holding when court “finds that it can no longer provide a plaintiff with any effectual relief, the case is generally moot”
How later courts described this case
- holding when court “finds that it can no longer provide a plaintiff with any effectual relief, the case is generally moot”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CORY DUSTIN HARDIMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No.: 1:24-CV-124-TAV-CHS
)
SHERIFF JOYCE MCCONNELL, )
SANDY METCALF, VICKY AFISOV, )
PATRICK MURDOCK, JIM BALDWIN, )
and BRIAN JENKINS, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Cory Dustin Hardiman, a state inmate formerly in the custody of the
Lincoln County Jail, was permitted to proceed in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a
claim that Lincoln County officials, in their official capacities, violated his right to equal
protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. [See Doc. 4, p. 19]. Sheriff Joyce
McConnell, Sandy Metcalf, Vicky Afisov, Patrick Murdock, Jim Baldwin, and Brian
Jenkins filed a motion to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim [Doc. 25]. Plaintiff
failed to timely respond to the motion, and, consistent with the Court’s local rules, the
Court finds that plaintiff has waived any opposition to the sought relief. See E.D. Tenn.
L.R. 7.1; 7.2. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion [Doc. 25] will be
GRANTED and this action will be DISMISSED.
I. Background1
Plaintiff claims the disparate treatment between male and female felons at the
Lincoln County Jail violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because male felons may earn “2 for 1” sentence credits by working, while female felons,
who are not permitted to work, receive such sentence credits automatically [Doc. 2, p. 16].
Plaintiff applied for several jobs at the jail but was repeatedly rejected, thus denying him
the opportunity to earn sentencing credit that female felons received automatically [Id. at
10–11, 16].
Aggrieved, plaintiff filed the instant action seeking declaratory relief, a court order
“compelling defendants to apply 2 for 1 credits retroactively and prospectively[,]” and both
nominal and punitive damages [Id. at 20]. Soon after filing suit, plaintiff was transported
to the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex [Doc. 5]. He is now confined at the Northeast
Correctional Complex, his “permanent time building facility” [Doc. 11].
II. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is plausible on its face
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A claim for relief is
1 As only plaintiff’s gender-based equal protection claim survived the Court’s screening of
the complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the
Court confines its recitation of plaintiff’s allegations to this claim [Doc. 4, p. 19].
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implausible on its face when “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. When considering a plaintiff’s claims,
all factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . .
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”— “that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations omitted).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s claim is essentially that since he was not selected for a work position, he
was in the same position as female felons at the Lincoln County Jail and was thus entitled
to the automatic sentence credits the female felons received [See Doc. 2, p. 16]. But
automatic sentence credits are proscribed by Tennessee law. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 41-21-236(a)(3)(A). And, as set forth more fully below, any automatic credits were
awarded incorrectly, and that mistaken award of an extra-legal benefit to female felons did
not actually deprive plaintiff of anything.
The resolution of defendants’ motion requires consideration of Tennessee Code
Annotated § 41-21-236, which states, in relevant part, that work positions “shall be
assigned” to prisoners when available. Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(a)(1). The credit
toward the sentence for time worked, however, is discretionary. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 41-21-236(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating an inmate “who exhibits satisfactory performance within
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a program may be awarded time credits toward the sentence imposed”). Additionally, and
with only a few minor and limited exceptions, whether to grant an inmate credit is a
decision made by the “warden[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(a)(1)(A)(iii). The
warden’s decisions can then be reviewed by “the inmate disciplinary oversight board.” Id.
However, no inmate has a “right to any such time credits[.]” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 41-21-236(a)(2)(D). In fact, the law goes further to state not only that “[s]entence credits
shall not be earned or credited automatically,” but to also emphasize that awarding time is
at “the discretion of the responsible warden in accordance with the criteria established by
the [Department of Corrections]” after receiving a document certifying the inmate’s “good
institutional behavior or satisfactory program performance or both.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 41-21-236(a)(3)(A).
Given the law recited above, defendants’ alleged conduct of awarding female felons
automatic sentence credit violates Tennessee law. Defendants acknowledge this fact and
state that they “have ceased the allegedly unconstitutional practice, so there is no longer a
case or controversy for this court to consider[,]” thereby rendering plaintiff’s claim moot
[Doc. 26, p. 16 (citing Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 529 U.S. 279 ___, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796
(2021) (holding when court “finds that it can no longer provide a plaintiff with any effectual
relief, the case is generally moot”)).
But even assuming plaintiff’s claim is not mooted by defendants’ cessation of their
conduct, plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claim. Article III of the United States
Constitution provides federal courts with the judicial power to resolve “cases” and
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“controversies[.]” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The case-or-controversy requirement requires
a plaintiff to establish his or her standing to sue. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). And “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing
contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The
first is “injury in fact[,]” which requires the plaintiff to have suffered “an invasion of a
legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical[.]’” Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
156 (1990)). Second, there needs to be a causal link between the challenged conduct and
the identified injury. Id. And finally, “it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Injury In Fact
Here, Plaintiff has not personally suffered a concrete injury, i.e., one that “actually
exist[s].” See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016). When alleging an
injury-in-fact in an equal protection case, a plaintiff can show that his injury stems from
“the imposition of [a] barrier,” and need not allege the injury is “the ultimate inability to
obtain the benefit.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). But as noted above, Tennessee law explicitly
provides that automatic credits “shall not be earned or credited[.]” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 41-21-236(a)(3). Thus, plaintiff was treated as prescribed by the law, even if defendants
inappropriately disregarded that law’s applicability to others. In other words, defendants’
apparent disregard of the law in giving females automatic credits did not result in an injury
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to plaintiff that “actually exist[s]” under the law, and therefore there is no concrete injury
in this case. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340.
Furthermore, defendants’ alleged conduct did not impact plaintiff in a
“particularized” way. Id. Plaintiff complains of an extra-legal benefit to female prisoners,
but that improper benefit to the females did not impact him in an individualized manner,
as it did not prevent him from receiving anything. Rather, the benefit plaintiff complains
the females received but he did not is prohibited by statute. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 41-21-236(a)(3). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim that the female inmates received these
inappropriate sentence credits alleges only an “impermissible generalized grievance,”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted), couched in the language of an
individualized injury. Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiff has failed to establish he
suffered an injury in fact.
B. Redressability
Additionally, plaintiff has also failed to plead for relief that is likely to redress
whatever injury he may have suffered, which provides the Court with additional grounds
to dismiss his complaint. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Plaintiff has requested both nominal and punitive damages [Doc. 2, p. 20]. But for
nominal damages to serve as the basis for redressing his injury, there must have been “a
completed violation of [his] legal right.” Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 801–02. And punitive
damages, which are awarded to pursue “deterrence and retribution[,]” consider, in part, any
misconduct by the defendants and the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff.
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See State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 418 (2003). But, as
discussed above, plaintiff has not experienced a violation of any legally cognizable right,
and thus, there was no misconduct by defendants directed toward plaintiff.
Plaintiff fares no better in seeking equitable relief [Doc. 2, p. 20]. The declaration
that plaintiff was deprived of equal protection of the law would do nothing to redress any
previous harm to him. Further, an injunction compelling defendants to give plaintiff “2 for
1” sentence credits retroactively and prospectively would be a plain violation of Tennessee
law, as none of defendants have power to grant the credits plaintiff desires. See Tenn Code
Ann. § 41-21-236(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing “warden” will award the credit). Since
defendants never had the power to provide this “2 for 1” credit to begin with, an injunction
ordering the credit “prospectively and retroactively” would violate Tennessee law. Thus,
the Court finds plaintiff’s suit also lacks redressability.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants motion to dismiss [Doc. 25] will be
GRANTED, and this action will be DISMISSED. Further, the Court CERTIFIES that
any appeal from this decision would not be taken in good faith and would be totally
frivolous, such that plaintiff is DENIED leave to proceed in forma pauperis should he
choose to file an appeal. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. An
appropriate order will enter.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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