Opinion

Chalhoub v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jul 3, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.8%

discussing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, | 143-46 (1979); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)

How later courts described this case

  • discussing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, | 143-46 (1979); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHEL CHALHOUB, ; No. 3:23cv592

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA; COLONEL :

ROBERT EVANCHICK, :

Commissioner of the Pennsylvania _ :

State Police; PENNSYLVANIA STATE :

POLICE TROOPER LUKASZ OLSZAR;:

COUNTY OF PIKE; and CRAIG A. 2

LOWE, Warden Pike County :

Correctional Facility, :

Defendants ;

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants County of Pike

(“Pike County”) and Craig A. Lowe, Warden Pike County Correctional Facility

(“Warden Lowe”). Having been fully briefed, this motion is ripe for a decision."

Background

On May 23, 2021, Defendant Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Lukasz

Olszar (“Trooper Olszar”) responded to Plaintiff Michel Chalhoub’s residence in

Dingman Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania for a report of a “physical

1 The Honorable Robert D. Mariani transferred this case to the undersigned on November 7,

2023.

| domestic.” (Doc. 1-2, Exh. A. to Pl. Compl., Police Crim. Compl., Aff. of Prob.

| Cause, ECF p. 4).2 Per Trooper Olszar’s affidavit of probable cause, the police

communications operator advised there was an active Protection From Abuse

order (“PFA order”) issued against plaintiff for the protection of another person ai

| the residence. (Id.) On scene, another trooper interviewed the purported victim

| of physical abuse, and she indicated that plaintiff threw an ashtray at her causing

burn marks on the back of her shirt. (Id.) Per Trooper Olszar’s narrative, the PF,

| Order was issued for the protection of that person and he indicated in his affidav

that the expiration date of that order was August 12, 2023. (Id.) After burn marks

on the alleged victim's shirt were reportedly observed and photographed,

| Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into custody and charged him with violating an

active PFA order. (Id.)

Per plaintiffs complaint, however, the PFA order had expired months

earlier, on February 26, 2021. (Doc. 1 J 20). Plaintiff alleges that he told Troope

Olszar that the PFA order had expired, but Trooper Olszar accused plaintiff of

lying and still placed him into custody. (Id. {] 18). Trooper Olszar told the

arraigning state magisterial district judge that the PFA order remained active, an

2 These background facts are derived from plaintiffs complaint and exhibits. At this stage of

the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Phillips

| v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d 2008).

| the judge credited the trooper’s incorrect statements and not the plaintiff's

accurate statements. (id. J 22).

| The magisterial district judge set bail at $40,000, which plaintiff could not

post. (Id. J 24). Plaintiff was committed to the Pike County Correctional Facility

(“Pike CCF”) based on Trooper Olszar’s statements that plaintiff violated the PF/

| Order. (Id. J 25).

| Plaintiff spent three days at Pike CCF. (Id. J 28). On May 26, 2021, a Pike

CCF employee told plaintiff to gather his belongings to leave the jail without

-urther explanation. (Id. J 29). Authorities released plaintiff and gave him

transportation to a train station. (Id. J 30). Plaintiff avers that he was released

| from Pike CCF “because the personnel in charge of that facility determined that

there was no basis for [plaintiff] being incarcerated.” (Id. J 31).

Plaintiff also alleges that he had open heart surgery in August 2020. (Id. J

8). During that surgery, plaintiff's ribs were wired together. (Id.) He needed

| another surgery on May 8, 2021 from the constant pain in his ribs. (Id. J 9).

| During that surgery, plaintiff had metal plates placed in his chest. (Id. J] 10).

| When Trooper Olszar placed plaintiff into custody, a drainage tube was still

| attached to the bottom of plaintiff's chest from the most recent surgery. (Id.)

Upon release, plaintiff took the train to his son’s house in New Jersey. (Id. ‘

30). The next day, plaintiff suffered severe pain and went to an emergency

room. (Id. § 35). As a result, plaintiff received an operation due to a “serious life-

threatening” internal infection, which continues to occur. (Id. ] 35, 42). He furthe

alleges that the infection occurred because he could not attend the scheduled

medical procedure to remove his drainage tube during his incarceration. (Id. □□□

11, 34-35).

Based on the above allegations, plaintiff asserts two causes of action in his

complaint: Count | — a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for

alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations against all defendants; anc

Count II — a state law claim for false imprisonment against Trooper Olszar, Pike

County, and Warden Lowe. (ld. J] 45-56).

Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe responded to the complaint

with the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.? The parties have

briefed their respective positions and this matter is ripe for disposition.

3 Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe also move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule o

Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for improper service based on deficient proofs of service. A summon:

must be served with a copy of the complaint by a person who is at least 18 years old and not <

party to the action within ninety (90) days of the complaint being filed. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1)-

(2), 4(m). The Rules of Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“Local Rules”) require

affidavits of service to be filed within fourteen (14) days after service. M.D.PA. L.R. 4.1

Plaintiff filed this action on April 6, 2023. (Doc. 1). He also filed two affidavits of service

collectively indicating that a copy of the summons and complaint were served on the “Pike

County Commissioners” and the “Pike County Warden” by a Pennsylvania State Constable on

April 28, 2023. (Docs. 15, 21). Although, plaintiff filed affidavits of service beyond the deadline

set by Local Rule 4.1, (see id.), defendants were otherwise properly served according to these

affidavits and the court will thus deny the Rule 12(b)(5) motion.

Jurisdiction

Because this case is brought pursuant to Section 1983, the court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state-

law false imprisonment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (“In any civil

action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts sha

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case

or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).

Legal Standard

Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations when

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 55\

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Aclaim has facial plausibility when factual content is plec

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

| for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

| statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all

| factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233

(citations omitted). Furthermore, courts may “generally consider only the

| allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and

matters of public record” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Pension Ben.

Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.

1993)(citations omitted).

| Analysis

| The complaint contains the following factual allegations specific to Pike

County and Warden Lowe:

e Pike County controls and operates Pike CCF “and is responsible fo

| the orderly and legal operation of same, including ensuring tha

| inmates are properly housed therein.” (Doc. 1, Compl. J 6).

e Warden Lowe “was responsible for overseeing the day to □□□

operations” of Pike CCF (Id. ¥] 7).*

| 4 Per the complaint, Warden Lowe is sued in his “original capacity.” (Doc. 1, 7). Given the

contents of plaintiffs pleading, the court construes this notation as one indicating that Warden

Lowe is sued in his official capacity.

e At the time of plaintiffs commitment to Pike CCF, plaintiff proteste

that there was no PFA Order, but the protests were rejected, and h

was incarcerated by the guards of that facility despite being innocent

(Doc. 1, Compl. J 26).

e Plaintiff was unlawfully detained at Pike CCF for three days. (Id. J 27)

e On the third day, an unknown Pike CCF employee told plaintiff t

gather up his belongings to leave the facility. (Id. J 29).

e Plaintiff believes he was released from Pike CCF because “th

personnel in charge of that facility determined there was no basis fo

the [plaintiff] being incarcerated.” (Id. J 31).

Plaintiff claims the above facts support a theory that Pike County and

Warden Lowe violated Section 1983 by falsely imprisoning him. (Id. Jf] 50-51).

Plaintiff also uses these facts to support his state law false imprisonment claim

against these defendants. (Id. ] 54).

Pike County and Warden Lowe move to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in

part, that plaintiff failed to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Pike County

and Warden Lowe and failed to sufficiently plead a state-law false imprisonment

claim against Warden Lowe.° The court will address the arguments relative to

plaintiff's claims against Warden Lowe first.

5 Plaintiffs complaint contains a claim for punitive damages, (Doc. 1, ad damnum clauses),.

which Defendants Pike County and Warden Lowe also move to dismiss. (See Doc. 14, Br. in

Supp. at 13). Plaintiff agrees with moving defendants’ argument that he is not entitled to

punitive damages with respect to his claims against Pike County. (Doc. 24, Br. in Opp, at 11-

12). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against Pike County will be dismissed

without additional discussion by the court.

+

| a. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Section 1983 Claim Against

| Warden Lowe

Plaintiff filed this action against the defendants pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs

committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it

| Serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.

| See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284—85 (2002). To establish a claim

| under Section 1983, two criteria must be met. First, the conduct complained of

must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law. Sameric

Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). Second, th

conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured under the Constitution or

| federal law. Id.

Plaintiff specifically names Warden Lowe as a defendant, asserting that he

| and the other defendants “knew or should have known that there was no

| outstanding [PFA Order] against [p]laintiff and that the [p]laintiff had not violated

any outstanding [PFA Order].” (Id. 47). But, in Section 1983 actions, a plaintiff

must plausibly plead facts that demonstrate a defendant’s personal involvement

in the alleged misconduct and cannot rely solely on a respondeat superior theory

| of liability. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)(citing Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Pleading personal

| involvement requires particular allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence. lId.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining

| that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ...§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must

| plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own

| individual actions, has violated the Constitution’).

Plaintiff's complaint is silent as to the alleged action or inaction of Warden

Lowe. There are no particular allegations of direct wrongful conduct. There are

allegations that Warden Lowe directed guards to do or not do anything relatec

| to plaintiffs claims. Likewise, the complaint does not contain allegations that

| Warden Lowe had any actual knowledge of plaintiff's circumstances. The facts

of the complaint, even when assumed true and construed in a light most

| favorable to plaintiff, only set forth a Section 1983 claim against Warden Lowe

under principles of respondeat superior.® Accordingly, the court must dismiss

| the Section 1983 claims against Warden Lowe in Count | of the complaint for lac!

of personal involvement.

po

6 Plaintiff's brief in opposition argues that Warden Lowe is liable under Section 1983 for failure

to train and supervise personnel so that they would not “imprison[] a person who had

| committed no crime.” (Doc. 24 at 6-7). Plaintiff, however, has not made any factual allegations

against Warden Lowe in the complaint that would support this argument. (See Doc. 1). The

| court will not address arguments by the parties that extend beyond the facts pled in the

| complaint.

b. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Claim for False Imprisonment

Against Warden Lowe

Plaintiff's other claim against Warden Lowe is a state law claim for false

imprisonment. Under Pennsylvania law, “[t]he elements of false imprisonment

are (1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such

detention.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (1994). False

imprisonment is an intentional tort. See Gray v. Huntzinger, 147 A.3d 924, 927

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); Little v. York Cnty. Earned Income Tax Bureau, 333 Pa.

481 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).

Warden Lowe argues the complaint lacks facts to support a claim of false

imprisonment against him since he does not determine probable cause to justify

an arrest or incarceration and he does not conduct investigations into guilt or

innocence. After careful consideration, the court will grant the motion to dismiss

based on the facts pled in the complaint.

As alleged and corroborated through exhibits attached to the complaint,

this case involves a situation where plaintiff was arrested without a warrant for

the violation of a PFA order. (Doc. 1, Compl. Ff] 12-13, 16, Doc. 1-2, Exh. A,

Police Crim. Compl.). Plaintiff then appeared before a state magisterial district

judge, who arraigned plaintiff and set monetary bail in the amount of $40,000.

(Doc. 1, Compl. Ff] 21-25). Plaintiff could not post bail and he was then

committed to Pike CCF. (Id. J] 25-26).

10

Generally, under the Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse Act (“PFA

Act”), courts may grant protection orders to those alleging abuse from family or

household members, or sexual or intimate partners. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §

6102(a) (definitions); § 6107(b) (temporary orders); § 6108 (relief); § 6110

(emergency relief from minor judiciary). The police are tasked with enforcement

of PFA orders once a petitioner obtains relief. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113.

| An arrest for a violation of a PFA order may be made by the police “without

warrant upon probable cause” whether the violation is committed in the presence

of the police officer or not. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(a).

After an arrest for contempt of a protection order, the PFA Act directs that

the defendant be taken by the police officer “without unnecessary delay” to the

court or to a magisterial district judge if the court is unavailable. 23 PA. Cons.

| STAT. § 6113(c). Defendants are also entitled by statute to a preliminary

| arraignment “without unnecessary delay.” 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(d).

Hearings on contempt must be scheduled within ten days of the filing of the

charge or complaint. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6113(f).

| Magisterial district judges in Pennsylvania have jurisdiction to preside at

arraignments and fix bail. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515(a). Under the

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, where a defendant is arrested withou

a warrant, a defendant shall not be detained after a preliminary arraignment

11

| unless the issuing authority, i.e., the magisterial district judge, “makes a

determination of probable cause.” PA. R. Crim. P. 540.

Accordingly, plaintiff has alleged that by the time he was committed to Pike

| CCF, a magisterial district judge made a determination of probable cause and se

bail. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff has not cited any statute or

case requiring wardens of county jails to second-guess or override

| determinations by magisterial district judges and the court’s research has

uncovered none.

Additionally, assuming the facts in the complaint to be true, plaintiff has

| pled that he was released because “personnel in charge of [Pike CCF]

| determined there was no basis for the plaintiff being incarcerated.” (Doc. 1,

| Compl. 431). Thus, he has alleged that officials in charge of Pike CCF, i.e.

| Warden Lowe, released plaintiff without court order after independent fact-

nding In this sense, plaintiffs false imprisonment allegations against Warden

Lowe are self-defeating where he fails to allege that Warden Lowe was aware,

before plaintiff's release, of the absence of legal authority to keep plaintiff in jail.

Accordingly, plaintiffs state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe

be dismissed.’

| 7 Additionally, Warden Lowe also claimed statutory immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania

| Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. STAT. § § 8541, ef seq. in his motion to

c. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a Section 1983 Claim Against

| Pike County

Regarding plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Defendant Pike County,

municipality moves for dismissal pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for failure to identify a policy or custom

™ led to plaintiff's allegedly unconstitutional commitment at Pike CCF. Plaintiff

| appears to counter with arguments that case law recognizes that the warden of a

county prison has final decision-making authority to attach liability to Pike County

and Warden Lowe determined that plaintiff should be kept incarcerated. (Doc. 24

Br. in Opp. at 9-10). As noted above, however, no specific factual allegations

| were made regarding Warden Lowe in plaintiff's complaint, and, in this regard,

| plaintiff's argument fails because it argues about facts not originally pled.? For

| the reasons set forth in this section and in section 1a regarding Warden Lowe

above, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

dismiss. (Doc. 5, J] 35). Warden Lowe failed to brief his statutory immunity arguments. (See

Docs. 14, 29). The court considers this argument waived with regard to this motion.

8 Plaintiffs complaint does contain an allegation that all defendants in this case had a “pattern,

practice and custom of subjecting citizens, such as the [p]laintiff, to unlawful arrest and

detention in the absence of probable cause.” (Doc. 1, J 39). But given the sparse facts related

to this allegation regarding the actions of Pike County (and Warden Lowe), this allegation is

conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).

13

| d. Leave to Amend

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

| may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend, unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing

| Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)). “In

assessing futility [of amendment], the district court applies the same standard of

| legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Burlington Coat Factory

sex Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)(citation and internal quotation

| marks omitted).

| Warden Lowe argues in the motion to dismiss that he is entitled to qualified

| immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials

performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages “insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). The doctrine “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.’”” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

The two-part test to determine whether government officials should receive

qualified immunity is well settled. Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99

| F.4th 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188

14

| (3d Cir. 2024)). Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, a court

| must decide whether the facts that plaintiff has alleged (under Rule 12(b)(6)) or

| shown (under Rule 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. Pearson v.

| Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citation omitted). Under the second prong,

| “the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the

time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted). To be clearly

established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In considering qualified

| immunity, the court may address the prongs of this test in any order. See

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that

he is entitled to qualified immunity. Burns v. PA Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176

(3d Cir. 2011)(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819).

“{I]f a person was arrested without probable cause, his or her detention

may implicate the Fourth Amendment. If he or she was arrested with probable

cause, the detention may amount to a deprivation of liberty without due

process[,]’ in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Stewart, 910 F.

Supp 1064, 1074 (W.D. Pa. 1996)(discussing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

| 143-46 (1979); Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)).

In a separate memorandum and order, the court has determined that Trooper

15

Olszar is entitled to qualified immunity after concluding that plaintiff could not

establish that the trooper lacked probable cause in making the arrest.

Accordingly, the court considers whether plaintiff has alleged facts making out a

Fourteenth Amendment violation.

As stated:

The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all

deprivations of liberty. It protects only against deprivations

of liberty accomplished “without due process of law.” A

reasonable division of functions between law enforcement

officers, committing magistrates, and judicial officers—all

of whom may be potential defendants in a § 1983 action—

is entirely consistent with “due process of law.” Given the

requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause

and that one detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do

not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required

by the Constitution to investigate independently every

claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on

mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite

intent. Nor is the official charged with maintaining custody

of the accused named in the warrant required by the

Constitution to perform an error-free investigation of such

claim...

Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights

protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of

care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of

injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-

law principles. Just as “[mJedical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the

victim is a prisoner,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106,

97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 LEdZzd 251 (1976), false

imprisonment does not become a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is

a state official.

16

Baker, 443 U.S. at 145-46.

Plaintiff alleges that he spent three days in Pike CCF before being releasec

based on a mistaken belief that he violated an active PFA order despite his

protestations that the order had expired. While perhaps relevant to a tort claim o

false imprisonment, a three-day detention based on the mistakes allegedly made

here “does not and could not amount’ to a deprivation of liberty without due

process for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The court finds

that Warden Lowe would be entitled to qualified immunity if plaintiff were allowed

to amend his Section 1983 false imprisonment claim and thus amendment of tha

claim would be futile.

This qualified immunity determination does not apply to plaintiff's state law

claim for false imprisonment against Warden Lowe. See El v. City of Pittsburgh,

975 F.3d 327, 334, n. 3 (3d Cir. 2020)(“Had the officers raised qualified immunity

as a defense to the state-law claims, the argument would have failed, because

qualified immunity is a defense only to violations of federal law under § 1983.

Immunity from state law claims is governed by the state’s immunity doctrine.”).

As for that claim, the court will grant plaintiff leave to amend based on the

allegation that plaintiff advised guards at Pike CCF at the time of commitment

that the PFA order against him had expired. Plaintiff may be able to plausibly

allege a state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe and the court

17

cannot conclusively determine at this time whether such claims would be futile

pursuant to the various statutory or common law immunity arguments that could

| be raised by Warden Lowe under Pennsylvania law. Furthermore, Pike County

did not move to dismiss the state law false imprisonment claim brought against it

in Count II of plaintiff's complaint and this claim would survive the motion to

dismiss.

Furthermore, while the complaint contains serious factual deficiencies

| regarding claims against Pike County, plaintiff may be able to plausibly allege a

Section 1983 claim against Pike County with the pleading of additional facts.

The best course of action is to afford plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended

complaint within the next twenty (20) days. Plaintiff will be permitted to file an

amended Section 1983 claim against Pike County. Plaintiff is also granted leave

| to amend his state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe.

Conclusion

| For the reasons set forth above, Pike County and Warden Lowe’s motion tc

| dismiss (Doc. 5) will be granted. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Warden

Lowe will be dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend based on Warden

Lowe’s qualified immunity. Plaintiff, however, will be afforded twenty (20) days tc

| file an amended complaint as to his Section 1983 claim against Pike County and

his state law false imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe. Should plaintiff fail

| 18

to file an amended complaint within that timeframe, the state law false

imprisonment claim against Warden Lowe in Count II and the Section 1983 clair

against Pike County in Count | will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate

order follows.

Date: 7 ZA a Ve

J ULIA K. MUNLE

U d/States District 9

19

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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