EVANS v. DOE 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LEAH EVANS and SEMAJ CARTER, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) 2:21cv413

) Electronic Filing

MICHAEL CATANZARO, )

LUCAS SZYMANSKI, )

JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs commenced this civil rights action seeking redress for an alleged unlawful

seizure and detention in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Recently, plaintiffs filed a

Third Amended Complaint after obtaining leave to do so. Presently before the court is defendant

Szymanski's motion to dismiss that complaint for failure to state a claim and/or based on

qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.

Each of the grounds advanced in support of the motion falls short. First, the Third

Amended Complaint satisfies the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Plaintiffs were

pulled over for an alleged traffic violation by defendant Catanzaro. Third Amended Complaint

(Doc. No. 51) at ¶ 10. Upon exiting his vehicle, Officer Catanzaro and another officer drew their

service weapons and trained them on plaintiffs and two other individuals in plaintiff Evans' car.

Id. at ¶ 12. The officers lacked probable cause to order the occupants out of the vehicle at gun

point. Id. Officer Catanzaro made verbal threats and used foul language while interacting with

plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiffs complied with the officers' requests and exited the vehicle

without incident. Id. at ¶ 14.

Another officer searched plaintiff Semjac Carter without probable cause while Officer

Catanzaro continued to train his firearm on plaintiff Evans and the other passengers. Id. at ¶ 15.

The search was without a warrant or consent and there was a lack of exigent circumstances to

justify the same. Id. at ¶ 16

Plaintiffs and the other passenger were ordered to sit on the ground, which they did.

Plaintiff Carter was handcuffed without probable cause for doing so. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff

Carter did not act aggressively toward the officers, behave in a dangerous manner or pose any

threat to the officers. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.

Defendant Szymanski arrived on the scene during the above-described interaction. Id. at

¶ 21. He and other arriving officers drew their firearms and pointed them at plaintiffs and the

other passengers. Id.

Defendant Catanzaro searched plaintiff Evans' vehicle without probable cause to do so.

Plaintiff Evans had not consented to the search nor did exigent circumstances exist to justify the

search. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. Each of the officers, including defendant Szymanski, held plaintiffs and

the other passenger at gunpoint for approximately 20 minutes. Id. at ¶ 24.

Plaintiffs were not charged with any form of criminal violation as a result of the

interaction. Id. at ¶ 26. The instant lawsuit followed.

Defendant Szymanski's challenge to the substance of plaintiff's false imprisonment claim

is unavailing. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must show that the arrest in question was made

without probable cause. Brown v. Makofka, 644 F. App'x 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing

Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995)). In other words, a plaintiff

must plead facts sufficient to show the absence of reasonable justification for an officer's seizure

of the plaintiff's person. Pleading the lack or absence of such justification during the officers'

ongoing conduct does not make such an averment vague or "conclusory." Under such an

approach a citizen would never be able to challenge a detention or arrest of his person or vehicle

as lacking in probable cause or reasonable suspicion because averring the absence of the same

would be meaningless. We decline the invitation to adopt such an approach.

Similarly, advancing such averments in the context reflected in the Third Amended

Complaint does not render the allegations "nothing more than a threadbare recital of the elements

of a § 1983 false arrest claim." Defendant Szymanski's Brief in Support (Doc. No. 53) at 3. A

complaint sufficiently states a claim where its averments are grounded in enough of a factual

basis to move the claim from the realm of mere possibility to one that shows entitlement by

presenting "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

Here, there is more than a sufficient description of the plaintiffs' conduct and the lack of

reactive behavior by plaintiffs to support the lack of justification or consent for a 20 minute

detention at gun point. Thus, the court is able to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Finally, defendant Szymanski's invocation of qualified immunity equally is unavailing.

Although immunity is an affirmative defense, “a complaint may be subject to dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense ... appears on its face.” ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29

F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 358–59 (1990) (citing cases). Accordingly, absolute or

qualified immunity “will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established

on the face of the complaint.” Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting

Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir.1996) (citation omitted)); accord Pani v. Empire

Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing entitlement to official

immunity on face of complaint); Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1342

(11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing entitlement to qualified immunity on face of complaint).

Qualified immunity shields "government officials performing discretionary

functions...from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."

Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). "A defendant has the burden to establish that he is entitled to qualified immunity."

Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court established a two-part test to

determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. First, "[t]aken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated

a constitutional right?" Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated, "the qualified

immunity inquiry is at an end; the officer is entitled to immunity." Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d

133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). If, however, the facts read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

show a violation of a constitutional right, the analysis proceeds to the second step: "whether the

right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. A right is clearly established in the particular context if

"it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted." Id. at 202. However, if it was not clear "to a reasonable officer what the law

required under the facts alleged, then he is entitled to qualified immunity." Kopec, 361 F.3d at

776. The courts retain discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of this analysis should be

addressed first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

Plaintiffs allege enough factual matter to raise the inference that defendant Szymanski

violated plaintiffs' clearly established rights. The Fourth Amendment prohibits an arrest of a

citizen except upon probable cause. Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing

Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Papachristou v. City

of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)). "Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a

reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be

arrested." Rogers, 120 F.3d at 453 (citing Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483). The elements of false arrest

include: 1) an arrest made without probable cause or 2) one made by someone without privilege

to arrest. Brockington v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F. Supp.2d 563, 572 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citing

Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978) and Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d

120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998)).

When the seizure or arrest of a citizen is based on the statements or actions of a fellow

officer, the officer's seizure or arrest is lawful only if the fellow officers issuing the statements or

engaging in the action possessed the facts and circumstances necessary to support a finding of

the requisite basis for the seizure or arrest. Rogers, 120 F.3d at 453. In other words, "[t]he

legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued [or conduct by] by fellow officers depends

on whether the officers who issued the statements [or engaged in the conduct] possessed the

requisite basis to seize the suspect." Id. (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231

(1985)).

The Third Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts and raises reasonable inferences

indicating that Officer Carter did not have the requisite justification for seizing plaintiffs and the

two other passengers at gun point and holding them for 20 minutes. It cannot be reasonably

inferred that defendant Szymanski gained the requisite basis to justify his participation in the

seizure from the actions of Officer Carter. And defendant Szymanski has not advanced any

evidence to support the existence of adequate grounds for the seizure and detention.

The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis asks whether "at the time of the

officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing is unlawful." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018);

James v. New Jersey State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2020) (same) (quoting Wesby, 138

S. Ct. at 589). The purpose of this inquiry is to account for "the reality that 'reasonable mistakes

can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.'" Hickman v. Borough,

2017 WL 1197806, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting Santini, 795 F.3d at 418).

The Constitutional right to be free from arrest based on the lack of probable cause was

well established when the incident outlined in the Third Amended Complaint occurred. See,

e.g., Rogers, 120 F.3d at 455-56 (recognizing in 1997 that where one officer did not have

probable cause for an arrest based on vague statements conveyed by a fellow officer, the officer

acted without probable cause in effectuating the arrest and was not shielded by qualified

immunity). So the right to be free from a seizure and arrest that was not supported by probable

cause was clearly established on August 14, 2019.

It would have also been clear to a reasonable officer who did not have personal

knowledge of probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a seizure and arrest that he or she could

lawfully proceed with the same only where the information within his or her or the fellow

officer's possession was sufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the

same. Given that the Third Amended Complaint fails to show that either Officer Carter or

Officer Szymanski possessed the requisite basis for the seizure and detention, it would have been

clear to a reasonable officer that participating in a seizure and detention under such specific

circumstances would violate the clearly established rights of the detainee.

It follows that defendant Szymanski has failed to carry his burden of showing entitlement

to qualified immunity based solely on the allegations of plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.

Consequently, his motion seeking dismissal based on the doctrine will be denied.

Date: September 9, 2024

s/David Stewart Cercone

David Stewart Cercone

Senior United States District Judge

cc: Joel S. Sansone, Esquire

Elizabeth Tuttle, Esquire

Massimo A. Terzigni, Esquire

Francis D. Wymard, Esquire

Dennis R. Biondo, Jr., Esquire

(Via CM/ECF Electronic Mail)