“[M]ootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.”
How later courts described this case
- “[M]ootness, however it may have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CALEB ANDREW FITZGERALD, )
)
Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 3:23-272
)
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF )
PROBATION AND PAROLE and )
SCOTT KLINEFELTER, )
)
Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court1 is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 6) filed by Caleb
Andrew Fitzgerald under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges the decision of the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) about whether to release him on parole. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Petition because it is moot and deny a certificate of
appealability.
I. Relevant Background
In 2022, the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County sentenced Fitzgerald to a term
of 24 to 48 months of imprisonment on convictions of receiving stolen property and resisting
arrest. His minimum sentence date was April 30, 2023.
In May 2023, the Board issued a decision denying Fitzgerald parole. (ECF 11-4.) He
challenged the Board’s decision in a petition he filed with the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania. That court subsequently dismissed that petition as improperly filed but noted that
1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties voluntarily consented to
have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including entry of a final
judgment.
Fitzgerald could file another petition in its original jurisdiction to challenge the Board’s alleged
reliance on incorrect information in making its parole decision. (ECF 11-5.)
Fitzgerald did not seek additional relief in state court. Instead, he filed the instant Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court in which he challenges the Board’s decision to deny
him parole. At the time, the DOC was housing him at SCI Houtzdale. As relief, Fitzgerald sought
an order from this Court directing that he be immediately released from confinement.
Respondents filed an Answer (ECF 11) in which they assert that Fitzgerald is not entitled
to habeas relief because he did not exhaust his available state court remedies and also because the
Board did not violate his due process rights, or any other constitutional right, when it denied him
parole in May 2023. (ECF 11.)
Thereafter, Respondents filed an Addendum to their Answer (ECF 17) in which they
notified the Court that the Board had granted Fitzgerald parole in a decision dated July 8, 2024. In
that decision, the Board directed that Fitzgerald was to be paroled “on or after” October 25, 2024.
(ECF 17-1.) Thus, Respondents contend, the Petition is now moot.
A review of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ online Inmate and Parolee
Locator, which is available at https://www.pa.gov/en/agencies/cor/inmate-parolee-locator.html
and of which this Court takes judicial notice, confirms that Fitzgerald has been released to parole.2
II. Discussion
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a
prisoner is held in custody. See, e.g., Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013)
2 Fitzgerald has not updated his address of record. Therefore, the Court will mail this Memorandum
and accompanying final order to his address of record at SCI Houtzdale, since that is the last known
address he provided to the Court.
2
(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). It is a well-established principle that
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or
controversy as required by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998). “‘To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be
threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.’” Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)
(quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990), which cited Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1982)). “The case or controversy
requirement continues through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate, and
requires that parties have a personal stake in the outcome.” Id. (citing Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78).
Thus, if developments occur during the litigation that eliminate a petitioner’s personal stake
in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant effective relief, the case must
be dismissed as moot. Id. at 147-48; Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013).
That is the case here. Fitzgerald is no longer incarcerated. He was granted parole in July 2024 and
was released to parole in October 2024. Accordingly, there is no relief that this Court can provide
to him and this habeas case is now moot. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18 (“[M]ootness, however it may
have come about, simply deprives us of our power to act; there is nothing for us to remedy, even
if we were disposed to do so.”).
III. Certificate of Appealability
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 AEDPA codified standards
governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court’s
disposition of a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice
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or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals
from…the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises
out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a]
certificate of appealability may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). Fitzgerald is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that all of his claims should be
dismissed as moot. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
IV. Conclusion
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the Petition because it is moot and
deny a certificate of appealability. An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: October 31, 2024 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge
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