Opinion

Roper v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections

Court
District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Aug 19, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.8%

“Eleventh 1 Section 1983 is the remedial vehicle which allows litigants to seek redress for constitutional violations perpetrated by persons acting under color of state law. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1162 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016

How later courts described this case

  • “Eleventh 1 Section 1983 is the remedial vehicle which allows litigants to seek redress for constitutional violations perpetrated by persons acting under color of state law. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1162 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016
  • cautioning district courts to limit sua sponte dismissals to those cases “when it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile” (quotation omitted)
  • concluding Heck barred plaintiff’s § 1983 overdetention claim

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ANTONIO GARCIA ROPER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-685-SLP

)

OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a Complaint [Doc. No. 1] against the Oklahoma

Department of Corrections. Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to screening pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court may sua sponte dismiss all or part of a case if a pro se

plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).

“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it

is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile

to give him an opportunity to amend.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001)). In reviewing the

Complaint, the Court accepts all factual allegations as true and draws all inferences in

Plaintiff’s favor. See id. While “a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally

and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, . . . . the

court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing

arguments.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights

under the Constitution, as well as a violation of his due process rights under the Oklahoma

Constitution.1 Compl. [Doc. No. 1] at 3. Plaintiff claims he “was set to be released from

the Oklahoma Dept of Corrections on 11-25-22 but wasn’t released until 11-28-22.” Id.

Plaintiff seeks money damages to compensate for his alleged overdetention. It appears

that, at the relevant time, Plaintiff was serving a state prison sentence in connection with

his guilty plea to three counts of robbery with a firearm in Oklahoma County. See State v.

Roper, Case No. CF-2017-1901.2

The sole Defendant named in Plaintiff’s Complaint is the Oklahoma Department of

Corrections (“ODOC”). But the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against ODOC, which

is “an arm of the state . . . entitled to absolute immunity.” Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr. of

Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 632 (10th Cir. 1988). “The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh

Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal

court.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); see also

Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Eleventh

1 Section 1983 is the remedial vehicle which allows litigants to seek redress for constitutional

violations perpetrated by persons acting under color of state law. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d

1151, 1162 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016).

2 The Court takes judicial notice of the state-court docket. See Mitchell v. Dowling, 672 F. App’x

792, 794 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing cases).

Amendment immunity applies regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks declaratory or

injunctive relief, or money damages.”).

To be sure, an arm of the state may be liable to suit where the state has waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999), or if

Congress has abrogated it, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. But neither exception applies here.

See Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1(B) (“[I]t is not the intent of the state to waive any rights

under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); Quern v. Jordan, 440

U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (concluding Congress did not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against ODOC

are subject to dismissal.

But because it is not clear that leave to amend would be futile, the Court will permit

Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. “[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983

suit, the district court must” dismiss the complaint if “judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff

can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). And although “Heck does not apply when a plaintiff

has no available habeas remedy, [] the plaintiff must show that the lack of a habeas remedy

is ‘through no lack of diligence on his part.’” Kilman v. Williams, 831 F. App’x 396, 398

(10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1317 (10th Cir. 2010)).

There are no facts describing the nature and circumstances of Plaintiff’s sentence or

his alleged overdetention—e.g., whether Plaintiff is challenging the application of good-

time credits. Cf. Kailey v. Ritter, 500 F. App’x 766, 768 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding Heck

barred plaintiff’s § 1983 overdetention claim); Brown v. Cline, 319 F. App’x 704, 705 (10th

Cir. 2009) (same). Without further detail about the overdetention, the Court is hesitant to

conclude that amendment would be futile. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th

Cir. 1991) (cautioning district courts to limit sua sponte dismissals to those cases “when it

is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged, and allowing

him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile” (quotation omitted)).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] against ODOC is

DISMISSED without prejudice.°

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within

21 days of the date of this Order. If no amendment is timely filed, this action will be

dismissed for the reasons articulated above.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 19" day of August, 2024.

eZ. ko

SCOTT L. PALK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

> “Fleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional,” so dismissals on this basis should be without

prejudice. Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2017).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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