Bowlds v. Oklahoma Indigent Defense System

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHARLES R. BOWLDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-220-SLP

)

OKLAHOMA INDIGENT )

DEFENSE SYSTEM, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 10] (R.&R.), issued

by United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and (C). Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks civil rights

relief, alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Magistrate Judge has recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s action.

Plaintiff has filed an Objection [Doc. No. 17] to the R.&R. Accordingly, the Court

must make a de novo determination of those issues specifically raised by the Objection,

and may accept, modify, or reject the recommended decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was tried by a jury and convicted in the District Court of Logan County,

State of Oklahoma, Case No. CF-2019-45, of: Count 1, Kidnapping, in violation of Okla.

Stat. tit. 21, § 741; Count 3, Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645, both After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies; and

Count 4, Domestic Assault and Battery (Misdemeanor), in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21,

§ 644(C).1

Plaintiff filed a direct appeal of his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal

Appeals (OCCA). The state district court appointed the Oklahoma Indigent Defense

System (OIDS) to represent Plaintiff. During the pendency of his direct appeal, Plaintiff

filed an application in state district court requesting leave to proceed pro se. See In re

Bowlds, Case No. MI-2023-22, District Court of Pittsburg County, State of Oklahoma. The

state district court granted Plaintiff’s request and found that Plaintiff made a knowing and

voluntary decision to represent himself on direct appeal. See id., Order filed Oct. 6, 2023.2

At the time this relief was granted, a counseled appellate brief had already been filed on

Plaintiff’s behalf.

The OCCA affirmed Plaintiff’s conviction on July 18, 2024, during the pendency

of this action. See Bowlds v. State, No. F-2021-1155, 2024 WL 3451551 (Okla. Crim.

App. July 18, 2024) (for publication). The OCCA addressed both the counseled challenges

to Plaintiff’s conviction and the grounds Plaintiff raised on his own behalf. Plaintiff did

not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

1 The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s state court proceedings, available at www.oscn.net.

2 Plaintiff also chose to appear pro se midstream during the course of his trial. On direct appeal,

the OCCA found that Plaintiff made a knowing and voluntary decision to represent himself at trial

and, thereafter, at sentencing. See Bowlds, 2024 WL 3451551 at *3.

II. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff alleges the State of Oklahoma, OIDS, its Board of Directors, and other

Defendants employed by OIDS (including his court-appointed appellate counsel) have

violated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. But he

emphasizes that his claim “is not premised upon ineffective assistance of counsel based

upon the ‘advice’ or deficiencies provided by Plaintiff’s individual OIDS-appointed

counsel(s).” Compl. [Doc. No. 1-1] at 8-9. Instead, Plaintiff claims that OIDS has a policy

or custom of structuring its contracts in such a way so as to delay payment to attorneys in

a manner that creates a “pervasive conflict of interest” by creating “a powerful financial

incentive” for attorneys to take on too many cases and close those cases out quickly. Id. at

3, 9.

According to Plaintiff, the OIDS policy incentivizes attorneys “not only to close

cases as quickly as possible, it also incentivizes them to take on a repugnant amount of

cases, and abandon their ethical oaths and statutory obligations” resulting in their ineffecive

representation contrary to the rights protected by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff

alleges that “[t]he statutorily-required [sic] provision which delays the final 10% of the

annual contractual payment until the end of the year, and upon verification that all of the

contract attorney’s cases are closed, creates a powerful financial incentive for attorneys to

take on Brobdingnagian case loads and ultimately close out cases quickly by constructing

and submitting cut and paste boilerplate briefs.” Id. at 9-10.

Plaintiff alleges that he faced a “Hobson’s choice” between continuing with

representation by incompetent or unprepared counsel or appearing pro se. Id. at 7. And

he alleges that he advised the state district court of this “Hobson’s choice” when he moved

to proceed pro se on direct appeal of his conviction. Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims, therefore,

that he did not voluntarily relinquish his right to the assistance of an attorney on direct

appeal. Id. As a consequence, Plaintiff alleges that he has been “immersed in the abyss of

the [Oklahoma] Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) Rules and appellate jurisprudence, in

an attempt to perfect his direct appeal.” Id. at 10.3

III. Plaintiff’s Objections

A. Individual-Capacity Claims Against Defendants Babcock and Capraro

As set forth, the state district court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff on direct

appeal and his case was assigned, within the General Appeals Division of OIDS, to

Defendant Babcock. The case was then reassigned, within OIDS, to Defendant Capraro.

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings that he has failed to state

individual-capacity claims against Defendants Babcock and Capraro, because, as public

defenders, these Defendants are not “state actors.” See R.&R. at 5 -9. Plaintiff contends

these Defendants “should be considered state actors because they were conspiring with

state officials, through the OIDS contract, to deprive him of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment Constitutional rights.” Obj. at 3. Plaintiff cites in support Feenstra v. Sigler,

No. 19-CV-00234-GFK-FHM, 2019 WL 6064854 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 14, 2019).4

3 Plaintiff did, in fact, “perfect” his direct appeal. Thus, he cannot show he was prejudiced by an

inability to do so.

4 As the Magistrate Judge noted, “Plaintiff parrots the court’s language in Feenstra as the basis of

his claim.” R.&R. at 8, n. 5 (citing Compl.).

The Magistrate Judge thoroughly addressed, and rejected this argument and

expressly distinguished Feenstra in doing so. R.&R. at 6-7, n. 3. As the Magistrate Judge

found, Plaintiff acknowledges that OIDS “employs” these Defendants in its “General

Appeals Division” and, therefore, “Plaintiff’s claim that an OIDS contract impacted their

ability to provide him adequate legal representation is baseless.” R.&R. at 8. The Court

concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis.

In his Objection, relying on Feenstra, Plaintiff argues that “OIDS attorneys that

contract with the General Appeals Division do so pursuant to the same statutorial provision

(policy) as set out in the Indigent Defense Act, with the same flat-rate fiscal year contracts.”

Obj. at 4. But he offers no factual or legal support for this argument. In any event,

Plaintiff’s allegations are devoid of any facts to show that any “policy” was the moving

force behind any violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See

Monnell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978) (A government entity may

not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity

can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.).

In Feenstra, the plaintiffs alleged “systemic” failures by OIDS-appointed contract

attorneys to inform indigent defendants of their statutory right, under Oklahoma law, to an

“ability to pay hearing” and to “challenge the imposition of fines and fees against

[p]laintiffs due to their poverty.” Feenstra, 2019 WL 6064854 at * 1-2. The challenged

contractual policy allegedly resulted in “systemic” conduct pursuant to which the issue of

indigency in the context of non-payment of funds was routinely ignored. Id. at * 7. Thus,

the plaintiffs alleged conduct that caused specific prejudice as a result of a challenged

policy to support their claim of a constitutional violation. Unlike the plaintiffs’ claims in

Feenstra, here, Plaintiff does not identify any facts to demonstrate any “systemic” failure.

Nor does he identify any impact the alleged policy had on the direct appeal rights of

indigent defendants. Instead, notwithstanding his assertion to the contrary, Plaintiff’s

allegations are directed solely to actions taken in his singular case.5

Furthermore, as discussed, Plaintiff sought, and was granted, the right to proceed

pro se on direct appeal. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion to the contrary,

the state trial court found Plaintiff made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to

appellate counsel. Consequently, Plaintiff is hard-pressed to assert a violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights in this § 1983 action. As previously set forth, his conclusory and

speculative allegations of prejudice are insufficient.

More fundamentally, as the Magistrate Judge found, to the extent Defendants

“inadequately represented him on appeal by requesting extensions of time or filing an

‘[in]sufficient’ and ‘[in]effective brief” such alleged conduct demonstrates Defendants

were performing “traditional functions while acting as Plaintiff’s appellate attorneys” and

were neither “state actors” nor acting “under color of state law” for purposes of his § 1983

claims. See R.&R. at 9. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims premised on such conduct are

“squarely foreclosed” by Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Id. at 5-9.

5 Plaintiff does not even identify any prejudice resulting from the OIDS’ attorneys’ representation

in his own direct appeal. Plaintiff alleges no facts to show his direct appeal counsel were

incompetent or unprepared. He references the fact that they requested extensions of time to submit

briefing, but such conduct, without more, is insufficient to substantiate his claims.

B. Dismissal of Defendants Laughlin and Danner

Defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Defendants

Laughlin and Danner be dismissed from this action. Plaintiff alleges these Defendants

acted in a supervisory capacity with respect to the alleged unconstitutional conduct of

Defendants Babcock and Capraro. Defendant Laughlin is the Executive Director of OIDs

and Defendant Danner was the direct supervisor who assigned Plaintiff’s appellate case to

Defendants Babcock and Capraro. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Laughlin and

Danner “implement[ed] a system that denies Plaintiff conflict-free counsel.” Compl. [Doc.

No. 1], Attachment [1-1] at 13. But as the Magistrate Judge found, “the contract provision

about which Plaintiff complains does not apply to Defendants Babcock and Capraro’s

conduct in representing him on appeal.” R.&R. at 11. And, as this Court has further

addressed, his allegations of “systemic” conduct or resulting prejudice to support any

constitutional violation are wholly deficient. Accordingly, “Plaintiff’s allegations against

these supervisory Defendants are insufficient to state a supervisory claim for relief[.]”

R.&R. at 11.

Plaintiff does not refute the Magistrate Judge’s finding. Instead, he asks that he be

allowed the “opportunity to fully develop the record, so that he can show this Court how

the fee provision does in fact apply to [such conduct].” Obj. at 7. But the Court will not

permit discovery or further development of a legally baseless claim. See, e.g., Shelton v.

Sha Ent., LLC, No. CV-20-644-D, 2020 WL 6389858, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2020)

(“Discovery is authorized solely for parties to develop the facts in a lawsuit in which a

plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim, not in order to permit a plaintiff to find out

whether he has such a claim.” (quoting Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 350 F. Supp.

2d 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).

C. Dismissal of Claims Against OIDS Board of Directors

Plaintiff next objects to the dismissal of the claims against the OIDS Board of

Directors. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the official-capacity claims

against the Board. See R.&R. at 13. Plaintiff does not object to this finding. Instead, he

attempts to argue that he brings individual capacity claims against the Board. And he

contends that the “OIDS Board of Directors set in motion a series of events that they should

have known would cause others to deprive the Plaintiff, and others, of their Constitutional

rights.” Obj. at 9. He further argues that his Complaint plausibly alleges “that the OIDS

Board of Directors engaged in conduct and policies which they knew, or should have

known would cause Plaintiff and other indigent criminal defendants to be deprived of their

constitutional rights.” Id. at 10.

A review of the Complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff brought only official-capacity

claims against the OIDS Board of Directors. See Compl. at 5.6 Moreover, his conclusory

assertions that the Board engaged in unconstitutional conduct, divorced from any factual

allegations, is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for relief.

6 As the Magistrate Judge found, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against

the State of Oklahoma, OIDS (an agency of the State), and the OIDS board members in their

official capacities. See R.&R. at 12-13.

D. Heck Bar

Plaintiff further objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that his claims are barred

by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In most conclusory fashion, Plaintiff states

“Judgment for the Plaintiff would in no way imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence.” Obj. at 11. Plaintiff’s objection is without merit. As set forth, Plaintiff’s

allegations are directed at alleged failures of his appellate counsel with respect to their

representation of Plaintiff on direct appeal, in his singular case. Thus, “his claim serves as

an attack on his criminal proceedings underlying his Logan County convictions,” see

R.&R. at 15 and, as such, his claims are barred by Heck.7

E. Leave to Amend

Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that leave to amend would

be futile. But Plaintiff fails to support this objection with any factual assertions or legal

argument. Because he fails to adequately support his objection, he was waived any

objection to this finding. See, e.g., Schupper v. Cafasso, 708 F. App’x 943, 946 (10th Cir.

2017) (generalized objections to a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations are

insufficient) Alternatively, the Court fully concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s finding

that leave to amend would be futile.

7 Although Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Younger abstention bars his

claims, this finding was an alternative basis upon which the Magistrate Judge recommended

dismissal and the Court need not address it. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No.

10] is ADOPTED and Plaintiffs action is DISMISSED.® A separate judgment of dismissal

shall be entered.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of September, 2024.

SCOTT L. PALK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8 Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional and, therefore, dismissal of claims on this basis

is without prejudice. See Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2017). Additionally,

dismissal of claims on the basis of Heck is without prejudice. See St. George v. City of Lakewood,

Colo., No. 22-1333, 2024 WL 3687780 at * 4 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 2024) (citing Fottler v. United

States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir. 1996)).

10