Opinion

BROWN v. DEVEREUX

Court
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 4, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.8%

observing that “Title VII and the ADA impose liability only on employers”

How later courts described this case

  • observing that “Title VII and the ADA impose liability only on employers”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAUREN LETITIA BROWN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-3131

:

DEB SULLI DEVEREUX, :

Defendant. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 4th day of September, 2024, upon consideration upon consideration of

Plaintiff Lauren Letitia Brown’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1), pro se

Complaint (ECF No. 2), and Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3), it is ORDERED that:

1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

2. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to AMEND the case caption to reflect two

separate Defendants:

a. Devereux

b. Deb Sulli

4. Lloyd’s claims against Deb Sulli are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), because Title VII does not provide a basis for

individual liability. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d

Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under Title

VII.”); see also Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.

2017) (observing that “Title VII and the ADA impose liability only on employers”).

5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendant Deb Sulli as a

party to this case.

6. The case shall proceed at this time to service by the U.S. Marshal Service, in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3), against the

following Defendant:

a. Devereux

7. In anticipation of service by the U.S. Marshal Service, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to Brown together with one copy of the U.S. Marshal

Service of Process Receipt and Return Form USM-285 (“USM-285 Form”) for the Defendant

listed in paragraph six (6) of this Order. The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to record the

mailing on the docket.

8. To proceed with service, Brown must complete a USM-285 Form for the

Defendant listed in paragraph six (6) and return the completed form to the Clerk’s Office within

twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Service cannot be made by the U.S. Marshal

Service until Brown completes and returns this form.

9. In completing the USM-285 Form, Brown is instructed as follows:

a. Only one Defendant’s name should appear on the USM-285 Form.

b. Brown shall not complete a USM-285 Form for any individual or entity that is

not listed as a Defendant in paragraph six (6) of this Order, or any Defendant

who already has been dismissed from this case.

c. Brown should include as much identifying information as possible for each

Defendant, including the Defendant’s first name, last name, and, where

relevant, the Defendant’s badge number.

d. Brown must provide each Defendant’s complete address at a location where

that Defendant can be served. The U.S. Marshals Service cannot serve a

Defendant at a P.O. Box address. It is Brown’s responsibility, and not the

duty of the Court, the Clerk’s Office, or the Marshals Service, to ascertain the

address of the Defendant.1

e. Failure to include a proper address may result in the Defendant not being

served and/or the dismissal of Brown’s claims against any such Defendant.

10. Brown is cautioned that failure to return a completed USM-285 Form in

accordance with the above instructions may result in dismissal of this case for failure to

prosecute, without further notice from the Court.

11. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to docket any USM-285 Forms that Brown

returns in this case.

12. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED not to issue summonses at this time. The

Court will direct issuance of summonses upon receipt of a properly completed USM-285 Form.

13. The Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED without prejudice to renewal after

any responsive pleadings.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Michael M. Baylson

MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.

1 See, e.g., Meade v. Reynolds, 810 F. App’x 86, 88 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“[T]he plaintiff

must provide the district court with sufficient information to enable the Marshals Service to

effectuate service of process.” (citing Lee v. Armontrout, 991 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1993));

Harris v. McMullen, 609 F. App’x 704, 707 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Harris has not pointed

to any authority instructing that a District Court or the USMS must engage in extraordinary

measures to assist an [in forma pauperis] litigant in locating a defendant’s address for the

purpose of service of process, and we are not aware of any.”).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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