BROWN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DELAINE MARIE BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-191-E

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 24th day of September, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial

evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.

Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,

48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.

1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported

by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court

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may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the

claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff raises a single issue on appeal: she argues her residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) is the product of legal error because the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed

to properly evaluate the opinion of consultative examiner, Tammy Connell, M.A. (Doc.

No. 8). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not conform with the applicable regulations

because the ALJ did not sufficiently consider and explain the consistency and

supportability factors relevant to evaluating this opinion. (Id.); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c,

416.920c. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds instead that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s RFC finding and his ultimate determination that Plaintiff is not

disabled.

The Court finds the ALJ sufficiently considered and explained the consistency and

supportability factors as they relate to his analysis of Ms. Connell’s opinion. As Plaintiff

acknowledges, for cases such as this one, filed on or after March 27, 2017, the regulations

have eliminated the “treating physician rule.” Compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),

416.927(c)(2) (applying to cases prior to the amendment of the regulations) with 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a) (applying to later cases). See also 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01,

at 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). While the medical source’s treating relationship with the

claimant is still a valid and important consideration, “the two most important factors for

determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.”

82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. See also §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c); 416.920c(b) and (c).

Specifically, in analyzing Ms. Connell’s opinion, the ALJ stated the following:

In addition to her treatment notes, the record contains the report of a

consultative mental status evaluation conducted on October 22, 2021 by

Tammy Connell, M.A. . . . During her mental status examination, Ms.

Connell observed no abnormalities in her appearance, speech, or thought

process. However, she noted the claimant’s affect was somewhat anxious,

her attention and concentration [were] mildly impaired due to anxiety, and

her memory was impaired. Ms. Connell then noted the claimant’s reports

that she was able to dress, bathe, and groom herself, and that she cooked,

cleaned, washed laundry, and shopped. Moreover, she stated she managed

her own money, drove, and described her relationships with friends and

family as good. Following the remainder of her examination, Ms. Connell

diagnosed the claimant with an unspecified anxiety disorder. She then

determined the claimant’s impairments resulted in moderate limitations on

her ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions and marked

limitations on her ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex

instructions and make judgments on complex work-related decisions.

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Additionally, she found the claimant’s impairments resulted in mild to

moderate limitations on her ability to interact appropriately with the public,

supervisors, and coworkers, and marked limitations on her ability to

respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine

work setting. (Ex. 8F).

After careful consideration, the undersigned finds Ms. Connell’s

conclusions are not persuasive because the claimant’s lack of mental health

treatment, including her more recent refusal to start medication, as well as

her largely unremarkable mental status examination and reported activities

of daily living do not support the conclusion that she has any more than

moderate limitations stemming from her history of schizophrenia and more

recently diagnosed anxiety.

(R. 37). Considering this, the ALJ adequately evaluated the consistency and

supportability of Ms. Connell’s decision, as he stated this opinion was not consistent with

the rest of the record, showing a lack of mental health treatment, Plaintiff’s refusal to start

medication, a largely unremarkable mental status examination, and her activities of daily

living. (Id.). Moreover, the ALJ found this opinion was not supported by Ms.

Connell’s own exam, which revealed no abnormalities in appearance, speech, or thought

process, and resulted in a largely normal mental status examination. (Id.). Thus,

Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not inquire into and address the reasons

Plaintiff failed to seek mental health treatment or receive psychotropic medications prior

to relying on this lack of evidence to support his rejection of Ms. Connell’s opinion. (Doc.

No. 8 at 16). However, the ALJ did discuss and consider Plaintiff’s hospitalization and

treatment and the fact that she was seeing a psychiatrist. (R. 65). The record was also

clear that Plaintiff was not on any psychotropic medications and that she was diagnosed

with generalized anxiety disorder, but she was not advised to be on medication and only

therapy was recommended. (R. 35). Further, the record showed that Plaintiff reported

to her psychologist that she did not want to be on anxiety medication because the side

effects scared her. (Ex. 14F/4-6). Given that the record showed Plaintiff’s treatment

and her reasoning for not taking medications, the ALJ did not err by failing to inquire about

Plaintiff’s reasoning for not seeking mental health treatment or taking psychotropic

medications. This is especially true given the fact that Plaintiff does not argue that the

ALJ made an inaccurate inference or incorrectly summarized the record. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.

Further, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not explain what evidence he considered

in determining that Plaintiff’s record reflected “largely unremarkable mental status

examination” such that Ms. Connell’s opinion could be considered inconsistent with the

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entirety of the evidence. (Doc. No. 8 at 16-17). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by

relying upon “a vague and conclusory notion that M.A. Connell’s opinion was inconsistent

with Plaintiff’s ‘largely unremarkable mental status examination’ in support of his ultimate

rejection of M.A. Connell’s opinion[,]” without specifying any specific records upon which

he was relying. (Id. at 17). However, the context of the record reveals that the ALJ was

referring to Ms. Connell’s mental status examination, which was generally normal. (Ex.

8F). While the ALJ provided no citation, it is clear from the context of his statements, as

quoted above, and his citation to Exhibit 8F, showing Ms. Connell’s exam only one

sentence earlier, that he was referring to Ms. Connell’s mental status examination. (R.

37). While there are other mental status examinations within the record, (R. 75, 87, 360,

362, 365, 371, 374, 386, 616), the context makes it clear that the ALJ was referring to Ms.

Connell’s mental status examination. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not consider the diagnostic

evidence concerning Plaintiff’s neuropsychological impairments, including her abnormal

awake and asleep 60-minute EEG and the MRI of her brain. (Doc. No. 8 at 18 (citing R.

413, 490, 499)). Plaintiff posits that the ALJ’s failure to consider this evidence, showing

the impact of Plaintiff’s chronic migraines and related neurological conditions on her

ability to work, led to a defective RFC. (Id.). The Court finds Plaintiff is mistaken that

the ALJ ignored this evidence. The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s abnormal EEG and her MRI

when explaining the Plaintiff’s testing and treatment during the relevant period and stated

the following:

[O]n July 2, 2021, [Plaintiff] obtained the requested brain MRI, which

revealed no acute intra-axial abnormality but showed an 8.5 mm right

choroidal fissure cyst and minimal chronic small vessel microvascular

ischemic change. (Ex. 9F/13).

***

Thereafter, on August 31, 2021, the claimant proceeded with another EEG,

the results of which were abnormal due to two right frontal sharp waves that

might be consistent with discharging foci in that region and tendency toward

seizure activity. However, no focal slowing or electrographic seizures

were seen and the administering provider noted that up to 10 epileptiform

discharges during a 60 minute EEG would be considered within normal

limits. (Ex. 9F/4-5).

(R. 31, 33). Plaintiff points to no findings or evidence concerning these tests that the ALJ

did not consider. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point is without merit.

Plaintiff also posits that the ALJ erred by finding Ms. Connell’s opinion

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and by failing to explain which

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

activities contradicted Ms. Connell’s opinion. (Doc. No. 8 at 18-19). However,

Plaintiff overlooks that Ms. Connell herself reported on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living

within her opinion. (Ex. 8F/6-7). This shows that Plaintiff reported she is able to do

many activities, including bathing and grooming herself, laundry, cooking, driving, and

managing her own money. (Id.). The ALJ’s statement on Ms. Connell’s opinion, as

shown above, makes clear that he found Ms. Connell’s opinion unsupported by all of

Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living. (R. 37). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument

does not undermine that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Given that the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial

evidence, the Plaintiff’s attack on the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert is without

merit. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating “objections

to the adequacy of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert often boil down to

attacks on the RFC assessment itself.”). Thus, The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are

supported by substantial evidence and the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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