Arrington v. Bureau of Prisons

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DERREK E. ARRINGTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-23-01087-JD

)

BUREAU OF PRISONS, DSCC, )

)

Respondent.1 )

ORDER

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) [Doc. No. 19] of

United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell, to whom this action was referred for

initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). See [Doc. No.

3]. Petitioner Derrek E. Arrington, appearing pro se, initiated this action by filing a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) [Doc. No. 1]. Mr.

Arrington is currently serving his District of Columbia (“D.C.”) parole violator sentence

at FCI El Reno.

I. BACKGROUND

In his Petition, Mr. Arrington asserts that the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”)

Designation and Sentencing Computation Center (“DSCC”) incorrectly applied 2,211

days of statutory good time credit toward his “full” sentence rather than toward his parole

violator term, in violation of P5880.33, Chapter 17.6 of D.C.’s Sentence Computation

1 Following this Order, and as discussed below, “FCI El Reno Warden” shall be

substituted for Respondent.

Manual and his constitutional rights. Petition at 2, 6–7. He requests “immediate release”

from custody. See id. at 7.

Respondent BOP DSCC filed a response and a motion to dismiss the Petition

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Doc. No. 13]. Specifically, Respondent

asserts that Mr. Arrington’s Petition should be denied and dismissed because Mr.

Arrington has named an improper respondent and because the BOP has properly applied

Mr. Arrington’s statutory good time credit toward his parole violator sentence.

Judge Mitchell recommends that the Court substitute the FCI El Reno Warden as

Respondent and deny the Petition as meritless because the BOP has properly applied Mr.

Arrington’s good time credit toward his parole violator term as required for D.C.

offenders. R. & R. at 2, 5–9.

Within the time limits authorized by the Court, Mr. Arrington objected to the R. &

R. [Doc. No. 20]. Accordingly, the Court must make a de novo determination of any

portion of the R. & R. to which a specific objection is made, and may accept, modify, or

reject the recommended decision in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Because Mr. Arrington is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally

construes his filings. See Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010).

Upon de novo review of the issues presented, and for the reasons stated herein, the

Court adopts the R. & R. [Doc. No. 19], which results in the denial of the Petition and a

dismissal with prejudice.2 Additionally, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 13] and denies Mr. Arrington’s Writ of

Mandamus [Doc. No. 22] for the reasons stated herein. The Court also denies a certificate

of appealability (“COA”).

II. ANALYSIS

Mr. Arrington does not dispute Judge Mitchell’s historical account of the prior

proceedings, and the Court accepts that portion of the R. & R.3 See R. & R. at 3–4. He

also concedes that he was released on parole on July 13, 1998. [Doc. No. 20 at 2]. Mr.

Arrington, however, continues to assert that “the BOP falsely awarded good time to the

full length of [his] sentence 18 [years] in error,” and that P5880.33, Chapter 17.6 clearly

states that statutory good time is awarded to the parole violator term to be served. See id.

at 3. The Court agrees with Judge Mitchell’s analysis that it is not necessary to resolve

Respondent’s challenge to Mr. Arrington’s Petition under the rubric of summary

judgment, and the Court is free to dismiss the Petition on the merits where no claim for

relief is stated. See Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x 227, 231–32 (10th Cir. 2012)

(unpublished) (denying COA and dismissing appeal where the district court denied the

2 Cf. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that if the “dismissal operates on the merits of the complaint, it will also

ordinarily be entered with prejudice”).

3 Mr. Arrington has waived further review of all issues as to which no specific

objection is made. See United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060–61 (10th Cir.

1996).

petition on the merits). Here, Mr. Arrington appears to dispute the length of his actual

parole violator term, rather than the BOP’s application of the D.C.’s policy to that term.

Upon de novo consideration of the issues, the Court concludes that the United

States Parole Commission (“Parole Commission”) revoked Mr. Arrington’s parole in a

decision dated March 6, 2019, and Mr. Arrington was not given any credit for time spent

on parole. [Doc. Nos. 13-1 at 42–43 and 17-1 at 1]. Additionally, the Parole Commission

continued Mr. Arrington’s incarceration “to the expiration of [his] sentence.” See id. The

National Appeals Board affirmed the Parole Commission’s decision on June 11, 2019.

[Doc. No. 13-1 at 50]. Mr. Arrington’s parole violator sentence was the 6,733 days he

had remaining when he was released on parole on July 13, 1998. [Doc. No. 13-1 at 1, 7,

20]. He was granted 88 days of credit for time served in jail between the end of his

federal sentence and the execution of the parole violator warrant on August 21, 2018.

[Doc. Nos. 1-1 at 8–9 and 13-1 at 27–28]. As a D.C. offender, Mr. Arrington earned 10

days per month in statutory good time credit, and the BOP applied 2,211 in statutory

good time credit toward his parole violator sentence, which accelerated his presumptive

release date to October 10, 2030, instead of October 29, 2036. [Doc. Nos. 1-1 at 8–9 and

13-1 at 67–68, 70]. The policy clearly states that statutory good time credit “to be

awarded is based on the length of the [parole violator] term rather than on the length of

the sentence from which paroled . . . .” [Doc. No. 13-1 at 70].

The BOP properly applied Mr. Arrington’s good time credits to his parole violator

term in accordance with the D.C. offender policy, and the Court cannot add further

meaningful analysis to that already set forth by Judge Mitchell on this issue.

Additionally, the Court concurs with Judge Mitchell that the Warden of FCI El Reno

should be substituted as Respondent. The United States Supreme Court has directed that

§ 2241 petitions should name the warden and that the district court in the place of

confinement has jurisdiction. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). BOP’s

website shows Mr. Arrington currently incarcerated at FCI El Reno with an anticipated

release date of October 10, 2029; thus, this Court has jurisdiction.

III. APPEALABILITY

The Tenth Circuit has held that a prisoner sentenced by the D.C. Superior Court,

but housed in a federal penal institution at the time of filing a § 2241 petition challenging

the BOP’s computation of a term of imprisonment, must obtain a COA to pursue a

§ 2241 challenge to the Tenth Circuit. See Smith v. Oliver, 615 F. App’x 905, 906 (10th

Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1241–42 (10th Cir.

2015)). A COA may issue only if Mr. Arrington “has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

To satisfy this required showing, Mr. Arrington “must demonstrate that reasonable

jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Smith, 615 F. App’x at 908 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Upon consideration, the Court finds

this standard is not met. Cf. Smith, 615 F. App’x at 909 (concluding that the petitioner

could not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right where there

was no error in the BOP’s calculation of the petitioner’s sentence).

Based on the Court’s analysis and its adoption of the R. & R., Mr. Arrington

cannot make the proper showing, and the Court therefore declines to issue a COA.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having carefully and thoroughly considered this matter under the de novo

framework for the objections raised, and for the reasons discussed above, the Court:

(1) ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation issued by United States Magistrate

Judge Suzanne Mitchell [Doc. No. 19], which results in the denial of Mr.

Arrington’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

[Doc. No. 1] and a dismissal with prejudice;

(2) GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Respondent Bureau of Prisons’

Response or Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28

U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 13];

(3) DECLINES to issue a COA;

(4) DENIES Mr. Arrington’s Writ of Mandamus [Doc. No. 22], in which Mr.

Arrington asks the Court to transfer his case to the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, because

jurisdiction is proper before this Court; and

(5) SUBSTITUTES the Warden of FCI El Reno as Respondent in this action and

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to update Respondent on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of September 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE