McKnight v. Kingsboro

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SONYA MCKNIGHT,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-01137

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

FARIDA KINGSBORO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court are three motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Kristyne

Crist (“Defendant Crist”), Kirsten Heine (“Defendant Heine”), and Jerrett Ferrari

(“Defendant Ferrari”) (collectively, “OAG Defendants”); Defendants Anthony Cummings

(“Defendant Cummings”), Chad Showers (“Defendant Showers”), and Dominic Cristillo

(“Defendant Cristillo”) (collectively, “Backup Officer Defendants”); and Defendant Farida

Kingsboro (“Defendant Kingsboro”) (collectively with Backup Officer Defendants and OAG

Defendants, “Moving Defendants”). (Doc. 15; Doc. 17; Doc. 18). On July 10, 2023, Plaintiff

Sonya McKnight (“McKnight”) filed a complaint (“Complaint”) against Moving Defendants

and Defendants John and Jane Doe (collectively, “Defendants”) in the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). This matter was reassigned to the

undersigned District Judge on February 12, 2024.

For the following reasons, Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss shall be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 15; Doc. 17; Doc. 18).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from McKnight’s Complaint. (Doc. 1). McKnight

is a Black woman who, at all times relevant to this matter, was a Magisterial District Judge

in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). On or around February 22, 2020, at 2:00

AM, McKnight’s son Kevin was pulled over by Defendant Kingsboro in Harrisburg during a

traffic stop. (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). The traffic stop was recorded on dashcam video without audio.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 33). Upon being pulled over, Kevin called McKnight, who arrived on the scene

about ten minutes later. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35, 39). Around the same time, backup officers

Defendants Showers and Cummings and transport officer Defendant Cristillo, arrived on the

scene. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 36-37).

Once she arrived at the scene, McKnight spoke with Defendant Kingsboro, who

informed her that Kevin was being arrested on an outstanding warrant and that drugs had

been found on his person. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 40-45). Defendant Kingsboro told McKnight that there

was no need for officers to reenter Kevin’s vehicle, so McKnight entered Kevin’s running

vehicle in the presence of all officers, turned the vehicle off, and removed the keys. (Doc. 1,

¶¶ 45-51). She was then given her son’s belongings, including his money. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 60-66).

At the conclusion of the traffic stop, Defendants Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and

Cristillo all wrote separate incident reports that largely told the same story, including that

McKnight seemed displeased with Kevin’s arrest. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 54-66). Defendants Kingsboro,

Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo later informed their supervisor of McKnight’s presence at

the scene. (Doc. 1, ¶ 67). On or around March 5, 2020, the Dauphin County DOA’s Criminal

Investigation Division referred this matter to the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) for

investigation, where Defendant Ferrari was assigned to investigate the case. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 70-

71). Defendant Ferrari obtained a copy of the dashcam video and interviewed Defendants

Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo separately without showing them the dashcam

video. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 72-73).

On November 12, 2020, Defendant Ferrari then interviewed McKnight. (Doc. 1, ¶ 88).

Defendant Heine was present during this interview. (Doc. 1, ¶ 88). During the interview,

Defendant Ferrari told McKnight that there was no dashcam video of the incident and

informed McKnight that she was being accused both of harassment and removing drugs from

her son’s vehicle. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 89-93). McKnight told Defendant Ferrari that she knew a video

existed and asked him to watch it. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 91-92). According to McKnight’s allegations in

her complaint, Defendant Ferrari refused and told McKnight that it was her word as a Black

woman against the word of four white officers, presumably Defendants Kingsboro, Showers,

Cummings, and Cristillo. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 89-93).

On December 16, 2020, soon after learning the OAG was going to criminally charge

her, McKnight voluntarily surrendered with her attorney. (Doc. 1, ¶ 97) Plaintiff was

subsequently charged with fabricating or tampering with evidence, obstructing with the

administration of law, and official oppression and bail was set for $30,000. (Doc. 1, ¶ 99).

McKnight was formally booked and posted bail. (Doc. 1, ¶ 101).

Before her preliminary hearing, McKnight and her attorney received the dashcam

video. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 102-104). However, Defendants Kingsboro and Ferrari did not mention

nor introduce the dashcam footage at the preliminary hearing, which took place on February

19, 2021 before Judge Nicholas Lippincott. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 104, 105). At the preliminary hearing,

Defendants Kingsboro and Ferrari testified. (Doc. 1, ¶ 105). During her testimony, Defendant

Kingsboro omitted that she gave McKnight permission to take possession of her son’s car.

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 105-111). Defendant Ferrari’s testimony revolved around phone records related

to his investigation and interviews conducted during his investigation. (Doc. 1, ¶ 112). Judge

Nicholas Lippincott found enough factual allegations to bind the charges over for trial,

stating, “there is enough to proceed here, and I think a lot of it comes down to, what was –

what was in her mind?” (Doc. 1, ¶ 113). McKnight’s case continued to trial. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 113,

117).

Shortly after the preliminary hearing, McKnight announced that she was running for

re-election, and on May 19, 2021, she was reelected as a Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 114,

116).

McKnight’s criminal trial took place on July 26, 2021, before Judge Stephen

Lieberman. (Doc. 1, ¶ 117). Defendants Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo

testified. During her testimony, Defendant Kingsboro gave conflicting testimony about

whether she reentered Kevin’s vehicle and the manner in which McKnight took possession

of the vehicle after her conversation with Defendant Kingsboro. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 119-123).

Defendant Kingsboro was impeached based on her conflicting testimony. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 119-

123). Defendant Kingsboro also testified that McKnight’s demeanor was “agitated” the night

of Kevin’s arrest. (Doc. 1, ¶ 119). After the Commonwealth rested, McKnight moved for

judgment on acquittal. (Doc. 1, ¶ 127). Judge Stephen Lieberman heard arguments from both

parties and acquitted McKnight on all counts. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 127-128).

McKnight now alleges that as a result of the charges and trial, she sustained damages

including lost wages, attorney’s fees and costs, damage to her reputation, and emotional

harm. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 171, 185, 194, 200, 205), and on July 10, 2023, she filed the instant

Complaint asserting Ten Counts of violations of state and federal law. (Doc. 1). The Ten

Counts are as follows: Count I – Malicious Prosecution in Violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment; Count II – Conspiracy to Remove Plaintiff from Office via Malicious

Prosecution in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; Count III – Malicious Prosecution

in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count IV – Malicious Abuse of

Process in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count V – Conspiracy to

Remove Plaintiff from Office via Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process with Racial

Animus in Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; Count VI – Abuse of

Process in Violation of Pennsylvania Law; Count VII – Malicious Prosecution in Violation

of Pennsylvania Law; Count VIII – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count IX –

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count X – Punitive Damages. (Doc. 1, at 20-32).

She seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and

declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, at 33).

On September 11, 2023, OAG Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and on September

19, 2023, they filed a brief in support of their motion. (Doc. 15; Doc. 20). McKnight filed a

brief in opposition to OAG Defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 7, 2023. (Doc. 32).

OAG Defendants filed a reply brief on October 23, 2023. (Doc. 40). Defendant Kingsboro

filed a motion to dismiss on September 17, 2023, and a brief in support of her motion on

October 6, 2023. (Doc. 17; Doc. 31). McKnight filed her brief in opposition to Defendant

Kingsboro’s motion to dismiss on October 26, 2023. (Doc. 43). Defendant Kingsboro filed a

reply brief on November 14, 2023. (Doc. 48). Backup Officer Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss on September 18, 2023, and on October 2, 2023, filed a brief in support. (Doc. 18;

Doc. 29). McKnight filed her brief in opposition to Backup Officer Defendants’ motion to

dismiss on October 15, 2023. (Doc. 34). Backup Officer Defendants filed a reply brief on

November 3, 2023. (Doc. 46). Accordingly, the motions to dismiss have been fully briefed

and are ripe for disposition. (Doc. 1; Doc. 20; Doc. 29; Doc. 32; Doc. 34; Doc. 40; Doc. 31;

Doc. 43; Doc. 46; Doc. 48).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a

court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause

of action for violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for

rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To

succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant, acting under color

of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark

v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). Further, “a defendant in a civil rights

action ‘must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable,’ and ‘cannot be

held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor

approved.’” Baraka v. M,cGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

“Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)

III. DISCUSSION

Moving Defendants each argue the Complaint is subject to dismissal. OAG

Defendants submit that the Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim

against them for Equal Protection Clause violations, conspiracy, abuse of process, and

malicious prosecution. (Doc. 20, at 2). OAG Defendants further argue that they enjoy

immunity for the claims asserted against them. (Doc. 20, at 2). Similarly, Backup Officer

Defendants contend that all claims against them should be dismissed because McKnight does

not make factual allegations sufficient to state any claim against them, and her Complaint

does not allege any specific wrongdoing by Backup Officer Defendants. (Doc. 29, at 2; Doc.

46, at 2). Backup Officer Defendants further assert that regardless, they are entitled to

qualified immunity for all claims. (Doc. 29, at 2). Defendant Kingsboro argues the claims

against her should be dismissed because McKnight failed to make factual allegations sufficient

to state a claim for conspiracy, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, or

malicious prosecution and abuse of process under state or federal law. (Doc. 31, at 2).

Defendant Kingsboro also avers that she is immune on qualified immunity grounds and

sovereign immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act (“PTCA”). (Doc. 31, at

2).

As McKnight sees it, none of the Moving Defendants are immune from liability for

the claims asserted against them. (Doc. 32, at 2-3; Doc. 34, at 2; Doc. 42, at 2). Further, she

avers that she has sufficiently stated a claim for each of the Counts asserted in her Complaint.

(Doc. 32, at 2-3; Doc. 34, at 2; Doc. 42, at 2). As all three of the instant motions to dismiss

raise common issues, the Court will address the motions together, considering arguments and

issues separately as appropriate.1

A. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY FOR DEFENDANT HEINE

The OAG Defendants assert that as a prosecutor in the Office of the Attorney General,

Defendant Heine is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for the claims against her.

(Doc. 20, at 15-16). In turn, McKnight argues that Defendant Heine is not entitled to

prosecutorial immunity because her actions of participating in the interview as part of the

1 McKnight does not dispute that Defendant Crist enjoys prosecutorial immunity for

actions he took in connection with this matter. (Doc. 32, at 26). All claims against Defendant

Crist are accordingly DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1, at 20-33). She also concedes that

Defendant Heine is entitled to sovereign immunity for all state law claims. (Doc. 32, at 7).

All state law claims against Defendant Heine are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1, at

28-33). McKnight also does not dispute OAG Defendants’ argument that any standalone

Fourteenth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process should be

dismissed per the explicit source rule. (Doc. 32, at 26). All Fourteenth Amendment claims for

malicious prosecution and abuse of process are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1, at 20-

27). Accordingly, the Court will not address the parties’ arguments as they relate to whether

or not Moving Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for McKnight’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.

criminal investigation were investigatory in nature and thus not within the scope of her duties

as a prosecutor. (Doc. 32, at 26).

It is well settled that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for actions “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process . . .” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 430 (1976). “More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the

‘right not to stand trial’ ... and is properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Odd v.

Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “[W]hether a prosecutor

is entitled to absolute immunity for his/her conduct depends on the function the prosecutor

was performing.” Segers v. Williams, 12 F. Supp. 3d 734, 738 (E.D. Pa. 2014). As such, a

prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit with respect to actions he or she performed in a

judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, but “not to administrative or investigatory actions

unrelated to initiating and conducting judicial proceedings.” Odd, 538 F.3d at 208 (quoting

Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994)). This is a fact-specific inquiry. See Roberts

v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 627 (3d Cir. 2024) (“‘our prosecutorial immunity analysis focuses on the

unique facts of each case and requires careful dissection of the prosecutor's actions.’”)

(quoting Odd, 538 F.3d at 210). Relevant here, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor

is immune from suit under § 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s

case.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Further, when a prosecutor functions as an advocate “in

evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial,” he is absolutely

immune for those actions. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). However, the

Third Circuit has found that “[b]efore probable cause for an arrest, a prosecutor’s ‘mission at

that time [i]s entirely investigative in character.’” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. at 274); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,

129-31 (1997) (a prosecutor who made an allegedly false statement in an arrest warrant

affidavit was not entitled absolute immunity); cf. Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d

Cir. 1992) (“[e]vidence gleaned prior to the filing is deemed investigative.). “‘[T]o earn the

protections of absolute immunity’ at the motion-to-dismiss stage, ‘a defendant must show that

the conduct triggering absolute immunity clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.’”

Weimer v. Cnty. of Fayette, Pa., 972 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fogle, 957 F.3d at

161).

In her Complaint, McKnight alleges that Defendant Heine not only listened, observed,

or evaluated evidence as a prosecutor during Defendant Ferrari’s November 12, 2020

interview, but that she participated as an investigator by falsely telling McKnight that no video

of the night of her son’s arrest existed. (Doc. 1, ¶ 93; Doc. 32, at 25-26). Courts have

considered the actions taken by a prosecutor before charges are filed to be investigative. See

Fogle, 957 F.3d at 160 (noting that before an arrest, a prosecutor’s mission is “entirely

investigative”); see also Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1465 (“Evidence gleaned prior to the filing is

deemed investigative. Certain pre-filing interactions with the police are investigative, such as

directing evidence-gathering”) (internal quotation omitted). Defendant Heine’s presence and

participation in Defendant Ferrari’s interview of McKnight occurred prior to both the filing

of charges and the preliminary hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 88-113). As such, Defendant Heine’s

actions in connection with the interview were investigatory in nature and she “cannot show

that the defense of absolute immunity appears clearly on the face of the complaint.” Weimer,

972 F.3d at 189; see Munchinski v. Solomon, 618 F. App'x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2015) (suggesting

that when a prosecutor interviews a suspect before charges are filed they “adopt[] ‘the

detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give [them] probable

cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested’” and thus are not entitled to prosecutorial

immunity) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Thus, at this stage of the litigation, the Court

finds that Defendant Heine is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity for alleged Fourth

Amendment violations. OAG Defendants’ motion is DENIED on this basis. (Doc. 15).

B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR ALL MOVING DEFENDANTS

Moving Defendants each argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for the

claims asserted against them. (Doc. 20, at 11; Doc. 29, at 12; Doc. 31, at 19). Qualified

immunity protects government officials from civil liability “in so far as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Courts consider two

prongs when determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity: “(1) whether

the official violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established.”

McAndrew v. Northumberland Cnty., No. 4:22-CV-00834, 2023 WL 408905, at *6 (M.D. Pa.

Jan. 25, 2023); see Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017). A right

is “clearly established” when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “The Supreme Court has stated that this standard does

not require a case directly on point but requires that ‘existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Andresen v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:20-CV-

989, 2022 WL 3045843, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011)). Relying generally on the text of a constitutional provision to find a clearly

established right is not enough. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (defining clearly established as

particular and relevant, rather than general violation of a constitutional provision and stating

that “if the test of ‘clearly established law’ were to be applied […generally…]” it would

“convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually

unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.”) (quoting Davis

v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)). At the motion to dismiss stage, this inquiry is the same.

Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[a]t the motion to dismiss stage,

federal and state officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the ‘facts, taken in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a constitutional violation,’ and (2) the alleged

right was clearly established at the time of the violation.”) (quoting Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d

483, 492 (3d Cir. 2006)).

1. Whether Backup Officer Defendants are Entitled to Qualified

Immunity

Backup Officer Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for all

constitutional claims asserted against them, because they did not violate any clearly

established law, committed no wrongdoing the night of Kevin’s arrest or thereafter, and are

not proper defendants for any claims. (Doc. 29, at 21). McKnight responds that, in making

this argument, Backup Officer Defendants rely on their subjective beliefs about the legality of

their actions, which is irrelevant to the qualified immunity objective inquiry. (Doc. 34, at 20-

21).

McKnight alleges only that Defendants Cummings, Showers, and Cristillo created a

supplemental report describing the scene at the arrest, that they complained to a supervisor

about her presence at the scene of Kevin’s arrest, and that they provided testimony at the July

2021 criminal trial. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-67, 118). These allegations do not implicate any clearly

established rights and McKnight fails to cite to any caselaw to the contrary. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-

67, 118; Doc. 34). Instead, she relies on her own legal conclusions that these actions violated

her rights. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-67, 118). This Court cannot find any authority asserting, nor can it

think of any reason why, these allegations would constitute wrongdoing or amount to a

violation of McKnight’s rights. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-67, 118). Thus, Backup Officer Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. See Kelly v. Police Officer Barry Szamboti Warwick Twp. Police

Dep't, No. 18-CV-3094, 2018 WL 11606340, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018) (dismissing a

complaint when the court noted “we can find no allegations of wrongdoing on [a defendant’s]

part whatsoever”); see also Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that

courts are “‘not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences’”

about a party’s wrongdoing) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007).

Backup Officer Defendants’ motion to dismiss all constitutional claims is GRANTED. (Doc.

18). Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Backup Officer Defendants are DISMISSED

without prejudice. (Doc. 1, at 20-33); Gainey v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 22-4143, 2023

WL 8258771, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2023) (finding officer was entitled to qualified

immunity where plaintiff’s allegations required the court to infer wrongdoing), dismissed sub

nom. Abdullah v. City of Philadelphia, No. 24-1015, 2024 WL 3295607 (3d Cir. Jan. 19, 2024).

2. Whether OAG Defendants and Defendant Kingsboro are entitled to

Qualified Immunity

OAG Defendants and Defendant Kingsboro also contend that they are protected by

qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claims against them. (Doc. 20, at 11; Doc. 29,

at 20; Doc. 31, at 19; Doc. 32, at 24; Doc. 34, at 20; Doc. 43, at 22). Qualified immunity for

the Fourth Amendment claims requires that the illegality of the relevant challenged act is

“beyond debate.” Redclift v. Schuylkill Cnty., No. 4:21-CV-1866, 2022 WL 3973824, at *11

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2022); see Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64 (“precedent must be clear enough that

every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to

apply”). Because the right to be free from arrest except upon probable cause is clearly

established under the Fourth Amendment, the qualified immunity inquiry requires a

determination of whether the allegations establish a violation of probable cause.2 Tereo v.

Smuck, No. 1:16-CV-1436, 2018 WL 4404676, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2018) (“The parties

appropriately do not dispute the second prong: as we held at the Rule 12 stage, the right to be

free from arrest except upon probable cause is clearly established. Hence, we need only

determine whether the record establishes a violation of that right.”) (citing Andrews v. Scuilli,

853 F.3d 690, 705 (3d Cir. 2017)) (internal citations omitted). Probable cause exists when

“facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge would convince a reasonable

person that an individual has committed an offense.” Tereo, 2018 WL 4404676, at *6. To find

a probable cause deficiency, a plaintiff must allege that the officer “‘knowingly and

deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions’ […

and] that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable

cause.’” Tereo, 2018 WL 4404676, at *6 (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d

Cir. 2000).

2 The Third Circuit has questioned whether a malicious prosecution claim can be

brought as a Fourteenth Amendment violation, providing such claims may be grounded in

the text of the Fourth Amendment, rather than the more general notion of substantive due

process. See Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 172 (holding that malicious prosecution

claims may not be grounded in substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment)

(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 267-70 (1994)); see also Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist.,

211 F.3d 782, 792 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity

from plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural

due process clause due to the lack of a ‘clearly established right’); see also Thomas v. City of

Phila., 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“The procedural due process right against

malicious prosecution is not clearly established. The Supreme Court has not yet articulated

such a right. And the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stopped short of deciding the right's

‘viability’ in 2014…”).

In claims relating to an officer’s alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment due to a

lack of probable cause, “qualified immunity is premised upon an officer's reasonable belief in

the accuracy of the facts [he provides] and the existence of probable cause based on those

facts. This premise is negated ‘where a[n ]officer causes an arrest to be made pursuant to a

warrant that he obtained on the basis of statements he knew to be false or on the basis of

statements he makes in reckless disregard of the truth....’” Pinkney v. Meadville, Pa., 648 F.

Supp. 3d 615, 645 (W.D. Pa. 2023), aff'd, 95 F.4th 743 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Lippay v.

Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993)). Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that a

reasonable officer should know they cannot “fabricate inculpatory evidence against a suspect

or defendant.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296 (3d Cir. 2014). As such, it is clearly

established that the use of false testimony or concealing evidence to further the likelihood of

conviction violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Crosland v. City of Phila., 676

F. Supp. 3d 364, 373 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (noting the longstanding constitutional right to be free

from convictions arising from perjured testimony or suppression of evidence) (internal

citations omitted); Dennis v. City of Phila., 19 F.4th 279, 292 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting that

allegations that, in an effort to secure a plaintiff’s conviction in a criminal matter, detectives

“knowingly deceived the court [. . . ] through false testimony” violate that plaintiff’s

constitutional rights). These probable cause requirements apply to both police officers and

detectives. See Outlaw v. City of Phila., No. CV 21-1290, 2021 WL 3471168, at *5 (E.D. Pa.

Aug. 6, 2021); see also Dennis, 19 F.4th at 292. The Court will review whether qualified

immunity protects Defendants Ferrari and Heine and Defendant Kingsboro, considering each

in turn.

a. Defendants Ferrari and Heine

OAG Defendants argue that Defendants Ferrari and Heine are entitled to qualified

immunity for the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims

asserted against them because “Plaintiff relies solely upon her own legal conclusions” that

Defendants Ferrari and Heine violated clearly established law. (Doc. 40, at 9). Additionally,

OAG Defendants aver that because the charges against McKnight “were bound over for

trial,” they were supported by probable cause and “taken to their normal and intended

conclusion.” (Doc. 40, at 7, 9-10). McKnight refutes this contention, responding that

Defendants Ferrari and Heine failed to refer to exculpatory evidence during the preliminary

hearing, namely the dashcam footage which showed McKnight’s relaxed body language in

contradiction to Defendant Kingsboro’s account, and thus her arrest lacked probable cause.

(Doc. 32, at 18, 28-29). She also contends that Defendants Heine and Ferrari took part in her

investigation and prosecutions to pressure her to step down from office. (Doc. 32, at 18, 28).

Thus, McKnight submits, her arrest and prosecution violated her right under the Fourth

Amendment to be free from malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process. (Doc. 32,

at 28-29).

Individuals enjoy the clearly established right to be free from malicious prosecution

based upon statements an officer or detective “makes in reckless disregard of the truth” and

in furtherance of an illegitimate purpose. Pinkney, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 645; see Richter v. Pa.

State Police, No. CV 15-775, 2018 WL 2984966, at *9 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2018) (“an official's

statements to a court concerning probable cause must disclose known material facts that

would weigh against an arrest.”); see also Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir.

1977) (finding that malicious abuse of process occurs when an officer uses the criminal process

for a purpose other than it was intended and clearly establishing such acts as a constitutional

violation). McKnight alleges that Defendants Ferrari and Heine intentionally failed to refer

to or produce the exculpatory dashcam footage at the preliminary hearing, with “blatant

disregard” for the truth, in order to pressure her to step down as a Magisterial District Judge.

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 93, 105-106, 162, 169-170). As a result of that failure, McKnight alleges that Judge

Lippincott “bound the charges over for trial[.]” (Doc. 1, ¶ 113).

At this stage of the litigation, these averments are sufficient to establish that

Defendants Ferrari and Heine violated clearly established law for the purposes of qualified

immunity. See Dayoub v. Aaron, No. 2:12CV1770, 2013 WL 4810382, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

9, 2013) (“[p]laintiff alleges enough factual matter to raise the inference that officer knowingly

gave false information [. . .] that contributed to the charges being filed[. . . ]without probable

cause, causing plaintiff to be arrested and seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The

right to be free from arrest and prosecution based only on false charges was well established.”);

see also Booker v. Borough of N. Braddock, No. 2:19-CV-01649-CCW, 2021 WL 37618, at *8

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2021) (denying qualified immunity to officers when plaintiff pled facts that

charges were filed against her in an attempt to unlawfully intimidate her). As such, the Court

finds Defendants Ferrari and Heine are not entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth

Amendment claims. OAG Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims on qualified immunity grounds is

DENIED. (Doc. 15); see Dayoub, 2013 WL 4810382, at *11-12 (finding that an officer is not

entitled to qualified immunity for Fourth Amendment claims when plaintiff alleged that an

officer knowingly gave false information during investigation, contributing to charges being

filed against plaintiff).

b. Defendant Kingsboro

Defendant Kingsboro also argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity for Fourth

Amendment claims against her because she did not violate clearly established law. (Doc. 48,

at 9). Defendant Kingsboro provides that to the extent that she wrote an incident report

exaggerating or mischaracterizing McKnight’s actions at the scene the night of Kevin’s arrest,

that report was created to document the arrest, not to file criminal charges against McKnight.

(Doc. 48, at 9). McKnight submits that Defendant Kingsboro is not entitled to qualified

immunity because her alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence during judicial

proceedings violated clearly established law. (Doc. 32, at 28-29; Doc. 43, at 23).

McKnight further alleges that Defendant Kingsboro knowingly provided misleading

facts and withheld exculpatory evidence when she filed her report of Kevin’s arrest, testified

at the preliminary hearing, and testified at the two-day trial. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 54-57, 105-111, 118-

124, 147, 160). According to the Complaint, Defendant Kingsboro was impeached at trial for

offering conflicting testimony about McKnight’s actions the night of her son’s arrest. (Doc. 1,

¶¶ 119-123). McKnight correctly asserts that Defendant Kingsboro’s misleading testimony

violated her clearly established right to be free from prosecution based on false statements.

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 54-57, 105-111, 118-124, 133); Richter, 2018 WL 2984966, at *9 (holding that

officials must disclose material facts that weigh against arrest). As such, Defendant Kingsboro

is not entitled to qualified immunity for Fourth Amendment claims. Pinkney, 648 F. Supp. 3d

at 645 (finding the right to be free from prosecution based on false statements to be clearly

established for the purpose of a qualified immunity claim); see also Booker, 2021 WL 37618, at

*8. Defendant Kingsboro’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution and abuse of process claims on qualified immunity grounds is DENIED. (Doc.

17); see Booker, 2021 WL 37618, at *6-8 (denying qualified immunity to officers for malicious

prosecution and abuse of process claims when a plaintiff alleged that she was prosecuted

without probable cause and in order to harass or intimidate her).

C. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND MCKNIGHT’S STATE LAW CLAIMS

OAG Defendants and Defendant Kingsboro posit that McKnight’s state law claims

must be dismissed because they are barred by sovereign immunity. (Doc. 20, at 25; Doc. 31,

at 22; Doc. 32, at 29-30; Doc. 34, at 21; Doc. 43, at 23-24). OAG Defendants contend that

because Moving Defendants are Commonwealth employees who took their allegedly

unlawful actions in scope of their employment, they each enjoy sovereign immunity. (Doc.

20, at 25). Without addressing the alleged acts of other defendants, McKnight responds that

Defendant Ferrari is not entitled to sovereign immunity because “his conduct was willful,

fraudulent, or malicious.” (Doc. 32, at 29-30). Further, that “[w]hen an investigator, like

Defendant Ferrari, initiates criminal proceedings without probable cause, he loses sovereign

immunity and is liable for malicious prosecution [sic].” (Doc. 32, at 30).

Under Pennsylvania's general provisions, “the Commonwealth, and its officials and

employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity

and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall

specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310. In actions against Commonwealth

parties, the General Assembly has specifically waived immunity in cases of: (1) vehicle

liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property;

(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous

conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard

activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522.

With limited statutory exceptions, sovereign immunity bars state law tort claims like

those alleged in this case, as Commonwealth employees are immune from liability for either

negligence or intentional torts. McGrath v. Johnson, 67 F. Supp. 2d 499, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1999),

aff'd, 35 F. App'x 357 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity bars damage

claims for state law torts against employees of Commonwealth agencies acting within the

scope of their duties, except for several narrowly enumerated exceptions.”); see also Urella v.

Pa. State Troopers Ass’n, 628 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“Under 1 Pa. C.S.A. §

2310, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has explicitly retained its sovereign immunity

from suit. The Pennsylvania legislature has waived sovereign immunity in only nine limited

circumstances.”). Courts have repeatedly concluded that claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress brought against Commonwealth employees arising out of actions taken by

those employees within the scope of their official duties are barred by sovereign immunity.

See e.g., Ray v. Pa. State Police, 654 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 676 A.2d 194

(1996) (holding that a state trooper acting within the scope of his duties is protected by

sovereign immunity from intentional infliction of emotional distress claims) (citation

omitted); see also Sarin v. Magee, 333 F. Supp. 3d 475, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding the

same). Likewise, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania retains sovereign immunity against

state law negligence claims and claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. 42 Pa.

C.S.A. § 8522(b).

First, “unlike Eleventh Amendment immunity, sovereign immunity ‘applies to

Commonwealth employees in both their official and individual capacities.’” Kintzel, 965 F.

Supp. 2d 601 at 606 (quoting Larsen v. State Emps.' Ret. Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 403, 420 (M.D.

Pa. 2008)); see Deforte v. Borough of Washington, 364 F. Supp. 3d 458, 486 (W.D. Pa. 2019)

(“Sovereign immunity's protection, barring suit against state employees whenever they act

within the scope of their official duties, applies regardless of whether Commonwealth

employees are sued in their official or individual capacities.”). Second, willful misconduct has

been expressly denied as an exception to sovereign immunity. See Brautigam v. Fraley, 684 F.

Supp. 2d 589, 594 (M.D. Pa. 2010). Sovereign immunity protection is undeniably broad, as

“[u]nlike employees of municipal agencies who remain liable for intentional torts, employees

of Commonwealth agencies are immune from liability even for intentional torts.” Mitchell v.

Luckenbill, 680 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Dill v. Oslick, No. Civ. A. 97-

6753, 1999 WL 508675, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1999)). As summarized in Yakowicz v.

McDermott:

the immunity defense provided by the General Assembly to local agencies and

their employees in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541–8564 is lost to local agency employees

where their actions which cause injury constitute a “crime, actual fraud, actual

malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550 ... The General Assembly has

not included any such abrogation of the immunity provided to Commonwealth

agency employees.”

548 A.2d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).

“Thus, despite the fact the claims alleged by Plaintiff[ ] might amount to willful misconduct,

any defendant is still within the umbrella of immunity provided by 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310.”

Brautigam, 684 F. Supp. at 594.

None of the exceptions to sovereign immunity appears to have any application to the

facts and circumstances of this particular case. See 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310. Whether Defendant

Ferrari acted willfully is irrelevant because willfulness does not affect the immunity provided

by 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310. (Doc. 43, at 24); see Brautigam, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (plaintiffs

“mistakenly argue that the immunity provided by [1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310] is somehow abrogated

with respect to individuals whose conduct constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or

willful misconduct. This is incorrect.”); see 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310. Additionally, the “clearly

established” test relates only to a qualified immunity, not a sovereign immunity, analysis.

Brautigam, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (not considering any clearly established test in a sovereign

immunity evaluation); see also Davison v. Kennedy, No. CV 3:15-1373, 2016 WL 538906, at *9

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2016) (conducting a sovereign immunity analysis without discussing

whether the relevant conduct was a clearly established violation of any right). Therefore, these

claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and thus are DISMISSED with

prejudice. (Doc. 1); see Davison, 2016 WL 538906, at *9 (dismissing state law claims against

parole officers who potentially engaged in willful misconduct because willfulness does not

affect sovereign immunity). Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss all state law claims are

GRANTED. (Doc. 15; Doc. 17; Doc. 18).

D. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM CONSTRUED BY OAG DEFENDANTS

OAG Defendants construe Count I – Malicious Prosecution in Violation of

Fourteenth Amendment as an Equal Protection claim. (Doc. 1, at 20; Doc. 20, at 13). OAG

Defendants state, “All though [sic] not clearly expressed [by Plaintiff], OAG Defendants

interpret Count I of the complaint to contain a selective prosecution/enforcement claim.”

(Doc. 20, at 13). OAG Defendants argue that McKnight has not adequately stated a

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based on selective prosecution. (Doc. 20, at

13). OAG Defendants assert that McKnight “fails to aver any facts to demonstrate that she

was treated differently from other, similarly situated persons” and that her allegation that

Defendant Ferrari said “‘it was her word as a Black woman against four (4) white officers’

fails to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s race or gender was the basis for […selective prosecution].”

(Doc. 20, at 13). McKnight, without acknowledging that she did not expressly plead a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause, adopts OAG Defendants’ interpretation of her

claim. (Doc. 1; Doc. 32, at 18-19). She posits that these statements “effectively classified Black

women's testimony as not believable when compared to the testimony of white officers” and

thus establish comparative evidence and reflect a discriminatory intent and racial animus by

Defendants Ferrari and Heine. (Doc. 1; Doc. 32, at 18-19).

The Third Circuit has stated that selective prosecution is:

“a form of discriminatory law enforcement that has been held to violate the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, (1886), which held officials liable for ‘illegal

discrimination’ when they ‘applied and administered’ a facially neutral law

‘with an evil eye and an unequal hand.’”

Davis v. Malitzki, 451 F. App'x 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2011).

To bring a successful selective prosecution claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that persons

similarly situated were not prosecuted; and (2) that the decision to prosecute was made on the

basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion or “some other arbitrary factor.”

Malitzki, 451 F. App'x at 234 (quoting U.S. v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989)). To

do so, the Complaint must contain allegations that McKnight was “treated differently from

other similarly situated individuals.” Dombrosky v. Stewart, 555 F. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir.

2014) (citing Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010)); Perano v. Twp. of

Tilden, 423 F. App'x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff “must

allege facts sufficient to make plausible the existence of such similarly situated parties” to state

an Equal Protection claim). “Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause

when they are alike in ‘all relevant respects.’” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d

Cir.2008) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). While a stray comment is

insufficient to demonstrate direct evidence of discriminatory intent, a plaintiff can state an

Equal Protection claim by showing that an officer placed substantial reliance on an

illegitimate criterion, such as race, when deciding to prosecute a plaintiff. Grooms Hauling,

LLC v. Robinson, No. CV 18-5405, 2020 WL 374449, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2020); see also

Kim-Foraker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 834 F. Supp. 2d 267, 277 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“stray remarks are

not direct evidence of discrimination.”).

McKnight alleges that Defendants Ferrari and Heine each violated the Equal

Protection Clause by commenting that the public would not believe her because of her race

and gender. (Doc. 1, ¶ 134). The Court will address each in turn.

a. Defendant Ferrari

McKnight alleges Defendant Ferrari made “continuous” remarks about her race and

gender, rather than a stray comment. (Doc. 32, at 18). However, the Complaint only alleges

one specific comment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 134). Additionally, she contends that Defendant Ferrari

attempted to persuade her to resign from her position as a Magisterial District Judge by

implying that the public would not believe evidence about the night of the arrest because she

is a Black woman. (Doc. 1, ¶ 134). McKnight further alleges that Defendant Ferrari referred

to her as a “girl” rather than a woman when making this remark. (Doc. 1, ¶ 134). The Court

agrees that these allegations are sufficient to allege that Defendant Ferrari “classified Black

women or ‘girls’ unfavorably as compared to white officers.” (Doc. 32, at 19). However, at

the motion to dismiss stage, an Equal Protection Clause claim requires a plaintiff “to make

plausible the existence of such similarly situated parties.” Perano, 423 F. App'x at 238 (quoting

Startzell, 533 F.3d at 203 (3d Cir.2008). The white officers and Black suspects about which

Defendant Ferrari comments are not alike in “all relevant respects” as required to show that

they are similarly situated. See Stradford v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022)

(“[o]ther factors explaining disparate treatment will usually preclude persons from being

similarly situated. In turn, the failure to identify similarly situated persons dooms an equal-

protection claim.”) (citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)); see

also Startzell, 533 F.3d at 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt held that [a]ppellants were

not similarly situated to the Philly Pride volunteers because the volunteers were there as part

of a permitted event that celebrated National Coming Out Day rather than as attendees with

no relationship to the organizers whatsoever.”). In other words, for her Equal Protection

claim to be sustained, McKnight must have alleged that Defendant Ferrari treated her

differently than other individuals being prosecuted. Suber v. Guinta, 927 F. Supp. 2d 184, 202

(E.D. Pa. 2013) (“‘[t]he Plaintiffs must prove that [their establishment] was treated differently

than similarly situated establishments that did not have predominantly minority clientele’”),

aff'd sub nom. Suber v. Wright, 574 F. App'x 207 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City

of Wilkes–Barre, 2006 WL 2460881, at *22 (M.D. Pa. August 23, 2006)). Here, the fact that

the more believable individuals to which Ferrari refers are not other non-Black suspects his

office is prosecuting, but police officers, means McKnight has failed to identify similarly

situated persons. See Stradford, 53 F.4th at 74. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserted

an Equal Protection claim against Defendant Ferrari, it is DISMISSED without prejudice.

(Doc. 1, at 20); see Davison, 2016 WL 538906, at *5-6 (dismissing Equal Protection claims

against officers when a plaintiff “has not identified other similarly situated individuals from

whom he was treated differently”); see also Fong v. City of Newark, No. CV227243SDWMAH,

2023 WL 8947378, at *13 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2023) (dismissing an Equal Protection claim

because “[t]he [c]omplaint has not identified who other ‘similarly situated’ persons are or

what unequal treatment those similarly situated individuals received from [d]efendants.”)

b. Defendant Heine

McKnight has not alleged that Defendant Heine remarked about Plaintiff’s race or

gender. (Doc. 1). Instead, she avers that Defendant Heine adopted Defendant Ferrari’s

statements by declining to refute them. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 88-94; Doc. 32, at 18). Courts in this Circuit

require more than a failure to intervene to hold Defendant Heine liable for Defendant

Ferrari’s actions. See Ogrod, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 273 (finding that “failing to intervene in their

fellow officers’ actions” did not subject individual officers to liability); see also Onyiah v. City of

Phila., 660 F. Supp. 3d 407, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (“we find that there is simply no pervasive

authority on which we could conclude that [police officers] had a clearly established duty to

intervene to prevent [p]laintiff’s coerced confession or malicious prosecution.”). Beyond that,

Defendant Heine cannot be liable for her failure to intervene in Defendant Ferrari’s alleged

Equal Protection violation when, as explained supra, McKnight has not sufficiently alleged

an Equal Protection claim against Defendant Ferrari in the first place. See DARYL COOK,

Plaintiff v. CHIEF GRIEVANCE OFFICER, et al., Defendants, No. 3:23-CV-1046, 2024 WL

3824867, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2024) (“other defendants cannot be faulted for failing to

intervene in an alleged constitutional violation” that itself is being dismissed for failure to

state a claim.). Therefore, to the extent that McKnight has asserted an Equal Protection claim

against Defendant Heine, it is DISMISSED without prejudice. (Doc. 1, at 20); see DARYL

COOK, 2024 WL 3824867 , at *4 (dismissing Equal Protection claims against officers that

“appear to arise from defendants' failure to intervene” in alleged unconstitutional conduct

which has also been dismissed).

E. § 1985 CONSPIRACY CLAIMS AGAINST ALL MOVING DEFENDANTS

Moving Defendants argue that McKnight fails to state a conspiracy claim under § 1985

because she makes no allegations reflecting an understanding or agreement by Defendants to

violate her civil rights. (Doc. 20, at 24; Doc. 29, at 15; Doc. 31, at 18-19). McKnight responds

that she pleads facts necessary to “infer” an agreement among Moving Defendants to violate

her rights. (Doc. 32, at 23; Doc. 34, at 17-18; Doc. 43, at 19-20). The Court finds this argument

unavailing. Because § 1985 requires the “‘intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal

privileges and immunities,’ a claimant must allege ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-

based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action’ in order to state a

claim.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971)). To state a claim for conspiracy to commit malicious

prosecution or abuse of process, “plaintiffs must allege that as a result of the [. . .] they were

deprived of a civil right.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 73 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 1999). Parties are

“required to plead that an actual agreement existed among the parties” Muhamman v.

Cappellini, 477 Fed. Appx. 935, 938 (3d Cir. 2012). There are some limitations to claims under

§ 1985. “A claim for conspiracy to commit a tort ‘may not exist without an underlying tort.’”

Muth v. Woodring, 755 Fed. Appx. 109, 115-16 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Boyanowski v. Capital

Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2000)). Therefore, “[a]n official who is

immune from suit for a § 1983 violation is also immune from liability under § 1985 for a claim

of conspiracy to commit the conduct that is the subject of the § 1983 violation.” Ippolito v.

Ahrene, 2015 WL 6447153, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2015). A conspiracy requires a meeting of the

minds, which can be inferred with enough facts implying that an actual agreement was made.

Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010) (“in the

conspiracy context, [the plausible pleading standard] require[s] ‘enough factual matter (taken

as true) to suggest that an agreement was made,’ in other words, ‘plausible grounds to infer

an agreement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This inference cannot just be

“conceivable” but must be “plausible.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (holding that factual

pleadings must move claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible”).

The Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to suggest that Moving

Defendants made an agreement was made to establish a conspiracy claim. (Doc. 1, at 22, 27).

McKnight’s allegations refer only to individualized conduct by each defendant. (Doc. 1). In

her brief, McKnight avers that “Defendant Ferrari and Defendant Heine conspired with the

Defendant Officers, under color of state law, and reached a mutual understanding to

undertake a course of conduct to cover up what truly happened,” but points to no factual

allegations that support that conclusion. (Doc. 32, at 23). McKnight also states, “Defendant

Ferrari and Defendant Kingsboro agreed to misrepresent the true facts at the preliminary

hearing. After that, Defendant Ferrari and Defendant Heine proceeded to file criminal

charges against Plaintiff,” but again fails to point to any supporting allegations in the

Complaint. (Doc. 1; Doc. 32, at 23). Further, the parallel acts by Moving Defendants do not

amount to a plausible inference that Moving Defendants agreed together to commit any

violation of McKnight’s rights. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co., 615 F.3d at 177 (declining to

find conspiracy inference plausible when “[t]he complaint sets forth merely a ‘conclusory

allegation of agreement at some unidentified point[, which] does not supply facts adequate to

show illegality.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 557); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 (mere

allegations of parallel conduct gives a court “no reason to infer that the companies had agreed

among themselves to do what was only natural anyway.”); see also Durham v. City and County

of Erie, 171 F.App’x 412, 415 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Under the notice-pleading standard, a

complaint must include more than ‘conclusory allegations of concerted action…’ It must also

contain at least some facts which could, if proven, permit a reasonable inference of a

conspiracy to be drawn.”) (quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998))

(citations omitted)). Here, it would only be natural for police officers to write an incident

report, testify when asked to, and participate in an investigation in which they were involved,

all conduct McKnight discusses when alleging that Moving Defendants acted “in furtherance

of the conspiracy.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 146-154, 175-176); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566 (there is no

conspiratorial agreement among defendants when they act in a way that is “only natural”

given their jobs or duties). This Court cannot infer a meeting of the minds without more

details that go beyond legal conclusions that a conspiracy occurred. Accordingly, Moving

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the § 1985 conspiracy claims are GRANTED. (Doc. 15; Doc.

17; Doc. 18). McKnight’s § 1985 conspiracy claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

(Doc. 1, at 22, 27); see Adams v. Teamsters Loc. 115, 214 F. App'x 167, 176 (3d Cir. 2007)

(dismissing conspiracy claims because plaintiff “does not provide any facts regarding the time,

place, or conduct of the alleged conspiracy” and “‘mere incantation of the words conspiracy

or acted in concert does not talismanically satisfy [the pleading requirements]”); see Zimmer v.

New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, No. CV152524FLWDEA, 2016 WL 234844, at

*13 (D. N.J. Jan. 20, 2016), aff'd, 741 F. App'x 875 (3d Cir. 2018) (dismissing conspiracy

claims when allegations were “conclusory”).

F. ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIMS AGAINST ALL MOVING DEFENDANTS

OAG Defendants argue that McKnight fails to state an abuse of process claim because

her Complaint “is completely devoid of any fact that any [] Defendant took any action that

was not in furtherance of an authorized criminal process to its conclusion” and does not assert

that the prosecution was continued for an unlawful purpose. (Doc. 20, at 22). Defendant

Kingsboro submits that McKnight has made only “naked conclusory allegations” that

Defendant Kingsboro provided a false narrative for an unlawful purpose. (Doc. 31, at 18).

She states that OAG Defendants “perverted the process by demeaning Plaintiff on the basis

of her race with the hope of getting her to step down from the bench.” (Doc. 32, at 22).

McKnight further responds that she properly stated an abuse of process claim because she

alleged that “Defendant Kingsboro cooperated with Defendants Heine and Ferrari in

prosecuting Plaintiff for the purpose of covering up Kingsboro's incomplete investigation and

search of [Kevin] or otherwise trying to have Plaintiff step down from the bench.” (Doc. 43,

at 19).

“[A] section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of process lies where ‘prosecution is [...]

used for a purpose other than that intended by the law.’” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n.17

(3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Jennings, 567 F.2d at 1217). However, “there is no cause of action for

abuse of process if the claimant, even with bad intentions, merely carries out the process to

its authorized conclusion.” Cameron v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., 817 F. Supp. 19, 21 (E.D. Pa.

1992). Instead, there must be a showing of perversion. Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund

Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit has defined “perversion” as a use

of legal process “primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not defined”

such that it “caused harm to the plaintiff.” Fireman's Fund Ins. Co, 337 F.3d at 304. In Jennings,

The Third Circuit explained the distinction between malicious abuse of process and malicious

prosecution, also known as malicious use:

We begin by distinguishing the justification given for issuance of process from

the use to which process is put. The justification given may be either legitimate

or illegitimate. If it is illegitimate, there is malicious use. Likewise, the use to

which process is put can be either legitimate or illegitimate, and, if illegitimate,

there is malicious abuse. For example, if the defendant justifies issuance of

process by untruthfully saying that the plaintiff solicited burglary and uses the

process only to have him jailed, this is malicious use only. It is not malicious

abuse because jailing is the purpose for which criminal process was intended.

If the defendant has process issued based on the truthful statement that the

plaintiff solicited burglary and then uses the threat of prosecution for purposes

of extortion, this is malicious abuse only. Finally, if, as is alleged in the present

case, the defendant has process served based on false statements and uses threat

of prosecution for purposes of extortion, both torts will lie.

Jennings, 567 F.2d at 1218–19 (footnote omitted).

A state law abuse of process claim requires materially similar allegations. Shiner v.

Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). To state a claim for abuse of process

under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendant (1) used a legal process

against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not

designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.” Shiner, 706 A.2d at 1236. “The

gravamen of abuse of process is the perversion of the particular legal process for a purpose of

benefit to the defendant, which is not an authorized goal of the procedure.” Shiner, 706 A.2d

at 1236. Thus, a plaintiff must allege “some definite act or threat not authorized by the

process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process[;] there is no liability

where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized

conclusion ....” Di Sante v. Russ Fin. Co., 380 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (quotation

omitted). Because the federal and state law abuse of process claims require similar factual

allegations, this Court will address these claims simultaneously.

McKnight alleges that “[d]uring the investigation and subsequent malicious

prosecution, the message continuously relayed to Judge McKnight from the OAG was that

this was her word as a Black woman, or ‘girl,’ against four white officers and she should step

down from the bench.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 134). She additionally alleges she was repeatedly asked to

step down during the investigation and that OAG Defendants’ and Defendant Kingsboro’s

“objective” in participating in the prosecution was to “force her to step down from office.”

(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 168, 170, 180, 182). McKnight further contends that OAG Defendants and

Defendant Kingsboro intentionally scheduled the preliminary hearing directly before Plaintiff

planned to announce her bid for re-election to adversely affect her chances. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 104,

114; Doc. 43, at 19). She argues that the sequence of events show that the process was

“designed to injure Plaintiff's reputation and destroy her career on the bench.” (Doc. 32, at

22). These averments that OAG Defendants and Defendant Kingsboro used the prosecution

to pressure McKnight to step down from the bench and damage her reputation prior to her

campaign for re-election amount to allegations that they used the prosecution for purposes

other than “[those] for which the criminal process was intended." Jennings, 567 F.2d at 1219;

see also Brown v. Johnston, 675 F. Supp. 287, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (“[w]hen process is used to

effect an extortionate demand, or to cause the surrender of a legal right, or is used in any other

way not so intended by proper use of the process, a cause of action for abuse of process can

be maintained.”). Therefore, McKnight has sufficiently pled abuse of process claims. (Doc.

1, at 26-30). Accordingly, OAG Defendants’ and Defendant Kingsboro’s motions to dismiss

the Fourth Amendment abuse of process claims against them are DENIED. Martin v. Finley,

No. 3:15-CV-1620, 2017 WL 626752, at *2-5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2017) (denying a motion to

dismiss abuse of process claims when a defendant allegedly used the threat of a criminal

proceeding to an illegitimate end, namely, to coerce a plaintiff to enter into a civil settlement).

G. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS AGAINST ALL MOVING DEFENDANTS

OAG Defendants argue that McKnight fails to state a malicious prosecution claim

because all the criminal charges asserted against her were supported by probable cause, OAG

Defendants did not act maliciously, and McKnight did not suffer a deprivation of liberty.

(Doc. 20, at 16-20). Defendant Kingsboro also argues that the claims against her fail because

Defendant Kingsboro did not initiate the criminal proceedings, probable cause existed, and

McKnight did not suffer deprivation of liberty. (Doc. 31, at 11-17). MckKnight responds that

OAG Defendants filed a criminal complaint against her “knowing that they lacked probable

cause,” due to the failure to show dashcam footage at the preliminary hearing, and perpetuate

“a false narrative of the events at the traffic stop.” (Doc. 32, at 20). She further avers that

Defendant Kingsboro can be liable for malicious prosecution even if she did not file the

criminal charges because “the charges were precipitated” by Defendant Kingsboro’s

“exaggerated and misleading description[s],” which “vitiate the preliminary hearing's finding

of probable cause.” (Doc. 43, at 16). Finally, McKnight argues that her liberty was restricted

“when she was forced to surrender herself, to be booked, and to pay bail.” (Doc. 32, at 21).

To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim asserted pursuant § 1983 and under state

law, a plaintiff “must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the

criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without

probable cause; [and] (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing

the plaintiff to justice.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Estate of

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)); see Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579

(3d Cir. 1996); Tereo, 2018 WL 4404676, at *6 (listing the elements of a malicious prosecution

claim). For the malicious prosecution claim asserted under § 1983, there is an additional

constitutional component requiring a plaintiff to show a loss of liberty beyond simply showing

an unlawful arrest. Merkle, 211 F.3d at 792.

“Probable cause exists when ‘the facts and circumstances within the [defendant's]

knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed.’” Stetser v. Jinks, 572 F. App'x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting U.S. v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990)). “While ‘the probable-cause

standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification,’ all interpretations of probable

cause require a belief of guilt that is reasonable, as opposed to certain.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at

299 (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (additional internal

citations and quotations omitted)). Generally, the existence of probable cause is a factual issue

for the jury, and a court should “exercise caution before granting a defendant summary

judgment in a malicious prosecution case when there is a question of whether there was

probable cause for the initiation of the criminal proceeding.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 300;

Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1998). When determining probable cause,

officers are not typically required to analyze the credibility of the evidence they rely upon.

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d. Cir. 2016); Eckman v. Lancaster City, 529 F.

App'x 185, 187 (3d Cir. 2013); Stafford v. Morris, 816 F. App'x 712, 717 (3d Cir. 2020).

However, probable cause does not exist when substantial evidence of a witness' unreliability

outweighs the probable cause that otherwise exists. See Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 479.

Here, McKnight has stated a plausible claim for malicious prosecution. She satisfies

the first and second elements, that a defendant initiated a criminal proceeding against a

plaintiff and that the the criminal proceeding ended in her favor, respectively, by alleging

Defendants Ferrari, Heine, and Kingsboro initiated a criminal proceeding that ended in

Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 188, 190). Johnson, 477 F.3d at 81-82. She also satisfies the third

element, that the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause, by alleging that

Defendants Ferrari, Heine, and Kingsboro’s investigation and prosecution of her lacked

probable cause. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 119-124, 144); Johnson, 477 F.3d at 81-82. McKnight contends

Defendants Ferrari, Heine, and Kingsboro knowingly perpetuated a false narrative of the

night of Kevin’s arrest during the preliminary hearing and that Defendant Kingsboro was

impeached for her inconsistent testimony at trial. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 119-124, 144). Further, as

discussed supra, McKnight adequately alleges that OAG Defendants and Defendant

Kingsboro “‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false

statements or omissions” that were “material” to “the finding of probable cause.’” Tereo, 2018

WL 4404676, at *6 (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87. Taking these allegations as true for

the purpose of a motion to dismiss, McKnight has sufficiently alleged an absence of probable

cause. See Crosland, 676 F. Supp. 3d 364, 379 (declining to dismiss a malicious prosecution

claim because the relevant affidavit was “thinly sourced” with unreliable witness'

statements.); see also Brazil v. Scranton School Board, et al., 2023 WL 5916470, at *9 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 11, 2023) (denying a motion to dismiss a malicious prosecution claim because the

complaint asserted probable cause was based on known “false information.”); Richter, 2018

WL 2984966, at *9 (noting that when an official does not disclose to a court known facts that

would weigh against arrest, probable cause may be negated). Regarding the fourth element,

malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause. Carson v. Aurand, No. 1:17-CV-

01263, 2019 WL 2539447, at *8 (M.D. Pa. June 20, 2019) (Hugee v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 101

A.2d 740, 743 (1954)). McKnight alleges the additional element required by § 1983 through

her allegation that she suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure

as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Thus, McKnight has stated a claim for malicious

prosecution. Barasky v. Dent, No. 4:21-CV-02041, 2022 WL 14915557, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct.

25, 2022). Accordingly, OAG Defendants’ and Defendant Kingsboro’s motions to dismiss

McKnight’s malicious prosecution claims are DENIED. (Doc. 15; Doc. 17); see Crosland, 676

F. Supp. 3d 364, 379 (denying motion to dismiss a malicious prosecution claim because

probable cause was based upon deficient testimony).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.

2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave

to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d

Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In

civil rights cases, District Courts are to follow this instruction “even [if] the plaintiff [is]

represented by experienced counsel [and] never sought leave to amend.” Shane v. Fauver, 213

F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Dist. Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir.

1986)). In this case, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and abuse of

process claims against Defendants Ferrari, Heine, and Kingsboro remain. (Doc. 1). However,

all other claims are dismissed. Because leave to amend would not be futile regarding the

conspiracy and Equal Protection claims, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint in an attempt to cure the deficiencies outlined herein. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 15; Doc. 17; Doc. 18). All claims against

Defendant Crist in Counts I through X are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1, at 20-33).

All claims against Backup Officer Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice. (Doc. 1,

at 20-33). All state law claims in Counts VI through X are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc.

1, at 28-33). All Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims

in Counts I through IV are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1, at 20-27). To the extent

Plaintiff asserted an Equal Protection claim in Count I, it is DISMISSED without prejudice.

(Doc. 1, at 20). All conspiracy claims in Counts II and V are DISMISSED without prejudice.

(Doc. 1, at 22-24, 27-28). Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend her complaint in accordance

with this Memorandum.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: September 6, 2024 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge