The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
MARK E. CLEVELAND, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 3:24-CV-161-KAC-DCP
)
UNITED CLEANUP OAK RIDGE, LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Rules of this Court,
and Standing Order 13-02.
Now before the Court is the Motion to Strike filed by Defendant, United Cleanup Oak
Ridge, LLC (“UCOR” or “Defendant”) [Doc. 11]. Plaintiff Mark E. Cleveland responded in
opposition to the motion [Doc. 19], and Defendant replied [Doc. 20]. The motion is now ripe for
adjudication. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a). For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES
the motion [Doc. 11].
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff alleges that he was fired from his position as a Waste Operations Project Manager
for Defendant on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 21, et seq. and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 4-21-201, et seq. [Doc. 1 ¶ 127]. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s stated reason for firing
him―that he was insubordinate for transferring an employee, Patricia Sexton (“Ms. Sexton”),
1 The Court will only summarize the portions of the Complaint that are pertinent to the
instant Motion to Strike.
from one department back to his department [id.]―is pretextual [id. ¶ 91]. For context, Plaintiff
states that Ms. Sexton had worked for Defendant or its predecessors since 1995 [Id. ¶ 38; Doc. 13
¶ 38], mowing the grass at the Oak Ridge Reservation Landfill Facility (“ORRLF”) for
approximately fifteen years [Doc. 1 ¶ 40; Doc. 13 ¶ 40], and was working for Plaintiff at the
ORRLF site until she was transferred to the other UCOR facility, the radiological Environmental
Management Waste Management Facility (“EMWMF”),2 on or about November 28, 2022 [Doc. 1
¶ 34; Doc. 13 ¶ 34]. Plaintiff asserts that he was told Ms. Sexton was transferred due to mowing
season being over and an increased need at the landfills at EMWMF [Doc. 1 ¶ 41]. However,
Defendant clarifies in its Answer “that the decision to reassign Ms. Sexton to the EMWMF was
based on then existing operational circumstances and labor needs” [Doc. 13 ¶ 41]. Effective March
20, 2023, Plaintiff transferred Ms. Sexton back to her previous position at ORRLF [Doc. 1 ¶ 56;
Doc. 13 ¶ 56], based on “his understanding [that] the transfer was temporary and mowing season
was getting ready to begin” [Doc. 1 ¶ 56]. At the time Plaintiff transferred Ms. Sexton back to
ORRLF, she had filed two different Unfair Labor Practice charges against Defendant [Id. ¶ 61;
Doc. 13 ¶ 61].
On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave and then fired on April 6,
2023 [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 88–89; Doc. 13 ¶¶ 88–89].3 Plaintiff maintains that he “was terminated because
he transferred Ms. Sexton back to ORRLF” [Doc. 1 ¶ 91]. However, he claims this reason is
pretextual and that the real reason was due to his age [Id.].
2 Plaintiff explains, and Defendant admits, that there are two main landfill sites located
within the Oak Ridge Reservation in which UCOR works to decommission and demolish former
nuclear facilities [Doc. 1 ¶ 8; Doc. 13 ¶ 8]―the Oak Ridge Reservation Landfill Facility and the
radiological Environmental Management Waste Management Facility [Doc. 1 ¶ 27; Doc. 13 ¶ 27].
3 Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 89 that Plaintiff was fired on April 6, 2024,
“for a trumped-up reason” [Doc. 13 ¶ 89].
II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Defendant requests that the Court strike paragraphs 79 and 80 from Plaintiff’s Complaint
[Doc. 1], because they contain information regarding an employment decision pertaining to Ms.
Sexton, after Plaintiff had been terminated [Doc. 11]. The paragraphs provide as follows:
79. However, Defendant immediately took steps to transfer Patricia
Sexton back to EMWMF effective April 17, 2023.
80. The next day, April 18, 2023, Defendant’s Labor Relations
employees, Len Morgan and Isaac De Los Santos, among others,
suspended Patricia Sexton for allegedly trying to organize a labor
strike on behalf of the union, and, thereafter, Sexton was terminated.
[Doc. 1 ¶¶ 79–80].
Defendant argues that the information in these paragraphs is not relevant to Plaintiff’s
allegation of wrongful termination under the ADEA and THRA [Doc. 12 p. 4]. While Defendant
acknowledges that Ms. Sexton’s initial transfers are relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that he was
wrongfully terminated for transferring her back to ORRLF, “any subsequent conduct regarding
Ms. Sexton (after Plaintiff’s termination) is immaterial and impertinent to Plaintiff’s claims” [Id.].
Without these paragraphs, Defendant contends there remains enough information in the Complaint
regarding Ms. Sexton’s employment and transfer to provide context for Plaintiff’s claim [Id.].
Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged retaliation or a hostile work environment,
and that the relevant paragraphs are unnecessary because they “cannot establish an element of
Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim, as they relate to conduct after his termination involving
another employee” [Id. at 4–5].
Plaintiff responds that Defendant admitted the first two transfers of Ms. Sexton were
relevant to Plaintiff’s claim and asserts that paragraphs 79 and 80 “are not ‘impertinent and
immaterial,’ but are highly relevant to the legitimacy of Defendant’s asserted reason for Plaintiff’s
termination, and on the issue of whether the stated reason is pretext” [Doc. 19 pp. 1–2 (footnote
omitted)]. Unlike the case law cited by Defendant, Plaintiff asserts, paragraphs 79 and 80 relate
to his legal argument, do not rise to the level of prejudice nor cast aspersions of Defendant’s
character, and detail events that occurred just days after Plaintiff was terminated [Id. at 9–12
(citations omitted)]. Finally, with respect to Defendant’s stated reasons for firing Plaintiff, he
argues that “[i]t defies logic for Defendant to justify Plaintiff’s termination due to him transferring
Ms. Sexton when Defendant already had plans of its own to nevertheless fire Ms. Sexton” [Id. at
11].4
Defendant replies that Plaintiff overlooks the fact that paragraphs 79 and 80 pertain to
events that occurred after he was terminated and to another employee whose termination did not
relate to her age nor to Plaintiff [Doc. 20 pp. 1–2]. Instead, it asserts that Ms. Sexton was
“terminat[ed] for attempting to organize a labor strike [which] is not relevant to Plaintiff’s potential
pretext argument” and that to hold otherwise would result in a mini trial related to Ms. Sexton’s
termination [Id. at 2]. While Defendant has admitted that the first two transfers of Ms. Sexton are
relevant, it argues that this does not open the door for all conduct occurring after Plaintiff was
terminated to be included in the Complaint [Id. at 2–3]. Further, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff
was terminated for insubordination with respect to his decision to wrongfully reassign Ms.
Sexton,” but that does not make all circumstances surrounding Ms. Sexton’s employment relevant
[Id. at 4]. Finally, Defendant argues that it is prejudiced by the relevant paragraphs because they
will “confuse the issues, or by its length and complexity, place an undue burden on the
[defendant],” namely that it will be forced to defend these allegations specifically related to Ms.
Sexton [Id. at 5–6].
4 Defendant notes that this language does not appear in the Complaint [Doc. 20 p. 3].
III. ANALYSIS
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to “strike from a pleading
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Motions
to strike are viewed with disfavor and are not frequently granted. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953). When a party seeks to use Rule 12(f) to
strike factual allegations from a pleading, he must show that they have “no possible relation to the
controversy.” Parlak v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 05–2003, 2006 WL 3634385, at *1
(6th Cir. April 27, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 201 F.2d at 822). In other words, courts should grant motions to strike only when “the
allegations being challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of any
consideration as a defense and that their presence in the pleading throughout the proceeding will
be prejudicial to the moving party.” EEOC v. FPM Grp., Ltd., 657 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (E.D.
Tenn. 2009) (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1380 p. 650 (2d ed. 1990)). “Striking a pleading is considered ‘a drastic remedy to be resorted to
only when required for the purposes of justice’ and it ‘should be sparingly used by the courts.’” Id.
(quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 201 F.2d at 822).
Turning to the language at issue and with this guidance in mind, the Court finds
Defendant’s request to strike not well taken. The challenged language does not rise to the level of
being redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. Further, “[w]hen a party seeks to use
[Rule 12(f)] to strike factual allegations from a pleading, he must show that they have ‘no possible
relation to the controversy.’” Starnes Fam. Off., LLC v. McCullar, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1059
(W.D. Tenn. 2011) (quoting Parlak, 2006 WL 3634385, at *1). “Where the challenged allegations
‘might serve to achieve a better understanding of the . . . claim for relief or perform some other
useful purpose in promoting the just and efficient disposition of litigation,’ a motion to strike
should be denied.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the challenged language has “no
possible relation to the controversy.” Parlak, 2006 WL 3634385, at *1. Plaintiff’s Complaint
contains a number of paragraphs regarding Ms. Sexton’s employment, which Defendant agrees is
relevant to Plaintiff’s claim. Now, Defendant seeks to strike two paragraphs also related to Ms.
Sexton’s employment, detailing events that occurred after Plaintiff was terminated. As Plaintiff
asserts, his reasoning for transferring Ms. Sexton back to ORRLF and “Defendant’s reasons for
transferring Ms. Sexton back to EMWMF a few days after Plaintiff’s termination and the
circumstances existing at that time” are all potentially relevant in determining “whether
Defendant’s stated reason for Plaintiff’s termination is pretext” [Doc. 19 pp. 7–8]. And, again,
Defendant has not otherwise shown that the two paragraphs have no possible relation to the issues
in this case. Finally, while Defendant argues that it is prejudiced by Plaintiff’s allegations because
it will be forced to defend these allegations specifically related to Ms. Sexton [Doc. 20 pp. 5–6],
as previously noted, Ms. Sexton’s employment is already a part of Plaintiff’s claim. To the extent
discovery later shows these allegations to be irrelevant or prejudicial, Defendant may file a motion
in limine.5 As Defendant has not proven that the relevant paragraphs have no possible relation to
5 The Court has reviewed and found that the cases cited by Defendant are inapposite [Doc.
12 p. 5; Doc 20 p. 6]. In Jameson Land Company, LLC v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, the court granted
the motion to strike as to “references to two unrelated lawsuits in the complaint” upon finding that
the plaintiff was not a party to those lawsuits and they are immaterial to the case. No. 8:15-CV-
00409-T-27, 2016 WL 7206122, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2016). As discussed above, Defendant
has not shown that the relevant language is immaterial to the case. Similarly, this Court granted a
motion to strike in Shlosser v. University of Tennessee, upon finding that the relevant language was
“obviously false and clearly injurious to a party.” No. 3:12-CV-534, 2014 WL 5325350, at *4
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2014). Such is not the case here.
the controversy and motions to strike are disfavored, the Court finds that striking these paragraphs
is not warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike
[Doc. 11].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: _
Pd thy i bool Lr
Debra C. Poplin J
United States Magistrate Judge