The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
CLARENCE CARR and SHAKIRA CARR,
Plaintiffs, Case. No. 1:24-cv-1681-CL
v. OPINION & ORDER
MEDFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
MCSHANE, Judge:
Pro se plaintiffs Clarence and Shakira Carr, proceeding pro se, move for a Temporary
Restraining Order against multiple Defendants including the Medford Police Department and the
Oregon Department of Human Services. ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs argue Defendants “unlawfully
seized their children.” Plaintiffs seek “a full investigation” into a state court judge, the Attorney
General, “and other legal representatives for advancing fraudulent legal actions in violation of
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” Plaintiffs allege that one year ago, state agents unlawfully
removed their children. In state court, Plaintiffs challenged the alleged “void ab initio” order
signed by the state judge. In the pending motion, Plaintiffs essentially challenge the state court
proceedings and the outcome, arguing Defendants violated their constitutional rights throughout
those proceedings. For example, Plaintiffs argue they “filed multiple motions to dismiss the
protective order, but these were wrongfully ignored. The pattern of judicial misconduct and
1 — Opinion & Order
malpractice by Judge Bloom and Attorney Karns violated Plaintiffs due process rights and
constitutes legal malpractice. Plaintiffs request a full investigation into the conspiracy, fraud, and
professional misconduct of all involved.” Motion ff 5.1—S.2. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare □
the October 13, 2023 protective order “void ab initio,” enjoin Defendants from enforcing the
order, “order immediate reunification of Plaintiffs with their children,” conduct a full
investigation, and award damages. □
Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief is clearly an attempted end run around state court
proceedings and is therefore barred by the Rooker-Fi eldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine precludes lower federal courts from hearing claims that collaterally attack prior state
court decisions.” See Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d
1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2006); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
482 n.16 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Perhaps more
importantly, federal courts are also generally prohibited from interfering in issues of domestic □
relations. This exception applies to issues involving child custody. Andenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992).
Additionally, to the extent his custody proceedings are ongoing, Younger abstention bars
Plaintiff's claims. “Younger abstention is a common law equitable doctrine holding that a federal
court should refrain from interfering with a pending state court proceeings. Poulos v. Caesars
World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 699 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Younger abstention applies
when: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the claims implicate important state interests;
and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate forum to raise federal questions. Weiner v.
County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994).
2 — Opinion & Order □
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff brings claims against judges for their actions in state court
proceedings, the claims are barred by judicial immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S, 219, 225
(1988). That absolute immunity applies not only to judges, but also “for advocates and
witnesses” involved in the proceedings. Jd. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff challenges “judicial
mistakes or wrongs,” such challenges must come “through ordinary mechanisms of review,” i.e.,
the appellate process. Jd.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 129 8. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). The mere possibility of irreparable
harm is not enough. Rather, the plaintiff must establish that this harm is likely. Alliance for the
Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The standards for issuing a
temporary restraining order are like those required for a preliminary injunction. Lockheed Missile
& Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ca. 1995).
Because Plaintiffs demonstrate no likelihood of success on the merits of the relief sought
in their motion for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No.
7, is DENIED. This order applies only to the request for injunctive relief, and not any of the -
other motions pending before Judge Clarke.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 3th day of October, 2024.
/s/ Michael McShane □
Michael McShane
United States District Judge
3 — Opinion & Order