BROWN v. COOPER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CORDIRO BROWN, et al., : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : NO. 24-2862

:

LAKEYSHA COOPER, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM-ORDER

Cordiro Brown, a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale who is

proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint (DI 1 (“Compl.”)) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting

claims on behalf of Tanya Martin, Celestine Martin, and minors C.M. and C.B.M. for violations

of their constitutional rights.1 Named as Defendants are Lakeysha Cooper, Marco Ortiz, and

Edward Jones, all Philadelphia parole agents, who allegedly violated the plaintiffs’ First, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they failed to protect them from abuse and harassment

by an unnamed parolee. (See Compl.). For the following reasons, the claims will be stricken.

Mr. Brown will be permitted to file an amended complaint asserting claims on his own behalf.

Mr. Brown does not allege that he is an attorney and, therefore, he may not represent the

plaintiffs in this case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, parties “may plead and conduct their own cases

personally or by counsel” in the federal courts. Section 1654 thus ensures that a person may

conduct his or her own case pro se or retain counsel to do so. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of

Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The statutory right to proceed pro se reflects a respect

1 Mr. Brown included the minors’ full names in his Complaint. (See DI 1.) Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 5.2 prohibits litigants from submitting documents that contain personal

information, including, inter alia, the names of persons under the age of 18, who are to be

identified by initials only. The Clerk of Court will be directed to designate the Complaint as

Court and case participants view only and amend the docket to reflect these minors by their

initials only. Mr. Brown is directed to refrain from including the minors’ names in future filings.

for the choice of an individual citizen to plead his or her own cause.” (quoting Cheung v. Youth

Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990))). Although an individual may

represent himself pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court. See

Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The rule that a non-

lawyer may not represent another person in court is a venerable common law rule.”), abrogated

on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516

(2007). This principle has been applied by the Supreme Court, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit, and other courts in various contexts. See, e.g., Rowland v. Cal.

Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (recognizing that corporations must be represented

by counsel and that “save in a few aberrant cases, the lower courts have uniformly held that 28

U.S.C. § 1654 . . . does not allow corporations, partnerships, or associations to appear in federal

court otherwise through a licensed attorney” (footnote omitted)); Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc.,

546 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a non-lawyer could not litigate pro se on behalf

of an ERISA plan); Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882 (“[W]e hold that Osei-Afriyie, a non-lawyer

appearing pro se, was not entitled to play the role of attorney for his children in federal court.”);

Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a non-attorney could not

appear pro se to conduct a shareholder’s derivative suit).

Additionally, Mr. Brown states in the Complaint that he is bringing this case on behalf of

his minor child C.B.M. (Compl. at 4). However, Mr. Brown lacks standing to bring claims on

behalf of his minor child. “[A] plaintiff must assert his or her own legal interests rather than

those of a third party” to have standing to bring a claim. See Twp. of Lyndhurst, N.J. v.

Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted)). The Third Circuit

and other district courts have found specifically that parents lack standing to bring claims for

their minor children. See Chang v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth, & their Fams., Div. of Fam.

Servs., 790 F. App’x 435, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (father lacked standing to address

children’s claims on appeal); Jackson v. Bolandi, No. 18-17484, 2020 WL 255974, at *5 (D.N.J.

Jan. 17, 2020) (“Here, pro se Plaintiff does not have standing to assert any claims on behalf of

her daughter.”).

For these reasons, Mr. Brown may not pursue claims on behalf of the other plaintiffs and

the claims he asserts on their behalf must be stricken. Mr. Brown may file an amended

complaint to assert claims on his own behalf. However, to do so, he must pay the applicable

filing fee or request leave to proceed in forma pauperis, as described below. Accordingly,

AND NOW, this 12th day of July 2024, it is ORDERED:

1. All claims asserted on behalf of Tanya Martin, Celestine Martin, and minors C.M.

and C.B.M. are STRICKEN.

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to AMEND the docket by replacing the minor

children’s full names with initials only. The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to designate

the Complaint (DI 1) as Court and participant view only.

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Tanya Martin, Celestine

Martin, and minors C.M. and C.B.M. as Plaintiffs.

4. If Mr. Brown seeks to proceed with this action he must, within thirty (30) days of

the date of this Order, either (1) pay $405 (comprising the $350 filing fee and $55 administrative

fee) to the Clerk of Court, or (2) file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with a certified copy

of his prisoner account statement (or institutional equivalent) showing all deposits, withdrawals,

and a current balance, from any correctional facility in which he was confined for the six-month

period from December 28, 2024 through June 28, 2024, reflecting account activity from that time

period.

5. If Mr. Brown is ultimately granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he will be

obligated to pay the $350 filing fee in installments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), even if his

case is dismissed. He will not be entitled to the return of any payments made toward the fee.

6. The Clerk of Court shall furnish Mr. Brown with a blank copy of this Court’s

current standard prisoner in forma pauperis form bearing the above civil action number. Mr.

Brown may use this form to seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis if he cannot afford to pay

the fees to commence this case.

7. Mr. Brown may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of

this Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended

complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state

the basis for Mr. Brown’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a

complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to

state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Mr. Brown should be mindful of the

Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained above. Upon the

filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the

Court.

8. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Mr. Brown a blank copy of the

Court’s form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action

number. Mr. Brown may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.

9. If, after review of this Order, Mr. Brown should decide not to further pursue this

action, Mr. Brown may file a Notice of Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a).2

10. If Mr. Brown fails to comply with this Order his case may be dismissed without

further notice for failure to prosecute.

_______________________

MURPHY, J.

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) provides in pertinent part that “the

plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing: . . . a notice of dismissal before

the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment[.]”