The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JESICA STEWART, )
as Next Friend of Joseph Stewart, )
deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-23-01046-JD
)
TURN KEY HEALTH CLINICS LLC, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, Natasha Kariuki,
Angela Albertson, and Christina Meza’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11], Defendant
Chris Amason’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10], responses and replies to those motions
[Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 17, 19], notices of supplemental authority [Doc. Nos. 20, 22], two
Reports and Recommendations issued by United States Magistrate Judge Amanda
Maxfield Green [Doc. Nos. 23, 25], objections filed by Turn Key and Plaintiff Jesica
Stewart [Doc. Nos. 26, 27], responses to the objections filed by Stewart and Amason
[Doc. Nos. 28, 29], and Turn Key’s reply to Stewart’s response to Turn Key’s objection
[Doc. No. 30].
For the following reasons, and upon its de novo review in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court grants in part
and denies in part the Motions to Dismiss and adopts in part and rejects in part the
Reports and Recommendations.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the death of Joseph Stewart—Plaintiff Stewart’s husband—
immediately after his custodial transfer from the Cleveland County Justice Center.
Stewart brought this action against Turn Key Health Clinics (“Turn Key”); Chris
Amason, the Sheriff of Cleveland County, in his official capacity; nurses Natasha
Kariuki, Angela Albertson, and Christina Meza (“the LPN Defendants”); and a fourth
nurse, Becky Pata. Stewart brings municipal liability claims against Turn Key and
Amason, alleging that they violated Joseph Stewart’s constitutional right to adequate
medical care by maintaining a deficient medical care delivery system and failing to train
their staff. She also brought state law negligence claims against Turn Key and the LPN
Defendants and Pata. The defendants removed the action to this Court on November 16,
2023, and the Court referred the case to Judge Green.
Turn Key and Amason moved to dismiss Stewart’s constitutional claims for failure
to state a claim for municipal liability. Turn Key and the LPN Defendants moved to
dismiss Stewart’s state law claims, asserting that they are immune from suit under the
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”) and that the claims are time-barred.
Judge Green recommends that the Court (1) deny Turn Key’s motion to dismiss Stewart’s
claim that Turn Key had a policy or practice of maintaining an inadequate medical
delivery system, (2) grant the motions to dismiss the other constitutional claims against
Turn Key and Amason, and (3) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
claims arising out of state law. Judge Green also recommends that the Court deny
requests for leave to amend made by Stewart in her responses to the motions to dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under this standard, the Court must “accept the
well-pleaded facts alleged as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264, 1275 (10th Cir. 2023).
However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and the Court must “draw on its judicial
experience and common sense” to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. “In other words, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate if the complaint alone is legally insufficient to state a claim.” Brokers’ Choice
of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104–05 (10th Cir. 2017).
When a magistrate judge has entered a recommended disposition of a matter, the
Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,” and the Court “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In addition, “while the statute does not
require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude
further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de
novo or any other standard.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). “De novo review
requires the district court to consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review
the magistrate judge’s recommendation.” In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1995).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court adopts the recommendations regarding the disposition of
Stewart’s constitutional claims.
Claim 3 of the amended petition alleges that Amason “adopted, maintained, and
enforced a written policy or unwritten practice that denied or delayed adequate medical
care” for Joseph Stewart, constituting deliberate indifference to his medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 75–78]. Claim 5 asserts the same
claim against Turn Key. Id. ¶¶ 84–87. Claim 4 asserts that Amason “did not provide staff
with adequate training to identify and document medical emergencies or to elevate care
decisions for at-risk people like” Joseph Stewart, also constituting deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 79–83. Claim 6 brings the same claim against Turn
Key. Id. ¶¶ 88–92. Judge Green recommends granting the motions to dismiss Claims 3, 4,
and 6, and denying the motion to dismiss Claim 5.
Upon de novo review of the record and Judge Green’s recommendation, the Court
adopts Judge Green’s recommendation. Judge Green has “dealt with the issues fully and
accurately,” and the Court “could add little of value to that analysis.” Griego, 64 F.3d at
584. Further, nothing in the objections, responses, or reply filed by the parties after Judge
Green issued her recommendation leads the Court to find any error in Judge Green’s
analysis.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Stewart’s claims for inadequate training against
Amason and Turn Key, as well as her claim against Amason for maintaining an
inadequate medical delivery system. The Court concludes that Stewart has sufficiently
pleaded a claim for deliberate indifference against Turn Key under the systemic failure
doctrine. See Crowson v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020).
Therefore, Claim 5 remains.
B. The Court declines to dismiss Stewart’s negligence claims against Turn
Key and the LPN Defendants.
Stewart did not object to Judge Green’s recommendation that the Court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Stewart’s negligence claims. [Doc. No. 23 at 22].1
Nevertheless, given that a federal claim remains following this pleading stage, the Court
finds it appropriate to review this issue de novo. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154.
As an initial matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that, “in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.” The district court, however, may decline to
exercise this supplemental jurisdiction if the claim raises a novel or complex issue of
state law, the claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district
court has original jurisdiction, the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
1 The Court uses CM/ECF page numbers from the top of docket filings.
original jurisdiction, or exceptional circumstances provide compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
As discussed above, there remains a claim over which the Court has original
jurisdiction. The negligence claims are related to the federal claim that remains. At this
pleading stage, the Court cannot say that there is an appropriate reason to decline
supplemental jurisdiction.2 Thus, the Court proceeds to analyze the reasons for dismissal
argued by the parties.
1) Turn Key and the LPN Defendants are not entitled to immunity
under the GTCA at the pleading stage.
The parties dispute whether Turn Key and the LPN Defendants are entitled to
immunity under the GTCA. 51 Okla. Stat. § 151, et seq. Turn Key and the LPN
Defendants argue that the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion in Barrios v. Haskell
County Public Facilities Authority, 432 P.3d 233, 241 (Okla. 2018), addressed this issue,
and that they are entitled to immunity as a result. Stewart argues that the GTCA does not
bar her tort claims because the statute excludes independent contractors and their
2 The Report and Recommendation recommends “that the Court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law negligence claims,” [Doc.
No. 23 at 22], citing for support RX Medical LLC v. Melton, No. CIV-22-731-PRW, 2022
WL 4000712 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 1, 2022). In that case, however, the court initially
exercised federal question jurisdiction over a single federal claim and supplemental
jurisdiction over five state law claims. 2022 WL 4000712, at *1. When the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to remove the lone federal claim, the court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction because only state law claims raising “complex issues of state
law revolving around the interpretation of an important state statute” remained. Id. at *3.
Here, in contrast, Stewart’s constitutional claim against Turn Key remains. Thus, RX
Medical is inapposite.
employees and, in any event, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lucas v. Turn Key Health
Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127 (10th Cir. 2023), instructs that dismissal at the pleading stage
is not appropriate.
“An employee of the state or its political subdivision who operates or maintains a
jail or correctional facility is exempt from state tort liability under the [GTCA].” Id. at
1147 (citing 51 Okla. Stat. § 155(25)). The term “employee” includes “licensed medical
professionals under contract with city, county, or state entities who provide medical care
to inmates or detainees in the custody or control of law enforcement agencies.” 51 Okla.
Stat. § 152(7)(b)(7).
“In a footnote in Barrios v. Haskell County Public Facilities Authority, 432 P.3d
233, 236 n.5 (Okla. 2018), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated, ‘Generally speaking, the
staff of a healthcare contractor at a jail are “employees” who are entitled to tort immunity
under the [O]GTCA.’” Bond v. Regalado, No. 22-5065, 2023 WL 7014047, at *3 (10th
Cir. Oct. 25, 2023) (unpublished). However, district courts have been instructed that, on a
motion to dismiss, it is “premature” to determine whether healthcare contractors and
prison doctors, nurses, etc. “[are] entitled to immunity based on Barrios’s non-binding
legal assumption, which was decidedly not an express statement of law.” Lucas, 58 F.4th
at 1148. Instead, the “proper route” for district courts to take “is to determine the
[GTCA]’s applicability to private corporations — and their employees — that contract
with the state to provide medical services at the summary judgment stage if the factual
record is sufficiently developed and the facts are uncontroverted.” Id.
Thus, the Court determines that Stewart’s allegations do not conclusively establish
that Defendants are entitled to immunity under the GTCA. Based on the Tenth Circuit’s
instruction in Lucas, the Court declines to dismiss the negligence claims against Turn
Key and the LPN Defendants on this ground at the pleading stage.3
2) Stewart’s negligence claims are not time barred at the pleading
stage.
Turn Key and the LPN Defendants argue that Stewart’s state law claims are
“barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” [Doc. No. 11 at 37]. That statute
provides that “[a]ll actions filed by an inmate or by a person based upon facts that
occurred while the person was an inmate in the custody of . . . a contractor of the State of
Oklahoma,” including “claims for injury to the rights of another, shall be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of action shall have accrued.” 12 Okla. Stat.
§ 95(A)(11). Because Joseph Stewart died on July 15, 2021, and Plaintiff Stewart
originally filed this action on March 13, 2023, see [Doc. No. 1-1], Turn Key and the LPN
3 The Court acknowledges the Report and Recommendation’s analysis that since
Lucas, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals (“COCA”) has decided two relevant cases
with conflicting holdings, and that there is current “disagreement within the COCA on
whether private entities that contract to provide medical care to inmates are entitled to
tort immunity under the []GTCA.” [Doc. No. 23 at 22]. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has granted a petition for writ of certiorari that might clarify the law in this area. See id. at
22 & n.3. If state law remains in conflict or unclear by summary judgment, then it might
be appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “novel or complex”
issues of state law under § 1367(c)(1), potentially among other reasons. However, for
efficiencies of the parties and the proceedings, the Court views it as premature to make
that determination and follows the Tenth Circuit’s direction in Lucas.
Defendants argue that this action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations imposed
by § 95(A)(11). [Doc. No. 11 at 38].
However, where a prisoner, former prisoner, or, as in this case, prisoner’s next
friend brings a tort action against a private correctional facility, “the GTCA is
controlling.” Hall v. GEO Grp., Inc., 2014 OK 22, ¶ 14, 324 P.3d 399, 404 (holding that
the GTCA controls over the one-year limitations period in 12 Okla. Stat. § 96); see also
Brown v. Creek Cnty. ex rel. Creek Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2007 OK 56, ¶ 9, 164
P.3d 1073, 1076 (“The plain language of the GTCA dictates that its prescriptions must
control over any others. . . . GTCA’s statute-of-limitation provisions, as distinguished
from those contained in the generic section on civil procedure, must hence govern.”);
Rout v. Crescent Pub. Works Auth., 1994 OK 85, ¶ 8, 878 P.2d 1045, 1049 (explaining
that “limitations within the [GTCA] control over general statutory law”).
Specifically, 57 Okla. Stat. § 566.4, “which applies the notice provisions of the
GTCA to lawsuits brought by prisoners or former prisoners against private correctional
facilities,” controls in this action. Hall, 2014 OK 22, ¶ 11, 324 P.3d at 404. The relevant
notice provisions of the GTCA require a person to “present a claim to the state or political
subdivision for any appropriate relief . . . . within one (1) year of the date the loss
occurs.” 51 Okla. Stat. § 156(A)–(B). “A person may not initiate a suit against the state or
a political subdivision unless the claim has been denied in whole or in part” by the state
or political subdivision. Id. § 157(A). “No action for any cause arising under,” the GTCA
“shall be maintained unless valid notice has been given and the action is commenced
within one hundred eighty (180) days after denial of the claim as set forth in this section.”
Id. § 157(B). “In short, a plaintiff has no access to the courts while awaiting the political
subdivision’s decision.” Brown, 2007 OK 56, ¶ 6, 164 P.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
“Because under GTCA’s § 157(A) the right to sue does not attach until the claim has been
denied or is deemed denied,” the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held “that causes of
action brought under the GTCA do not accrue until that point.” Id. ¶ 7, 164 P.3d at 1075.
Here, Stewart alleges she “has timely complied with any prerequisites to filing
suit, including serving a notice of claim on Turn Key consistent with 57 O.S.
§ 566.4(B)(2) on June 17, 2022.” [Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 6]. Thus, she complied with the
GTCA’s requirement that she present a claim within one year of the date the loss occurred
on July 15, 2021, when Joseph Stewart died.
The amended petition does not allege sufficient information to determine when the
cause of action accrued because it does not provide the date on which the claim was
denied. But the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and a “plaintiff need not
anticipate in the complaint an affirmative defense that may be raised by the defendant.”
Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2018).
Therefore, at this stage in the proceedings, Stewart’s negligence claims are not
time-barred. The Court denies the motions to dismiss insofar as they seek to dismiss the
negligence claims against Turn Key and the LPN Defendants.
C. The Court dismisses Counts 3, 4, and 6 without prejudice.
“To the extent the Court determines the pleading is deficient,” Stewart’s responses
to defendants’ motions to dismiss “respectfully request[] the Court grant leave to amend,
or alternatively,” limited pre-answer discovery. [Doc. No. 14 at 25; Doc. No. 15 at 19].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs that “[t]he court should freely give
leave” to amend pleadings “when justice so requires.” Where the party has “expressed a
willingness to amend,” and “‘if it is at all possible that the party against whom the
dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading or state a claim for relief, the
court should dismiss with leave to amend.’” Brever v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119,
1131 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1483, at 587 (2d ed. 1990)). Here, because the deficiencies in Stewart’s
complaint are potentially curable, the Motions were directed at an amended petition
drafted under state (versus federal) pleading standards in this removed action, and
Stewart seeks the ability to amend her pleading, the Court dismisses Claims 3, 4, and 6
without prejudice. Should Stewart wish to amend her complaint, she must follow the
Federal and Local Civil Rules of Procedure and the deadlines in any scheduling order. Cf.
LCvR7.1(c) (“A response to a motion may not also include a motion or a cross-motion
made by the responding party.”); see also LCvR15.1 (explaining that a party moving to
amend a pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 “must attached the proposed
pleading as an exhibit to the motion”).4
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the Reports and
Recommendations [Doc. Nos. 23, 25], GRANTS Amason’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.
4 Before filing any motion for leave to amend, the Court requires the parties to
confer to determine if they can resolve any disputes and to avoid further motion practice
on the issues so that the action may progress. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
10], GRANTS Turn Key’s Motion to Dismiss Claim 6, and DENIES Turn Key’s Motion
to Dismiss Claim 5 [Doc. No. 11]. The Court REJECTS IN PART the Report and
Recommendation [Doc. No. 23] and DENIES Turn Key and the LPN Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Claims 1 and 2 [Doc. No. 11]. Claims 1, 2, and 5 remain.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4) governs answer deadlines. This action
remains referred to Judge Green.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of October 2024.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12