Howell v. McCormick

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

MATTHEW HOWELL and ALISHA )

BROWN, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) NO. 3:15-cv-01428

v. )

) JUDGE CAMPBELL

JUSTIN MCCORMICK, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court are four motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 245, 249,

251, 260) filed by Defendants Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County

(“Metro”), Justin McCormick, Luis Lopez Aldea, Wallis Massey, James Jenson, and Daniel Polk

(collectively the “Officers”) and Joshua Vaughn. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for

resolution. (See Doc. Nos. 275, 280, 284, 285). For the reasons discussed below, the motions will

be GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the warrantless seizures of Plaintiffs Matthew Howell, Alisha Brown,

and Howell’s vehicle on December 9, 2014. Howell and Brown bring the present action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, violation of Howell’s Fifth

Amendment Rights, and state law claims of conversion, trespass, battery, and false arrest. (See

Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 72). At all relevant times, Howell and Brown co-owned and lived

together in a residence located in Davidson County, Tennessee (“the residence”). Defendant Leila

Avila briefly rented a room at the residence.

December 9, 2014

On December 9, 2014, Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (“MNPD”) officers

responded to an emergency dispatch to the residence. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 3 at PageID # 1545). The

information first relayed by the dispatch operator informed the officers of a domestic disturbance

involving a man with a gun. (Id. ¶ 4 at PageID # 1546). The suspect was described as the victim's

roommate named Matt Howell. (Id.). Dispatch was also informed that Howell was intoxicated and

had pointed a gun at the victim. (Id.). The dispatcher assigned the emergency a Code 3 and advised

that the caller would be standing in the street. (Id.). A Code 3 emergency is the highest level of

priority that the dispatcher may assign to an emergency response. (Id. ¶ 6 at PageID # 1546).

Dispatch sent a second radio transmission that informed the officers that another female was in the

home. (Id. ¶ 5 at PageID # 1546). Consistent with a Code 3 life threatening emergency, MNPD

officers responded by driving their patrol vehicles in full emergency mode to the scene. (Id. ¶ 7 at

PageID # 1547).

Vaughn was the first officer to arrive on the scene. (See Doc. No. 277-3 at PageID # 1598,

1648). When McCormick and Jenson arrived, Massey, Aldea, and Vaughn were already standing

with Avila outside. (Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 8, 9 at PageID # 1547; Doc. No. 277-3 at PageID # 1650,

1684-85; Doc. No. 254-2 ¶ 4). McCormick could see that Avila was unnerved and shaking. (Doc.

No. 276 ¶ 9 at PageID # 1547). Massey told McCormick that Avila had confirmed that her

roommate, Howell, had pointed a gun at her. (Id. ¶ 10 at PageID # 1547).

McCormick then left Avila with Massey and Jenson and approached the front door of the

residence with Vaughn and Aldea in tow. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 13 at PageID # 1548; Doc. No. 277-3

at PageID # 1600, 1682, 1688). When the front door opened, Howell was standing in the doorway.

(Doc. No. 276 ¶ 15 at PageID # 1549). Howell refused McCormick’s requests to enter the residence

and pat him down for weapons. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 17 at PageID # 1549; Doc. No. 277-1 ¶¶ 3, 5;

Doc. No. 277-2 ¶¶ 3, 5). Howell informed McCormick that there were weapons in the house but

denied having any weapons on his person. (Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 19, 20 at PageID # 1550). McCormick

was not able to see if Howell was armed or what objects or weapons were within Howell’s reach

within the residence. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 21 at PageID # 1550-51).

McCormick was able to see a female standing to Howell’s left and asked her to step outside

and talk. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 22 at PageID # 1551). Howell told the female not to go out of the house.

(Id.). Howell continued to stand in the doorway and refused to step out of the doorway onto the

porch. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 23 at PageID # 1551). Howell informed the officers that he had not done

anything wrong and to contact his attorney. (Doc. No. 277-1 ¶¶ 3, 5; Doc. No. 277-2 ¶¶ 3, 5).

McCormick then grabbed Howell’s hand in a martial-arts style maneuver and the other officers at

the front door, Vaughn and Aldea, pushed Howell into an interior wall while his arm was still

twisted around. (Doc. No. 277-2 ¶ 5; Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 14, 26 at PageID # 1541, 1552; Doc. No.

277-3 at PageID # 1612, 1614; Doc. No. 277-4 at PageID # 1707). After Howell was handcuffed,

McCormick and Vaughn escorted Howell to McCormick’s patrol vehicle, where Howell was

patted down and seated inside. (Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 43, 47 at PageID # 1558-59; Doc. No. 277-3 at

PageID # 1622). Detective Polk arrived at the scene during Howell’s escort to McCormick’s patrol

vehicle. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 47 at PageID # 1559; Doc. No. 254-2 ¶ 11). Vaughn stood in front of

McCormick’s patrol vehicle, while McCormick and Detective Polk questioned Howell in the

patrol vehicle. (Doc. No. 277-3 at PageID # 1623-24; Doc. No. 276 ¶ 16 at PageID # 1542).

Vaughn, Detective Polk, and McCormick then approached the front door and questioned

Brown for approximately ten minutes before handcuffing her for not being cooperative. (Doc. No.

277-1 ¶¶ 8-14). Officers took Brown outside into the driveway while she was handcuffed, in full

view of any neighbors who might have been watching. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16). Officers kept Brown

handcuffed for about 30 to 45 minutes while Jensen, Massey, and Avila went inside the residence.

(Doc. No. 277-1 ¶¶ 14-16; Doc. No. 254-2 ¶¶ 17-24; Doc. No. 277-6 at PageID # 1747).

McCormick charged Howell with aggravated assault under Tennessee Code Annotated Section

39-13-102 and resisting a frisk under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-16-602. (Doc. No.

254-1 ¶ 33; Doc. No. 278-1). After the officers left the scene, the vehicle at issue was either still

on the property or on the street in front of the residence. (See Doc. No. 276 ¶ 25 at PageID # 1544).

Howell’s Complaint

A week after the incident on December 9, 2014, Howell tried to report his vehicle as stolen

by Avila and MNPD officers. (Doc. No. 277-2 ¶¶ 13-14). Although a MNPD officer came to

Howell’s residence in response to the report, the officer was dismissive of Howell and took no

action. (Id. ¶ 13). After that, Howell tried filing an official, written complaint with Internal Affairs.

(Id. ¶ 14). According to Howell, MNPD “now pretends that it never received any verbal or written

complaints from [him].” (Id.). At the end of 2015 or beginning of 2016, the Office of Professional

Accountability left a voicemail for Howell’s attorney but never interviewed Howell about his

complaint. (Id. ¶ 15). Howell later found out that the Office of Professional Accountability had

opened a file in response to his complaint but closed it the same day. (Id.; Doc. No. 278-4).

The Prosecution

A preliminary hearing was held on March 11, 2015, where Avila was the sole witness.

(Doc. No. 254-6). In April 2015, the Davidson County Grand Jury charged Howell with one count

each of resisting arrest and aggravated assault by causing Avila to fear bodily injury by use or

display of a deadly weapon. (Doc. No. 278-3). The criminal jury trial took place in February 2016.

McCormick, Polk, Vaughn, Massey, Jensen, Howell, and Brown each testified at the trial. (See

Doc. No. 277-4 at PageID # 1694-99). Polk’s trial testimony included the following:

Q. Okay. And explain to us a little bit about warrants. In other

words, is a police officer typically allowed to arrest someone

in his home without a warrant?

A. If a police officer has probable cause to believe that a crime

has been committed, yes.

Q. And that’s what they teach y’all at your police department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you make it a point to point out that you yourself

never stepped to any significant amount into the house?

A. I didn’t step a significant amount into the house. I just

walked inside the door. There was a police officer in there

so I wanted to make sure, because no one had been in there,

that the scene was secure and he was not in there by himself.

(Doc. No. 277-5 at PageID # 1739). The jury acquitted Howell of both aggravated assault and

resisting arrest but found him guilty of reckless aggravated assault. See State v. Howell, No.

M201601812CCAR3CD, 2018 WL 385505, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2018). The trial

court amended the jury’s verdict to that of simple assault because Avila suffered no bodily injury.

See id. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently determined that “when the trial

court amended the defendant's conviction to simple assault, it did so in violation of the defendant's

protection against double jeopardy because simple assault is an offense that requires an intentional

or knowing mental state and specifically excludes the mens rea of recklessness.” Id. at *7. The

state appellate court held “that a new trial on the offense of simple assault is barred by double

jeopardy and collateral estopped principles.” Id. at *9. And because there were no other available

lesser-included offenses, the appellate court vacated the trial court’s judgment convicting Howell

of assault and dismissed the case. Id.

MNPD Training

MNPD officers receive training in the police academy as to constitutional issues that may

arise during the performance of their duties. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 5). They also receive periodic in-

service training and roll call updates as to any case law that may affect the performance of their

duties. (Id.). Additionally, the MNPD manual requires officers to keep up to date with any legal

issues that may arise in the performance of their duties as applied to criminal matters. (Id.).

Any constitutional issues related to an officer's performance of duties can be reported by

the District Attorney's Office or by a superior officer. (Id. ¶ 6). Additionally, there are MNPD

policies in place to review case quality. (Id.). MNPD policy also provides for the District Attorney's

Office to report an officer when a case has been dismissed due to police mishandling and for the

matter to be reviewed by Case Preparation personnel. (Id.). MNPD officers receive domestic

violence training as part of basic training as well as periodic updates. (Id. ¶ 7). Additionally, MNPD

officers receive training regarding exigent circumstances in the context of domestic violence. (Id.

¶ 8). The MNPD Manuel in effect in 2014 provides that:

Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Payton v. New

York, it is presumptively unreasonable for Metropolitan Nashville

Police Officers to make a non-consensual warrantless entry into a

suspect’s home for the purpose of making a routine felony arrest.

However, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly

carries with it the limited authority to enter the dwelling in which

the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is

within.

(Doc. No. 254-9 at PageID # 1308 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Doc. No. 276

¶ 10 at PageID # 1569). The Manual further provides that officers should wait until invited to enter

a property unless there is probable cause to enter the property which can include ensuring the

safety of a potential victim. (Doc. No. 276 ¶ 7). Additionally, the Manual provides that officers

should arrest a suspect in response to a domestic violence call only after they have determined

there is probable cause. (Id.). The Manual addresses making non-consensual entry into a suspect's

home for the purposes of making an arrest and when officers are permitted to enter an individual's

property without a warrant in the context of domestic violence. (Id. ¶ 8).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the

Court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence

of a genuine dispute over material facts. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). The

moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element

of the non-moving party's claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case. Id.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most

favorable for the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 242 (6th Cir. 2015); Wexler v. White’s

Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court does not weigh the evidence,

judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Rather, the Court determines whether sufficient evidence has been

presented to make the issue of material fact a proper jury question. Id. The mere scintilla of

evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to survive summary

judgment; instead, there must be evidence of which the jury could reasonably find for the

nonmoving party. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Qualified Immunity

Through their pending motions, the Officers and Vaughn seek summary judgment on

qualified immunity grounds. “Qualified immunity shields officers from civil liability when their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” King v. City of Rockford, Michigan, 97 F.4th 379, 390 (6th Cir. 2024)

(citation and internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate unless the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff would permit a

reasonable juror to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was

clearly established. See id. “If either prong is not met, then the government officer is entitled to

qualified immunity.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 604 (6th Cir. 2018). When a defendant

asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff has burden of showing that the defendant

is not entitled to qualified immunity. Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 546 (6th Cir. 2024).

To be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes, “a legal principle must have a

sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995,

1009 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). In the context of a

warrantless arrest, a “clearly established” rule, for qualified immunity purposes, must resolve

whether the circumstances with which the particular officer was confronted constituted probable

cause. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. “To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest,

[courts] examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts,

viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.”

Id. at 56–57 (internal quotations omitted). Because probable cause deals with probabilities and

depends on the totality of the circumstances, it is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even

usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Id. at 57 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

“It requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of

such activity.” Id. “Given its imprecise nature, officers will often find it difficult to know how the

general standard of probable cause applies in the precise situation encountered.” Id. at 64 (citation

and internal quotations omitted). “Thus, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] stressed the need to identify a

case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. “While there does not have to be a case directly on point, existing precedent

must place the lawfulness of the particular arrest beyond debate” such that “a body of relevant case

law is usually necessary to clearly establish the answer with respect to probable cause.” Id.

(citations and internal quotations omitted).

1. Count One

In Count One, Howell and Brown claim Vaughn, McCormick, Aldea, and Polk violated

their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (See Amended

Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 48-66). Howell and Brown argue the law was clearly established as of

December 2014 that an unsubstantiated 911 call did not create probable cause for an arrest. (See

Doc. No. 275 at 1, 11-15). In support, Howell and Brown cite to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213

(1983) and Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 843 (6th Cir. 2005). Both of these cases are inapposite.

In Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court considered the application of the Fourth Amendment to the

issuance of a search warrant based on a partially corroborated anonymous informant's tip. 462 U.S.

213, 217 (1983). There, the police had received an anonymous letter stating that a husband and

wife were engaged in selling drugs, had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement, and that

they were picking up more drugs in Florida in a few days. See id. at 213. The police acted on the

tip by arranging for surveillance of the couple’s travel arrangements and then obtained a search

warrant based on the foregoing facts. See id. When the couple arrived at their home, the police

were waiting and discovered drugs and other contraband in the couple’s car and home. See id. The

Supreme Court determined that the judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding

that probable cause to search the couple’s home and car existed because the anonymous letter had

been corroborated through the police’s independent investigation. See id. at 242-46, 214 (“Under

the ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis, corroboration by details of an informant’s tip by

independent police work is of significant value.”).

Fisher v. Harden concerned a seizure based on an attempted suicide. In that case the Sixth

Circuit considered “whether it was clearly established at the time of Fisher's arrest that a law

enforcement officer may not affect a mental health seizure without probable cause.” 398 F.3d 837,

846 (6th Cir. 2005). The officers in Fisher were responding to a dispatch that a man, who had tied

himself to railroad tracks, might be attempting to commit suicide. See id. at 843. When the officers

arrived, Fisher, who was not tied to the railroad tracks, complied with their orders and “did not do

anything that the officers considered to be suspicious or threatening.” Id. And the Sixth Circuit

determined it was “clearly established that an officer may not affect a mental health seizure without

probable cause.” Id. at 849.

Neither Illinois nor Fisher are cases “where an officer is acting under similar circumstances

was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018). The

officers in Illinois and Fisher were not responding to a domestic disturbance call, as in the present

case. Nor were the officers in Illinois and Fisher responding to a 911 call from a contemporaneous

eyewitness, as in the present case. Because firsthand knowledge and contemporaneity weigh in

favor of a statement's reliability, courts in the Sixth Circuit distinguish a 911 call from a

contemporaneous eyewitness account as more reliable than a 911 call from an informant with less

proximity in time and space to the reported criminal activity. See Robinson v. Howes, 663 F.3d

819, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing cases); United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“hearsay may be sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant, so long

as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.”) (internal quotations omitted).

In sum, Howell and Brown have failed to direct the undersigned to a case directly on-point

or existing precedent placing the lawfulness of the challenged searches and seizures beyond

debate. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. As such, they have failed to meet their burden of establishing

the Officers and/or Vaughn are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count One. Therefore,

these defendants’ motions will be granted as to Count One on qualified immunity grounds.

2. Count Two

In Count Two, Howell claims McCormick, Aldea, Massey, Jenson, and Polk violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure of property. (See Amended

Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 67-71).1 In response to these officers’ claims of qualified immunity for

Count Two, Howell merely submits that “seizing a vehicle may constitute a Fourth Amendment

violation, if done unreasonably.” (Doc. No. 275 at 32 (citing Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 493-

94 (6th Cir. 1989)).

In Collins v. Nagle, the Sixth Circuit held that, in analyzing whether the seizure of a vehicle

was proper under the Fourth Amendment, a court must determine whether the “decision to

impound was reasonable under the circumstances.” 892 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing

Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967)). Collins concerned the impoundment of a truck in

connection with a mining investigation:

The facts and circumstances surrounding the impoundment are

numerous. An unidentified pickup truck was blocking the mining

1 Howell also has claims against Vaughn that are addressed separately. See infra III.B.

investigators' exit from the site where they were investigating a

suspected illegal mining operation. M. Collins and Fultz were

present when the mining investigators tried to leave and stated that

they did not have the keys to the truck. At no other point during the

incident did anyone claim to be able to move the truck. Since Martin,

Riddle and Brown had seen M. Collins and Fultz in the truck on

numerous occasions, it was reasonable to believe that they had

custody and control of the pickup. B. Collins appeared on the scene

during the arrest. However, he did not identify himself to the mining

investigators; and he did not indicate that he had dominion and

control over the truck. Before following Brown's order to leave the

scene, B. Collins merely claimed that he had a right to be on the

premises. It was only after taking the truck into custody that the

mining investigators traced the registration and discovered that

Maggie Collins, B. Collins' wife, was the true owner of the truck.

Thus, once the mining investigators decided to arrest M. Collins and

Fultz, they were faced with the problem of securing the truck. We

find that the impoundment was a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful,

means to insure against the damage or theft of the abandoned truck,

as the mining investigators knew of no other person immediately

available to take custody of the vehicle. Brown, 787 F.2d at 932.

Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 1989).

In the present case, the Officers did not impound the vehicle at issue. As such, Collins is

not on-point or helpful in resolving the issue of qualified immunity as to Count Two. Because

Collins was the only case identified by Howell to meet the “clearly established” prong of the

qualified immunity analysis, he fails to meet his burden of establishing that McCormick, Aldea,

Massey, Jenson, and Polk are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two. Mosier v. Evans,

90 F.4th 541, 546 (6th Cir. 2024). Therefore, the Officers’ motion for summary judgment will be

granted as to Count Two on qualified immunity grounds.

3. Count Three

In Count Three, Howell claims McCormick violated his Fourth Amendment right to be

free from seizure by malicious prosecution. (See Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 72-85).

While Howell responds to McCormick’s motion for summary judgment as to the merits of this

Count, he does not appear to address McCormick’s assertions of qualified immunity. (See Doc.

No. 275 at 24-29). Accordingly, Howell fails to meet his burden of establishing that McCormick

is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Three. See Mosier, 90 F.4th at 546. Therefore, the

Officers’ motion will be granted as to Count Three on qualified immunity grounds.

4. Count Four

In Count Four, Howell claims McCormick, Aldea, and Polk violated his Fifth Amendment

rights to remain silent and to not be compelled to be a witness against himself. (See Amended

Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 86-92). Howell fails to argue against qualified immunity as to

McCormick, Aldea, or Polk in his response to their motion for summary judgment as to Count

Four. Accordingly, Howell fails to meet his burden of establishing that McCormick, Aldea, and

Polk are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Four. See Mosier, 90 F.4th at 546.

Therefore, the Officers’ motion will be granted as to Count Four on qualified immunity grounds.

B. Remaining federal claims against Vaughn

The Court now turns to Vaughn’s arguments for summary judgment on Counts Two and

Four, on the merits.

1. Count Two

In Count Two, Howell claims Vaughn seized his vehicle in violation his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure of property. (See Amended Complaint,

Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 67-71). A seizure results in a constitutional violation only if it is unreasonable.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). To prevail in a claim for damages under Section

1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional

violations because each defendant’s liability must be assessed individually based on his own

actions. See Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider, 954 F.3d 842, 850 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted); see

also Chaney-Snell v. Young, 98 F.4th 699, 721 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Section 1983 generally prohibits

a plaintiff from holding one officer liable for another's actions.”). Thus, to survive summary

judgment, a plaintiff must put forward evidence suggesting that the defendant participated in the

violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, since as a general rule, mere presence at the scene

of a search, without a showing of direct responsibility for the action, will not subject an officer to

liability. See id. Here, Vaughn argues he is entitled to summary judgment on Count Two based on

Brown’s following deposition testimony:

Q. She came back at some point, and do you think you were

asleep when she took the car?

A. No, I was awake when she took the car.

Q. What happened there? Who –

A. I know she pushed it out of the driveway somehow. And I

don’t know what she did with it once she got it to the street,

after she got it out of the garage.

Q. Did you observe Officer Vaughn or any of these officers

helping her push that car?

A. I don’t remember. They might – like at one point they were

in the garage with her. This was before she had left and while

they were still here while I was still – because they had me

in cuffs. And they had taken me from where I was outside

back inside. And they had said they wanted to keep us

separate, you know, in case anything happened, Leila and I.

So I was in the living room restrained and she was out in the

garage. And some of the officers were outside, so I don’t

know if they had – if there was any cooperation there.

Q. Did you see any of them help her take that car, yes or no?

A. No.

Q. And you didn’t have any ownership interest in that vehicle,

right?

A. No, I sure didn’t.

(Brown Deposition from February 7, 2017, Doc. No. 254-3 at PageID # 1211-12).

Q. When you say there was an issue with the car, you’re

referring to the Lumina?

A. Yeah.

Q. It was still in the driveway at that time?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. You don’t remember whether –

A. I don’t remember if she got it out, if she had it towed. I don’t

remember what happened with that. I know she was trying

to get it out, but I don’t remember exactly what ended up

happening with it.

Q. But anyway, you have a recollection at some point, even

after the officers had left, the vehicle was still on the

premises?

A. Correct.

Q. While she was fooling around, trying to either get the vehicle

towed or get it started and whatever she was doing with that,

you didn’t call any police to say stop her from taking the

vehicle, did you?

A. I didn’t, no.

(Brown Deposition from July 15, 2017, Doc. No. 248-2 at PageID # 1134).

In his response, Howell fails to direct the Court to evidence in the record suggesting that

Vaughn participated in a seizure of his vehicle. Instead, Howell denies the vehicle was still on the

premises after the officers had left (see Doc. No. 276 ¶ 25 at PageID # 1544 (citing McCormick

Trial Testimony from Feb. 22, 2016, Doc. No. 277-4 at PageID # 1726)). Even viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to Howell and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, he has

failed to create a genuine dispute as to whether Vaughn seized the vehicle in question.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Vaughn has demonstrated the absence of any material dispute of

fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Two.

2. Count Four

With respect to Count Four, Howell claims Vaughn violated his rights under the Fifth

Amendment. A Fifth Amendment violation occurs only if compelled incriminating statements are

used against the defendant at trial. See Peterson v. Heymes, 931 F.3d 546, 555 (6th Cir. 2019)

(citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003)); United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494

U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (“The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth

Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law

enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation

occurs only at trial”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985) (the Fifth Amendment

prohibits the prosecution's use of compelled testimony in its case in chief). Additionally, the United

States Supreme Court has held that a violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a

Section 1983 claim. See Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 141-150 (2022).

Here, Howell claims Vaughn violated his Fifth Amendment rights by physically assaulting

him in relation for invoking his right to remain silent and by arresting Howell’s girlfriend. (Doc.

No. 275 at 30). As the challenged conduct does not violate the Fifth Amendment,2 Vaughn is

entitled to summary judgment as to Count Four.

C. Municipal Liability

In Counts One, Two, and Three, Howell and Brown seek to hold Metro liable under Section

1983. A municipality is only liable under Section 1983 “if the plaintiff demonstrates that the injury

suffered was a direct result of the city's official policy or custom.” Wiley v. City of Columbus,

Ohio, 36 F.4th 661, 670 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 456 (6th Cir.

2008)). There are at least four avenues a plaintiff may take to prove the existence of a

2 The Court has already addressed Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the seizure of Howell.

municipality's policy or custom: (1) the municipality's legislative enactments or official agency

policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of

inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights

violations. Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

1. Count One

a. Allegations in the Complaint

In Count One, Howell and Brown claim that MNPD has a policy and practice of officers

intruding upon homes without a warrant in the middle of the night and generally failing to train

and supervise its officers, including supervisors failing to punish officers who violate the rights of

citizens. (See Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 48-66). In support, Howell and Brown allege

MNPD officers routinely implement “knock-and-talks” under which multiple officers go to the

entrance of a house at bothersome hours, in an effort to persuade or intimidate the homeowner into

granting consent for entry without having to get a warrant. (Id. ¶ 52). The Amended Complaint

alleges two examples of MNPD forcibly invading the curtilage of a home at improper hours: (1)

the allegedly warrantless seizure of Willie Pointer at his home on April 14, 2011, during a

nighttime knock-and-talk, and (2) the allegedly warrantless seizure of David Chase on June 8,

2014. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54).3

On the issue of improper supervision, the Amended Complaint alleges, as to Count One,

that “supervisors routinely fail to punish officers who violate the rights of citizens – even when

those officers commit criminal acts.” (Id. ¶ 62). The Amended Complaint alleges that, as “just one

3 Through its motion for summary judgment, Metro submits that the Chase case did not involve

warrantless entry, warrantless arrest, or warrantless seizure. (Doc. No. 260 at 6 (citing Chase v. White, 2016

WL 7210155 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (granting defendants’ motions to dismiss)). Plaintiffs do not argue

otherwise or even mention the Chase case in their response. (See Doc. No. 275).

example,” the Internal Affairs division failed to investigate Howell’s complaint in this particular

case. (Id. ¶ 63). The Amended Complaint further alleges that MNPD has an official policy of

working hand-in-hand with District Attorney Glenn Funk to shield officers from liability by

threatening people with baseless prosecutions. (Id. ¶ 65). Additionally, the Amended Complaint

alleges that MNPD has frequently allowed officers who committed crimes or serious disciplinary

offenses to leave the MNPD in good standing, rather than seeking POST certification. (Doc. No.

72 ¶ 66 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-8-104(b)-(c); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1110-02-.04(2)(b)).4

b. Metro’s arguments for summary judgment as to Count One

Through its motion for summary judgment on Count One, Metro submits that Howell has

not shown that MNPD had a policy and practice to intrude on homes in disregard of the Fourth

Amendment curtilage doctrine. (Doc. No. 260 at 6-7). In support, Metro produces evidence of the

training that the officers receive. (See Christoper Gilder Deposition, Doc. No. 254-8 at PageID #

1267-69, 1270-74, 1280-87; MNPD Manual, Doc. No. 254-9 at PageID # 1299-1300, 1308, 1329,

1336, 1339)). Next, Metro argues Howell and Brown cannot establish that it fails to punish officers

because there are systems in place for citizens to file complaints against officers and procedures

for investigating those complaints. (See Doc. No. 260 at 7 (citing Christoper Gilder Deposition,

Doc. No. 254-8)). As for the alleged failure to investigate Howell’s complaint, Metro submits there

are a myriad of situations where an OPA complaint might be closed and contends there has been

4 Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (“POST Commission” or “the

Commission”) is an administrative body established by Tennessee's legislature. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 38–

8–101, et seq. The POST Commission's responsibilities are related to the training and qualifications of law

enforcement officers in Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 38–8–104. The powers and duties of the POST

Commission are set out by statute and in the rules promulgated by the Commission, as authorized in the

statutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 38–8–104; POST Commission Rules and Regulations (Tennessee Compiled

Rules & Regulations 1110–01–.01, et seq.). Under the statutes and the regulations, the POST Commission

has the power to deny, suspend, or revoke the certification of law enforcement officers who do not meet the

established standards. See Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 00–191, 2000 WL 33115961 (Dec. 20, 2000).

no showing that anything was improper about the OPA investigation. (See id.). Additionally, Metro

argues it cannot be held liable for the alleged conduct of District Attorney Glen Funk. (Id. at 8).5

With regard to the POST allegations, Metro submits there is no showing of a custom or policy to

not notify POST of officer resignations in lieu of terminations. Metro also argues Plaintiffs have

failed to show how the alleged POST policy or custom influenced the officers’ conduct in this case

in anyway. (Id. at 8-9).

c. Plaintiffs’ response

In their response, Plaintiffs contend that Metro is wrong to suggest that they “cannot

possibly show that it has any constitutional policies or customs …. because the Complaint alleges

improper supervision or training, and the Plaintiffs are in possession of a great deal of facts in that

regard.” (Doc. No. 275 at 32). According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he specific facts fall into two categories:

1) [Metro] trains its officers that the Fourth Amendment protections for the home are dispensable,

and 2) [Metro] routinely protects, rather than punishes, officers who commit wrongdoing.” (Id.).

As for the first category – defective training/supervision on the Fourth Amendment –

Plaintiffs submit that, “[b]asically, Metro Nashville trains its officers that the Fourth Amendment

does not really apply to its officers, at least not when it comes to entering people’s homes.” (Doc.

No. 275 at 33). In support, Plaintiffs cite to Sections 15.50.020-F and 5.20.010 of the MNPD

manual and excerpts of Polk and McCormick’s testimony from Howell’s criminal trial about their

training. (Doc. No. 275 at 33 (citing Doc. Nos. 277-5; 277-4; 277-9). Plaintiffs argue that “[a]long

these same lines, Metro Nashville has a widespread custom of abusing the knock-and-talk power

to violate homeowner’s rights.” (Doc. No. 275 at 34 (citing Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶

52, 55)). Plaintiffs submit that “[t]his unconstitutional custom is particularly relevant here because

5 Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument in their response. (See Doc. No. 275).

the Officers effectively arrested Plaintiff Howell from the very moment that they laid eyes on him

at the front door.” (Id. at 34). Additionally, Plaintiffs submit that the Officers’ “show of force,

aggressively summoning him, using multiple officers to confront him at night, followed by

pointing at least one gun at him, was not consistent with the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by

the Supreme Court in See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).” (Id.).6

As to the second category – defective supervision/custom of protecting rather than

punishing officers who commit wrongdoing – Plaintiffs submit that, “[r]egardless of any training,

the Complaint also argues that, whenever Nashville officers violate the law, they are routinely

protected rather than disciplined.” (Doc. No. 275 at 35). In support, Plaintiffs identify “[a]s one

flagrant and notable example,” when the Office of Professional Accountability “made only a token

effort to investigate” Howell’s complaint about the December 2014 incident, “refusing even to

interview the witnesses in question before (apparently) exonerating the officers.” (Id. (citing

Howell Declaration, Doc. No. 277-2 ¶ 15)).7 Plaintiffs submit “[e]vidence at trial will show that

the investigation was immediately closed because the OPA spoke with Metro Nashville’s

attorneys.” (Doc. No. 275 at 35 (citing Plaintiffs’ manual filing of an Audio CD)). Plaintiffs point

to evidence that it is difficult to discipline MNPD officers and that the Nashville Civil Service

6 Plaintiffs do not bring federal claims of excessive use of force in the present matter.

7 Paragraph 15 of Howell’s Declaration provides as follows:

While my criminal trial was pending (but after I filed my lawsuit), my

attorney Drew Justice told me that he had received a voicemail from the

Office of Professional Accountability about my case. I told him that of

course I wanted to speak with them about my grievances, and I told him

to let them know that I was available. My understanding is that they never

would call him back. Later I found out that they closed the OPA file right

after they opened it, and that they closed it after speaking with Metro

Legal. They never did interview me about my complaint.

Commission has reversed the chief of police’s attempts to discipline officers, on numerous

occasions. (Doc. No. 275 at 36 (citing Doc. No. 277-10 at PageID 1813-14)).

Plaintiffs also cite to a MNPD investigation into a 2011 complaint against Detective Polk

as evidence of Metro ratifying a false arrest. (Doc. No. 275 at 35-36 (citing MNPD complaint

report, Doc. No. 277-12)). According to the MNPD complaint report, an individual complained

that Detective Polk “issued her a citation without questioning her first” and “slapped her arm

causing bruising and took her to jail without allowing her to receive medical treatment for the

injuries.” (Doc. No. 277-12 at PageID # 1870). While Plaintiffs contend, without explanation, that

“the OPA condoned the false arrest,” (see Doc. No. 275 at 36), the contents of the complaint report

indicate that Polk’s supervising officer interviewed the complainant and other fact witnesses,

including Polk, before concluding that the complaint was not sustained. (See Doc. No. 277-12 at

PageID # 1872-76).

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that “Metro Nashville has previously implemented a policy of

allowing these rogue officers to resign in good standing, instead of reporting their misdeeds to the

state Police Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission as required by law.” (Doc. No.

275 at 26 (citing Disciplinary File Excerpts of Chad Knaggs, Chad Barth, Tyrone Wimberly, Bruce

Guldeman, and Mitchell Kizer, Doc. Nos. 277-17, 277-14, 277-18, 277-15, 277-16)). Plaintiffs

argue the foregoing practice – allowing officers who committed crimes or serious disciplinary

offenses to leave the MNPD in good standing without reporting to the POST Commission – “can

be said to be a ‘moving force’ behind the police misconduct here” because “[a] police officer who

can simply cover up his misdeeds in one department, resigning in good standing before going to

work at another, has no motivation to obey the law.” (Doc. No. 275 at 37).

d. Metro’s reply

As for the allegedly defective training/supervision on the Fourth Amendment, Metro argues

in its reply that Detective Polk’s testimony about his Fourth Amendment training is insufficient to

establish municipal liability here because the Supreme Court has recognized “[t]hat a particular

officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the

officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.” (Doc.

No. 285 at 3 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989)). As for Metro’s

alleged custom of using “knock-and-talks” to persuade or intimidate the homeowner into granting

consent for entry without having to get a warrant, (Doc. No. 72 ¶ 52), Metro submits that the

incident on December 9, 2014, was not a “knock and talk” because the parties agree that it was a

Code 3 response to a domestic disturbance. (See Doc. No. 285 at 3-4; Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 4, 6, 7 at

PageID # 1546-47). Accordingly, Metro argues Plaintiffs cannot hold it liable for a policy or

custom of illegal “knock-and-talks” because the alleged injury – violation of the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures – was brought about by a

Code 3 response rather than a “knock -and-talk.” Additionally, Metro argues the failure to train

theory of liability fails on summary judgment because Plaintiffs have not identified more than one

instance of a purportedly inappropriate “knock-and-talk.”

As for the allegedly defective supervision/custom of protecting rather than punishing

officers who commit wrongdoing, in its reply, Metro points to five “Change of Status Forms” sent

to the POST Commission notifying it that the five respective officers had been suspended for 30

days. (See Doc. No. 285 at 5; Doc. No. 283 ¶¶ 5-9 at PageID # 1958-60 (citing Doc. No. 277-14

at 3; Doc. No. 283-1 at 3-5; Doc. No. 277-15 at 4)). Metro further argues, even though it is difficult

to discipline officers, Plaintiffs have not shown that Metro has not pursued discipline when

warranted. (Doc. No. 285 at 5).

e. Analysis

According to Plaintiffs’ response, they pursue two theories of municipal liability for their

claimed violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures in Count One: 1) failure to train on the Fourth Amendment protections for the home, and

2) failure to supervise/punish officers who commit wrongdoing. (See Doc. No. 275 at 32). The

Court will address the parties’ arguments as to each theory of municipality liability in turn.

i. Failure to Train

To succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must

prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the

inadequacy was the result of the municipality's deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was

closely related to or actually caused the injury. See Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun.

Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Harris v. City of Saginaw, Michigan, 62

F.4th 1028, 1039 (6th Cir. 2023) (“the City's potential liability for failure to supervise… turns on

whether the City exhibited deliberate indifference to its citizens' constitutional rights.”).8

In its motion for summary judgment, Metro challenges Plaintiffs’ proof as to the first

element – that the training was inadequate for the tasks performed – by producing evidence of the

training that it provides to its officers. (See Doc. No. 260 at 4-7). Metro also challenges Plaintiffs’

8 There are two ways to support a claim that a failure to train or supervise is the result of a

municipality's deliberate indifference – i.e., element two – a plaintiff may prove (1) a pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees or (2) a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by

a showing that the municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting

an obvious potential for a constitutional violation. See Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Kentucky, 60 F.4th 305,

323 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 692, 217 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2024) (citing Shadrick v. Hopkins

Cnty., 805 F.3d 724, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2015)).

proof as to the second element – that the inadequacy was closely related or actually caused the

injury – arguing it cannot be held liable for the alleged policy and practice of abusive “knock-and-

talks” because the parties agree that the incident at issue in this case arose from MNPD officers

responding to a Code 3 involving a domestic disturbance. (Doc. No. 260 at 5).9 Stated another

way, Metro has produced unrebutted evidence that the alleged policy and practice of abusive

“knock-and-talks” was not the moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury in Count One.

In their response, Plaintiffs attempt to create a dispute of material fact as to the first element

by pointing to Detective Polk’s trial testimony about his training on the Fourth Amendment

protections against warrantless entry into homes. (See Doc. No. 275 at 33). However, in its reply,

Metro asserts that Detective Polk’s cited testimony is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of

material fact as to the adequacy of Metro’s training because, under City of Canton v. Harris, “[t]hat

a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the

city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training

program.” (Doc. No. 285 at 3 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989)).

As for Metro’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ ability to meet the second element – that the alleged

“knock-and-talk” custom or policy was closely related to or actually caused the constitutional

injury – Plaintiffs conclusively respond by stating “[a]ll the aforementioned defective training,

custom, and supervision could quite reasonably be called the ‘moving force’ behind the Fourth

Amendment violations here.” (Doc. No. 275 at 35). Even viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, they have failed to

9 As noted above, the parties agree that MNPD trains its officers on the Fourth Amendment

protections for the home, including in the context of domestic violence, (Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 4-8, 10 at PageID

# 1566-69), and that the MNPD officers came to Howell’s residence on the night in question on a Code 3

response to a domestic disturbance. (Doc. No. 285 at 3-4; Doc. No. 276 ¶¶ 4, 6, 7 at PageID # 1546-47).

demonstrate a genuine dispute as to whether the alleged “knock-and-talk” custom or policy was

closely related to or actually caused the alleged constitutional injury in Count One.

ii. Ratification

To succeed on a “ratification” theory, a plaintiff needs evidence “that an official with final

decision-making authority ratified the conduct.” Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2024).

“A plaintiff can establish municipal liability by showing that the municipality ratifies the

unconstitutional acts of its employees by failing to meaningfully investigate and punish allegations

of unconstitutional conduct.” Wright v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 962 F.3d 852, 882 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citing Leach v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1247–48 (6th Cir. 1990)).

In its motion for summary judgment, Metro submits that Plaintiffs cannot establish that it

fails to punish officers for alleged misconduct because it produced evidence of the systems in place

for citizens to file complaints against officers and procedures for investigating those complaints.

(See Doc. No. 260 at 7 (citing Christoper Gilder Deposition, Doc. No. 254-8)). In further support,

Metro notes that Polk was not punished for the 2011 complaint against him because the

investigation exonerated him. (See Doc. No. 277-12 at PageID # 1872-76). And as for its alleged

policy of not reporting the misdeeds of “rogue” officers to the POST Commission, Metro produces

“Change of Status Forms” it sent to the POST Commission notifying the Commission that Chad

Knaggs, Chad Barth, Tyrone Wimberly, Bruce Guldeman, and Mitchell Kizer had each been

suspended for misconduct. (See Doc. No. 285 at 5; Doc. No. 283 ¶¶ 5-9 at PageID # 1958-60

(citing Doc. No. 277-14 at 3; Doc. No. 283-1 at 3-5; Doc. No. 277-15 at 4)). Even viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor,

Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Metro has failed to

meaningfully punish allegations of unconstitutional conduct.

Plaintiffs also seek to establish municipal liability for Metro’s alleged failure to meaningful

investigate Howell’s complaint of unconstitutional conduct about the present matter. A

municipality's ratification of unconstitutional conduct by its employees may take form of failure

to investigate if there have been multiple earlier inadequate investigations that concern comparable

claims. Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541 (6th Cir. 2024) (inaction can also support municipal liability

under Section 1983 when there is a clear and persistent pattern of illegal activity). Here, Plaintiffs

have failed to direct the Court to evidence in the record of any earlier inadequate investigations

that concern comparable claims. (See Doc. No. 275). As such, Plaintiffs have also failed to create

a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Metro has failed to meaningfully investigate allegations of

unconstitutional misconduct.

For the foregoing reasons, Metro will be granted summary judgment as to Count One.

2. Count Two

In Count Two, Howell claims that, but for MNPD’s failure to supervise its officers, his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure of property would not have been

violated. (See Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 72 ¶¶ 67-71). In support of this claim, Howell alleges

Metro failed to discipline Defendant McCormick after he was sued in federal court for allegedly

having a person’s vehicle towed illegally. (Id. ¶ 71).

Through its motion for summary judgment, Metro notes that this Court, in Tuell v.

McCormick, No. 3:14-CV-1834, 2015 WL 4727144 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 7, 2015), determined that

it was a reasonable decision to have the vehicle at issue towed and impounded under the

circumstances. (Doc. No. 260 at 9 (citing Tuell at *6). Metro submits that McCormick did not

deserve to be disciplined for having that person’s vehicle towed because the seizure was

reasonable. (See id.). Howell does not address Metro’s argument for summary judgment as to

Count Two in his response. (See Doc. No. 275). Accordingly, Metro’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted as unopposed as to Count Two.

3. Count Three

In Count Three, Howell claims that, but for MNPD’s failure to supervise its officers, his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution would not have been violated.

(Doc. No. 72 ¶ 83). Howell alleges that Metro “fosters a culture of reckless prosecution” by “upon

information and belief, … routinely send[ing] officers to procure indictments who have zero

knowledge about the cases being prosecuted.” (Id. ¶ 84). Howell also alleges the Chief of Police

for MNPD “specifically assisted the illegal prosecution of [Howell], by filing a motion to illegally

quash a subpoena so that the Chief would not have to testify in [Howell]’s defense.” (Id. ¶ 85).

Metro moves for summary judgment on Count Three on the basis that “Howell has failed

to make a showing of a Metro policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged

malicious prosecution by its officers.” (Doc. No. 260 at 10). It argues Howell has not demonstrated

any prior instances of malicious prosecution that would lead to Metro being put on notice as to the

failure to supervise. (Id. at 11). Metro also cites to its policies for review and supervision of

prosecutions that may have been mishandled by an officer. (Id. at 12). As for the officers who

procure indictments, Metro argues Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-12-104 does not

preclude personnel from Case Preparation testifying before the grand jury so long as they have

knowledge or proof regarding the criminal offense. (Id. at 12). Last, Metro submits (without

citation to the record) that the criminal court quashed the subpoena for the Chief of Police and that

Howell has not shown any impropriety by Metro or the Chief of Police in seeking to have the

subpoena squashed. (Id. at 12-13). In his response, Howell does not appear to address Metro’s

foregoing arguments for summary judgment as to Count Three. Accordingly, Metro’s motion for

summary judgment will be granted as unopposed as to Count Three.

D. State Law Claims

As the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims, it will decline to exercise supplemental

Jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (noting that a district

court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if... (3)

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); see also

Hamilton vy. Franklin, Tennessee, 608 F. Supp. 3d 599, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 2022). Further,

“[nJeedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote

Justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” United

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Here, the interest of judicial economy weighs

against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction because questions remain about

whether state law would provide qualified immunity to the individual officer defendants in this

matter. See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Residual

Jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the

avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law

issues.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice

and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 245, 249, 251, 260) will be granted

as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

An appropriate Order will enter. = /

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28