The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
NICK SHAFFER and CHARLA SHAFFER, )
Individually, and NICK AND CHARLA )
SHAFFER, as Parents and Next Friends of )
HOPE SHAFFER, Deceased, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 5:22-cv-00151-R
)
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
In this products liability case arising under Oklahoma law, Plaintiffs allege that a
defective front seatback in a 2020 Toyota Corolla collapsed during a rear-end collision and
resulted in the death of the back seat passenger. Defendants deny the seat is defective and
allege as an affirmative defense that the product meets all applicable federal safety
standards. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel Discovery [Doc.
No. 97] seeking responses to various discovery requests aimed at the lobbying efforts
undertaken by Defendant Toyota Motor North America, Inc. (“TMNA”). Defendant
TMNA responded in opposition [Doc. No. 100] that it already responded to some of the
requests and the remaining requests are irrelevant. Because the requests at issue seek
information that does not appear to have any bearing on the claims or defenses in this
action, the motion is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that:
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information,
the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,
and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
The scope of discovery under this rule is broad but it “is not without limits and the trial
court is given wide discretion in balancing the needs and rights of both plaintiff and
defendant.” Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation omitted). When the relevance of a particular discovery request “is not readily
apparent, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevance of the
information requested.” Barton v. Tomacek, No. 11-CV-0619-CVE-TLW, 2012 WL
4735927, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2012). Conversely, when the discovery request appears
relevant, the party resisting the request has the burden of showing that the request falls
outside the scope of permissible discovery. Id. Having considered the parties submissions
under these standards, the Court that Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied.
The primary dispute between the parties concerns several discovery requests that
seek information about Defendants’ lobbying efforts, regardless of whether the lobbying is
related to seats or seat back strength. The following requests are included in this category:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state the full name, address, title, and
position of any lobbyist, lobbying organization, and/or lobbying group that
has been retained, worked, paid, and/or lobbied on behalf of Toyota
Defendants with the United States Government from 2000 to 2020.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce any and all
correspondence, invoices, receipts, letters, e-mails, documents, attachments,
and materials of Defendant TMNA related to lobbying with United States
Senate, United States House of Representatives, the Executive Branch, the
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Transportation Safety Board,
Department of Justice, and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Please produce any and all
documents, materials, invoices, and information related to how much Toyota
has spent on lobbying with the United States Federal Government from 2000
to 2020, including a breakdown of the total amount of money spent and how
much was spent each year.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce any and all
documents, materials, correspondence, letters, e-mails, invoices, and
information between Toyota and its registered, hired, and/or contracted
lobbyists to lobby with the United States Federal Government from how from
2000 to 2020.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Please produce any and all
documents, materials, correspondence, letters, e-mails, invoices, and
information related to Toyota and lobbyists with United States Federal
Government regarding lobbying efforts from 2000 to 2020 about United
States Government's inquiry into safety problems, Toyota stalling inquiries
into safety recalls and various other investigations the United States Federal
Government conducted.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Please produce any and all
documents, materials, and information identifying the number of employees
of Toyota that previously worked with National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration, and/or US Department of Transportation.
See Pls.’ Ex. 10.
Plaintiffs argue that the information sought by these requests is relevant to TMNA’s
affirmative defense that it complied with federal safety standards. The defense is set forth
in Okla. Stat. tit. 76, § 57.2(A), which provides that there is a presumption in a products
liability action that a manufacturer is not liable if the product complied with mandatory
safety standards required by the federal government. However, the presumption can be
rebutted if the plaintiff can show either of the following:
1. The mandatory federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the
product and asserted by the defendant as its basis for rebuttable presumption
were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or
damage; or
2. The manufacturer, before or after marketing the product, withheld or
misrepresented information or material relevant to the federal government's
or agency’s determination of adequacy of the safety standards or regulations
at issue in the action.
Id. at § 57.2(B) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are overly broad in that
they seek lobbying information that goes well beyond the “regulations applicable to the
product” or the safety standards “at issue in the action.” Id. As TMNA notes, information
about Toyota’s lobbying efforts in connection with, for example, emission standards has
no bearing on whether Toyota withheld or misrepresented information relevant to the
safety standards that are at issue in this action.
Perhaps aware of this shortcoming, Plaintiffs argue that these requests are relevant
because they show the purpose and character of the actions of the corporation, and more
specifically that Toyota promoted itself as having a robust safety culture while behind the
scenes it was involved in a scandal related to a safety issue that resulted in a deferred
prosecution agreement with the federal government. However, the safety issue at the root
of the deferred prosecution agreement concerned problems with unintended accelerations
and is unrelated to the safety standards at issue in this action. See Murphy v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 2022 WL 18776149, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 2022) (concluding “that evidence
regarding the DPA is neither relevant nor admissible” because the vehicle involved in the
litigation “was not one of the vehicles involved in the DPA”). Further, the case law
Plaintiffs cite in support of their contention that evidence of a corporation’s “purpose and
character” is discoverable comes from a footnote in United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 n.3 (1965), stating that evidence of lobbying efforts may
be admissible in an antitrust lawsuit “to show the purpose and character of the particular
transactions under scrutiny.” This is a products liability case, not an antitrust case. While
there may be some instances where information concerning a company’s general lobbying
efforts are relevant to issues in a products liability case, Plaintiffs have not persuasively
explained how unrelated lobbying efforts have any bearing on the claims and defenses
involved in this action, which concern an alleged design defect and the adequacy of specific
federal safety standards.
Plaintiffs additionally argue that this information is discoverable because Toyota’s
massive lobbying efforts compromise the NHTSA’s ability to regulate the auto industry,
causing the federal safety standards to remain low and thereby making it easier for Toyota
to prove its affirmative defense. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs rely on Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Reavis, 627 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. App. 2021), a products liability
case that, like here, involved an alleged defect with the seat in a Toyota vehicle. In Reavis,
the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of Toyota’s extensive lobbying efforts for the purpose of showing that the
NHTSA was not an effective regulator and the federal standards were not adequate. Id. at
743. Plaintiffs fail to point out, however, that the appellate court’s judgment was vacated
by the Texas Supreme Court after the parties settled the case during the appeal. See
TMNA’s Ex. 4. In any event, the Court does not find the majority’s reasoning in Reavis
persuasive. Plaintiffs’ discovery requests seek information that is totally unrelated to the
design defect or safety standards at issue in this case and the requests therefore go beyond
the scope of permissible discovery. See Reavis, 627 S.W.3d at 776 (Schenck, J. dissenting)
(explaining that “such evidence served little or no purpose relative to the merits of any
issue’’).
The remaining discovery requests that are at issue identify a specific safety standard
or are more specifically addressed to seeking information related to seats. In its response
brief, TMNA asserts that it already produced its communications with NHTSA that govern
seats and the involved safety standards. TMNA further asserts that it does not communicate
with the federal government through lobbyists about seat backs or seat back strength.
Plaintiffs did not file a reply brief challenging these statements. Given TMNA’s
representations and the Court’s finding that lobbying information unrelated to seats, seat
back strength, or the related safety standards is outside the scope of permissible discovery,
it is not apparent what further information Plaintiffs seek to compel. To the extent there are
additional items in dispute, Plaintiffs should confer with Defendants about these issues and,
if necessary, file a motion that identifies the specific discovery requests that are in dispute.
Accordingly, as outlined above, Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel Discovery
[Doc. No. 97] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6" day of August, 2024.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE