Allen v. Eller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT GREENEVILLE

JOHNATHAN ALLEN, )

) Case No. 2:23-cv-158

Petitioner, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

)

BRIAN ELLER, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, a Tennessee Department of Correction prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 asserting that the Tennessee Board of Parole

improperly denied him parole (Doc. 1) that is now before the Court. In support of his petition,

Petitioner filed exhibits (Doc. 1-1) and a memorandum (Doc. 2). Respondent filed an answer to

the petition (Doc. 14), and the state court record from Petitioner’s underlying criminal

proceedings (Doc. 13). After considering the parties’ arguments, the state court record, and the

applicable law, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2241 for the reasons

set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner pleaded guilty to an arson committed in Lincoln County, Tennessee, and

received a sentence of four years and six months in confinement. State v. Allen, No. M2022-

01400-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 5817286, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2023). On appeal,

Petitioner argued, among other things, that “the State’s negligent handling of certain sentencing

documents caused an unreasonable delay in his transfer from the jail to the prison thereby

delaying the date of his parole hearing.” Id.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) determined that Petitioner waived

review of his claim that the prosecution negligently handled documents. Id. at *1, *6–7. It also

found that, notwithstanding Petitioner’s waiver, “there [was] no proof in the record to support”

that claim. Id. at *7. Petitioner applied for discretionary review by the Tennessee Supreme

Court (“TSC”) (Doc. 13-12), and the TSC declined review (Doc. 13-14).

II. ANALYSIS

This Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who “is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because

Petitioner attacks the execution of his sentence in this action, § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle

for his claim. See Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998) (“In general, a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 is reserved for a challenge to the manner in

which a sentence is executed, rather than the validity of the sentence itself.” (citing United States

v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991))).

However, a petitioner is required to exhaust his state court remedies before pursuing

federal habeas corpus relief. See Collins v. Million, 121 F. App’x 628, 630 (6th Cir. 2005)

(finding that regardless of whether a petition is brought under § 2254 or § 2241, a petitioner “is

required first to exhaust his state court remedies”); Seaton v. Kentucky, 92 F. App’x 174, 175

(6th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of a § 2241 petition for “failure to exhaust state court

remedies”). Exhaustion is a “strictly enforced doctrine designed to promote comity between the

states and federal government by giving the state an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct

alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Rayner v. Lee, No. 3:18-CV-01103, 2020 WL

58610, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 6, 2020) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845

(1999)). Therefore, each claim—and the substance of each claim—must have been presented to

the state courts as a federal constitutional claim before it is presented in a federal habeas petition.

See, e.g., Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996). Under Tennessee law, inmates may

challenge parole decisions through a petition for a writ of certiorari. Stewart v. Schofield, 368

S.W.3d 457, 465 (Tenn. 2012) (providing that inmates challenging a parole decision “have only

the limited right of review afforded by the common law writ of certiorari”).

As the record establishes that Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court

remedies for the parole claims he seeks to bring herein, the Court will not address the merits of

those claims. As set forth above, in his direct appeal of his conviction, Petitioner pursued a

claim asserting that the prosecution’s mishandling of certain documents delayed his parole

hearing. (Doc. 13-9, at 32, 35.) But that claim is substantively different from Petitioner’s claims

in his § 2241 petition, which assert that the denial of parole to him was improper for various

reasons. (Doc. 1, at 6–7.) And the record demonstrates that Petitioner did not file a petition for a

writ of certiorari regarding the parole claims he seeks to bring in this action. (See generally Doc.

13.)

Moreover, while Petitioner states that any further attempts to exhaust his parole claims

would be futile in an exhibit to his petition (Doc. 1-1, at 2) and his memorandum (Doc. 2, at 3),

he does not support this conclusory assertion with any facts. Nor does Petitioner acknowledge or

address his failure to file a petition of writ of certiorari regarding these claims, despite Tennessee

law allowing him to do so.

Accordingly, the Court will not address the merits of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims,1

and the instant petition will be DISMISSED.

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”) before he may appeal this

Court’s decision denying federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also Greene v. Tenn.

Dep’t of Corr., 265 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring prisoner to obtain a COA to appeal

resolution of a § 2241 petition rejecting his challenge to his sentencing credit because his

custody arose out of a state conviction). A COA will not issue unless a petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” of any claim rejected on its merits,

which a petitioner may do by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). To obtain a COA on a claim that has been

rejected on procedural grounds, a petitioner must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and

that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its

1 Petitioner does not request that the Court stay this action and hold it in abeyance while he

exhausts his state court remedies, and this Court is not required to raise or address this option on

its own. McBride v. Skipper, 76 F.4th 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require district

courts to make arguments that petitioners—even pro se petitioners—fail to make. Federal

district court judges have ‘no obligation’ to warn a pro se petitioner about such a procedure . . .

(citing Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004))). But even if Petitioner had requested that the

Court stay this action and hold it in abeyance to allow him to exhaust his claims, the Court would

not do so, because Petitioner has not shown good cause for his failure to exhaust his unexhausted

claims before filing this action.  Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273, 277–78 (2005) (providing

that “because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner’s failure to present his claims first

to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there

was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court[,]” and where

the “unexhausted claims are [not] plainly meritless”).

procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Because reasonable jurists would not debate that

Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted, a COA will not issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be

DENIED, this action will be DISMISSED, and a certificate of appealability SHALL NOT

ISSUE. Further, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in

good faith and would be totally frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 24.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT SHALL ENTER.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE