Martinez v. Berfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALBERT E. MARTINEZ, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-1759

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)

:

v. :

:

JASON BERFIELD, et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff,

Albert E. Martinez, alleges that defendants violated his First, Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights during and after a five-day period when he was

placed in a “dry cell” based on suspicions that he was in possession of contraband.1

Defendants have moved for summary judgment. The motion will be granted in part

and denied in part.

I. Procedural History

Martinez was incarcerated in Camp Hill State Correctional Institution (“SCI-

Camp Hill”) at all relevant times. Martinez filed this case on September 25, 2020.

1 “A ‘dry cell’ is a cell that lacks water—all standing water has been drained

from the toilet, the room’s water supply has been shut off, and the sink and toilet

have been capped to prevent inmate access. An inmate may be placed in a dry cell

when prison staff have observed the inmate attempt to ingest an item of contraband

or they learn that the inmate is attempting to introduce contraband into the prison.

Dry cells are used to closely observe the inmate until natural processes allow for the

ingested contraband to be retrieved.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir.

2020).

(Doc. 1). According to the allegations in his complaint,2 prison officials allegedly

escorted Martinez from the prison’s visitation room to a personal observation cell

on January 17, 2019, after officials purportedly witnessed him swallow an unknown

object. (Id. ¶ 11). When he arrived in the cell, prison officials allegedly stripped him

naked, gave him a smock to wear, and handcuffed him to the floor on a mattress

with no bedding. (Id. ¶ 12). A few hours later, a nurse in the prison brought him an

unknown medicine and instructed him to ingest it. (Id. ¶ 13). Martinez believed

that the medication was a laxative. (Id.) After taking the medicine, Martinez

allegedly defecated on himself multiple times. (Id.) Correctional officers who were

present purportedly did not allow Martinez to clean himself and instead forced him

to remain lying on the mattress with feces on his legs and genitals. (Id.)

Martinez remained in the observation cell the following day, at which point

his handcuffs were so tight on his right wrist that they purportedly caused his wrist

to bleed and caused him to temporarily lose sensation in his arm. (Id. ¶ 14).

Martinez asked officials to clean the wound on his wrist, but purportedly had to

wait approximately two to four hours until a nurse did so. (Id.) Correctional

officers allegedly told Martinez, “We will loosen the cuffs when you give us the

contraband.” (Id.)

During Martinez’s second day in the observation cell, defendants Evans and

Berfield, a security captain and security lieutenant in the prison, purportedly

2 Martinez’s allegations are provided solely to aid the reader’s understanding

of the nature of his claims. Nothing in this section shall be construed as a finding

that the allegations in the complaint are undisputed.

ordered their subordinate correctional officers to confiscate a blanket that officers

had previously given Martinez. (Id. ¶ 15). The removal of the blanket allegedly

caused Martinez to be extremely cold because the outside temperature was below

zero degrees. (Id.) Martinez was allegedly exposed to the cold without a blanket for

four nights. (Id.) He was also allegedly subjected to continuous lighting throughout

every night in the cell. (Id.)

Prison officials allegedly compelled Martinez to defecate and urinate in front

of them repeatedly while he was in the observation cell. (Id. ¶ 16). Several female

employees in the prison, including defendant Fultz, a shift lieutenant, purportedly

observed Martinez defecating and urinating. (Id.) After testing and examining

Martinez’s bowel movements and urine, prison officials purportedly determined

that he had not ingested any contraband. (Id.) The complaint alleges that

throughout his time in the observation cell, correctional officers outside the cell

repeatedly taunted him by asking him, “[a]re you cold?” and “[h]ow does it feel to

sleep in your own shit?” (Id. ¶ 17). Martinez repeatedly requested heat, a blanket,

soap, water, and medical attention, but was purportedly denied all of these things

while in the observation cell. (Id.)

On January 22, 2019, after continued exposure to the conditions of the

observation cell, Martinez allegedly began to demonstrate suicidal thoughts and

prison officials transferred him to an observation cell. (Id. ¶ 18). After several days

on suicide watch, prison officials allegedly transferred him to solitary confinement

for thirty days, despite not finding any contraband. (Id.)

In March 2019, defendant Berfield allegedly directed correctional officers to

confiscate a television, radio, and trunk that Martinez had previously purchased

from the prison’s commissary. (Id. ¶ 19). Berfield purportedly told Martinez that he

would return the property if Martinez agreed to withdraw a grievance he had filed

regarding the events of January 17, 2019. (Id.) Martinez refused to do so, and he

was subsequently transferred to another institution without the confiscated

property. (Id.)

At some point after the events of January 2019, Martinez allegedly filed a

grievance regarding the purported invasion of his privacy by female prison officials

observing him defecating and urinating. (Id. ¶ 20). On July 29, 2019, defendant

Mihal, a lieutenant in the prison, allegedly retaliated against Martinez for this

grievance by bringing misconduct charges against him alleging that the grievance

contained false information. (Id.)

The complaint asserts claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement

in violation of the Eighth Amendment against defendants Berfield, Evans, Hardy,

and multiple John Doe defendants; deprivation of personal property in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment against defendant Berfield; invasion of privacy in

violation of the Fourth Amendment by defendant Fultz and several Jane Doe

defendants; and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by defendant Mihal.

(Id. at 7-9). Martinez seeks declaratory relief and damages. The named defendants

answered the complaint on February 11, 2021. (Doc. 15).

Defendants moved for summary judgment on July 31, 2023. (Doc. 66). The

court denied the motion without prejudice, concluding that additional discovery

was necessary based on a motion to compel discovery that Martinez had filed.

(Docs. 81-82). The court reopened discovery, ordered defendants to produce the

relevant discovery, and granted defendants leave to file a renewed motion for

summary judgment after the close of discovery. (Doc. 82).

Defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on February 29,

2024. (Doc. 85). After being granted an extension of time, defendants filed a brief in

support of the motion and a statement of material facts as required by Local Rule

56.1 on April 12, 2024. (Docs. 90-91). Martinez filed a brief in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment on August 15, 2024, after the court had granted him

several extensions of time. (Doc. 99). Defendants filed a reply brief on September

20, 2024, making the motion ripe for review. (Doc. 102).

II. Unidentified Defendants

As a preliminary matter, the court will sua sponte dismiss Martinez’s claims

against all John and Jane Doe defendants because he did not identify them prior to

the discovery deadline. Claims against John or Jane Doe defendants are properly

dismissed when the defendants have not been identified prior to the discovery

deadline. See, e.g., Blakeslee v. Clinton County, 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009)

(nonprecedential);3 Ornstein v. Warden, 3:18-CV-2042, 2021 WL 4290180, at *3 n.35

(M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2021); King v. Mansfield Univ. of Pa., No. 1:11-CV-1112, 2014 WL

4546524, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2014).

3 The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding

upon federal district courts. Citations to nonprecedential decisions reflect that the

court has carefully considered and is persuaded by the panel’s ratio decidendi.

III. Material Facts4

Martinez was housed in SCI-Camp Hill in January 2019. (Doc. 91 ¶ 1). All

named defendants were employed at SCI-Camp Hill during this time. (Id. ¶¶ 2-6).

On January 17, 2019, he was transferred to a “dry cell” based on prison staff

members’ belief that he had obtained contraband from an outside visitor. (Id. ¶ 7).

An x-ray performed on January 18, 2019, could not rule out the presence of

contraband in Martinez’s body. (Id.)5 Martinez remained in the dry cell until

January 22, 2019, when he was transferred to a psychiatric observation cell after

expressing suicidal ideations. (Id. ¶ 9). Martinez was offered exercise and checked

by medical officials at appropriate times while in was in the dry cell. (Id. ¶ 10).

4 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise

statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving

party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. A party

opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s

statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Defendants have filed a

statement of material facts as required by Rule 56.1. (Doc. 91). Martinez has filed a

document that purports to respond to defendants’ statement, but instead of

responding to the numbered paragraphs in defendants’ statement, it simply gives

Martinez’s own conclusory assertions of what legal issues are in dispute. (See Doc.

99-12). Because Martinez’s statement does not comply with Local Rule 56.1, the

court deems the facts set out in defendants’ statement admitted. (See M.D. PA. L.R.

56.1). The court will cite directly to defendants’ statement of material facts where

applicable.

5 Defendants’ statement of facts states that the x-ray was performed on

January 18, 2024. (Id.) This appears to be a typographical error because the x-ray

report attached to the statement indicates that the x-ray was performed on January

18, 2019. (See Doc. 91-5). The court accordingly deems undisputed the factual

contention that the x-ray was performed on January 18, 2019, rather than January

18, 2024.

After Martinez complained that female staff members had observed him

defecating and urinating while in the dry cell, prison staff investigated his claim and

determined that it was unfounded. (Id. ¶ 11). Martinez filed several grievances

related to the facts of this case. (Id. ¶ 12). None of these grievances were appealed

through all stages of administrative review. (Id. ¶ 23).

IV. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that

do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial

would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of

proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond

the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of his right to relief. Pappas v. City of

Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This

evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the

non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-

57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89

(1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas,

331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.

V. Discussion

Martinez brings his federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed

by state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights,

but serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d

1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show a

deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United

States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204

(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1)

Martinez failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) he has failed to show the

personal involvement of defendants Hardy and Fultz; and (3) he has failed to

establish the elements of his claims. (Doc. 90).

Having reviewed the parties’ summary judgment arguments and the

evidence of record, we conclude that defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on Martinez’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims.6 We conclude,

6 The court will decide these claims on the merits without addressing

whether Martinez exhausted administrative remedies. Exhaustion of

administrative remedies under the PLRA is “non-jurisdictional” in nature. Rinaldi

v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 265 (2018). When an exhaustion rule is non-

jurisdictional, courts may grant summary judgment to a defendant on the merits of

a plaintiff’s claim without deciding whether the plaintiff has exhausted

administrative remedies. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023).

however, that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on

Martinez’s Eighth Amendment claim. We address Martinez’s claims seriatim.

A. First Amendment – Retaliation

Claims that a defendant has retaliated against a plaintiff in violation of the

First Amendment require proof that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally

protected conduct; (2) the defendant took retaliatory action against him that was

sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional

rights; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the

retaliatory action. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). Causation may

be shown by establishing either an unusually suggestive temporal proximity

between the plaintiff’s protected conduct and the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory

action or a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing. Dondero v. Lower Milford

Twp., 5 F.4th 355, 361-62 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.

DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)). Causation may also be implied by “the

record as a whole.” Id. (citing DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267). Even if a plaintiff

establishes the elements of a retaliation claim, defendant prison officials “may still

prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the

protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological

interest.” Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).

Martinez’s retaliation claim alleges that defendant Mihal retaliated against

him by filing a misconduct charge asserting that Martinez provided false

information when he complained that defendant Fultz and other female prison

employees viewed him defecating and urinating. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 20). Retaliatory

misconduct claims fail when there is some evidence that the prisoner plaintiff

committed the underlying infraction. See, e.g., Nifas v. Beard, 374 F. App’x 241, 244

(3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential) (holding that retaliatory misconduct claim fails

when there is some evidence to support the misconduct charge); Carter v. McGrady,

292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that retaliatory misconduct charge failed

because there was a quantum of evidence indicating that prisoner plaintiff

committed underlying misconduct). Here, the record reflects that there was some

evidence to support Mihal’s misconduct charges against Martinez—Fultz and other

employees stated during an internal investigation that female employees had not

viewed Martinez defecating and urinating. (See Doc. 91-7). We will accordingly

grant summary judgment on the retaliation claim because it fails as a matter of law.

B. Fourth Amendment – Right to Bodily Privacy

Martinez’s Fourth Amendment claim asserts that defendant Fultz violated

his right to bodily privacy because she is a woman and she observed Martinez

defecating and urinating while he was in the dry cell. (Doc. 1 ¶ 26). Our court of

appeals has recognized that prison inmates have a limited right to bodily privacy

under the Fourth Amendment during their incarceration. Parkell v. Danberg, 833

F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2016). The “contours” of this right, however, are “very

narrow,” and courts considering claims alleging violation of the right must balance

the right against the prison’s institutional needs. Id.

Neither the Supreme Court nor our court of appeals has held that the Fourth

Amendment right to bodily privacy protects an inmate’s right to be free from prison

officials observing them using the restroom. Several courts in this district,

however, have recently held that an inmate’s right to bodily privacy does not extend

to some situations in which prison officials have observed an inmate’s naked body.

See Ayers v. Warden of LCCF, No. 3:24-CV-1184, 2024 WL 3498355, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

July 22, 2024) (Munley, J.) (holding that Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy

does not extend to “claim regarding the possibility of the video camera revealing

him in the nude and on a continuous basis”); Drumgo v. Reese, No. 3:20-CV-2434,

2022 WL 4295442, at *16 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2022) (Mehalchick, M.J.) (holding that

placement of plaintiff in dry cell and resulting search of his feces and urine for

contraband did not violate Fourth Amendment right to bodily privacy), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 3:20-CV-2434, 2022 WL 3045310, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2,

2022) (Brann, C.J.). Based on these persuasive authorities, we find that the Fourth

Amendment right to bodily privacy does not extend to Martinez’s claim alleging

isolated incidents of a correctional officer of the opposite sex observing him

defecating and urinating. Furthermore, even if the Fourth Amendment does

protect such a right, defendant Fultz would be entitled to qualified immunity from

Martinez’s claim because that right was not clearly established by Supreme Court

or Third Circuit precedent at the time of the alleged violation. Hence, we will grant

the motion for summary judgment with respect to Martinez’s Fourth Amendment

claim.

C. Fourteenth Amendment – Deprivation of Property

We will also grant the motion for summary judgment on Martinez’s

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Due process claims based on

destruction or deprivation of a prisoner’s personal property fail as a matter of law if

the government provides adequate post-deprivation procedures to remedy the loss

of the property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1984). The Third

Circuit has held that the DOC’s grievance process generally provides an adequate

post-deprivation remedy for the deprivation of property. See Pressley v. Johnson,

268 F. App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential); Jordan v. Horn, 165 F. App’x

979, 981 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential). Martinez has not provided any evidence

to show that the grievance process was inadequate in this case.

D. Eighth Amendment – Conditions of Confinement

1. Exhaustion

Turning to Martinez’s Eighth Amendment claim, we will first consider

defendants’ argument that Martinez failed to exhaust administrative remedies.7

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners complaining about the

conditions of their confinement must exhaust available administrative remedies

before they may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires

proper exhaustion, meaning plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims in

accordance with the procedural rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated.

Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove; it is not a pleading

requirement for plaintiffs. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).

7 As noted above, the court did not address defendants’ exhaustion argument

with respect to Martinez’s other claims because summary judgment was warranted

on the merits of the claims.

A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are

“available.” Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268 (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93). An

administrative remedy is unavailable, and administrative exhaustion is thus

excused, in three situations: “(1) when ‘it operates as a simple dead end—with

officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates’;

(2) when it is ‘so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,’

such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when ‘prison

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process

through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’” Id. at 266-67 (quoting

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016)). Once a defendant has established that

the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that the administrative process was unavailable to him. Id. at 268.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies in the DOC is governed by the three-

step process outlined in the DOC’s grievance policy, DC-ADM 804. (See DC-ADM

804, available at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/cor/documents

/about-us/doc-policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf) (last visited Sept. 20,

2024).8 Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must first submit a written grievance within

fifteen working days from the date of the incident. Id. § 1(A)(8). DC-ADM 804

8 The parties agree that DC-ADM 804 is the relevant DOC policy, but neither

party has included a copy of the policy in the summary judgment record. The court

takes judicial notice of the policy and its contents as a document that is publicly

available on a government website. See Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189,

205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017). All citations to DC-ADM 804 will be to the version of the

policy that is available on the DOC’s website. The current version of DC-ADM 804

has been in effect since May 1, 2015, and was therefore in effect at all relevant times.

provides that the grievance must include “a statement of the facts relevant to the

claim,” “identify individuals directly involved in the events,” and “specifically state

any claims [the inmate] wishes to make concerning violations of Department

directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.” Id. § 1(A)(11). If the inmate is

unable to comply with the fifteen-day deadline, he may request an extension of time

to file a grievance. Id. § 1(C)(2). Next, the prisoner must submit a written appeal to

an intermediate review level within fifteen working days. Id. § 2(A)(1)(a). Finally,

the inmate must submit an appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances

and Appeals (“SOIGA”) within fifteen working days. Id. § 2(B)(1)(b).

Defendants argue that Martinez failed to exhaust administrative remedies

with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim because he failed to appeal it through

final review by SOIGA. (Doc. 90 at 19-20). Martinez argues that he should be

deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies because he attempted to appeal

an initial grievance about these claims to the facility manager, but the facility

manager did not respond to the appeal. (Doc. 99 at 5). Martinez has filed a copy of

the appeal he purportedly attempted to submit to the facility manager. (See Doc.

99-9 at 5). He has also attached a copy of an inmate request to staff member that he

purportedly submitted approximately two months after submitting the appeal in

which he asked why the appeal was never addressed. (Id. at 6).

We find that Martinez’s proffered evidence creates a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he exhausted administrative remedies. Martinez has

produced evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that the prison failed to

respond to his appeal. This failure to respond, if proven, would satisfy Martinez’s

obligation to exhaust administrative remedies. See Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d

356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A]s soon as a prison fails to respond to a properly

submitted grievance or appeal within the time limits prescribed by its own policies,

it has made its administrative remedies unavailable and the prisoner has fully

discharged the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.”). We accordingly will deny the

motion for summary judgment to the extent that it asserts failure to exhaust

administrative remedies with respect to the Eighth Amendment claim.

2. Merits

To establish an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

plaintiffs must show (1) that they were subjected to an objectively, sufficiently

serious deprivation that resulted in the denial of minimal civilized measures of life’s

necessities and (2) that defendant prison officials were deliberately indifferent to

inmate health or safety. Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020)

(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The defendant is deliberately

indifferent if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). An evaluation of the context of the

claim is necessary. “Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth

Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone. . . .” Id. at

304. Our court of appeals has recognized that “even though administrative

confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so long as the

conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are supported by some

penological justification, they will not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas, 948

F.3d at 133.

We find that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on

the Eighth Amendment claim. Although it appears defendants had a legitimate

penological justification for placing Martinez in a dry cell based on their suspicions

that he had ingested contraband, there are genuine issues of material fact as to

whether the conditions of his confinement in the dry cell violated his constitutional

rights. Martinez alleges that while he was in the dry cell, he was forced to remain

handcuffed to the floor, that prison staff did not clean him—or allow him to clean

himself—after he urinated and defecated on himself, that prison staff applied

handcuffs that were so tight that they caused him physical injuries, that they did not

allow him to use a blanket despite the outside temperature being below zero

degrees, and that officials outside the cell repeatedly mocked him for being cold and

for being covered in his own excrement. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11-17). A reasonable finder

of fact viewing these facts could conclude that Martinez was subjected to “foul or

inhuman” conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Thomas, 948 F.3d at 133. And there is no basis at this stage to doubt the veracity of

Martinez’s allegations: defendants argue that the conditions of Martinez’s

confinement did not violate the Eighth Amendment, but they do not provide any

evidence to show that Martinez was not subjected to the conditions of confinement.

Hence, we will deny the motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment

claim because genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary

judgment.

We will grant the motion for summary judgment, however, with respect to

defendant Hardy, for lack of personal involvement. A defendant cannot be liable

for a violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights unless the defendant was personally

involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir.

2018). The defendant’s personal involvement cannot be based solely on a theory of

respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

Rather, for a supervisor to be liable for the actions of a subordinate, there must be

allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Id. There

are no allegations in Martinez’s complaint as to how Hardy was personally involved

in the conditions of confinement that give rise to the Eighth Amendment claim

beyond vague and general allegations that he was responsible for his subordinate

officers subjecting Martinez to the conditions. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 25). Hence, because

the claims against Hardy are solely based on his supervisory role as a captain in the

prison, we will grant Hardy summary judgment.

VI. Conclusion

We will grant in part and deny in part the motion for summary judgment,

allow this case to proceed solely as to Martinez’s Eighth Amendment claim against

defendants Berfield and Evans, and direct the parties to file a joint status report

indicating whether they wish to have the case referred to mediation. If the case is

not resolved through mediation, the court will schedule the case for an evidentiary

hearing to determine whether defendants can establish the affirmative defense of

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER

Christopher C. Conner

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: September 26, 2024