BROWN v. DEVEREUX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAUREN LETITIA BROWN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-3131

:

DEB SULLI DEVEREUX, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, J. SEPTEMBER 4, 2024

Plaintiff Lauren Letitia Brown, acting pro se, has filed a Complaint asserting claims of

employment discrimination, a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and a Motion for

Appointment of Counsel. Named as Defendants are her former employer, identified only as

“Devereux,” and her former supervisor, Deb Sulli.1 (Compl. at 2.) For the following reasons,

the Court will dismiss her Complaint with leave to amend.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

Brown states that she is “Black/Asian,” and began working for Devereux in July 2023.

(Id. at 3.) She alleges that, from the outset of her employment, her supervisor Deb Sulli “would

make racial[ly] explicit remarks to [Brown] that would make [her] extremely uncomfortable.”

(Id.) She claims that Sulli asked her “how Africans got here, did they arrive by boat,” if she

1 The Clerk of Court is directed, as stated in the order accompanying this memorandum, to

amend the case caption to reflect these two separate Defendants.

2 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Brown’s Complaint and attached

exhibits (ECF No. 2). The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the

CM/ECF docketing system.

“knew that there were more blacks than whites working here,” and for her “thoughts on black

single women taking care of their parents instead of putting them in nursing homes such as white

women do.” (Id. at 3-4.) Brown asserts that Sulli said that “she feels bad for the ‘Blacks’ in the

city that will not get a proper education,” and made other politically and racially charged

statements. (Id. at 4.) She claims that her job was “mentally draining” knowing that she would

have to face such comments. (Id.)

Brown states that the “last straw” came in November 2023, following a Zoom call with

Sulli and two other people. (Id. at 4-5.) She explains that the call happened in the late afternoon

and the lights were off in her office. (Id. at 5.) Brown claims that the next day, Sulli approached

her and made comments implying “that she could only see my teeth [on the Zoom call] because

[Brown is] so dark.” (Id.)

Following this incident, Brown “felt [she] had no choice but to resign.” (Id.) She called

the human resources director, “told her everything that [she] had been experiencing,” and gave a

month’s notice. (Id. at 5-6.) She had a meeting with human resources the next day and was told

there would be an investigation of her claims, but she never learned the outcome of that

investigation. (Id. at 6.) She claims that Sulli later sent her a text about the incident after the

Zoom call, “asking for forgiveness.” (Id.).

Brown filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) in December 2023. (Id. at 7, 10-12.) The EEOC declined to take action

and issued Brown a “right-to-sue” letter on April 24, 2024. (Id. at 13-14.) Brown appears to

seek relief in the form of lost wages and damages. (Id. at 8.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Brown leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). ‘“At this early stage

of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’

‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]

complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”

Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d

768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v.

Hollingsworth, No. 22-2846, 2024 WL 3820969 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2024). Conclusory allegations

do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[T]he plausibility paradigm

announced in [Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly[, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),] applies with equal force to

analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.” Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). As Brown is proceeding pro se, the

Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court understands Brown to assert claims for a hostile work environment and

constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which

prohibits discrimination in employment based on certain characteristics, including race.3 See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see also Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 559 (2016) (“[C]onstructive

discharge is a claim distinct from the underlying discriminatory act.”); Pa. State Police v. Suders,

542 U.S. 129, 146 (2004) (“The constructive discharge here at issue stems from, and can be

regarded as an aggravated case of, sexual harassment or hostile work environment.”). To plead a

hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she suffered intentional

discrimination because of membership in a protected class; (2) the discrimination was severe or

pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) it would have detrimentally

affected a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) a basis for employer liability is

present. Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d 416, 428 (3d

Cir. 2020) (alterations, internal quotations, and citations omitted); Felder v. Penn Mfg. Indus.,

3 The EEOC charge document Brown attached to her complaint contains additional facts not

stated in the Complaint. (See Compl. at 10-12.) In conducting a statutory screening under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may consider exhibits attached to a pro se plaintiff’s

complaint. See Harris v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 10-328, 2011 WL 3607833, at *2 (W.D. Pa.

Apr. 6, 2011), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2011 WL 3625136 (W.D. Pa.

Aug. 15, 2011) (“In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record,

orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case in

disposing of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and hence, under the screening provisions

of the PLRA.”) (citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.2 (3d

Cir. 1994)). However, a plaintiff may not state a claim by relying solely on exhibits. See Estate

of Egenious Coles, 658 F. App’x at 111 (“[W]e cannot fault the District Court for failing to intuit

the necessary factual allegations from one of the many exhibits appended to the complaint.”); see

also Berkery v. Credit Collection Servs., No. 21-3809, 2021 WL 4060454, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept.

7, 2021) (“While a court may consider exhibits attached to a complaint, merely attaching exhibits

is insufficient to meet the requirement that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”).

Inc., 303 F.R.D. 241, 243 (E.D. Pa. 2014). However, “Title VII imposes no general civility

code” as it “does not reach the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, for example, sporadic use

of abusive language or generally boorish conduct.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452

(2013) (internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff alleging constructive discharge in the context of

a hostile work environment bears the additional burden of “show working conditions so

intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Suders, 542 U.S. at

147. To state a claim under the employment discrimination statutes, a plaintiff must “put forth

allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the

necessary element[s].” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (3d Cir. 2009).

As an initial matter, Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to discriminate. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Brown, however, seeks to assert claims under Title VII not only against

her employer, Devereux, but against an individual who is not her employer, namely Sulli, a

supervisor. An “employer” is defined as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce

who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has declined to extend liability under

Title VII to individuals, such as Sulli, holding the term “employer” as used in Title VII does not

encompass individual employees. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061,

1078 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, any claims against Sulli are meritless and will be dismissed

with prejudice.

As to Brown’s claims against Devereux as her employer, Brown alleges that her

supervisor subjected her to repeated race-based comments that made her uncomfortable to the

point where she felt that she had to resign. Liberally construed, the Court concludes that Brown

has alleged a sufficient basis for proceeding at this early stage of the litigation. See Huston v.

Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that the

“basis of an employer’s liability for hostile environment . . . depends on whether the harasser is

the victim’s supervisor or merely a coworker,” and will be satisfied where “management-level

employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a . . . hostile

environment” (citations omitted)).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s claims against Sulli will be dismissed with prejudice,

and her claims against Devereux will proceed to service by the U.S. Marshals in accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). An appropriate Order with further instructions will be entered separately.4

BY THE COURT:

s/ Michael M. Baylson

MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.

4 Brown’s Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (ECF No. 12) is denied without prejudice to

renewal after the filing of any responsive pleadings. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d

Cir. 1993) (in determining whether appointment of counsel is appropriate, the Court must

consider, among other things, the complexity of the legal issues presented and what factual

disputes may require investigation).