Brown v. Roland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

COLUMBIA DIVISION

RONALD BROWN, #130144, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 1:23-cv-00058

)

SHERIFF BUCKY ROWLAND, ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a pro se Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) and an

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 3), filed by state inmate Ronald

Brown over conditions during his incarceration at the Maury County Jail. The case is before the

Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP application and initial review of the Complaint under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP

A prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing

fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from Plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds

to pay the entire filing fee, that application (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED and a $350 filing fee is

ASSESSED. The fee will be collected in installments as described below.

The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust

account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)

20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average

monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of

the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s

preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when

the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350

filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which

Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining

to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,

the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of

confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order

must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. INITIAL REVIEW

A. Legal Standard

In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the

Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.

To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the

Court reviews for whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although pro se pleadings must be liberally

construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the plaintiff must still “plead[] factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.

2009).

Plaintiff filed this action under Section 1983, which authorizes a federal suit against any

person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-

Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the

Complaint must plausibly allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and

(2) that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595

(6th Cir. 2014).

B. Allegations and Claims

Plaintiff is a 70-year-old, disabled inmate of the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex

(BCCX), where he is serving a 43-year sentence imposed in 2003. (See Doc. No. 1 at 4, 6.) He

alleges that, on June 10, 2023, when he was detained at the Maury County Jail on “[p]ending

charges” following a June 7 “VOP” (presumably, violation of parole), he tripped and fell against

the wall of his cell, breaking his left arm. (Id. at 4, 6; Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.) Approximately three

hours later, he was taken to an outside clinic for an x-ray which revealed the broken bone. (Doc.

No. 1 at 4.) He was given a temporary arm brace, scheduled for a follow up appointment at the

clinic six weeks later, and returned to the Jail. (Id.; Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff was given Tylenol

and “some other pill” for pain at the jail, but no other medical attention. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.) On

July 24, 2023, he was transferred to state custody. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights

were violated when the jail failed to provide further medical treatment or return him to the outside

clinic, instead “sen[ding] [him] to prison to avoid this.” (Id. at 2.) He claims that the jail left him

to endure mental and physical “pain and anguish” before transferring him to BCCX (id. at 1–2),

and that in the meantime they put him on “max security” for “expressing [him]self,” without

charging him with any disciplinary violation. (Doc. No. 1 at 4–5; Doc. No. 1-1 at 1.)

Plaintiff sues Maury County Sheriff Bucky Rowland. The Complaint does not identify the

relief Plaintiff seeks.

C. Analysis

For purposes of initial review, the Court presumes that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee

during his time at the Maury County Jail. See Hanington v. Multnomah Cnty., 593 F. Supp. 3d

1022, 1032 (D. Or. 2022) (noting that circuit courts “have generally found that individuals arrested

for suspected parole violations are pretrial detainees”) (citing, e.g., Martin v. Warren Cnty., Ky.,

799 F. App’x 329, 334, 337 (6th Cir. 2020)). As such, Plaintiff had a Fourteenth Amendment right

to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Hyman v. Lewis, 27 F. 4th

1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 2022). To state a claim for a violation of this right, Plaintiff must allege that:

(1) he had a sufficiently serious medical need; and (2) a defendant “acted deliberately (not

accidentally), [and] also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either

known or so obvious that it should be known.” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., 60 F. 4th 305,

317 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Even affording the Complaint a liberal construction and viewing its allegations in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, it does not support a plausible claim that Plaintiff’s constitutional right

to adequate medical care was violated at the Maury County Jail. The Complaint’s allegations

establish that Plaintiff was taken to an outside clinic for x-ray of his arm within three hours of

injuring it; that the x-ray revealed a broken bone; and that the evaluation of that injury resulted in

the prescription of an arm brace and the scheduling of a follow up visit in six weeks’ time. Then,

upon arriving back at the Jail, Plaintiff was given two different medications to treat his pain.

“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the

treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to

constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law,” unless “the medical attention rendered [is]

so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860

n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). It cannot plausibly be claimed that the medical treatment Plaintiff received at

the Jail, and at the clinic to which the Jail took him, left him in effectively the same condition as

he would have been if no medical treatment had been rendered. In short, the three-hour delay in

sending Plaintiff to the clinic was minimal, and the medical decisions to perform an x-ray, put him

in a brace, and treat his pain with oral medications cannot be equated with ignoring his injury. Nor

was the care provided suggestive of recklessness in the face of a known or obvious, unjustifiably

high risk of suffering from his arm injury. Plaintiff’s “desire for additional or different treatment

[does not by itself] suffice to support [a constitutional] claim.” Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721,

740 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anthony v. Swanson, 701 F. App’x 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2017)). At best,

the Complaint’s allegations support a claim of medical negligence that is not cognizable under

§ 1983. See Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (“[T]hat a [medical professional] has been negligent in

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim” under § 1983.).

Nor can it be claimed that the decision to send Plaintiff to BCCX around the time of his

six-week follow up appointment violated his constitutional rights. To the extent that municipal

authorities have any say in the timing of a re-arrested inmate’s transfer to state custody after a

parole or probation violation, the exercise of such discretion in order to avoid a follow up clinic

visit (rather than, say, a costly or imminently necessary surgery) simply cannot be said to violate

the Constitution. Cf. Develder v. Hirschler, No. 2:09-CV-1803-EFB P, 2016 WL 319219, at *1–3

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1162671 (E.D. Cal. Mar.

24, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint alleged that defendant (1) knew of outside

clinic’s recommendation that prisoner needed immediate surgery to remedy painful condition and

(2) scheduled that surgery, but (3) approved prisoner’s transfer just prior to scheduled surgery,

allegedly because of cost).

The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff was put on “max security” sometime after his

return from the clinic, either for “expressing [him]self” (Doc. No. 1 at 4–5) or “for no reason”

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 1); that he was transferred to BCCX in retaliation for filing grievances (id.); and

that he did not receive a phone call, mail, or reading materials at the Jail. (Id.) These bare assertions

are not supported by sufficient factual matter to support a plausible claim to relief under § 1983

against any defendant who could properly be held liable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The only

Defendant named in the Complaint is the Maury County Sheriff. In the absence of any allegation

that this Defendant was personally involved in any alleged misconduct,1 the Complaint must be

construed as suing him in his official capacity, which is tantamount to suing Maury County itself.

Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005). Maury County can only be held

liable if a county policy or custom was the “moving force” behind Plaintiff’s injuries. Miller v.

Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Complaint does not

contain any reference to a policy or custom of Maury County that caused or contributed to

Plaintiff’s alleged injuries, nor is this pleading requirement satisfied by averring to conditions that

1 The Court does not construe the isolated allegation that Defendant “ignored every response even

grievance procedure” (Doc. No. 1 at 5) as demonstrating his personal involvement, particularly in light of

the Complaint’s other allegations, which can only be read as claiming Sheriff Rowland’s responsibility as

the official in overall command of the Jail.

were, for whatever reason, allowed to obtain at the Jail. See Bowers v. Livingston Cnty., 426 F.

App’x 371, 372 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of claim against county because inmates did

not identify a policy, but only “seem[ed] to argue” that an unofficial custom of tolerating jail

conditions caused their mjury).

In sum, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and will be

dismissed on that basis.

IH. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (ai), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

58(b)(1).

It is so ORDERED.

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CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE