Blalock v. Corley

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAREL BLALOCK, : No. 3:24-CV-0647

Plaintiff :

3 (Judge Munley)

Vv. ;

LT. CORELY, et al.,

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Karel Blalock initiated the above-captioned pro se action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983," alleging that multiple officials at the State Correctional Institution

Huntingdon (SCI Huntingdon) failed to protect him from an inmate assault. Upor

required screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court will dismiss in part

Blalock’s complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

At all relevant times to the instant lawsuit, Blalock was incarcerated at SC]

Huntingdon. (Doc. 1 Jf] 19-49). He is now incarcerated at the Howard R. Young

Correctional Institution in Wilmington, Delaware. (See Doc. 18).

Blalock recounts that he was transferred from another state prison to SCI

Huntingdon on April 20, 2023. (Doc. 1 19). According to records from the

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed b'

state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism fo

vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273

284-85 (2002).

| Program Review Committee (PRC) attached to Blalock’s complaint, he was

| placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) upon his arrival to SCI Huntingdon

as an “Administrative Separation Transfer” in Disciplinary Custody (DC) status.

(Doc. 1-14). That DC time was initially set to expire on January 20, 2024. (Id.)

The day after his arrival, Blalock alleges that he met with Lieutenant Corley

from the security department and informed Corley of his fear of being assaulted

| at SCI Huntingdon. (Id. §] 20). According to Blalock, there was an inmate at SCI

Huntingdon who had already made two attempts on Blalock’s life—once “in the

community” and once while they were housed together at SCI Smithfield. (Id.)

| Blalock asserts that he provided the inmate’s first name, his “alias,” anda

physical description, and noted that he was “gang affiliated.” (Id.) Blalock,

| however, does not specify when he provided this identification information to

prison officials.

| That same day, Blalock filed a grievance (#1030559) in which he claimed

that his life was in jeopardy and that Lieutenant Corley and “other staff’ were

“brushing off’ his efforts to seek protection. (Id. J] 21; Doc. 1-1). Blalock stated ir

this grievance that he “fear[ed] for his life in this facility's general] population”

because of the other “gangmember” inmate’s presence. (Doc. 1-1). He sought é

| transfer to another facility and asked that Corley be removed from his security

| position because “the safety of inmates [was] clearly not a priority to him.” (Id.)

|

| Blalock’s grievance was denied by the Facility Grievance Coordinator,

| Captain A. Eberling, (see Doc. 1-2), and the subsequent appeal was denied by

the Facility Manager, Superintendent J. Rivello, (see Doc. 1-4). In the Facility

| Grievance Coordinator's denial, Eberling noted that Blalock had “refused to

divulge the name of the inmate” who allegedly represented a threat to him, so

| Lieutenant Corley could not request an administrative segregation. (Doc. 1-2 at

1). Eberling reasoned that by failing to identify the inmate who was perceived as

a threat, “it is impossible for Lt. Corley to justify requesting a separation on

[Blalock’s] behalf.” (Id.) Eberling also noted that Corley had recommended that

Blalock “remain in the RHU” while his allegations were investigated and informed

| Blalock that only the PRC could decide to remove him from the RHU and send

him to general population. (Id.)

| On first-level appeal, Superintendent Rivello reiterated that without Blalock

providing the identity of the inmate he feared, prison officials in the security

department could not “put in a separation” to ensure Blalock’s safety. (Doc. 1-4).

Rivello further noted that Blalock had “chosen to withhold the identity and other

| information regarding the inmate [he was] in fear of.” (Id.)

In his May 31, 2023 appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances

& Appeals (SOIGA), Blalock—apparently for the first time—admitted that he did

not know the last name of the other inmate, only that his first name was “Derrick”

|

| and he “goes by (crack) [sic] now.” (Doc. 1-5). Blalock continued, “If you[] still

don’t feel as though this is helpful enough, go ahead an[d] send me to [general]

| population.” (Id.) He also restated his requests for transfer to a different facility

and for Lieutenant Corley to be removed from his security position. (Id.) On July

19, 2023, Chief Grievance Officer D. Varner (through Keri Moore) upheld the

| lower-level grievance denials based on the reasoning in those denials. (See

Doc. 1-6). Varner “encouraged [Blalock] to cooperate with staff’ regarding

| identifying the inmate who allegedly posed a threat, and advised Blalock to

provide any additional information that may be relevant or helpful to the

appropriate prison staff. (Id.)

| On July 12, 2023, a week prior to receiving the SOIGA’s final denial,

Blalock recounts that he was seen by the PRC, which included DSCS J. Spyker,

| DSFM J. Kohler, and CCPM T. Strait. (Doc. 1] 27). He alleges that he

“explained to all three” individuals his “fear[] for his safety” and the “deplorable”

| responses he received from officials throughout the grievance process. (Id.)

Blalock asserts that his complaints were not “recorded or documented” as

allegedly required by prison policy. (Id.)

| On September 9, 2023, Blalock met with another security officer,

Lieutenant K.L. Strong. (Id. J 28). Blalock alleges that, during this meeting, he

| explained “all the issues involving the threat to his life” as well as the steps he

|

had taken “to try [to] get help.” (Id.) He avers that, despite providing this

information to Strong, he “was not given any help,” was not placed in “protective

custody status,” nor was he given a “temporary z code (single cell status)” for

protection. (Id.)

Two and a half weeks later, on the morning of September 26, 2023, □□□□□□□

was assaulted by another inmate—identified in Blalock’s October 26 grievance

appeal as “Curtis Young’”—while in the RHU recreation cages. (Id. {| 29; Doc. 1-

8; Doc. 1-10; Doc. 1-17 at 1). Young attacked Blalock with what is known in

prison vernacular as a “bomb,” consisting of “feces, vomit, urine, and semen”

combined in a bottle, which mixture was thrown on Blalock. (Doc. 1 ¥ 29).

According to Blalock, Young assaulted him to collect a bounty that was placed o1

Blalock by the inmate “Derrick” or “Derek,” (nicknamed “Crack”), whom Blalock

had previously expressed fear about and discussed with security officers. (Id.;

Doc. 1-9).

After exhausting administrative remedies through grievance #1056213

following the attack, (see Docs. 1-8 through 1-13), Blalock filed his Section 1983

lawsuit in this court. He names fourteen defendants in his complaint: Lieutenant

Corley, Lieutenant Strong, Captain Eberling, Superintendent Rivello, Lieutenant

Campbell, Chief Grievance Officer Varner, Lieutenant J. Watt, Counselor N.

Walters, Psych/PSS J. Helsel, DSCS Spyker, DSFM Kohler, CCPM Strait, Major

M. Yost, and Major W. House. (Doc. 1 at 4-7). He sues all Defendants in their

individual and official capacities. (Id.) He alleges that he suffered “depression,”

“anguish, mental and emotional injury,” and exposure to potential disease and

infections. (!d. 50). He seeks the following relief: (1) a declaration that his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) injunctive relief in the form of being

removed from SCI Huntingdon; (3) compensatory damages in the amount of

$100,000 as to each Defendant; (4) punitive damages of $100,000 as to each

Defendant; and (5) payment of all legal fees. (Id. ff] 51-55).

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,”

unrepresented prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or

employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). One basis for dismissal at the screening

stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted[.}” Id. § 1915A(b)(1). This language closely tracks Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to screening a

pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as they

utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien v.

U.S. Fed. Gov't, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(nonprecedential); cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must

accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.

Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's

claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct ¢

three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016) (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). At step

one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state

aclaim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in

original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded factual allegations—

which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions, which “are not

entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. Id. (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegation:

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

Because Blalock proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyersj[.]” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true when

the pro se litigant, like Blalock, is incarcerated. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

lll. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the sufficiency of Blalock’s complaint, the court must

identify the claimed constitutional violations. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

266, 271 (1994) (“The first step in any [Section 1983] claim is to identify the

specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 394 (1989) (explaining that analysis of a Section 1983 claim requires

“identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged”

conduct).

| Blalock plainly alleges Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. (See

Doc. 1 at 17 J 46). Indeed, these claims are the essence of his Section 1983

| lawsuit. He also posits that he is asserting a claim for “cruel and unusual

punishment.” (See id. at 18 {| 47). However, this assertion is based on the same

allegations as his failure-to-protect claim and thus does not alter the proper

| characterization of his Eighth Amendment claims as “failure to protect.”

It appears that Blalock is also attempting to assert a state-law claim of

negligence with respect to prison officials’ failure to contact the Pennsylvania

| State Police and pursue criminal charges against inmate Young. (See id. at 18

| 48). Blalock additionally alleges that Defendants violated the Department of

| Corrections (DOC) “code of ethics,” and asserts that he is bringing a state-law

claim of “assumpsit” for violating “an implied promise of protection.” (Id. at 18-19

749).

Blalock’s complaint is rife with material pleading deficiencies. The court wil

address these deficiencies in turn.

A. Personal Involvement

| It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

| “predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.

| Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens

|

| context). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that

demonstrate the defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”

Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Personal involvement can

| include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated

| through evidence of “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and

acquiescence”; however, such averments must be made with particularity. Id.

(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Furthermore, it is equally settled that

| involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does not give rise to

Section 1983 liability. See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison

| officials for lack of personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was

“their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp.

| 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’

923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x

1924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims

against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations

against them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance

process’).

| Blalock’s first pleading error is that he does not plausibly allege personal

| involvement for multiple Defendants. As to defendants Lieutenant Watt,

Lieutenant Campbell, Major Yost, and Major House, these Defendants had no

10

interaction with Blalock until after Young’s assault. (See Doc. 1 at 12-16 Jf] 32-

45, 49). Thus, they logically had no personal involvement in failing to protect him

from the attack by Young. Moreover, it appears that Watt’s only involvement was

providing the initial grievance response following the September 26 incident.

(See id. J 36; Doc. 1-9). However, involvement in the “post-incident grievance

process” alone does not give rise to Section 1983 liability. See Dooley, 957 F.3d

at 374; Alexander, 144 F. App’x at 925. The same rational applies to Chief

Grievance Officer Varner, who merely denied Blalock’s final appeal to the SOIGA

in January 2024.2 (See Doc. 1-13).

B. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect

“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696

F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by

Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). Prison officials, therefore, have “a

duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id.

2 Although Varner also denied Blalock’s final appeal for his initial grievance, that denial hac

nothing to do with failing to implement protective measures for Blalock at SCI Huntingdon. (See

generally Doc. 1-6). Rather, Varner simply upheld the denials from Eberling and Rivellc

indicating that Blalock needed to provide more identification information if he wanted ar

administrative separation from another inmate. (See id.). Blalock has not plausibly alleged hov

Varner’s response at the SOIGA—which merely upheld Eberling’s and Rivello’s findings—

played any role in failing to protect him at SCI Huntingdon. Thus, Blalock’s reliance on Varner’s

role in the grievance process alone is insufficient to establish personal involvement for Sectior

1983 liability. See Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374; Alexander, 144 F. App’x at 925. Moreover, as wil

be explained in detail below, Blalock failed to administratively exhaust any claim against Varner

11

(alteration in original) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).

However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another □□ .

| translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the □□□□□□□□

sate: Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

| To state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison

official, the inmate must plausibly allege that “(1) he was incarcerated under

| conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was

deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health and safety

and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused [the prisoner] harm.” Bistrian,

F.3d at 367. In this context, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard;

| that is, ‘the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of

the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256

F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)). Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial

risk to an inmate’s safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

At the pleading stage, Blalock has plausibly alleged a failure-to-protect

claim against Lieutenant Corley, Lieutenant Strong, Captain Eberling,

Superintendent Rivello, DSCS Spyker, DSFM Kohler, CCPM Strait, Counselor

Walters, and Psych/PSS Helsel. With respect to these Defendants, Blalock has

| alleged with sufficient factual detail that he informed them of risk of attack from

| 49

another inmate, that no protective measures were taken, and that these officials’

deliberate indifference resulted in the September 26, 2023 assault by Young.

The other named Defendants, who lack personal involvement in the allege:

constitutional violation, cannot be said to have been the cause of Blalock’s harm.

That is because, quite simply, they were not involved with Blalock’s custody at

SCI Huntingdon until after the September 26 assault. Thus, Blalock cannot state

an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against them because it cannot be

said that their alleged deliberate indifference caused his harm. See Bistrian, 69€

F.3d at 367.

C. Administrative Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et

seq., requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before

suing prison officials for alleged constitutional violations. See id. § 1997e(a);

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only “available”

remedies must be exhausted). Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the

inmate is seeking relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the

administrative system. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). The

exhaustion process is governed by the contours of the prison grievance system

in effect where the inmate is incarcerated. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218

(2007); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.

13

Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step

grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative

remedies in most cases. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir.

2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy

No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter “DC-ADM 804”). If informal

resolution attempts do not resolve the problem, the first step is to file a written

grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the Facility Grievance Coordinator

within 15 working days after “the event upon which the claim is based.” DC-ADN

804 § 1(A)(3)-(5), (8). An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator may be

appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-review

response or rejection. Id. § 2(A)(1). Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility

Manager may be appealed to “Final Review’ with the Secretary’s Office of

Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 1!

working days of the date of the Facility Manager's decision. Id. § 2(B)(1).

The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates.

Those requirements include, among other conditions, that the grievance “be

legible [and] understandable’; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the

claim” as well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that

gave rise to the grievance’; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved

in the event(s)”; and that the grievance sets forth “the specific relief sought,”

14

including “compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.” id.

§ 1(A)(11).

Generally, failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, not a pleading requirement. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.

Nevertheless, when it is apparent from the face of the complaint that a plaintiff

has failed to administratively exhaust a claim, dismissal may be appropriate

based on “failure to state a claim.” See Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 460 (3d

Cir. 2013), abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S

532 (2015). This includes sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. See

Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Booth v.

Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 290-91, 300 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s sua

sponte dismissal where prisoner-plaintiff conceded in his complaint that he did

not exhaust administrative remedies); Pena-Ruiz v. Sclorzano, 281 F. App’x 110

112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential) (“Although failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is generally an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the

defendant, we have recognized that a district court has the inherent power to

dismiss sua sponte a complaint . . . which facially violates a bar to suit.”).

Here, Blalock attached detailed documentation to his complaint regarding

administrative exhaustion of his failure-to-protect claim. (See Docs. 1-8 through

1-13). Notably, in his post-incident grievance (#1056213), he identifies the

15

following SCI Huntingdon officials as violating his Eighth Amendment rights for

failing to protect him from Young’s assault: “I’ve informed Security, PRC,

Superintendent, P[s]ych, and my counselor prior to being assaulted that | feared

for my life.” (Doc. 1-8). Under DC-ADM 804, an inmate is required to identify the

individuals involved in the at-issue event or events. DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(11)(b).

Blalock complied with this requirement but only as to certain Defendants. Under

the most liberal construction, those Defendants include only Lieutenant Corley

and Lieutenant Strong (“Security”)*; DSCS Spyker, DSFM Kohler, and CCPM

Strait (“PRC”)*; Superintendent Rivello (“Superintendent”); Psych/PSS Helsel

(“P[s]ych”); and Counselor Walters (“[Blalock’s] counselor”).

Thus, from the face of the complaint and the attachments thereto, it is clea

that Blalock did not exhaust administrative remedies as to Captain Eberling,

Chief Grievance Officer Varner, or Lieutenant Watt. In particular, Blalock does

not assert that any official involved with only his grievances (i.e., Eberling,

Varner, and Watt) violated his civil rights. (See Doc. 1-8). Consequently, to the

extent that Blalock alleges sufficient facts to plead an Eighth Amendment claim

against any of these Defendants (incidentally, only Eberling), any such claim

3 While Blalock anemia to sue Lieutenant Campbell, who is also alleged to be securit

personnel, (see Doc. 1 {J 38), Blalock’s allegations against Campbell do not state □□□□□□□

involvement in the failure-to-protect claim, as noted in Section III(A) above.

4 Blalock attempts to sue other PRC members (i.e., Major Yost and Major House) but, as notes

in Section III(A), those Defendants had no personal involvement in the failure-to-protect claim.

16

must be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim based

on Blalock’s patent failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Ball, 726

F.3d at 460; Pena-Ruiz, 281 F. App’x at 112 n.3.

D. Official Capacity Claims

As noted, Blalock sues all Defendants in their individual and official

capacities. However, any official capacity claim seeking monetary damages fron

state officials is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents

federal courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of

foreign states—brought against a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur

d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S

1, 10 (1890). This immunity from private suit extends to state agencies as well

as State officials acting in their official capacity because such lawsuits are

essentially civil actions “against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). States may waive this immunity if they choose,

but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its immunity with respect to claims

brought under Section 1983. See 42 PA. COoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b); Downey v.

Pa. Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth

Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 PA. CoNs. STAT.

§ 8521(b)). There are two exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's bar to

17

private suits against nonconsenting states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a □□□□□□□

immunity” and (2) “parties may sue state officers for prospective injunctive and

declaratory relief.” Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Pa.,

141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

Blalock’s official capacity claims, to the extent they seek monetary

damages, are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. His request

for a declaration that his civil rights were violated is retrospective, rather than

prospective, in nature. And, although Blalock seeks prospective injunctive relief

in the form of a prison transfer, he has already been transferred out of SCI

Huntingdon (the facility complained of) to a prison in Delaware. His claim for

prospective injunctive relief, therefore, is moot because he has received the relie

requested. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An

inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable

and declaratory claims.”); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d

Cir. 1993). In sum, all official capacity claims will be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

E. State-Law Claims

Blalock asserts state-law claims of negligence and “assumpsit.” Neither of

these claims survives Section 1915A(a) scrutiny.

18

Blalock first alleges that multiple prison officials were negligent for failing to

contact the Pennsylvania State Police “so that charges could be filed” against

Young. (Doc. 1 at 18 48). Under Pennsylvania law, to establish the tort of

negligence, a plaintiff must show that “the defendant owed a duty of care to the

plaintiff, that duty was breached, the breach resulted in the plaintiff's injury, and

the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or damages.” Kinney-Lindstrom v. Med. Care

Availability & Reduction of Error Fund, 73 A.3d 543, 563 n.17 (Pa. 2013) (quoting

Merlini ex rel. Merlini v. Gallitzin Water Auth., 980 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 2009)).

Blalock’s negligence claim plainly fails because he has not established any

duty of care owed with regard to reporting the assault to the Pennsylvania State

Police. Even if there were such a duty, Blalock has not plausibly alleged that he

was injured by the purported breach of this duty or that he suffered actual loss or

damages. Thus, his negligence claim must be dismissed. Dismissal will be with

prejudice because granting leave to amend would be futile. Blalock has not, and

cannot, allege facts that would establish injury or actual loss or damages

stemming from Defendants’ alleged failure to report the assault to the state

police.

Blalock next alleges that DOC officials violated the department's “code of

ethics,” which code he contends “gives [him] an implied promise of protection by

19

all staff in the P.A. D.O.C.” (Doc. 1 at 18-19 J 49). He labels this claim as

“assumpsit.” (Id.)

As best as the court can ascertain, Blalock is asserting a claim sounding in

breach of contract (i.e., breaking an implied promise) based on the DOC’s Code

of Ethics. Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “assumpsit” as a “common-law

action for breach of [an express or implied] promise or for breach of contract.”

Assumpsit, BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). See also Schriver v.

Schriver, 316 A.3d 153, 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) (noting that claim regarding

breach of a settlement agreement “sounds in assumpsit”); Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul

Cos., 717 A.2d 376, 411 n.1 (Pa. 2001) (Zappala, J., dissenting) (noting that .

action of “assumpsit” is founded on a contract not a tort (citing BLACK’s LAw

DICTIONARY 122 (6th ed. 1991))). Thus, Blalock’s “assumpsit” claim alleging that

prison officials breached an implied promise to protect him sounds in breach of

contract rather than tort law.

Blalock, however, does not allege how the DOC’s Code of Ethics provides

a promise (express or implied) to protect him from assaults by other inmates. He

does not cite any specific provision of the Code of Ethics, nor can the court

independently ascertain a basis for such an alleged contractual duty. See

generally COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., CODE OF ETHICS,

https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/cor/documents/about-

90

us/doc-policies/Code%200f%20Ethics.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2024). Moreover

Blalock does not plausibly allege that he is a party to the DOC’s Code of Ethics

such that he could maintain a breach of contract action based on that document.

See Butler v. Kauffman, No. 4:19-CV-02171, 2022 WL 2977337, at *11 □□□□□ Pa

July 27, 2022) (Brann, J.) (finding that prisoner-plaintiffs were not parties to

DOC’s Code of Ethics and therefore could not assert a breach of contract claim

against prison officials based on alleged breach of that document), affid, No. 23-

1761, 2024 WL 1007444 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2024) (nonprecedential). Nor has

Blalock alleged that he is an intended third-party beneficiary and that this

intention is expressly contained in the contract itself. See Melley v. Pioneer

Bank, N.A., 834 A.2d 1191, 1202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (citation omitted).

Thus, assuming arguendo that the DOC’s Code of Ethics could be

considered a “contract” under Pennsylvania law, Blalock has neither identified ar

express or implied contractual duty breached by Defendants’ conduct, nor has he

plausibly alleged that he is a party to this agreement or an intended third-party

beneficiary such that he can maintain a breach-of-contract claim in the first place

Blalock’s assumpsit claim, therefore, will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to

Section 1915A(b)(1) as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss—pursuant to Section

1915A(b)(1)—the Section 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims

| against Captain Eberling, Lieutenant Campbell, Chief Grievance Officer Varner,

| Lieutenant Watt, Major Yost, and Major House. The court will likewise dismiss a

official capacity claims, as well as Blalock’s state-law negligence and assumpsit

claims. This case will proceed only on the individual capacity Eighth Amendmen

failure-to-protect claims against Lieutenant Corley, Lieutenant Strong,

Superintendent Rivello, Counselor Walters, Psych/PSS Helsel, DSCS Spyker,

DSFM Kohler, and CCPM Strait. An appropriate Order follows.

Date: / i : Y COURT:

| : sm MUNLEY

| United States District Cou

992