Jones v. Garman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SADEEN JONES, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-01715

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

MARK C. GARMAN, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants.

(Doc. 45.) For the following reasons, the court will grant the motion for summary

judgment in part, and refrain from entering judgment until all issues have been

fully adjudicated. Here, Defendants failed to seek summary judgment on the issue

of the duration of Plaintiff’s stay in the dry cell and whether it runs afoul of the

Eighth Amendment. Therefore, this issue, which was raised against all

Defendants, will survive summary judgment.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sadeen Jones (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action by filing a complaint, which

was received and docketed by the court on October 7, 2021. (Doc. 1.)1 This

complaint is not on the court’s civil rights complaint form and is somewhat

difficult to discern. The complaint focuses on the events beginning on July 21,

1 The court notes that this complaint is unsigned in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). The court

will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to sign the complaint prior to striking it from the docket.

2019 during visiting hours when Plaintiff was removed from his visit and

transported to a dry cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was in this dry cell for ten days.

(Id.) He raises due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and retaliation claims.

(Id.) Plaintiff failed to clearly set forth the defendants in the complaint, but he

named the following six individuals in the statement of facts: (1) Mark C. Garman

(“Garman”), Acting Superintendent; (2) Captain VanGorder (“VanGorder”); (3)

Lt. Vance (“Vance”); (4) Lt. Sherman (“Sherman”); (5) Lt. Stover (“Stover”); and

(6) C.O. J. Nicholas (“Nicholas”). (Id.)

Following Defendants’ motion to partially dismiss the compliant, Magistrate

Judge Martin C. Carlson entered a report and recommendation recommending that

the court grant the motion in part and dismiss Plaintiff’s injunctive relief and the

official capacity damages claims. (Doc. 18.) None of the parties raised any

objections to the report and recommendation. The court adopted it on June 2, 2022

and dismissed Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief and all damages claims

against Defendants in their official capacity. (Doc. 19.)

Following the conclusion of fact discovery, Defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment, statement of facts, and brief in support. (Doc. 45, 49, 50.)

Plaintiff responded with a brief in opposition. (Doc. 51.) Defendants then filed a

reply brief. (Doc. 52.) In the briefing, the parties agree that remaining claims in

this case are due process, cruel and unusual punishment, and retaliation against

Defendants. (Docs. 50, 51.) The court will now address the pending motion for

summary judgment.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil

cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Venue is

proper in this district because the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to the

claims occurred at SCI-Rockview, located in Centre County, Pennsylvania, which

is located within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b).

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of

the dispute “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is

not precluded by “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary.” Id. “A

dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the

nonmovant’ and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thomas v.

Tice, 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh

Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in that party’s favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288

(3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher

Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)). The court may not “weigh the evidence”

or “determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the

court’s role in reviewing the facts of the case is “to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Id.

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The non-moving party must then

oppose the motion, and in doing so “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [its] pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or

suspicions will not suffice.’” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent.

Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).

Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party “fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support

of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

DISCUSSION

A. Summary of Undisputed Facts

Defendants provided a statement of facts that Plaintiff did not challenge.

(Doc. 49.) Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the unopposed statement of material facts

is deemed admitted.

In July of 2019, Plaintiff was incarcerated at SCI-Rockview. (Doc. 49, ¶ 1;

Doc. 49-1, pp. 4–5.)2 Following a visit on July 21, 2019, Plaintiff was placed in a

dry cell and investigated for the possession of contraband and possession of a

dangerous substance under misconduct D370858. (Doc. 49, ¶¶ 2–3; Doc. 49-2, pp.

8–9; Doc. 49-3.) Plaintiff received misconduct D110222 for possession of

2 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

contraband and possession of a dangerous substance based on a cell search on July

22, 2019. (Doc. 49, ¶ 4; Doc. 49-4.) Plaintiff pled guilty to misconduct D110222

and did not appeal any misconducts. (Doc. 49, ¶¶ 5–6; 49-2, pp. 11–12.) Plaintiff

remained in the dry cell based on the belief that he had ingested these substances.

(Doc. 49, ¶ 7; Doc. 49-5, ¶¶ 6–7.)

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based on a Lack of

Personal Involvement Will Be Denied.

Defendants initially argue that based on Plaintiff’s deposition, he cannot

establish the personal involvement of any Defendants beyond respondent superior:

“Any and all claims that boil down to supervisory liability should have judgment

entered in favor of Defendants.” (Doc. 50, p. 7.)

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold

requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a

person acting under color of state law; and 2) that, as a result, he was deprived of

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is also well established that “[a]

defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation

which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey,

481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff named six individuals in his complaint: (1) Garman; (2)

VanGorder; (3) Vance; (4) Sherman; (5) Stover ; and (6) Nicholas. (Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff appears to base the liability of Defendant Garman on his role as the

Superintendent at SCI-Rockview. Specifically, in his deposition Plaintiff stated

that he based his claims against Defendant Garman on his response to a request

slip and his role as a Superintendent. (Doc. 49-2, pp. 22–26.) Plaintiff stated

“[h]e’s the supervisor of all the COs and everything that was happening, he could

have stopped it. He’s the superintendent, he could have stopped what was going

on while I was in the dry cell and while they did what they did to me, he could

have stopped it.” (Id., p. 26.)

When asked about Defendant VanGorder and the basis of his liability,

Plaintiff stated in his deposition “he’s also a ranked officer who could have put an

end and could have stopped what was going on with me being in the dry cell and

those supposed misconducts that was placed on me . . . .” (Id., p. 27.)

When asked about Defendant Vance during the deposition, Plaintiff based

Defendant Vance’s liability on the fact that he told Plaintiff he was going to the

RHU prior to Plaintiff attending the hearing, and stated:

he’s also a ranking officer who could have put an end to what was going

on, because he also came down to the dry cell, during my stay in the

dry cell, and told not just me, but several guys that, in order for me to

get out, that I would have to defecate more times than what I had

already done at that period of time.

(Id., p. 28.) Plaintiff then stated that he took a laxative because Defendant Vance

said he would have to defecate more to be released from the dry cell. (Id., p. 29.)

Plaintiff stated that he based the liability of Defendant Stover on the fact that

he hand-cuffed him to the top of the bedrail when he initially was placed in the dry

cell and that Defendant Stover did not correct Sergeant Butler when he handcuffed

Plaintiff to the bottom bedrail. (Id., p. 30.) He also states that Defendants Stover

and Nicholas were the individuals who initially took him to the body scanner and

the dry cell. (Id., p. 31.) Additionally, Plaintiff also alleges that while in the dry

cell, Defendant Nicholas would deprive him of water if he used the restroom

during his shift. (Id.)

In the deposition, Plaintiff premised the liability of Defendant Sherman on

the fact that he was present when Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Vance in the

security office and “could have stopped it.” (Id., pp. 30–31.)

While the court agrees that any claim that is based solely on supervisory

liability should have judgment entered in favor of such defendant, the court notes

that Defendants failed to identify which claims boiled down to supervisory liability

exclusively. Furthermore, as addressed at length below, Defendants failed to

address the issue of the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement in the dry cell and

presented no evidence as to why or who made the decision to retain Plaintiff in the

dry cell after the July 24, 2019 body scan. Therefore, the court will deny

Defendants’ motion regarding the personal involvement of each Defendant in the

remaining Eighth Amendment issue involving Plaintiff’s prolonged detention in

the dry cell.

C. The Court Will Enter Judgment in Defendants’ Favor on the Due

Process Claims.

Plaintiff asserts a due process violation regarding the allegedly false

misconducts raised against him by citing both the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 1, ¶ 44.)

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no State shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”3

See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Third Circuit has held that “with respect to the

misconduct hearing, due process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an

opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly falsified evidence and

groundless misconduct reports. Thus, so long as certain procedural requirements

are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or misconduct reports, without

more, are not enough to state a due process claim.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d

641, 653–54 (3d Cir. 2022) citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir.

1986); see also Thomas v. McCoy, 467 F. App'x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)

3 Since the crux of the complaint took place at a state facility and Defendants are employees of

the state, the court will only address the Fourteenth Amendment claim, as the Fifth Amendment

is not applicable.

(“Due process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard

and to defend against the allegedly false misconduct reports.”). Moreover, a

retaliatory discipline claim fails when there is “some evidence” to support the

determination. See Nifas v. Beard, 374 F. App'x 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing

Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994)).

Here, the documents attached to the complaint belie any allegation that he

was not afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly

false misconduct report. The misconduct report Plaintiff attached to his complaint

states that the report was given to him on the day after the incident, July 22, 2019.

(Doc. 1-1.) Furthermore, it provided Plaintiff with notice that a hearing may be

scheduled any time after July 23, 2019. (Id.) A hearing took place on July 31,

2019, and Plaintiff pled guilty to all charges. (Id.) In his deposition, Plaintiff

stated that he pled guilty to the misconduct. (Doc. 49-2, pp. 11–12.) Plaintiff

stated that he pled guilty, “because no one beats misconducts, and I didn’t want to

spend 180 days inside of RHU.” (Id, p. 18.) He then alleged that Defendant

Vance told him he was going to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”) before he

even had a hearing, “so it didn’t matter.” (Id., pp. 18–19.) Furthermore, Plaintiff

admitted at the deposition, that he did not appeal his misconduct: “I didn’t appeal

it. Nobody wins misconducts. I didn’t appeal it. You don’t win misconducts.”

(Doc. 49-2, p. 25.)

Furthermore, there was evidence to support the misconduct report that

Plaintiff was in possession of a dangerous or controlled substance and contraband.

Suboxone and tobacco were found in Plaintiff’s property when it was searched.

(Doc. 49-5, p. 3.)

Here, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establishes

that Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to be heard and defend against the

allegedly false misconduct report. The fact that he decided against taking

advantage of this opportunity because he thought that it did not matter or he would

not be successful does not rise to the level of a due process violation. Furthermore,

there was evidence to support the allegedly false misconduct. Therefore, the due

process challenge will not proceed past summary judgment.

The court acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants failed to

follow Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy. (Docs. 1, 51.) However, DOC

policy does not have the force of law and does not rise to the level of a regulation.

Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532, 556, n. 24 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2008) citing

Mercy Catholic Medical Center v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 2004).

Therefore, judgment will be entered in Defendants’ favor on the Fourteenth

Amendment claim.

D. Summary Judgment Will Be Entered, In Part, In Favor of

Defendants on the Eighth Amendment Claims.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.

Const. Amend. VIII. Prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment if

they result in a serious deprivation of the prisoner’s basic human needs. See

Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). Only

conditions that are so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under contemporary

standards or deprive an inmate of minimal civilized measures of the necessities of

life violate the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9

(1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “A claim of inhumane prison

conditions may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where the

prison official ‘deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities’ and ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing

the inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage to [his] future health.’”

Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Parkell v.

Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335 (3d Cir. 2016)).

Such a claim contains two requirements: an objective and subjective

component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prisoner asserting a

claim that the conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment must

allege: (1) that objectively, they were “incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2) that the defendant prison official

personally knew of the substantial risk to the inmate’s health or safety and failed to

“respond [ ] reasonably to the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 844–45.

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was given a mattress, but because

of the way he was handcuffed, he had to sleep on the floor while held in the dry

cell for ten days. (Doc. 1, ¶ 34.) He alleges that he was “substantially deprived of

drinking water when placed in the dry cell.” (Id., ¶ 35.) He also alleges that he

was “compelled to def[e]cate for a total of 27 times all the while with his left wrist

handcuffed to a bed rail for 10 days – 24 hours a day.” (Id., ¶ 36.) Therefore,

Plaintiff clearly challenges the conditions of his confinement in the dry cell.

Additionally, Plaintiff challenges the duration of his time in the dry cell following

the second body scan on July 24, 2019: “thereafter Plaintiff should’ve been

released from the dry cell, instead Plaintiff was again returned cruel[l]y to the dry

cell for an additional six (6) more days.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 24.)

When considering whether conditions of confinement violated the Eighth

Amendment, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons .

. . which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, (1981). “To the extent that such

conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal

offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347. The Third Circuit has

clearly found that “administrative confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often

unsanitary, [but] so long as the conditions of that confinement are not foul or

inhuman, and are supported by some penological justification, they will not violate

the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2020).

Defendants have presented evidence regarding the conditions of Plaintiff’s

stay in the dry cell including his deposition, in which he states that Defendant

Nicholas would deprive inmates of water if they used the bathroom during his

shift. (Doc. 49-2, p. 31.) Defendants submitted medical evidence demonstrating

that while in the dry cell, Plaintiff was monitored by medical every two hours, and

he was consistently offered water for hydration. (Doc. 49-6.) The medical notes

demonstrate that Plaintiff was either witnessed drinking water or Plaintiff was

offered and refused water. (Id.) They also demonstrate that Plaintiff was

consistently viewed on his bunk and that he refused to have the wrist restraints or

“cuffs” moved from his left arm to his right. (Id.) He was also provided an

opportunity to exercise, but he consistently refused. (Id.) Therefore, the court

finds that Defendants have presented evidence that the conditions of confinement

in the dry cell do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The

evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff refused offers of water, exercise, and relief

from the restraint on the left arm and that the extreme conditions he raised in the

complaint were not forced upon him, but were a product of his own choice.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence to refute this evidence. Therefore, the court

will grant judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of conditions of

confinement for his stay in the dry cell.

However, Defendants failed to address the issue of the duration of

confinement in the dry cell as part of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc.

50.) In Thomas, the Third Circuit stated the following concerning a prolonged

detention in a dry cell:

Our precedent is clear that, without some penological justification, an

inmate may not be administratively confined in a dry cell. See Young,

960 F.2d 351, 364–65; cf. United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254,

1256 (8th Cir. 1997) (dry cell justified when prison officials had reason

to believe inmate was smuggling contraband into jail). See also

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (conditions of confinement

may not be “grossly disproportionate” or “result in pain without any

penological purpose”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct.

2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (“[T]he sanction imposed cannot be so

totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous

infliction of suffering.”).

While the penological purpose must always be legitimate, Ricks v.

Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475, 476 (3d Cir. 2018), we have never

determined the exact quantum or nature of penological interest that is

needed to justify confinement in a dry cell. But we are satisfied that

there must be at least some interest. Here, the PRC failed to present

evidence of any continuing penological interest after its initial

interview with Thomas.

Thomas, 948 F.3d at 141.

Therefore, the court is left to discern the penological interest to justify

confinement in the dry cell. Defendants have submitted the affidavit of Defendant

VanGorder, which states that a confidential informant informed him that Plaintiff

would be receiving “another one hundred (100) strips of suboxone at his next visit

on 7/24/2019.” (Doc. 49-5, p. 3.) Based on this evidence, Defendant VanGorder

directed officers to place Plaintiff in a dry cell, pending investigation. (Id.) When

Plaintiff’s property was searched on July 21, 2019, eighteen strips of suboxone and

two bags of pipe tobacco were found. (Id.) Defendant VanGorder states “I

believed it was highly probable that Jones could have ingested additional

suboxone.” (Id.) Plaintiff was held in the dry cell from July 21, 2019 through

August 1, 2019. (Id.)

Here, Defendants have established an initial penological justification for

holding Plaintiff in a dry cell per Defendant VanGorder’s affidavit stating he

“believed it was highly probably that Jones could have ingested additional

suboxone.” (Doc. 49-5.) However, Plaintiff included allegations in the complaint

that the body scans performed on both July 21, 2019 and July 24, 2019 showed no

evidence of any contraband. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 21, 24.) Despite these negative body

scans, Plaintiff continued to be held in a dry cell through August 1, 2019.

Defendants have presented no evidence of a continued penological reason for the

detention in the dry cell following the July 24, 2019 body scan. In fact,

Defendants’ evidence is devoid of any reference to the two body scans and their

findings. Therefore, the court finds in accord with the Third Circuit precedence in

Thomas that there is an issue of material fact regarding any continuing penological

interest to justify Plaintiff’s continued detention in the dry cell after the July 24,

2019 body scan. Therefore, this issue will continue past summary judgment.

E. Summary Judgement Will Be Entered In Favor of Defendants on the

First Amendment Claims.

Plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against for filing grievances. (Doc. 1, ¶¶

57–61.) It is well-settled that prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate

because he exercises his right of access to the courts. Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d

184, 191 (3d Cir. 2015). A prisoner asserting a retaliation claim must allege the

following elements: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he

suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct

was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,

530 (3d Cir. 2003). The filing of a lawsuit or a prison grievance constitutes

protected activity under the First Amendment. Fantone, 780 F.3d at 191.

Here, the record submitted by Defendants clearly establishes that grievances

were not filed prior to his prolonged stay in the dry cell or prior to the misconducts.

(Doc. 49-7.) Both his confinement in the dry cell and the misconduct were

concluded prior to Plaintiff’s submission of his grievance on August 2, 2019. (Id.)

Plaintiff was released from the dry cell on August 1, 2019, and his misconduct

hearing was July 31, 2019. (Doc. 49-4.) Therefore, it is unclear what

constitutionally protected activity Plaintiff was conducting that resulted in the

alleged retaliatory activity of placement in the dry cell and the allegedly false

misconduct. Based on the undisputed evidence submitted by Defendants,

summary judgment will be granted in Defendants’ favor in regards to the First

Amendment retaliation claim.

CONCLUSION

For the afore mentioned reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion in

part, and grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim, the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement

claim, and the First Amendment retaliation claim. However, Defendants failed to

present evidence concerning the duration of Plaintiff’s detention in the dry cell and

the Eighth Amendment claim associated with the detention continuing past the July

24, 2019 body scan. Since this was not properly addressed in briefing, the court

will allow this claim to proceed against all named Defendants.

An appropriate order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: September 26, 2024