Opinion

Alexander v. Two Oaks Investments, LLC

Court
District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Aug 9, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.8%

finding triable issue of fact where plaintiff was unable to work more than 6-8 hours or lift heavy objects due to her high-risk pregnancy

How later courts described this case

  • finding triable issue of fact where plaintiff was unable to work more than 6-8 hours or lift heavy objects due to her high-risk pregnancy
  • “Title I of the ADA requires a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit”
  • noting the presumption against retroactive legislation
  • noting subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time prior to judgment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AMELIA ALEXANDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

TWO OAKS INVESTMENTS, LLC d.b.a. ) Case No. 23-cv-00406-SH

CONSOLIDATED BENEFITS )

RESOURCES (CBR) INC.; THE KEY )

GROUP, INC. d.b.a. KEY PERSONNEL )

DS; and DOES 1-25, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the partial motion to dismiss of Defendant The Key Group, Inc.

(“Key Group”).1 Key Group moves to dismiss (1) Plaintiff’s claims under the Pregnant

Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000gg–2000gg-6; (2) Plaintiff’s claims

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213;

and (3) Plaintiff’s “disability-related claims” under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination

Act (“OADA”), Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §§ 1101–1706.

Plaintiff agrees to the removal of her PWFA claims, as “the PWFA was enacted after

the incidents at issue occurred.” (ECF No. 45 at 2.2) Key Group’s motion will also be

granted as to the ADA and disability-related OADA claims, because Plaintiff has failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies.

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge for all purposes

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a). (ECF No. 32 at 5.)

2 References to page numbers refer to the ECF header.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Amelia Alexander (“Alexander”) asserts claims against Key Group and

Defendant Consolidated Benefits Resources, Inc. (“CBR”). The Court derives the

following factual allegations from the amended complaint (ECF No. 33) and assumes they

are true for purposes of this motion. As noted below (section I, infra), the Court also

considers the charge of discrimination filed by Alexander with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF No. 40-1).

In May 2021, CBR hired Alexander through Key Group, a temporary agency, to be

a receptionist. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.) While at CBR, Alexander worked an average of at least 35

hours a week on tasks such as “data entry, mail sorting, sending out mail and checks,

[and] managing email systems.” (Id. at 2.) Alexander always performed the essential

functions of her job and received no write-ups, negative performance evaluations, or crit-

icism. (Id. at 2 & ¶ 30.)

From the beginning of the hiring process, both Key Group and CBR were on notice

that Alexander “was carrying a high-risk pregnancy.” (Id. at 2.) Alexander “needed time

off on some days due to medical pre-natal care, and issues related to her high-risk

pregnancy.” (Id.) Alexander generally provided reasonable notice when she had appoint-

ments, and CBR gave her time off for “appointments ranging anywhere from 50 minutes

[to] 2½ hours once a week.” (Id. at 2–3.)

While Alexander was at CBR, her co-worker, Trena Jones (“Jones”), treated

“women in the office who were pregnant outside of wedlock differently with harassing

behavior, inappropriate comments, and lack of concern for their need to maternity and

medical accommodation, to impose her conservative, religious values against” them. (Id.

¶ 30.) “At least one other woman faced similar discrimination by Trena Jones for being

pregnant and unmarried, which ultimately led [to] that woman being separated from that

department.” (Id. ¶ 33.)

During the week of August 16, 2021, Alexander told Key Group and CBR she

needed “information on scheduling maternity and medical leave.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Key Group

told Alexander it would not be providing her with leave. (Id. ¶ 42.) At CBR, Jones told

Alexander to reach out to human resources (“HR”), but they were unresponsive. (Id.

¶ 43.)

On August 25, 2021, Alexander left work early for emergency fetal monitoring. (Id.

¶ 24.) Jones “continued to make disapproving comments” to Alexander and “showed

little sympathy” for her medical condition. (Id. ¶ 25.) At or near that same day, Alexander

“reached out regarding her needs for accommodation as she got closer to labor” and

“followed up with Key [Group] regarding medical leave again.” (Id. ¶¶ 36, 44.) Key Group

told Alexander to reach out to her supervisor at CBR, but Alexander received no response

from CBR when she did so. (Id. ¶ 44.)

That week, Alexander also reported Jones’ conduct to the Supervisor of Adjustors,

Heather Carr (“Carr”). (Id. ¶ 26.) Alexander told Carr she had not previously reported

Jones’ behavior “due to the possibility of retaliation.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 46.) As far as Alexander

is aware, Carr ignored her concerns and did not report Jones’ behavior to HR. (Id. ¶¶ 28,

46.) Alexander also raised similar concerns to a Key Group employee, who ignored or

denied her claims without explanation. (Id. ¶ 37; see also id. ¶ 19 (alleging Bailey Miller

worked for Key Group).)

On August 31, 2021, Alexander was off work after exposure to COVID-19. (Id.

¶¶ 47–48.) Alexander told Jones that she had been exposed and needed to quarantine

until she could confirm she had not contracted the virus. (Id. ¶ 50.) Alexander then tested

negative for COVID, but her doctor said she needed to test again due to her symptoms.

(Id. ¶ 51.) Alexander told Jones about her doctor’s advice. (Id.) That same day, Key

Group informed Alexander she was being let go, and CBR terminated her employment.

(Id. ¶¶ 20, 29, 47, 54.) Defendants said “attendance issues” were the reason for her

termination. (Id. at ¶ 55.) Alexander only had two unplanned absences during her time

with CBR—one being when she “had to miss work for emergency” fetal monitoring and

the other being the “day following her COVID-19 exposure.” (Id. ¶ 56.)

Alexander filed a charge of employment discrimination against Key Group with the

EEOC on May 10, 2022. (Id. ¶ 15; ECF No. 40-1.) The form had a box for “DISCRIMINATION

BASED ON,” in which Alexander selected: “Sex.” (ECF No. 40-1 at 1.) When asked what

“THE PARTICULARS ARE” of her claim, Alexander restated many of the facts above and

concluded,

I believe I was terminated because of my pregnancy, as all of my appoint-

ments were approved. Outside of my approved appointments I had notified

Ms. Trena [Jones] and when I would need to miss work which was during

the week I was discharged as I was being tested for covid and also the week

prior when I had left work for emergency fetal monitoring all of which I was

told was okay. . . . I believe that I have been discriminated against because

of my sex, Female, and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

(Id. at 1–2.) Alexander received her right to sue letter on June 20, 2023. (ECF No. 33

¶ 16.)

Procedural Background

Alexander brought the current lawsuit on September 18, 2023. (ECF No. 2.) She

described her claims as pregnancy, gender, and religious discrimination; retaliation for

reporting gender discrimination and harassment; breach of duty to investigate and pre-

vent gender discrimination and retaliation; and wrongful termination. (ECF No. 2 at 1 &

¶¶ 15–53.) Alexander alleged three “causes of action”—(1) employment discrimination

“based on pregnancy, sex, gender, disability, and religious beliefs” in violation of the

OADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–

2000e-17; (2) retaliation for participation in protected activities in violation of Title VII

and the OADA; and (3) “wrongful termination in violation of public policies” under the

OADA. (Id. ¶¶ 54–88.) Both CBR and Key Group filed answers to the original complaint.

(ECF Nos. 11, 22.)

Alexander then amended her complaint. (ECF No. 33.) In the amended complaint,

Alexander largely restates the factual allegations undergirding her three original “causes

of action.” (Id. at 2–18.) However, Alexander now alleges that (1) the employment dis-

crimination violated the PWFA; and (2) the retaliation violated the PWFA. (Id. at 12 &

¶ 62; id. at 15 & ¶ 81.) Further, Alexander has added a fourth “cause of action” for

disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA and OADA. (Id.

¶¶ 97–106.)

Key Group moves to dismiss the PWFA claims and the entirety of the fourth “cause

of action.” (ECF No. 40 at 1.) Key Group argues Alexander (1) cannot bring claims under

the PWFA—as the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred before its enactment; (2) has

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the ADA and disability-

related OADA claims; (3) has failed to bring her ADA and disability-related OADA claims

in a timely manner; and (4) has failed to plead plausible facts to support her ADA and

disability-related OADA claims. (Id. at 5–13.) The Court finds Key Group is entitled to

dismissal on the first two grounds and does not reach its other arguments.

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

Most of Key Group’s arguments fall under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as they assert

Alexander has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See ECF No. 40

at 5–11.) See also Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1185 (10th Cir. 2018)

(overruling prior Tenth Circuit precedent and holding that failure to exhaust does not

deprive the court of jurisdiction over a claim).

However, Key Group’s arguments as to the OADA go to jurisdiction and are

properly heard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1350(B) (requiring

the filing of a timely charge before an employee may “have standing in a court of law to

allege discrimination”); see also Johnson v. Spirit Aerosys., Inc., No. 20-CV-00138-GKF-

CDL, 2021 WL 6066701, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2021) (noting the long-established

doctrine in Oklahoma that exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite); Moler v. Enbridge

Emp. Servs., Inc., No. CIV-20-00515-PRW, 2022 WL 331014, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 3,

2022) (“By statutory amendments in 2011, the Oklahoma Legislature unequivocally

imposed an administrative filing requirement in jurisdictional terms”).

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

A 12(b)(6) motion argues that a plaintiff has failed “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive such a motion, “a plaintiff must

plead sufficient factual allegations ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim is facially

plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). All such reasonable inferences are resolved

in the plaintiff’s favor. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in

fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations and footnotes omitted). A motion to

dismiss is properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and

conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation” of the elements. Id. at 555.

When assessing the allegations in a complaint, the Court looks not only to the com-

plaint itself; it may also “consider documents attached to or referenced in the complaint

if they ‘are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’

authenticity.’” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co.,

287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002)). Here, the Court considers Plaintiff’s EEOC charge

of discrimination (ECF No. 40-1) in ruling on Key Group’s motion. Plaintiff references

the charge in her amended complaint (ECF No. 33 at 5); it is central to her claim (see

section III(B), infra); and no party disputes its authenticity. See also Mobley v. Dillon

Cos., 153 F.3d 727 (table), 1998 WL 314589, at *1 (10th Cir. May 29, 1998) (unpublished)

(finding court properly considered EEOC charge in ruling on 12(b)(6) motion).3

The Court does not, however, consider the additional documents attached to

Plaintiff’s response, which appear to be statements of position and responses submitted

to the EEOC by Alexander, Key Group, and CBR. (ECF Nos. 45-1–45-4.) The Tenth

Circuit has “consistently held, time and again, that the reasonable and likely scope of the

investigation is determined by the allegations contained in the Charge itself, rather than

3 Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but they may be cited for their persuasive

value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

the Charge and any responsive documents.” Smith v. Cheyenne Ret. Invs. L.P., 904 F.3d

1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2018). As a result, the court has rejected the argument that facts

raised in a response to a position statement can put the defendant “on notice” of a theory

later alleged in the complaint. Delsa Brooke Sanderson v. Wyoming Highway Patrol,

976 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2020) (“to determine the claim before the EEOC, one looks

only to the Charge itself”).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion typically takes one of two forms. “The moving party may

(1) facially attack the complaint’s allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdic-

tion, or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to

challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Maestas v.

Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003). In a facial attack, the Court accepts the

allegations in the complaint as true, United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195,

1203 (10th Cir. 2001), and applies the same standards as are applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1

(10th Cir. 2010). In a factual attack, the Court does not presume the allegations are true

but, instead, has wide discretion to consider other evidence. Rodriquez-Aguirre, 264

F.3d at 1203.

Key Group characterizes its motion as a factual attack. (ECF No. 40 at 12 n.3.)

However, the only document Key Group asks the Court to consider is the charge of dis-

crimination. (ECF No. 40-1.) As noted above, this document is properly considered as

part of the allegations of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which means it is also

properly considered as part of a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1). Muscogee (Creek)

Nation, 611 F.3d at 1227 n.1. The Court, therefore, construes Key Group’s motion as a

facial attack. See Moreno v. Kan. City Steak Co., No. 17-CV-02029-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL

2985748, at *5 (D. Kan. July 13, 2017) (finding jurisdictional challenge based on

document attached to complaint to be “facial attack”); see also Glenwood Springs

Citizens’ All. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 639 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 n.6 (D. Colo. 2022)

(noting, even when construing 12(b)(1) motion as facial attack, the court may consider

documents attached to or referenced in the complaint); Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v.

Whisenant, No. CV 19-1024 KG/KK, 2020 WL 5366810, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 8, 2020)

(noting consideration of documents attached to or referenced in a complaint generally

does not convert a facial attack into a factual one).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims under the PWFA

Plaintiff concedes that dismissal of her PWFA claims is appropriate (ECF No. 45 at

2), and the Court agrees. Plaintiff was terminated from her employment on August 31,

2021. (E.g., ECF No. 33 ¶ 29.) The PWFA was enacted on December 29, 2022, and

explicitly stated that it would take effect 180 days after its enactment. Consolidated Ap-

propriations Act, Pub. L. 117-328, div. II, § 109, 136 Stat. 4459, 6089 (2022); see also

Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 266 (2012) (noting the presumption against retroactive

legislation). Plaintiff’s PWFA claims will be dismissed.

III. Plaintiff’s Claims under the ADA and OADA (Disability)

A. Key Group Did Not Waive Its Dismissal Arguments

Plaintiff argues Key Group cannot file a motion to dismiss her amended complaint

because it answered her original complaint. (ECF No. 45 at 8.) Plaintiff is wrong.

Rule 12 allows a party to file a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim so long as the motion is “made before pleading if

a responsive pleading is allowed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Here, Plaintiff filed her amended

complaint on February 20, 2024 (ECF No. 33), superseding and rendering her original

complaint without legal effect. Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007).

Once a party is allowed to amend its pleadings, “the opposing party’s right to interpose a

Rule 12(b) motion is extended or revived accordingly.” 5C Benjamin Spencer, Fed. Prac.

& Proc. (Wright & Miller) § 1361 (3d ed.). In any event, neither failure to state a claim nor

subject-matter jurisdiction is waived by failing to include it in a responsive pleading or

Rule 12(b) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) & (h); see also City of Albuquerque v. Soto

Enterprises, Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting subject-matter

jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time prior to judgment).

Plaintiff’s citation to Lincoln for her argument is misplaced. Lincoln stands for the

proposition that “a plaintiff’s failure to file an EEOC charge . . . merely permits the

employer to raise an affirmative defense of failure to exhaust but does not bar a federal

court from assuming jurisdiction over a claim.” 900 F.3d at 1185; see also Gad v. Kan.

State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1041 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting certain Title VII exhaustion

requirements are conditions precedent for which the plaintiff has a burden and are not,

therefore, affirmative defenses “in the classical sense”). Lincoln also remanded for the

district court to consider whether to enforce a defendant’s stipulation that exhaustion had

occurred. Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1186-88. Lincoln does nothing to bar a defendant from

raising affirmative defenses or conditions precedent in a timely Rule 12(b) motion.4

The Court, therefore, turns to the merits of Key Group’s exhaustion arguments.

4 In any event, Key Group pled failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction in response to Alexander’s original complaint. (ECF No. 11 at

11.)

B. Exhaustion of ADA and OADA Claims

Generally, “Congress has directed the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement

powers, remedies, and procedures that are set forth in Title VII . . . when it is enforcing

the ADA’s prohibitions against employment discrimination on the basis of disability.”

E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).

Under Title VII, a plaintiff normally may not bring an action based upon claims that were

not part of a timely filed EEOC charge for which she has received a right-to-sue letter.

Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1181. The same requirement is found in the ADA. See Jones v.

U.P.S., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Title I of the ADA requires a plaintiff

to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit”), overruled on other grounds

by Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1185–86. The same requirement is also found in the OADA.5 See

Bergner v. Oklahoma, No. 21-CV-00232-GKF-CDL, 2022 WL 22246885, at *3 (N.D.

Okla. Feb. 10, 2022) (“[t]he OADA includes an administrative exhaustion requirement”

(citing Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1350(B))); see also Womack v. Mercy Hosp. Okla. City, Inc.,

No. CIV-19-683-R, 2020 WL 3513245, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 2020) (noting

claims alleging violations of Title I of the ADA and the OADA “are subject to the same

EEOC pre-suit requirements as claims alleging violations of Title VII.”)).

As the Tenth Circuit has summarized:

The exhaustion rule derives from two principal purposes: 1) to give notice

of the alleged violation to the charged party; and 2) to give the EEOC an

opportunity to conciliate the claim . . . . To advance these purposes, . . .

[the] plaintiff’s claim in court is generally limited by the scope of the admin-

istrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge

of discrimination submitted to the EEOC. While we liberally construe the

plaintiff’s allegations in the EEOC charge, the charge must contain facts

5 While exhaustion under the OADA is jurisdictional, this distinction is immaterial unless

the defendant has waived or forfeited the non-jurisdictional defense. Smith, 904 F.3d at

1164.

concerning the discriminatory and retaliatory actions underlying each

claim. The ultimate question is whether the conduct alleged in the lawsuit

would fall within the scope of an EEOC investigation which would reasona-

bly grow out of the charges actually made in the EEOC charge.

Smith, 904 F.3d at 1164–65 (cleaned up). To determine the scope of an EEOC charge, the

Court first looks to the label an employee gave her claim. “The failure to mark a particular

box [alleging discrimination] creates a presumption that the charging party is not

asserting claims represented by that box,” but the presumption may be rebutted “if the

text of the charge clearly sets forth the basis of the claim.” Jones, 502 F.3d at 1186.

C. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies for Her

ADA and Disability-Related OADA Claims

As noted above, Alexander marked only “Sex” in the box stating the basis of her

discrimination claim. (ECF No. 40-1 at 1.) As such, the undersigned will presume she

only asserted claims of discrimination on the basis of sex unless the text of her charge

clearly sets forth another basis. Jones, 502 F.3d at 1186. Upon review, the Court finds

the particulars of Plaintiff’s charge do not rebut this presumption.

1. Disability Discrimination under the ADA and OADA

Under the ADA, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual6 on the basis of disability” in the hiring or employment process. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1302(A)(1) (including disability as a basis for a

discriminatory employment practice). A “disability” is “(A) a physical or mental impair-

ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a

record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .”

6 A “qualified individual” is one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can

perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or

desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1301(4) (defining “individual with a

disability”). A “major life activity” includes “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,

learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(2)(A). It may also encompass “the operation of a major bodily function, including

. . . functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,

neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” Id.

§ 12102(2)(B).

In order to demonstrate that an employer has discriminated based on disability,

“an employee must show: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is

qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions

of the job held or desired; and (3) she was discriminated against because of her disability.”

Exby-Stolley v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 979 F.3d 784, 795 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal

quotations omitted).

2. Pregnancy-Related Disability

Here, Plaintiff appears to assert disability-related claims based on the existence of

her high-risk pregnancy. As Plaintiff acknowledges (ECF No. 45 at 4), pregnancy alone is

not a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Bank of Lab., No. 21-2316-JAR-KGG,

2022 WL 2072722, at *6 & n.29 (D. Kan. June 9, 2022) (collecting cases), aff’d, No. 22-

3127, 2023 WL 3590699 (10th Cir. May 23, 2023). Instead, the EEOC would look to

whether there was a pregnancy-related impairment that substantially limits a major life

activity.7 See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29

C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (“Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a

physiological disorder are also not impairments. However, a pregnancy-related

impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a disability under the first

prong of the definition.”).

3. Plaintiff’s Charge Does Not Include Disability

The text of Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination does not set forth any basis for a

disability-related claim (much less does it do so “clearly”). The most detail Plaintiff gives

about her pregnancy is classifying it as “high risk” and noting that she had “appointments”

that were “pre-approved.” (ECF No. 40-1 at 1.) She also notes that she once missed work

due to “emergency fetal monitoring,” which she “was told was ok.” (Id. at 2.) Other than

Jones’ comments about “being pregnant and not married,” nothing else pregnancy-

related is mentioned.

Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s EEOC charge contains no facts indicating she

suffered from a pregnancy-related impairment that limited a major life activity. Cf.

Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920-21 (N.D. Ill. 2013)

(finding triable issue of fact where plaintiff was unable to work more than 6-8 hours or

lift heavy objects due to her high-risk pregnancy). The EEOC would not be reasonably

expected to investigate disability-related discrimination on the basis of Plaintiff’s charge.

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the ADA or disability-

7 Examples given by the EEOC include “a diagnosis of cervical insufficiency” that requires

bed rest, or other impairments (like anemia, sciatica, nausea, abnormal heart rhythms,

swelling, or depression) that may “result in pregnancy-related limitations.” Enforcement

Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, § II(A), available at

https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-pregnancy-

discrimination-and-related-issues#IIA (last visited Aug. 9, 2024).

related claims under the OADA, and such claims will be dismissed. Because the time for

Plaintiff to file a charge under the ADA and OADA has long-since passed,* this dismissal

will be with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant The Key Group, Inc.’s Partial

Motion to Dismiss Certain of Plaintiffs Claims (ECF No. 40) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs

PWEA claims, ADA claims, and disability-related OADA claims against Defendant The

Key Group, Inc. d.b.a. Key Personnel DS, are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ORDERED this 9th day of August, 2024.

and ond TE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (noting the procedures set forth in § 2000e-5 apply to persons

alleging discrimination on the basis of disability); Id. § 2000e-5(e)() (a charge must be

filed within 180 or 300 days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred,

depending on whether the proceedings are initially instituted with a State or local

agency); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1350(B) (requiring a charge be filed within 180 days

from the last date of alleged discrimination).

15

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Alexander v. Two Oaks Investments, LLC | Frix