Johnson v. Harris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AMY NICOLE JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-23-513-SLP

)

JASON HARRIS, in his individual )

capacity, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

Before the Court is Defendant Leslie Shelton-Denley’s Motion to Dismiss and Brief

in Support [Doc. No. 13]. Plaintiff, Amy Johnson, has responded [Doc. No. 14], and Ms.

Shelton-Denley has replied [Doc. No. 15]. The matter is fully briefed and ready for

determination. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Ms. Johnson, appearing pro se, filed this action on June 9, 2023. Compl. [Doc. No.

1]. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she asserts two claims against all the Defendants in this

action: one for unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and another for

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1, 8-10. Defendants Jason

Harris and Nick Crauthers filed Answers, [Doc. Nos. 11, 12], and only Ms. Shelton-

Denley’s Motion is presently at issue. Ms. Shelton-Denley asserts she is entitled to

qualified immunity on Ms. Johnson’s claims against her. See Mot. [Doc. No. 13] at 7-8.

The Court agrees.

II. Governing Standard

A pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss

[under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. But “mere ‘labels and conclusions,’ and ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action’ will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual

allegations to support each claim.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210,

1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Generally, the sufficiency of

a complaint must rest on its contents alone.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th

Cir. 2010).

Where the Court reviews the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, it applies the same

legal standards, but liberally construes the complaint’s allegations. See Northington v.

Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). The Court cannot, however, “take on

the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and

searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th

Cir. 2005). And it is still true that “the court need accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-

pleaded factual contentions, not [her] conclusory allegations.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal

training to recount the facts surrounding [her] alleged injury, and [s]he must provide such

facts if the court is to determine whether [s]he makes out a claim on which relief can be

granted.” Id.

III. Factual Allegations of the Complaint1

Ms. Johnson’s contact with law enforcement occurred after she called 911 to report

that she found her father nonresponsive and potentially deceased inside an RV trailer where

he resided in Elk City, Oklahoma. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 13. Two paramedics arrived,

and Ms. Johnson directed them toward her father’s body. Id. ¶ 14. Ms. Johnson began

recording the interactions on her cell phone after potentially hearing one of the paramedics

snicker. Id.

Officers Crauthers and Harris arrived about five minutes later. Id. ¶ 15. They

approached Ms. Johnson near the RV and demanded that she leave the area. Id. Ms.

Johnson expressed her desire to remain with her father, and further stated she was recording

the interaction. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Officer Crauthers told Ms. Johnson to step aside, and then

assaulted Ms. Johnson while she was attempting to comply, slamming her face down into

the parking lot and causing significant injuries. Id. ¶ 26. Officer Crauthers then placed his

knee on Ms. Johnson’s neck, and a struggle ensued while he attempted to place her in

handcuffs. Id. Ms. Johnson exclaimed that she was in pain and that she could not breathe,

but Officer Crauthers continued to press upon her upper body to the point that she began

to lose consciousness. Id.

1 The Court views the factual allegations of the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

as the non-moving party. Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018).

Officer Harris approached to assist and placed Ms. Johnson in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 16.

The officers placed Ms. Johnson in the back of a police car, where she remained for

approximately three and a half hours. Id. ¶ 17. During that time, she was able to see her

father’s dead body and was denied any water, food, and the ability to use the restroom. Id.

¶ 17.

After that, the officers took Ms. Johnson to the Elk City Police Department. Id. ¶

18. There, Ms. Shelton-Denley and Officer Harris began the booking process. Id. Ms.

Shelton-Denley told Ms. Johnson to remove her jewelry, then took mugshots and began

gathering fingerprints. Id. ¶ 19. Ms. Johnson’s family members arrived and demanded

that Officer Harris and Ms. Shelton-Denley release her because she had not committed a

crime. Id. Officer Harris and Ms. Shelton-Denley refused to release her. Id.

Ms. Johnson’s family members then told Officer Harris and Ms. Shelton-Denley

that they would initiate legal action if the department continued its refusal to release Ms.

Johnson. Id. Ms. Shelton-Denley called an “unknown supervisor.” Id. ¶ 20. After a short

conversation with that individual, Ms. Shelton-Denley confirmed Ms. Johnson should be

released. Id. Ms. Shelton-Denley and Officer Harris then returned Ms. Johnson’s

belongings and released her from custody. Id.

IV. Discussion

Although asserted at the end of Ms. Shelton-Denley’s Motion, qualified immunity

provides the governing framework for the Court’s analysis. See Hunt v. Montano, 39 F.4th

1270, 1284 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[w]hen a § 1983 defendant raises qualified immunity . . . the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish both prongs of the defense.”); see also Bledsoe v.

Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 606 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[w]here, as here, defendants moved for

dismissal of § 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity, there is ‘a

presumption that the defendant is immune from suit.’” (citation omitted)).

“When a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the court must dismiss the

action unless the plaintiff shows that (1) the defendant violated a statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Mayfield v.

Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016). At this stage, a plaintiff “must allege

sufficient facts that show—when taken as true—the defendant plausibly violated [her]

constitutional rights, which were clearly established at the time of violation.” Hernandez

v. Ridley, 734 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

As to the second prong, Ms. Johnson must identify “clearly established” law that

would have notified Ms. Shelton-Denley her actions were unlawful. See Washington v.

Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 847 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.3 (10th Cir. 2017). Ms. Johnson

may show the law to be “clearly established” by citing an on-point Supreme Court or Tenth

Circuit decision, or by showing “the clearly established weight of authority from other

courts . . . have found the law to be” as she maintains. Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162,

1168 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An on-point

decision means the precedent is “particularized to the facts”—that it “involves materially

similar facts” to the case at hand. Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071, 1076 (10th Cir.

2017); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (“The dispositive question is

whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In other words, on-point

precedent cannot define a right at “a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 742 (2011). There does not have to be “a case directly on point, but existing

precedent [nonetheless] must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1014 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

427 (2021) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).

A. Unlawful Seizure

Ms. Johnson contends Ms. Shelton-Denley may be held liable for a Fourth

Amendment violation based on a failure to intervene in the unlawful arrest made by

Officers Harris and Crauthers. 2 Resp. [Doc. No. 14] at 2-6. As set forth below, however,

Ms. Johnson has not met her burden to show Ms. Shelton-Denley violated clearly

established law. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1202 n.3.

Ms. Johnson’s argument is based on a block quote from the Tenth Circuit’s

discussion in Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 616-17 (10th Cir. 2022). There, the court

recognized:

[A]ll law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to

protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law

enforcement officers in their presence . . . A plaintiff states a constitutional

violation in the form of failure to intervene by alleging that 1) a government

officer violated his constitutional rights, 2) a different government actor (the

defendant) observed or had reasons to know about that constitutional

violation, and 3) the defendant had a realistic opportunity to intervene, but

failed to do so.

2 Ms. Johnson relatedly claims Ms. Shelton-Denley “failed to report” the constitutional violations,

but she cites no authority and wholly fails to develop this argument. Id. All the cases she cites

relate to duty to intervene, and the Court cannot construct or further develop this argument for her.

Id. at 616 (citations omitted). The court held “a failure-to-intervene claim is not limited to

excessive force claims, but can involve other underlying constitutional violations.” Id. at

617 (finding failure to intervene could apply to claims for alleged fabrication of evidence,

suppression of exculpatory evidence, and for malicious arrest, prosecution, and conviction

without probable cause). The court cited a prior unpublished decision where it recognized

a failure to intervene claim in the context of an unlawful seizure. Id. at 616 (citing Reid v.

Wren, Nos. 94-7122, 94-7123, 94-7124, 1995 WL 339401, at *1–2 (10th Cir. 1995)).

Ms. Johnson’s argument, liberally construed, is insufficient to meet her burden.

Bledsoe was decided on November 15, 2022, which is after the events at issue allegedly

took place on either November 5, 2021 or November 5, 2022.3 Accordingly, Bledsoe is

not clearly established authority that would have been available to guide Ms. Shelton-

Denley’s actions. Swanson v. Town of Mountain View, Colo., 577 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th

Cir. 2009) (“Because the law must be clearly established at the time of the incident, cases

published before the incident govern our analysis.”).

Even if the events at issue occurred after November 15, 2022, Ms. Johnson relies

on a “general statement of the law” which is “not sufficient to show that the law was clearly

established.” Est. of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 761 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme

Court has ‘repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high level of

generality since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably

3 The Complaint first states the events at issue occurred on November 5, 2021, but then states they

occurred on November 5, 2022. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 13, 23. Either way, pertinent events occurred

before Bledsoe was published.

in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.’” (citations omitted)).4

Liberally construing Ms. Johnson’s argument, the Court finds the same is true for

her reference to Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 360 (8th Cir. 2012), found in her quote

from Bledsoe. Resp. [Doc. No. 14] at 3. There, the Eighth Circuit noted four other Circuits

“have recognized the duty to intervene outside of the excessive force context,” while the

Eleventh Circuit declined to do so. Id. at 360. This is a general statement of law, untethered

to the legal claim or facts at issue here, and is therefore insufficient. Gillen, 761 F.3d at

1106. Additionally, the court held that the duty to intervene outside the excessive force

context was not clearly established where “the federal circuits disagree” on the topic.

Livers, 700 F.3d at 360. As such, the reference to Livers does not advance Ms. Johnson’s

argument in this case.5

Finally, although only incidentally referenced by Ms. Johnson, the Court notes her

citation to Reid v. Wren fares no better. See Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1305 n. 10 (10th

Cir. 2009) (“In determining whether the law was clearly established, we have held that we

may not rely upon unpublished decisions.”); Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th

Cir. 2007) (“An unpublished opinion, . . . even if the facts were closer, provides little

4 Moreover, the facts of Bledsoe are in no way “materially similar.” Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1076.

It involved allegations of a truly extraordinary plot by the family of the plaintiff, an attorney, and

multiple law enforcement officers to frame the plaintiff for the murder of his sister-in-law, all to

avoid the conviction of the plaintiff’s brother, who actually committed the murder. Bledsoe, 53

F.3d at 595-601. None of the allegations against any defendant in Bledsoe relate to an individual

who merely booked the plaintiff in jail after an unlawful arrest where the subject defendant was

not present. See id.

5 As with Bledsoe, Livers involved unique facts unlike anything alleged here: the subject arrests

were allegedly without probable cause because they were based on a “fundamentally flawed”

polygraph examination and a coerced confession. See id. at 357-58.

support for the notion that the law is clearly established.”).6 Accordingly, Ms. Johnson’s

Fourth Amendment claim against Ms. Shelton-Denley is barred by qualified immunity.7

B. Excessive Force

The Court finds Ms. Johnson did not assert a claim for excessive force against Ms.

Shelton-Denley in the first place: she specifically states that claim is based on “officers on

the scene us[ing] excessive and unreasonable force”, but nothing in any of her factual

allegations suggests Ms. Shelton-Denley is a police officer, that she was “on the scene,” or

that she used any measure of force at any time. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 13-20, 30.

Accordingly, Ms. Johnson failed to state a claim for excessive force against Ms. Shelton-

Denley.8

6 In any event, Reid provides no meaningful comparison from a factual standpoint: the subject of

the unlawful seizure claim was a horse the plaintiff owned, rather than an unlawful arrest of a

person, and the officers against whom the failure to intervene claim was asserted were actually

present at the scene when the seizure occurred. 1995 WL 339401 at *1-2.

7 As a final matter, Ms. Johnson asserts that the officers failed to read her Miranda rights—but the

connection between that allegation and her claim against Ms. Shelton-Denley for failure to

intervene in an unlawful seizure is entirely unclear. See Resp. [Doc. No. 14] at 5. Ms. Johnson

does not assert a due process claim, and she includes no allegations regarding any self-

incriminating statements, let alone their use in criminal proceedings. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶

16-30. Accordingly, this reference to Miranda does not advance her cause as to the Fourth

Amendment claim, nor does it otherwise support a cause of action under § 1983. See Chavez v.

Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (holding a § 1983 claim alleging compelled self-incrimination

failed where the plaintiff “was never charged with a crime, and his answers were never used against

him in any criminal prosecution.”).

8 Where a plaintiff sues multiple defendants, the complaint should “explain what each defendant

did to the plaintiff; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s actions harmed him or her; and,

what specific right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown

B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe Cnty. Just. Ctr., 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). In § 1983

actions, “it is particularly important” that the plaintiff “make clear exactly who is alleged to have

done what to whom, . . . as distinguished from collective allegations. . .” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC

v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In her Response, Ms. Johnson suggests she did intend to assert such a claim, arguing

Ms. Shelton-Denley had a duty to intervene because she: (1) saw Ms. Johnson’s injuries

when she arrived at the police department; and (2) knew about the excessive force taking

place because she was a dispatcher on duty when the events took place. [Doc. No. 14] at

4. But none of these factual allegations are included in the Complaint, and nothing about

the Complaint suggests she did intend to assert such a claim. See Gee, 627 F.3d at 1186

(“[T]he sufficiency of a complaint must rest on its contents alone.’’).

Even if these facts were properly alleged, they would only satisfy the knowledge

component of the duty to intervene analysis set forth in Bledsoe, 53 F.4th at 616. Ms.

Johnson’s claim still fails because it is clear from her allegations that Ms. Shelton-Denley

was not at the scene where the excessive force took place, therefore she did not have “a

realistic opportunity to intervene[.]” See id.; see also Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 576

(10th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Ms. Johnson has failed to assert a claim for excessive force

against Ms. Shelton-Denley.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Leslie Shelton-Denley’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. No. 13] is GRANTED. Plaintiff Amy Johnson’s claims against Ms.

Shelton-Denley are DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7" day of August, 2024.

hav bib

SCOTT L. PALK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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