Brown v. Hollibaugh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NOEL L. BROWN, :

Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-799

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

KEN HOLLIBAUGH, et al., :

Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is Petitioner’s pro se motion for

reconsideration regarding this court’s denial of his pro se petition for habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 and motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc.

16.) Petitioner initiated this action by filing a habeas petition collaterally

attacking in 2016 state court conviction for inter alia child sex trafficking. On

report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle, the

court denied petitioner’s habeas petition because it was an impermissibly

filed second or successive petition and in turn dismissed his motion for

appointment of counsel as moot. (Doc. 15.) Nonetheless, Petitioner has filed

the present motion for reconsideration, in which he does not dispute that his

petition was an impermissibly filed second habeas petition, but instead

attempts to reargue the merits of the claims raised in that already denied

petition. Based on the following, this motion will also be DENIED.

I. Legal Standard

“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest

errors of law or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco v. Zlotnicki,

779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). “Accordingly, a judgment may be altered

or amended if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the

following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the

availability of new evidence that was not [previously] available [ ]; or (3) the

need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”

Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251

(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.

Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Chesapeake

Appalachia, LLC v. Scott Petroleum, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (M.D. Pa.

2014) (Generally, reconsideration motions should be granted sparingly.)

“The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is a stringent one ...

[A] mere disagreement with the court does not translate into a clear error of

law.” Id. (quoting Mpala v. Smith, 2007 WL 136750, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 16,

2007), aff’d, 241 Fed. Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2007)) (alteration in original).

II. Discussion

Petitioner does not present any intervening change of controlling law,

new evidence that was not available when the court denied his petition, or a

clear error of fact or law that indicates a manifest injustice. Instead, Petitioner

attempts to reargue some of the claims already raised and denied in his

petition. Specifically, he argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because

his sentence “to death by length of sentence” stems from a one-day trial, the

state caused him to procedurally default on his claims, the court did not

properly discern the relevance of his alleged Brady violation, and the court

did not construe the evidence from his unexhausted entrapment claim in the

light most favorable to him. The court will address each of these issues in

turn.

While recognizing that the habeas petition filed in this action was his

second such petition, petitioner questions whether the court was aware that

his sentence “to death by length of sentence” stems from a one-day trial.

Regardless of how long Petitioner’s trial lasted federal law bars state

prisoners from collaterally attacking their convictions through second or

successive habeas petitions except in very limited circumstances. See 28

U.S.C. §2244. A habeas petition is classified as a “second” or “successive”

petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §2244 if a prior petition has been

decided on the merits, the prior and new petitions challenge the same

conviction, and the new petition asserts claims that were, or could have

been, raised in a prior habeas petition. See Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d

812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005). As discussed at length in the court’s challenged

order, Petitioner has already filed a habeas petition regarding his child sex

trafficking conviction that was denied on its merits. The mere allegation that

Petitioner was convicted after a one-day trial, something that would have

been known when he filed his first Petition, does not allow the court to review

let alone grant any second or successive habeas petitions filed by him.

Likewise, while recognizing that he procedurally defaulted on some of

the claims raised in his impermissibly filed second habeas petition, Petitioner

asserts that he is not responsible for that default. When a petitioner has

defaulted on his claims under state law, a court may only reach the merits of

those claims “if the petitioner makes the standard showing of ‘cause and

prejudice’ or establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Slutzker v.

Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lines v. Larkins, 208

F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2000)). To establish cause a petitioner must identify

“some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded [his] efforts to

comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

488 (1986). To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice a Petitioner

must demonstrate “actual innocence by asserting ‘new reliable evidence—

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial,’

showing that no reasonable juror would have voted to find the petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 339–40 (3d

Cir. 2004).

The external factor Petitioner identifies to explain his default is his

alleged transfer to the custody of the state of New York after sentencing.

However, Petitioner does not explain why this transfer alone prevented him

from raising the defaulted claims at issue here for five years. Similarly, the

exculpatory evidence Petitioner identifies as establishing a miscarriage of

justice is a receipt for the hotel room where his trafficking victim was found

with a different man’s name on it. Even assuming this receipt is authentic,

Petitioner does not explain how this evidence alone would have contradicted

the other evidence introduced against him at trial or prevented any

reasonable jury from convicting him. Thus, there is still no basis for Petitioner

to raise his procedurally defaulted claims in this court.

Regarding the alleged Brady violation raised in his impermissibly filed

second habeas petition, Petitioner states “please correct me if I am wrong”

but “undisclosed evidence as well as testimony improperly withheld”

because it is exculpatory and impeaching constitutes Brady evidence.

Plaintiff is correct that such evidence must be disclosed under Brady.

However, his alleged Brady violation does not involve such evidence. In his

petition, Petitioner argues that the state trial court’s failure to obtain a warrant

directing Instagram to produce certain evidence used at trial violated Brady.

First trial courts do not obtain warrants. The government obtains warrants

from the trial court. Second the government does not need a warrant to get

evidence from a third-party custodian like Instagram. Putting those facts

aside, Petitioner still argues in the present motion that evidence of this failure

would have proven his arresting officer knew about his actual innocence

before testifying against him at trial and therefore “is the definition of Brady

violation.” However, a motion for reconsideration is meant to address

intervening changes in law and correct serious errors. It is not an opportunity

to supplement a filing already ruled upon by the court with arguments that

could have and should have been made before the court entered its ruling.

Petitioner cannot overcome the fact he is barred from filing a second habeas

petition by using the present motion to effectively file a third such petition.

Finally, while Petitioner recognizes that his entrapment claim is

unexhausted, he still asserts that the mere existence of the “investment

contract” underlying that claim must be construed in the light most favorable

to him. Petitioner did not explain the significance of this “contract” in his

petition but in the present motion appears to argue that this “contract”

between him and his underage victim releases him from all criminal liability

as well as proves that he did not know she was a minor. Essentially, it

appears that Petitioner wants the court to construe this document as a valid

agreement under which the victim agreed to work for Petitioner as an adult

prostitute. This argument is patently frivolous.

Even if the court had to and could construe this document in the light

most favorable to Petitioner, it would not be relevant to the court’s analysis

here because it is not a legal contract. See Commonwealth v. Tanner, 2019

62, 205 A.3d 388, 399 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (“a contract with an illegal term

is void and unenforceable.”). Moreover, it is hornbook contract law that a

minor, with certain exceptions, is not competent to enter into a “valid”

contract. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §12 (1981).

Petitioner is arguing that the alleged “contract” was in the

government’s possession and was not properly disclosed to the jury during

his trial and such is, a Brady violation. But this is not what Petitioner argued

in his petition. Moreover, a state prisoner seeking to invoke the power of this

court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must have exhausted the remedies

available to them in the courts of their state. §2254(b)(1)(A). Since Petitioner

concedes that this claim is unexhausted in Pennsylvania state courts, this

court cannot grant him any relief for it.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration will be DENIED.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: September 26, 2024

24-799-02