The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN ANTONIO CRUZ, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-655
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
MR. W.T. AUKER, et al., :
:
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff,
John Antonio Cruz, alleges that defendants violated his civil rights by not providing
him religious meals during Passover in 2020. The parties have filed cross motions
for summary judgment. Cruz’s motion will be denied, and defendants’ motion will
be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Procedural History
Cruz filed his complaint on March 13, 2021, and the court received and
docketed it on April 9, 2021. (Doc. 1). On November 8, 2022, the court granted
Cruz’s motion for leave to amend except to the extent that it sought to add a claim
for violation of the Eighth Amendment and to add claims against Robert Marsh and
deemed plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 40) the operative complaint in the case.
(Doc. 44). The case accordingly proceeded as to: (1) a First Amendment freedom of
religion claim; (2) a First Amendment retaliation claim; and (3) a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim. (See Doc. 40). Defendants answered the
amended complaint on February 23, 2023. (Doc. 52).
Defendants moved for summary judgment on May 31, 2023. (Doc. 82). Cruz
moved for summary judgment on October 3, 2023. (Doc. 97). The court
subsequently granted Cruz’s motion to compel discovery, reopened discovery, and
denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice to file a
renewed motion for summary judgment after the close of discovery. (Doc. 104). On
March 1, 2024, the court denied Cruz’s motion to supplement his complaint to
include a claim for permanent injunctive relief requiring the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections to provide appropriate religious meals for Jewish
inmates observing Passover and other religious ceremonies in the future. (Doc.
115). The court found that this proposed supplemental claim related “only
indirectly” to the claims at issue in the case and that allowing the claim to proceed
would likely require months of additional discovery. (Id. at 4). Defendants filed a
renewed motion for summary judgment on March 29, 2024. (Doc. 120). Cruz moved
to strike one of defendants’ summary judgment exhibits on June 4, 2024. (Doc. 127).
The motions for summary judgment and motion to strike are ripe for review.
II. Material Facts1
1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. A party
opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material
facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s
statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise noted,
the factual background herein derives from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements of
material facts. (See Docs. 99, 121-22, 124). To the extent the parties’ statements are
undisputed or supported by uncontroverted record evidence, the court cites
directly to the statements of material facts.
A. Facts Regarding Liability
Cruz is a member of the Jewish faith. (Doc. 121 ¶ 2; Doc. 124 ¶ 2). On April 6,
2020, he filed a grievance complaining that Jewish inmates who had signed up for a
Kosher diet were receiving less food than they were supposed to. (Doc. 98-1 at 2).
Passover began on April 8, 2020. (Doc. 99 ¶ 10; Doc. 122 ¶ 10). Cruz had previously
signed up to receive religious meals for Passover. (Doc. 99 ¶ 3; Doc. 122 ¶ 3). Cruz
did not receive any of the required Passover meals from April 8, 2020 through April
14, 2020. (Doc. 121 ¶ 5; Doc. 124 ¶ 5). Defendant Auker admits that he was one of
the officials responsible for distributing Passover meals during the relevant period.
(Doc. 126-6 at 3). Cruz has produced evidence showing that Marzzacco was also
personally involved in distributing Passover meals. (See Doc. 126-8 ¶ 18).
The parties’ accounts differ on when defendants learned that Cruz was not
receiving Passover meals, why this error occurred, and what defendants did to fix
the error. Defendants assert that Cruz’s name was “unconsciously and
inadvertently” omitted from the list of inmates who were to receive Passover meals
and that as soon as defendant Auker learned he was not receiving his Passover
meals he arranged to have them provided to him beginning on April 14, 2020. (Doc.
121 ¶¶ 4-6). Defendants cite grievance responses from prison officials and Auker’s
responses to Cruz’s requests for admissions to support these assertions. (See Docs.
121-4, 121-5). Defendants assert that this inadvertent omission occurred because
Passover was occurring at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was
causing significant stress on the prison’s food service staff. (Doc. 121 ¶¶ 7-8).
Cruz disputes defendants’ factual contentions. According to Cruz,
defendants were aware that he was supposed to receive Passover meals prior to the
beginning of Passover but withheld the meals from him intentionally. (Doc. 124 ¶
4). In support of this assertion, Cruz cites an April 2, 2020 email from Matthew
McCoy to defendant Auker providing a list of inmates who were to receive Passover
meals. (Doc. 124-4). Cruz also notes that he personally notified Auker that he was
not receiving Passover meals via an inmate’s request to staff on April 10, 2024.
(Doc. 124 ¶ 4; Doc. 124-5).
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Exhaustion of administrative remedies in the DOC is governed by the three-
step process outlined in the DOC’s grievance policy, DC-ADM 804. (See Doc. 121-
6).2 Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must first submit a written grievance within
fifteen working days from the date of the incident. Id. § 1(A)(8). DC-ADM 804
provides that the grievance must include “a statement of the facts relevant to the
claim,” “identify individuals directly involved in the events,” and “specifically state
any claims [the inmate] wishes to make concerning violations of Department
directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.” Id. § 1(A)(11). Next, the
prisoner must submit a written appeal to an intermediate review level within fifteen
working days. Id. § 2(A)(1)(a). Finally, the inmate must submit an appeal to the
2 Doc. 121-6 is a copy of DC-ADM 804, which is attached as Exhibit 6 to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”) within fifteen
working days. Id. § 2(B)(1)(b).
Cruz has filed one grievance about the events at issue in this case, grievance
number 864382. (Doc. 121 ¶ 15; Doc. 124 ¶ 15).3 The grievance does not assert a
retaliation claim. (Doc. 121 ¶ 17; Doc. 124 ¶ 17).4 The grievance does not name
defendant Marzzacco by her name or title, (Doc. 121 ¶ 16), but Cruz asserts that the
grievance’s reference to “dietary” should be construed as a reference to all dietary
staff members who were involved in the purported denial of Passover meals, a class
of people that included Marzzacco. (See Doc. 124 ¶ 16).
3 Defendants assert that “Plaintiff filed one grievance, number 864382, about
the events at issue in the above-captioned litigation.” (Doc. 121 ¶ 15). Cruz argues
that this is not true because he filed another grievance on April 6, 2020 asserting
that Jewish inmates were not being given full meal portions and this grievance is
the basis of his retaliation claim. (Doc. 124 ¶ 15). The court agrees that Cruz’s
amended complaint asserts a retaliation claim based on his filing of the April 6,
2020, grievance, but we construe defendants’ statement to assert that Cruz only
filed one grievance to exhaust administrative remedies on the claims he raises in
this case. Because the substance of Cruz’s retaliation claim is that defendants
denied him Passover meals in retaliation for the filing of his April 6, 2020, grievance,
his filing of the April 6, 2020, grievance does not—and cannot—exhaust
administrative remedies for his retaliation claim since the alleged retaliation
occurred after the grievance was filed. We accordingly deem defendants’ assertion
that Cruz only filed one grievance about the events at issue in this case undisputed.
4 Cruz objects that this assertion is “irrelevant” because “the defendants are
attempting to argue a pleadings argument during summary judgment.” (Doc. 124 ¶
17). Cruz continues: “This court liberally construed the Plaintiff’s complaint to also
claim a First Amendment Retaliation claim and gave direction to the defendants to
address it during the pleading stages of litigation. See Doc. 44. The defendants
failed to address this claim during the pleading stages of litigation and therefore
have waived their opportunity to do so.” (Doc. 124 ¶ 17 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)
and 15(a)(3).) Because this response does not address the substance of defendants’
contention that the grievance fails to advance a retaliation claim, we will treat the
contention as undisputed. We address Cruz’s argument that defendants have
waived their exhaustion argument in the discussion section below.
III. Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that
do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of
proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond
the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This
evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the
non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-
57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89
(1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas,
331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
Courts may resolve cross-motions for summary judgment concurrently. See
Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Johnson
v. FedEx, 996 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (M.D. Pa. 2014); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720 (3d ed. 2015). When doing so, the
court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party with respect to each motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 310
(quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)).
IV. Discussion
Cruz brings his federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 creates a cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by state
officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights, but
serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d
1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show a
deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204
(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Cruz’s motion for summary judgment asserts that he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on his remaining claims. (Doc. 98). Defendants advance three
arguments to the contrary as to why they should instead be granted summary
judgment: (1) that Cruz failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his claims
against Marzzacco and his retaliation claim; (2) that defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity as to Cruz’s free exercise and equal protection claims; and (3)
that Cruz may not recover declaratory relief, compensatory damages, or punitive
damages.5 (Doc. 123).
5 Defendants’ brief separates the declaratory relief, compensatory damages,
and punitive damages arguments into three separate arguments, but the court has
combined them here for the sake of brevity. We have additionally reordered
defendants’ arguments to align with the order in which we analyze them.
A. Exhaustion
We first consider defendants’ argument that Cruz failed to exhaust
administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation claim and his claims against
defendant Marzzacco. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners
complaining about the conditions of their confinement must exhaust available
administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion, meaning plaintiffs must
administratively grieve their claims in accordance with the procedural rules of the
prison in which they are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299,
305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that defendants must plead and
prove; it is not a pleading requirement for plaintiffs. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
216 (2007).
A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are
“available.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (2018) (citing Woodford, 548
U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy is unavailable, and administrative exhaustion
is thus excused, in three situations: “(1) when ‘it operates as a simple dead end—
with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved
inmates’; (2) when it is ‘so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of
use,’ such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when
‘prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’” Id. at 266-67 (quoting
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016)). If defendants establish failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
administrative remedy process was unavailable. Id. at 268.
At the outset, we consider Cruz’s argument that defendants waived their
ability to assert failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not asserting the
argument at the pleading stage of litigation. (Doc. 124 ¶ 17). This argument is
meritless. There is no strict timing requirement for defendants to assert the
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Drippe v.
Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781 (3d Cir. 2010).6
Turning to the merits of the exhaustion argument, record evidence
establishes that Cruz failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his
retaliation claim. The only grievance Cruz filed to exhaust administrative remedies
on his claims, grievance number 864382, does not assert a retaliation claim or assert
6 To the extent Cruz’s citations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h) and
15(a)(3) are meant as arguments that defendants waived their exhaustion argument
under these rules, (see Doc. 124 ¶ 17), these arguments are also meritless. Rule
12(h) states that the affirmative defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction, improper
venue, insufficient process, or insufficient service of process may be waived if a
defendant fails to assert them in an answer or motion to dismiss. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(h). The rule does not set a strict timing requirement for the assertion of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. Rule 15(a)(3) states that “[u]nless the court
orders otherwise, any required response to an amended pleading must be made
within the time remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14 days
after service of the amended pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(3). We liberally
construe Cruz’s citation to Rule 15(a)(3) as an argument that defendants waived
failure to exhaust administrative remedies because their answer to his amended
complaint was untimely. Rule 15(a)(3), however, specifically contemplates that the
court may impose timing requirements for parties to answer amended complaints
that differ from the rule’s requirements, and this court has previously deemed
defendants’ answer to the amended complaint “properly and timely filed.” (Doc. 61
at 2). Neither Rule 12(h) nor Rule 15(a)(3) compels the conclusion that defendants
waived the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust.
any facts from which a retaliation claim could be inferred. (See Doc. 121 at 6). The
gravamen of Cruz’s retaliation claim is that defendants denied Cruz Passover meals
in retaliation for his April 6, 2020, grievance complaining about the portions of food
given to Jewish inmates, but grievance number 864382 does not mention the April
6, 2020, grievance or assert in any way that the denial of Passover meals was
motivated by Cruz filing earlier grievances. (See id.) Hence, we will grant
defendants summary judgment on the retaliation claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Defendants additionally argue that Marzzacco is entitled to summary
judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Cruz failed to
name her in his grievance by name or title. (Doc. 123 at 14-15).
We disagree. The PLRA does not impose a “name all defendants” rule for
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Jones, 549 U.S. at 217. The purpose of a
grievance “is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to
a particular official that he may be sued.” Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 219). Thus, an inmate’s failure to name a
defendant in his original grievance may be excused if the unnamed defendant is
“fairly within the compass of the prisoner’s grievance.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004).
Cruz’s grievance states that “Dietary” was responsible for denying him
Passover meals, (Doc. 121-2 at 6), and Cruz asserts that this is a common term used
by inmates and staff in the DOC to refer to all dietary officials responsible for
serving meals when the exact identity of the individuals in question is not known.
(Doc. 126 at 18). The responses to Cruz’s initial grievance appear to corroborate his
assertion that “dietary” is commonly used to refer to all staff members working in
food service. (See, e.g., Doc. 121-2 at 7 (repeatedly using “Dietary” as a plural noun
referring to staff members); id. at 11 (same).) We find that this evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cruz’s reference to “Dietary” was
sufficient to name Marzzacco in his original grievance.
B. Free Exercise and Equal Protection Claims
Cruz argues he is entitled to summary judgment on his free exercise and
equal protection claims and defendants argue they are entitled to qualified
immunity on these claims. We address these arguments concurrently.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Id. It “provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that his
conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that official from
liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson, 555
U.S. at 244).
Although qualified immunity is generally a question of law that should be
considered at the earliest possible stage of proceedings, a genuine dispute of
material fact may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity. Giles, 571
F.3d at 325-26. A qualified immunity determination involves a two-pronged inquiry:
(1) whether a constitutional or federal right has been violated, and (2) whether that
right was “clearly established.” Pearson, 556 U.S. at 232. These prongs may be
considered in either order. Id. at 236. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense
that must be pleaded and proven by the defendant asserting it. Halsey v. Pfeiffer,
750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014).
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they
reasonably believed that their actions did not violate Cruz’s constitutional rights.
Defendants concede that Cruz has the right to religious meals in accordance with
his faith, but they assert they were unaware they were violating this right because
the list of inmates slated to receive Passover meals inadvertently omitted Cruz.
(Doc. 123 at 7-8). Given the purported omission of Cruz’s name from the list as well
as the stress caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants assert that a
reasonable person in their shoes would have similarly declined to give Cruz
religious meals. (Id. at 8). Defendants assert that as soon as Auker became aware of
Cruz not being given Passover meals, he rectified the mistake. (Id. at 8-9).
We find that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as
to both defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity and plaintiff’s merits argument.
The parties have provided conflicting accounts—both of which are supported by
record evidence—as to when defendants learned that Cruz was being denied
religious meals, why he had been denied these meals, and what steps defendants
took to rectify the situation when they learned of it. Defendants assert that the
omission of Cruz’s name from the list of inmates to receive Passover meals was an
inadvertent mistake caused largely by the stress of the COVID-19 pandemic and
that immediately upon learning of this mistake they corrected it and began
providing Passover meals to Cruz. (See Doc. 121 ¶¶ 4-8; Doc. 121-4; Doc. 121-5).
Cruz asserts that defendants were subjectively aware that he was supposed to
receive Passover meals throughout Passover but intentionally deprived him of
those meals. (See Doc. 124 ¶ 4; Doc. 124-4; Doc. 124-5). Determining which of these
accounts of the relevant facts is true is the province of the finder of fact. The court
cannot weigh the parties’ conflicting evidence at this stage of litigation. We will
deny both parties’ motions with respect to Cruz’s free exercise and equal protection
claims.
C. Declaratory Judgment
Declaratory relief is prospective in nature and may not be awarded based on
past harms. CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 628 (3d Cir.
2013); Wenzig v. SEIU Local 668, 426 F. Supp. 3d 88, 100 (M.D. Pa. 2019).
Defendants argue that Cruz may not recover declaratory judgment in this case
because he alleges only past harms of his civil rights. (Doc. 123 at 10-11). Cruz
argues that declaratory relief is appropriate because:
Passover 2024 was scheduled to begin April 22, 2024 through April 30,
2024, and there are men here who were not given their unleavened
bread, the Plaintiff was shortened his amount because more people
signed up to observe this year. He was not provided with the complete
list of Seder food items Passover 2020, Passover 2023, or Passover 2024.
The Jews are experiencing antisemitic hatred concerning Passover
and this can only be settled via declarative judgment.
(Doc. 126 at 15).
We agree with defendants that Cruz cannot recover declaratory relief. Cruz’s
only allegation of harm—that he was denied religious meals during Passover in
2020—is a past harm for which the court may not grant declaratory relief. CMR
D.N. Corp., 703 F.3d at 628. Cruz’s allegation that Jewish inmates continue to be
denied adequate religious meals for Passover is immaterial. The court previously
denied Cruz’s motion to supplement his complaint to include claims requiring
defendants to prospectively provide Jewish inmates with adequate religious meals,
finding that these claims “relate only indirectly” to his currently operative
complaint seeking damages for the denial of religious meals during Passover in
2020. (Doc. 115 at 4). Because the only claims in this case seek relief for past harms,
we will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment to the extent it seeks to bar
Cruz from obtaining declaratory judgment.
D. Damages
Defendants seek to bar Cruz from recovering compensatory or punitive
damages. The PLRA prohibits inmates from bringing claims “for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). A prisoner
plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages based on “mental and/or emotional
injury” caused by a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights are barred by the
PLRA unless the plaintiff can establish that he suffered a related physical injury.
Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000).
Defendants argue Cruz may not recover compensatory damages because he
does not allege any physical injuries and instead seeks relief “for his injury of not
being able to observe his religious faith.” (Doc. 123 at 10). Defendants cite to a
portion of Cruz’s deposition to support this argument, (see Doc. 121 ¶ 13), wherein
defendants’ counsel asked Cruz to “briefly describe” his injuries and he responded,
“Well, you can imagine a person who is trying to, you know, observe their faith and
having to go through all these obstacles to do it, you know, that’s - - that was the
injury.” (Doc. 121-1 at 6).7 Cruz disagrees with defendants’ argument, asserting
that he suffered a physical injury in the form of hunger. (Doc. 124 ¶ 13).
We find that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on
the issue of compensatory damages. Cruz’s amended complaint alleges that during
the period he was denied Passover meals he suffered the following physical injuries:
After three days the body began to go through withdrawal, he could
not sleep, but he did not have enough energy to do anything. He had
to drink hot water to try to mask the hunger pains. His knees started
hurting the fourth day, and it did not matter how much he had the
housing unit officers contact dietary. Another day, no breakfast, no
lunch, no dinner, it is psychological. Every meal there was a false
hope, only to find out that it would not be for that day. Five days, six
days, flush, dizzy, starving.
(Doc. 40 at 12). It is undisputed that Cruz was provided alternative meals during
the relevant period, but his amended complaint alleges that eating these meals
7 The court cites the deposition transcript using the page numbers from the
court’s electronic docket.
during Passover would violate his Jewish faith because the meals were
contaminated with Chometz.8 (Doc. 40 ¶¶ 14-17). Defendants rely on Cruz’s
deposition testimony in which he only referred to his psychological injuries to
establish the fact that he did not suffer any physical injuries, but it appears from the
deposition transcript provided to the court that counsel never asked whether he
suffered any physical injuries in addition to his psychological injuries. (Doc. 121-1
at 6). We do not construe Cruz’s testimony regarding his psychological injuries as
an admission that he suffered no physical injuries. Because there are genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Cruz suffered physical injuries, we will deny
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of compensatory damages.
Defendants additionally seek to bar Cruz from recovering punitive damages.
(Doc. 123 at 11-12). Punitive damages, however, may be awarded “based solely on a
constitutional violation, provided the proper showing is made,” Allah, 226 F.3d 251,
that is, “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). We will deny defendants’
request to bar Cruz from recovering punitive damages. We cannot say as a matter
of law that defendants’ actions were not recklessly or callously indifferent to Cruz’s
constitutional rights.
8 For purposes of this summary judgment analysis only, the court takes
judicial notice that “chometz,” often alternatively spelled as “chametz” or “other
spellings transliterated from Hebrew,” refers to “foods with leavening agents that
are forbidden to Jews on the holiday of Passover.” Chametz, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chametz, (last visited July 30, 2024).
E. John Doe Defendants
Having resolved the parties’ summary judgment arguments, the court will
sua sponte dismiss Cruz’s claims against any John or Jane Doe defendants. Claims
against John or Jane Doe defendants are properly dismissed when the defendants
have not been identified prior to the discovery deadline. See, e.g., Blakeslee v.
Clinton County, 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential);9 Ornstein v.
Warden, 3:18-CV-2042, 2021 WL 4290180, at *3 n.35 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2021); King v.
Mansfield Univ. of Pa., No. 1:11-CV-1112, 2014 WL 4546524, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept.
12, 2014).
F. Motion to Strike
Finally, we will deny Cruz’s motion to strike. The motion seeks to strike from
the docket the list of inmates that defendants have produced that showed which
inmates were to receive meals for Passover in 2020. (Doc. 127). Cruz argues the list
is properly stricken from the record because it cannot be verified as authentic
under Federal Rules of Evidence 901 or 902. (Id.) The court finds that the motion
to strike presents an evidentiary issue that would be properly resolved at the time of
trial, or, if appropriate, through a motion in limine filed before trial. We will deny
the motion to strike without prejudice to Cruz’s right to challenge the admissibility
of the list at a later stage of litigation.
9 The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding
upon federal district courts. Citations to nonprecedential decisions reflect that the
court has carefully considered and is persuaded by the panel’s ratio decidendi.
IV. Conclusion
We will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and deny it
in part. The case will proceed solely as to Cruz’s free exercise and equal protection
claims for damages against defendants Auker and Marzzacco. The parties will be
directed to file a joint status report indicating whether they wish to have this case
referred to mediation. If the case is not resolved through mediation, the court will
schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendants can establish the
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: July 30, 2024