where

Plaintiff either requests a fee award for hours spent completing a task generally not compensable

in a fee award or has billed multiple hours for a task that the Court believes could be completed in

less time. The Court is troubled by these sorts of entries and finds they provide additional support

for applying an across-the-board reduction. For example, Plaintiff requests an award for hours

spent by Amy Mohan (a SRVH attorney) preparing a media statement, but Hargett counsels that

time spent on press coverage is generally not compensable. 2021 WL 4441262, at *8 (“[A]ctivities

by attorneys focused on press coverage or publicity will typically not be recoverable.”).

Furthermore, on September 27, 2023, Ryan Wagenleitner spent 4.1 hours, reviewing, annotating,

and summarizing a third-party deposition transcript, which provides an example entry where more

timed was billed than the undersigned could understand as being necessary. Docket No. 66-8, p.

71. These entries, and others like them, concern the Court of the reasonableness of the hours on

the whole.

d. Plaintiff’s Discovery Argument

Plaintiff attempts to justify the excessive hours spent on this case by asserting that

Defendants were obstructive and difficult during discovery. Docket No. 62, pp. 11-15. Defendants

counter this characterization, asserting that “Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in gamesmanship of their

own,” and that Defendants had to respond “to the voluminous discovery sets constantly peppered

to Defendants by Plaintiff.” Docket No. 78, pp. 10-11. Discovery in this case had some contentious

elements, and the Court expects and accepts as reasonable in this case a slight increase of hours

due to the discovery disputes. Indeed, as calculated below, the Court is recommending a fee award

for 716.1 hours, which in part reflects the additional time needed to spend on discovery in this

case. However, the undersigned oversaw discovery in this case, and from the Court’s perspective

and experience, discovery was not so far out of the ordinary as to warrant the sheer number of

hours Plaintiff has requested.

Indeed, recent employment discrimination cases that went through full discovery, trial

preparation, and trial have commanded fee awards for significantly fewer hours than the number

of hours for which Plaintiff has requested an award. For example, in the employment case Reeder

v. County of Wayne, the court considered the plaintiff’s motion for a fee award seeking 692.6

hours. No. 15-CV-10177, 2016 WL 6524144, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2016). The Court granted

the motion only after reducing the number of hours by 10% due to block-billing issues. Id. at *7.

Reeder included a motion for summary judgment, an oral argument regarding that motion, and six

days of trial. Id. To the contrary, the case at bar did not reach any of these common litigation

stages, yet Plaintiff still seeks a fee award for approximately 1,100 hours. Docket Nos. 66-8; 67-

1, p. 3; 85-2, p. 1. In light of cases like Reeder, the Court cannot accept the argument that a fee

award for approximately 1,100 hours is justified or reasonable due to some early-stage discovery

disputes and issues. 2016 WL 6524144, at *7. Many cases have discovery disputes necessitating

court intervention, and, as Defendants point out, discovery in this case did not even reach the point

of deposing any of the parties. Docket No. 78, p. 1. And, in any event, an excessive number of

nondiscovery-related hours were billed. See generally Docket No. 66-8.

3. Reduction

In light of the billing deficiencies discussed above, the Court finds an across-the-board

reduction of 30% to be proper. This reduction is in line with the types of reductions taken in cases

within the Sixth Circuit that presented similar types of deficiencies. See, e.g., Hubbell, 933 F. 3d

558, 576 (“[W]e cannot say that the court exceeded the scope of its authority in reducing the

number of billed hours by 35 percent due to the lack of specificity and duplication in the attorneys’

billing records.”); Krueger, 2024 WL 497105, at *7 (“Accordingly, due to the Court's concerns

about block-billing, excessive billing, vagueness, and billing accuracy, a 35 percent reduction is

warranted.”).

C. Calculation of Fee

Initially, Plaintiff requested for HLA’s work a fee award covering 1,005 hours. Docket No.

66-8. Then, Plaintiff added 2.1 hours to this request due to William Harris’ work completed

following the initial fee petition, for a total request of 1,007.1 hours. Docket No. 85-2, p. 1.

Applying to the 1,007.1 hours the 30% across-the-board reduction, the Court recommends an

award of fees for 704.97 hours for HLA’s work. Using HLA’s new blended rate of $407.50 per

hour, the Court recommends a fee award of $287,275.27 for the work performed by HLA.

For the work of SRVH, Plaintiff requests a fee award for the work of each attorney or

paralegal as follows: 4.1 hours for Amy Mohan’s work, 68.5 hours for Christopher Sabis’ work,

1.2 hours for Alice Haston’s work, 20.8 hours for Lindsay Oduor’s work. Docket Nos. 67-1, p. 3;

85-2, p. 1.8 These numbers include both the initial request from SRVH’s main bill and the request

for hours associated with work occurring after the initial fee petition’s filing. Docket Nos. 67-1, p.

3; 85-2, p. 1. Applying the 30% across-the-board reduction, the number of hours for which the

Court recommends a fee award is as follows: 2.87 hours for Amy Mohan’s work (at an hourly rate

of $250.00), 47.95 hours for Christopher Sabis’ work (at an hourly rate of $450.00), .84 for Alice

Haston’s work (at an hourly rate of $250.00), and 14.56 for Lindsay Oduor’s work (at an hourly

rate of $150.00). Thus, the total recommended award for the work performed by SRVH is $24,689

8 In the initial bill, there are an additional 8.5 hours by Christopher Sabis and 2.9 hours by Lindsay

Oduor, but considering SRVH has assessed a rate of $0.00 for these hours, the Court takes that to

mean that SRVH intends for those hours to not be included. Docket No. 67-1, p. 3.

Therefore, in sum, the Court recommends a fee award of $311,964.27, which represents an

award for 771.19 hours.

D. Consideration of 22-9 Factors

As described earlier in this Report and Recommendation, in either “determining the basic

lodestar fee and/or adjustments thereto,” the district court may consider the following Johnson

factors:

(1) the time and labor required by a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly; (4)

the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the

‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 349 n.8.

Plaintiff makes several arguments for why the Johnson factors support the high fee award.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a high fee award is justified as she contends (1) extraordinary

results were obtained, (2) this has been “a labor-intensive matter,” (3) Plaintiff’s lawyers are skilled

and experienced lawyers, (4) this case required the skills of Plaintiff’s lawyers, (5) the rates

requested are the same or lower than Plaintiff’s lawyers’ rates in other cases, (6) the fees are

consistent with fee awards in similar cases in this district, (7) prominent Nashville attorneys agree

that the fee is reasonable, (8) the fee is contingent, (9) the case precluded other employment for

Plaintiff’s attorneys, (10) the case was difficult due to discovery issues, (11) time limitations

existed due to Ms. Moore’s continued employment by Mount Zion, (12) this case was undesirable

given one of the Defendants is a religious institution, and (13) the lawyers maintained a close

working relationship with Plaintiff. Docket No. 62, pp. 6-7, 11, 15, 17-19, 21-23.

In this case, the undersigned finds that the lodestar amount already includes consideration

of any Johnson factors that may be relevant to this case. As courts within this circuit have

explained, “[t]he Johnson factors are generally incorporated into the lodestar method.” See, e.g.,

McClain v. Hanna, No. 2:19-CV-10700, 2019 WL 7288768, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2019).

Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has stated, “The Supreme Court…has limited the application of the

Johnson factors, noting that ‘many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial

calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.’” Geier, 372 F.3d at 792

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9). Specifically, throughout this Report and Recommendation,

the undersigned already discussed or explicitly considered seven of the factors. For example, the

Court, in determining the rates or reasonableness of the hours, discussed the attorneys’ experience,

the attorneys’ rates, awards in other cases, the complexity of the claims and discovery issues, and

the lawyer-client communications.

The undersigned will briefly discuss the five factors not explicitly considered earlier in the

Report and Recommendation. In sum, the Court finds that these five Johnson factors (the results

obtained, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, preclusion of employment, time limitations, and

the undesirability of the case) do not warrant any upward or downward adjustment. Beginning

with the results obtained, although the settlement was a good outcome for Plaintiff, the Court does

not find the settlement to be particularly extraordinary such as to warrant an upward adjustment.

Second, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this case being on a contingent basis does not warrant

any upward adjustment in the fee. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992); Lee

v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 568 F. Supp. 2d 870, 880 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (“[Defendant]

correctly notes that, after City of Burlington, contingency risk alone is not sufficient to support a

multiplier.”). Third, Plaintiff’s preclusion of employment argument does not persuade the Court.

Docket No. 62, p. 22. If an appropriate number of hours had actually been expended on this matter,

other employment would not have been precluded, and, in Court’s view, the lodestar already

contemplates this factor in determining a reasonable number of hours.

Fourth, the undersigned is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that her continued

employment by Mount Zion supports a high fee award. Plaintiff maintains that this continued

employment placed time restrains on Plaintiff’s counsel, alleging that her working conditions were

“continually deteriorating” and “[e]arly resignation was not a viable option as she feared that

Defendants would use that resignation as a means to further stonewall her in discovery.” Id. at 23.

The Court does not find any adjustment based on this factor to be warranted. As Defendants point

out, this argument cuts both ways. Defendants did not terminate Plaintiff and by Plaintiff

remaining employed, she kept a steady source of income. See Docket No. 78, p. 20.

Lastly, regarding the undesirability of the case, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient

evidence to support that this was such an undesirable case as to warrant a high fee award. Docket

No. 62, p. 23. Four lawyers declining representation does not persuade the Court, especially

considering it is unclear why representation was denied. See id. While this is a lawsuit that some

attorneys may be unwilling to pursue given one of the Defendants is a religious institution, it seems

likely to the Court that other attorneys would remain impartial with regard to the identities of the

Defendants, and Plaintiff has not provided contrary evidence. See id.

Based on the Johnson factors, Defendants make two additional arguments for why the fee

amount should be lowered. First, Defendants point to other employment cases that resulted in

lower fee awards. Docket No. 78, pp. 9-10. The undersigned finds that these cases do not support

a further reduction in hours, considering the Court, while calculating the loadstar, has already

contemplated other similar cases. See e.g., supra, section II(B)(2)(d). Second, Defendants argue

that the award should be decreased because Defendants’ counsel spent fewer hours on this case

than Plaintiff’s counsel. Docket No. 78, pp. 21-22. In light of the Court already recommending a

30% reduction in hours, the Court does not find Defendants’ argument on this matter to be

persuasive. While there is still a discrepancy in hours, after the reduction, the gap is smaller now

and does not concern the Court given the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court ultimately

finds both parties’ arguments regarding the Johnson factors considered in this section to be

unpersuasive. Even if the Court were to find in favor of the Plaintiff on one of the factors they

assert and raise the award, the Court would then be equally and necessarily compelled to give merit

to Defendant’s counterarguments and lower it. The result, then, would be the same.

III. COSTS

In addition to attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff seeks recovery of “litigation expenses,” which she

asserts total $6,720.71. Docket Nos. 62, 67, 69. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides

that ‘[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than

attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.’ The expenses that a federal court may

tax as costs are set forth in 28 U. S. C § 1920.” Carney v. Suncrest Healthcare of Middle Tennessee,

LLC, No. 3:13-CV-00527, 2016 WL 5468268, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2016) (citing reference

omitted). Defendant does not object to Plaintiff’s calculation of the costs except on the grounds

that two included expenses are not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920: Travel expenses to and

from Nashville by out-of-town counsel and pro hac vice fees. Docket No. 78, p. 21.

“It is within the Court’s discretion whether or not to award fees for time spent in travel

given the district court’s familiarity with local practice.” Grier v. Goetz, No. 3:79-3107, 2009 WL

10729589, at *20, (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2009) (citing Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F. 2d 761, 765 (6th

Cir. 1991). Likewise, in the case where out-of-town counsel were employed, the reasonability of

travel expenses to and from the forum state will depend on the necessity of retaining out-of-town

counsel. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F. 2d 546, 559 (10th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds

by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987). In

Grier, the Court allowed out-of-town travel costs only after determining that “retention of out-of-

town counsel was both necessary and reasonable,” citing Ramos for its rule but reaching the

opposite conclusion with the opposite facts. Grier, 2009 WL 10729589 at *20. This Court thus

finds that where, as here, employment of out-of-town counsel was not necessary, their travel

expenses should not be included in costs awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

With respect to pro hac vice fees, both the Western and Middle District Courts in Tennessee

have previously declined to award the cost of pro hac vice filing fees under § 1920(1). See, e.g.,

Keatley v. Escape Game LLC, No. 3:21-cv-00230, 2022 WL 1432552, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. May 5,

2022); Clay v. Berryhill, No. 17-2586-DKV, 2019 WL 12711724, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. July 29,

2019). This Court sees no reason to now depart from these well-reasoned perspectives.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends a denial of both Plaintiff’s travel

expenses to and from Nashville by out-of-town counsel and Plaintiff’s pro hac vice filing fees.

Docket Nos. 69-5, p. 77; 67-1, p. 12. Accordingly, this Court recommends an award of costs in the

amount of $5,575.80.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion (Docket

No. 61) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As thoroughly explained above, the

undersigned recommends that the rates for several of the attorneys be lowered to match their

experience and reflect the prevailing market rate. Furthermore, the issues with accuracy, excessive

billing, and redundant billing persuade the undersigned that Plaintiff’s claimed attorneys’ fees

should be reduced. Considering all of the Parties’ arguments, the undersigned recommends a 30%

across-the-board reduction of the hours claimed, which, when implemented with the new

recommended rates, provides a total attorneys’ fee award of $311,964.27. In addition, for the

reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's costs be reduced to $5,575.80.

Thus, in total, the undersigned recommends an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiff of

$317,540.07.

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days

from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this

Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen

(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said

objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report

and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).

— 2 Xe.

JEFFERY S.FRENSLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

25