Opinion

Brown v. Vulcan LLC

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Jul 30, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.8%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BYRON BROWN, Case No.: 3:23-cv-01408-AN

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

VULCAN LLC, VULCAN SPORTS &

ENTERTAINMENT LLC, and LANDMARK

EVENT STAFFING SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Byron Brown brings this action against defendants Vulcan LLC, Vulcan Sports &

Entertainment LLC (collectively, "Vulcan"), Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc. ("Landmark"), and

John Doe1, alleging violations of the Oregon Public Accommodations Act ("OPAA"), Oregon Revised

Statue ("ORS") § 659a.403, and negligence. Vulcan moves to dismiss the claims against it pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After reviewing the parties' pleadings, the Court finds that oral

argument will not help resolve this matter. Local R. 7-1(d). For the reasons stated herein, Vulcan's motion

is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted when the allegations do

not "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard . . . asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell &

1 John Doe has been identified as Charles Colbert, a resident of Oregon. After the case was removed to this Court and

the present motion was filed, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to name Colbert as a defendant. Mot. for Leave

to File Am. Compl., ECF [18]. This Court denied plaintiff's motion for failing to establish compelling reasons

supporting an amendment for joinder of a nondiverse party that would destroy diversity and divest the Court of subject-

matter jurisdiction. Order, ECF [29]. John Doe will be referred to as Charles Colbert and removed as a defendant.

Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept

as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); see Daniels-

Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Allegations in a complaint "may not simply

recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give

fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

1216 (9th Cir. 2011). While the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in

favor of the plaintiff, Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008), the court

need not credit legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff regularly purchases tickets from Ticketmaster and resells them at the Moda

Center. Decl. of Nathan Morales in Supp. of Not. of Removal ("Morales Decl."), ECF [2], Ex. A

("Compl."), ¶ 5. On February 19, 2023, plaintiff was reselling tickets in a "designated area" when Charles

Colbert ("Colbert"), an employee of Landmark2, an entity that provides security services to the Moda

Center, approached plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. Colbert allegedly told plaintiff to leave the area and go across the

street. Id. Plaintiff responded that the area at which he stood was the designated area to buy and sell tickets.

Id. ¶ 6. Colbert insisted that plaintiff go across the street. Id. Plaintiff asked Colbert to call his supervisor

and to tell the supervisor where plaintiff was selling tickets. Id. ¶ 7. When plaintiff did not leave, Colbert

allegedly told plaintiff, an African American man, that he did not deserve to be there and that he should "go

back to the cotton fields." Id. Colbert repeated the racist remark and that was the end of their interaction.

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Vulcan is a holding company that manages the Moda Center and had

control or a right to control the conduct of Colbert, acting as an agent of Vulcan. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff further

2 Defendant Landmark does not join Vulcan's motion.

alleges that he is aware of Caucasian ticket resellers permitted to sell tickets in the "designated area." Id.

¶ 5. As result of this interaction, plaintiff alleges that he "suffers from feelings of embarrassment,

frustration, anger, humiliation and a sense of increased vulnerability, and racial stigmatization." Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Oregon Public Accommodations Act Claim

Plaintiff brings a discrimination claim under the OPAA. The OPAA provides that "all

persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,

facilities, and privileges of any place of accommodation, without any distinction, discrimination or

restriction on account of…race…" Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403(1). "It is an unlawful practice" to deprive an

individual of those rights. Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.403(3). OPAA defines a "place of public accommodation"

as "any place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether

in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, transportation or otherwise." Or. Rev. Stat. §

659A.400(1)(A).

While its clear that the Moda Center itself is a place of public accommodation, see Schwenk

v.Boy Scouts of America, 275 Or. 327, 335, 551 P.2d 465 (1976), the distinction between the building and

the so called "designated area" outside the building is immaterial. The real issue before the Court is whether

plaintiff can allege denial of full and equal access to the accommodations and services provided by

defendants on the account of race, and in violation of ORS § 659A.403(1).

To proceed on a claim of racial discrimination under the OPAA, plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show that defendants intended to deny African Americans full and equal access to the

accommodations and services available at the Moda Center. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d

1085, 1089 (D. Or. 2018) (emphasis added). Plaintiff, however, cannot meet this burden as Portland City

Code ("PCC") § 14A.50.060 prohibits the reselling of tickets at the Moda Center. See PCC § 14A.50.060

("It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale any ticket for … any event at the Rose Garden

Arena, at a price greater than the retail price printed thereon or at a price greater than the original retail

price."). The Court infers from plaintiff's complaint that he was reselling tickets for profit in violation of

PCC § 14A.50.060. In turn, plaintiff cannot establish that he was denied services and accommodations that

the Moda Center does not offer. Accordingly, plaintiff's discrimination claim under the OPAA as to Vulcan

is dismissed.

Given plaintiff's failure to state a discrimination claim under the OPAA, the Court need not

decide whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he was discriminated against.

B. Negligence Claim

Plaintiff brings a negligence claim against Vulcan based on a theory of vicarious liability.

Plaintiff alleges that Vulcan had control over Colbert and that he was the actual or apparent agent of Vulcan.

Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that Colbert is an agent of Vulcan because Vulcan allegedly manages the

Moda Center, and Landmark, the actual employer of Colbert, provides security services for the Moda

Center. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.

An individual must meet two requirements before a court will consider the person an agent

of another: (1) the individual is subject to another's control; and (2) the individual acts on behalf of the other

person. Vaughn v. First Transit, Inc., 346 Or. 128, 136, 206 P.3d 181 (2009). "[T]he principal's 'control'

over what the agent shall or shall not do is necessary for an agency relationship[.]" Id. However, an agency

relationship does not result "when an individual (or entity) simply agrees to provide services for another,

even if the other person—through contract—is able to establish general standards for performance and in

that way 'control' the individual." Id.

Plaintiff fails to allege the extent of control, if any, Vulcan had over Colbert, an employee

of Landmark. Plaintiff does not allege that Vulcan exercised or had control over Colbert's hiring, training,

assignments, hours, wages, or conduct. Simply stating that Vulcan "had actual control or a right to control

[Colbert]," Compl. ¶ 4, is not enough to establish an agency relationship. Accordingly, plaintiff's

negligence claim against Vulcan is dismissed.

Because plaintiff has failed to allege an agency relationship with Vulcan, the Court declines

to address whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Vulcan acted negligently and whether plaintiff is

entitled to noneconomic damages under the "legally protected interest" exception to the physical impact

rule.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Vulcan's Motion to Dismiss, ECF [8], is GRANTED. Plaintiff's

claims against Vulcan are dismissed with leave to amend. In the event that plaintiff elects to file an amended

complaint, he must do so within fourteen (14) days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 30th day of July, 2024.

Jif, be pape Xx tor

Adrienne Nelson

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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