BROWN v. SMITH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WES LEE BROWN, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

NO. 23-780-KSM

v.

DEPUTY WARDEN STEPHANIE SMITH,

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. September 5, 2024

Pro Se Plaintiff Wes Lee Brown brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, asserting claims against multiple officials at Berks County Jail. The Court previously

screened Brown’s currently operative Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and found that Brown had stated a claim against Defendant Deputy Warden

Stephanie Smith for unconstitutional punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment and against

Defendant Jessica Collins for First Amendment retaliation. Presently before the Court is

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Brown’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 23.) For the following

reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Brown’s Initial Complaint

On February 21, 2023, Brown initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint asserting claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following Defendants: (1) Berks County Jail; (2) Berks

County; (3) Jeffrey Smith, the Warden of Berks County Jail; (4) Stephanie Smith, the Deputy

Warden of Berks County Jail; (5) Jessica Collins, the Director of Treatment at Berks County Jail;

and (6) Hanna Long, the Law Librarian at Berks County Jail. (Doc. No. 2 at 2–3, 5.)1 Brown

alleged that he was exposed to black mold in the jail’s showers, to dirty standing water on the

floor of his cell while housed in the disciplinary unit, and to a dirty ventilation system. (Id. at 3–

6, 8.) He also alleged that he was denied access to the law library, and that he was retaliated

against for filing a grievance. (Id.)

In a May 9, 2023 Memorandum and Order, the Court granted Brown leave to proceed in

forma pauperis and dismissed his Complaint in part following screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. (See Doc. Nos 6, 7.) In particular, the Court

dismissed Brown’s claims against the Berks County Jail, his official capacity claims against the

individually-named Berks County Jail employees, and all claims against Berks County because

jails are not subject to liability under § 1983 and because Brown failed to allege a basis for

municipal liability. (Doc. No. 6 at 5–7.) The Court also dismissed Brown’s claims based on

unsanitary housing conditions at the Berks County Jail because he did “not tie any of his

allegations regarding the black mold, standing water in his cell, or ventilation system to specific

conduct by any named Defendant.” (Id. at 9.) Finally, the Court dismissed Brown’s First

Amendment access to courts claim because he failed to allege that he suffered an actual injury.

(Id. at 10–12.) However, the Court found that Brown had stated a plausible claim against

Defendant Collins for First Amendment retaliation, premised on his allegation that she issued a

fraudulent misconduct report against him after he filed a grievance. (Id. at 12–14.) The Court

permitted Brown leave to file an amended complaint to the extent he could cure the defects

identified by the Court.

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

B. Brown’s Amended Complaint

On June 26, 2023, Brown filed the currently operative Amended Complaint and a motion

to appoint counsel. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9.) In his Amended Complaint, Brown again brings § 1983

claims against Defendants Jeffrey Smith, Stephanie Smith, Jessica Collins, and Hanna Long for

First Amendment retaliation, denial of access to courts, and unconstitutional punishment in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment related to the unsanitary conditions at Berks County Jail,

namely the presence of black mold, dirty standing water, and a dirty ventilation system. (Doc.

No. 9 at 2–3.) As to the retaliation claim, Brown alleges that he filed a grievance after the jail’s

Treatment Department refused to place him on a list of approved workers at the jail. (Id. at 14,

18.) After filing the grievance, Brown was given a “Class I Misconduct” by Collins for

“interfering with staff.” (Id.) As a punishment for the misconduct write-up, Brown was sent to

the “hole” for 15 days and then to the maximum-security block for 30 days. (Id. at 18.)

And with regard to the dirty ventilation system, Brown alleges that he noticed dirt and

dust particles blowing out of the vents into his cell. (Id. at 13, 16.) Brown alleges that this dirty

ventilation system caused him to suffer headaches and breathing difficulties. (Id. at 20.) He was

allegedly told by prison staff members that the vent filters are never cleaned or changed. (Id. at

13.) Brown complained to Defendant Stephanie Smith and to maintenance personnel about the

ventilation system but they “brushed it off and ignored the issue.” (Id. at 17, 20.) Brown seeks

money damages as a remedy. (Id. at 22–24.)

Brown alleges that he filed grievances regarding the prison’s “conditions, denial of

constitutional rights, false statements by staff, and malicious and vindictive actions by staff, and

oppression by staff, retaliation.” (Id. at 7.) He alleges that these grievances were denied, as were

his appeals to the superintendent. (Id.)

On August 14, 2024 the Court issued a Memorandum and Order screening Brown’s

Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (Doc. Nos. 11, 12.) The Court

dismissed Brown’s claim for denial of access to courts, finding that he had again not alleged an

actual injury. (Doc. No. 11 at 8.) The Court also dismissed Brown’s claims related to the black

mold and dirty standing water because he “failed to allege that any individually-named

Defendant had actual knowledge or was otherwise aware of the alleged unsanitary conditions.”

(Id. at 6–7.) However, the Court found that Brown stated a plausible cause of action related to

the dirty ventilation system against Defendant Deputy Warden Stephanie Smith because Brown

alleged that Smith ignored his complaints about this issue. (Id. at 7.) The Court also held that

Brown had again stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation against Defendant Collins,

finding that Brown had alleged that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct by filing a

grievance and that Collins retaliated against him by issuing a misconduct report. (Id. at 9.)

Having found that Brown had stated two viable causes of action, the Court directed the

Clerk of Court to serve written waiver requests on Defendants Smith and Collins. (Doc. No. 12.)

On October 12, 2023, Defendants entered their appearance (Doc. No. 22) and filed the instant

motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 23). On October 30, 2023, Brown filed a pro se response to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.2 (Doc. No. 28.)

2 Shortly after screening the Amended Complaint, the Court entered an Order granting Brown’s motion to

appoint counsel and directed the Clerk of Court to refer this matter to the Court’s Prisoner Civil Rights

Panel seeking an attorney to voluntarily represent Brown. (Doc. No. 16.) Around the time that

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Brown submitted a letter seeking more information as to who

would be representing him in this matter. (Doc. No. 21.) The Court held a status conference with the

parties via Zoom on October 23, 2023 to provide more information to Brown on the workings of the

Prisoner Civil Rights Panel and to remind him that referral to the panel did not guarantee representation.

(Doc. Nos. 25, 26.) During this status conference, Brown informed the Court that rather than proceeding

with the case pro se, he preferred to wait a few months to see if an attorney would agree to represent him.

The Court thus entered an Order staying this case until February 1, 2024 or until an attorney entered their

appearance on Brown’s behalf. (Doc. No. 27.) The Court also ordered that Brown respond to the

pending motion to dismiss no later than February 29, 2024. (Id.) Notwithstanding that the Court had

stayed the matter on his request, on October 30, 2023, Brown filed his pro se opposition to Defendants’

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement.’” Id. Factual allegations must be “enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level,” and a “complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that

actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (quotation marks omitted).

That said, “[t]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; see

also Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (explaining that the Plaintiff must “provide the grounds of

his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action”). It is the Defendants’ burden to show that a

complaint fails to state a claim. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005)

(explaining that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the “defendant bears the burden of

showing that no claim has been presented”).

motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 28.) On February 6, 2024 the Court lifted the stay because no attorney had

entered their appearance on Brown’s behalf. (Doc. No. 32.) However, the Court subsequently received

notice from Brown that he wished to remain on the panel. (Doc. Nos. 33, 34.) The Court thus entered

another order staying this matter until either Brown received representation or July 30, 2024. (Doc. No.

35.) However, on July 15, 2024, after having received a letter from Brown indicating that he wished to

proceed without counsel (Doc. No. 36), the Court lifted the stay and permitted Brown to file a supplement

to his pro se opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 37.) Brown never filed such a supplement.

Because Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his allegations. Vogt

v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 703 F.3d 239,

244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with

imprisoned pro se litigants.’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 244). The Court will “apply the

relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704

F.3d at 245). However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).

III. DISCUSSION

Following the Court’s screening of Brown’s Amended Complaint, the only claims

remaining are a claim for unconstitutional punishment under the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause against Defendant Smith in relation to the dirty ventilation system at Berks

County Jail and a claim for First Amendment retaliation against Defendant Collins related to her

issuing a misconduct report against Brown after he filed a grievance. In their motion to dismiss,

Defendants argue that Brown’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice in its

entirety because: (1) he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as is required under the

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”); and (2) he has failed to state a claim for

unconstitutional punishment or retaliation. (Doc. No. 23-1.) We will address each argument in

turn below.

A. Exhaustion

The Court turns first to Defendants’ argument that Brown failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies under the PLRA. The PLRA mandates that before prisoners can file

lawsuits related to “prison conditions,” they must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are

available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Otherwise, the claim is “premature and cannot be entertained”

in federal court. El v. Matson, No. 2:21-CV-01325, 2023 WL 4134723, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 22,

2023). This exhaustion requirement applies to “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The requirement to exhaust is

mandatory; the Court may not “excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on

the ground of futility, inadequacy or any other basis.” Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.

2000). Prisoners are required to exhaust even if they seek remedies “not available in grievance

proceedings,” such as monetary damages. Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524.

The PLRA also requires prisoners to exhaust “properly.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

218 (2007). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules’—rules that are

defined not by [§ 1997e(a)], but by the prison grievance process itself.” Id. (citation omitted)

(quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)); see also Shade v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No.

3:16-CV-1635, 2020 WL 1891856, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2020) (“To exhaust administrative

remedies an inmate must comply with all applicable grievance procedures and rules.” (citing

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004))). The Third Circuit has read this requirement

to act as a procedural default rule. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230 (“We believe that Congress’s

policy objectives will be served by interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement to include a

procedural default component.”). In other words, failure to substantially comply with the

procedural requirements of the administrative process set forth by the prison “bars the prisoner

from bringing a claim in federal court unless equitable considerations warrant review of the

claim.” Shade, 2020 WL 1891856, at *3 (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227–32; Camp v. Brennan,

219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000)).

The “failure to exhaust available administrative remedies is an affirmative defense.” Hill

v. Harry, No. 1:21-CV-01424, 2023 WL 6522400, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2023) (citing Jones,

549 U.S. at 216). Thus, the burden to plead and prove a failure to exhaust “rests on the

defendant.” See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018).

Here, Defendants argue that Brown’s claims must be dismissed because he has not

adequately pled that he exhausted his administrative remedies in accordance with the grievance

system maintained by the Berks County Jail System. (See Doc. No. 23-1 at 13 (describing the

grievance system available in the Berks County Jail System).) But the Supreme Court has made

clear that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA” and that “inmates are not

required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Bock, 549 U.S. at

216. Although the Court may dismiss a claim at this stage in the limited circumstances where

the failure to exhaust is apparent on the face of the complaint, Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293

n.5 (3d Cir. 2002), here that is plainly not the case. To the contrary, Plaintiff made clear that he

filed grievances regarding the “conditions” at the jail (presumably including the dirty ventilation

system) and regarding the “retaliation” that he faced. (Doc. No. 9 at 7.) Thus, although he was

not obligated to plead that he exhausted his administrative remedies, under a liberal construction

of the Amended Complaint, Brown did so regardless.3 Defendants’ argument that the Amended

Complaint must be dismissed because Brown has not adequately pled that he exhausted his

administrative remedies is thus meritless. Cf. Ruiz v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. 15-3304 (RBK)

(JS), 2016 WL 3450813, at *2 (D.N.J. June 21, 2016) (refusing to dismiss on failure to exhaust

3 Defendants appear to acknowledge Brown’s general allegations that he filed and appealed grievances

regarding the “conditions” of his confinement and “retaliation.” They argue that these allegations are

insufficient, however, because Brown does not specifically allege that he filed a grievance regarding the

ventilation system or the particular instance of retaliation with Defendant Collins. Such a strict reading of

the Amended Complaint is contrary to the Court’s obligation to liberally construe Brown’s allegations

due to his pro se and incarcerated status. See Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185.

grounds where it was “not apparent from the face of the complaint whether or not plaintiff has

exhausted his administrative remedies”).

B. Dirty Ventilation System Claim

The Court turns next to Defendants’ argument that Brown has failed to state a claim for

unconstitutional punishment premised on the dirty ventilation system. As an initial matter, when

screening the Amended Complaint and applying the same standard applicable to the instant

motion, the Court determined that Brown adequately pled such a claim. See Muchler v.

Greenwald, 624 F. App’x 794, 797 (3d Cir. 2015) (providing that determining whether a

complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). Nevertheless,

because Defendants raise arguments not explicitly addressed by the Court’s prior Memorandum,

the Court will evaluate this claim again.

Since Brown was a pretrial detainee while at Berks County Jail (Doc. No. 6 at 8 n.6), the

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause governs his claim regarding the conditions of his

confinement. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164–67 (3d Cir. 2005). To establish a

Fourteenth Amendment violation, a prisoner must allege that his conditions of confinement

amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“In evaluating the

constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the

protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper

inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”); Hope v. Warden

York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that “detainees may not be punished

before they are adjudicated guilty”).

“Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective

components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he objective component

requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious.” Id. Only conditions

of confinement that “cause inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an

extended period of time” violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229,

233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (noting

that in assessing whether conditions amount to unconstitutional punishment of detainees, courts

“consider the totality of the circumstances of confinement, including any genuine privations or

hardship over an extended period of time”).

The subjective component, on the other hand, asks whether the officials acted with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68. To satisfy the subjective

component, a prisoner generally must assert that prison officials acted with deliberate

indifference, meaning that they consciously disregarded a serious risk to the detainee’s health or

safety. See Edwards v. Northampton County, 663 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(“[W]e agree with the District Court and find no reason to apply a different standard here as we

have applied the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in cases involving prisoners and

pretrial detainees.” (internal citations omitted)). The Court may infer this state of mind “when

the restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government

purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68

(providing that in Bell the Supreme Court “allowed for an inference of mens rea where the

restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, or where the restriction is excessive, even if it would

accomplish a legitimate governmental objective”); Bell, 441 U.S. at 584 n.15 (“[I]f a restriction

or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a

court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may

not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”); Camps v. Giorla, 843 F. App’x

450, 452 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[A] court must determine whether the conditions

complained of were imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is merely incidental to

a legitimate governmental objective.”). In determining whether a restriction or condition is

related to a government interest, the Supreme Court has warned that these “considerations are

peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the

absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their

response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such

matters.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23. The Court must also keep in mind that “practical

considerations of detention justify limitations on ‘many privileges and rights’” and that a

detainee “simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.”

Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 545–46). In determining whether a pretrial

detainee was subjected to unconstitutional punishment, we must consider the totality of the

circumstances. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 372 (3d Cir. 2012).

Here, as was implicit in our conclusion that Brown stated a claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment at the screening stage, the Court finds that Brown has alleged sufficient facts to

meet both the objective and subject components of this test. First, as to the objective component,

while the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991), the conditions to which inmates are exposed must be humane, Cook v. Corbett, No. 14-

5895, 2015 WL 4111692, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2015). To that end, courts have held that the

Constitution provides a “right, under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to adequate

ventilation,” and that this right is implicated where the ventilation “undermine[s] the health of

inmates and the sanitation of the penitentiary.” Stokelin v. A.C.J.F. Warden, No. CV 17-3484

(RBK), 2018 WL 4357482, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2018); see also Davis v. Yates, No. CV15-

6943(KM)(JBC), 2016 WL 5508809, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016) (providing the same); cf.

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Inadequate ventilation and air flow violates

the Eighth Amendment if it undermines the health of inmates and the sanitation of the

penitentiary.” (quotation marks omitted)). Here, Brown has alleged sufficient facts to

demonstrate that the ventilation system “undermine[d]” his health. In particular, Brown has

alleged that the dust and dirt blown out of the vents and into his cell caused breathing difficulties

and headaches. (Doc. No. 9 at 13, 16, 20.) Through these allegations, the Court finds that

Brown has sufficiently asserted that the ventilation system has caused him “genuine privations

and hardship over an extended period of time” and thus has met the objective component of

unconstitutional punishment. Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159.4

Second, the Court finds that Brown has adequately pled the subjective component of

unconstitutional punishment. In particular, it does not appear that the dirty condition of the

Berks County Jail’s ventilation system is rationally related to any legitimate government interest,

and thus the Court can infer that Defendants acted with the requisite mental state.5 See

4 Defendants also argue that Brown has not adequately pled an objective punishment because he has not

alleged facts suggesting that Defendant Smith “intended to punish Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” (Doc. No. 23-1 at 8.) The Court finds that this argument is better addressed through the

subjective portion of unconstitutional punishment, which as noted above, asks whether the defendant

acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68.

5 Defendants appear to argue that the Court should defer to their expert judgment on this issue. (Doc. No.

23-1 at 6.) But while the Supreme Court has explained that when evaluating the prison’s interest in

“maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion” courts should defer

to the expertise of prison officials, Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n.23, the Court finds that an issue as general as

determining whether to clean the ventilation system is not an issue that is “peculiarly within the province

and professional expertise of corrections officials.” And more fundamentally Defendants have not

provided any justification as why they chose not to clean the vents such that the Court could defer to their

judgment.

Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68; Alexis v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CIV. 05-1484 (WJM),

2005 WL 1502068, at *10 (D.N.J. June 24, 2005) (“[The] unsafe, unsanitary and inadequate

conditions do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental

objective.”). Additionally, Brown has pled that he raised his concerns about the ventilation

system directly to Defendant Smith and that she “brushed [] off and ignored” these concerns.

(Doc. No. 9 at 20.) At this early stage, and liberally construing Brown’s Amended Complaint,

the Court finds that these allegations plausibly allege that Defendant Smith acted with deliberate

indifference. Thus, the Court finds that Brown has adequately pled facts to meet the subjective

component of unconstitutional punishment.

Grasping for straws, Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Brown’s claim

because Brown has not adequately alleged that the dirty ventilation system was the proximate

cause of his injuries as opposed to the other uncleanly portions of the jail, such as the mold and

dirty standing water. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 9.) But Brown specifically alleges that his headaches

and breathing problems were the result of his exposure to the dirty ventilation system (Doc. No.

9 at 20), and the Court must credit that allegation at this stage. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v.

Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts

accept as true the allegations in the complaint and its attachments, as well as reasonable

inferences construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”). And regardless, the Court

finds that the causal relationship between the dirty ventilation system and Brown’s injuries is an

issue that needs further factual development and should not be resolved through a motion to

dismiss.

* * *

In sum, the Court finds that Brown has adequately stated a claim against Defendant

Smith related to the dirty ventilation system at Berks County Jail. Accordingly, Defendants’

motion to dismiss is denied as to this claim.

C. First Amendment Retaliation

Finally, the Court addresses Brown’s claim for First Amendment retaliation premised on

Defendant Collins issuing a misconduct report against him after he filed a grievance. To state a

plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he engaged in

constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person

of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the constitutionally

protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). As

to the third prong, a plaintiff can “establish the requisite causal connection by showing either: (1)

an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly

retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”

Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 759 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

As in our prior screening Memoranda, the Court finds that Brown has plausibly alleged

each of these factors. (Doc. No. 11 at 9.) First, Brown alleges that he engaged in

constitutionally protected conduct by filing a grievance. (Doc. No. 9 at 14, 18.) Second,

Collins’s misconduct report, which resulted in Brown being placed in the “hole,” was

sufficiently adverse to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional

rights. (Id.) And finally, there exists “unusually suggestive temporal proximity” between

Brown’s protected conduct and the misconduct report, given that he alleges he received this

misconduct report the “same afternoon” that he submitted a grievance.6 (Id.) See Hammond v.

City of Wilkes Barre, 628 F. App’x 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “two weeks may be

close enough temporally to be probative of causation”); Johnson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CV

23-3430, 2024 WL 1773358, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2024) (finding that the retaliatory conduct

occurring the same day as the protected activity was sufficient to show causation).

Defendants do not contest that the first two prongs are met. Instead, they argue that

Brown has failed to meet the third prong because he has not alleged that Defendant Collins was

aware of his grievance. (Doc. No. 23-1 at 10–11.) As an initial matter, Defendants are correct

that to satisfy the causation component of a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff needs

to prove that the individual who purportedly conducted the adverse action against them was

aware of the protected conduct.7 See Falco v. Zimmer, 767 F. App’x 288, 310 (3d Cir. 2019)

(“For protected conduct to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision, the decisionmakers

must be aware of the protected conduct.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)); Smart v.

Cmty. Educ. Ctr., Inc., No. CV162099KMJBC, 2017 WL 187148, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2017)

(“[A] plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant had knowledge of the constitutionally

protected activity. Without such knowledge, any adverse action cannot be shown to be

6 While Brown claims the misconduct report was issued the same day as his “last inquiry,” (Doc. No. 9 at

14), reading this allegation in connection with other portions of the Amended Complaint, the Court

understands Brown to be referring to his grievance (id. at 18).

7 The Court notes, however, that Defendants reasoning as to why Brown must show that Defendant

Collins had knowledge of the protected conduct is misguided. Defendants appear to argue that Brown’s

First Amendment retaliation claim must meet the standards for unconstitutional punishment under the

Fourteenth Amendment, which requires some level of knowledge on the part of the defendant. (Doc. No.

23-1 at 10.) But Brown’s claim for First Amendment retaliation is wholly distinct from his claims under

the Fourteenth Amendment and is not subject to the standard for unconstitutional punishment. The

requirement that the defendant have knowledge of the protected conduct arises instead from the

requirement that the protected conduct be “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action. See

Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333. Without knowledge of the protected conduct, an individual cannot be said to

have been motivated by that conduct in committing the adverse action.

retaliatory.” (citation omitted)). But at this stage, Brown need not conclusively allege that

Defendant Collins had knowledge of his protected conduct, and instead need only plead “facts

that allow the Court to reasonably infer that . . . defendant was aware of the protected conduct.”

Cucchi v. Kagel, No. CV 17-01597, 2018 WL 3752880, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018) (emphasis

added) (citing Ambrose v. Township of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also

Falco, 767 F. App’x at 310 (“[A]t this motion to dismiss stage, Falco must only produce some

evidence, direct or circumstantial, of [the causation] element that is enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” (quotation marks omitted)). And here, liberally construing

the Amended Complaint, Brown has met that burden. In particular, Brown alleges that the same

day that he filed a grievance regarding the Treatment Department’s refusal to place him on the

list of approved worked at the jail, Collins, who is the Director of the Treatment Department,

filed a “Class I Misconduct” report against him, claiming that he was “interfering with staff.”

(Doc. No. 9 at 14, 18.) Although a close call, the combination of Collins being the director of

the department against which Brown filed a grievance and that the misconduct report, as Brown

describes it, seems to be related to Brown’s filing of grievances regarding the list of approved

workers, allows the Court to reasonably infer that Collins knew of the grievance when issuing

her retaliatory misconduct report. See Bell v. Sullivan, No. CV 17-912, 2017 WL 5518005, at *4

(E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss where the defendant argued that the

plaintiff failed to plead knowledge on the part of the defendant because the Court “need only

reasonably infer” causation and the surrounding circumstances met this burden).

Thus, the Court concludes that Brown has adequately stated a claim for First Amendment

retaliation and denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to that claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.

An appropriate Order follows.