Bailey v. Ada, City of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHRISTY BAILEY, as Personal )

Representative of the Estate )

of Jeffrey Peterson, deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-20-327-JAR

)

CITY OF ADA; )

OFFICER MARCUS BEALE; )

OFFICER JUSSELY CANADA; )

OFFICER MICHAEL MEEKS; and )

OFFICER PHILLIP VOGT. )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Reconsider filed by

Defendant Marcus Beale (Docket Entry #121) and the Motion to Reconsider filed

by Defendant City of Ada (Docket Entry #122). On October 13, 2023, this Court

entered an Opinion and Order on the pending summary judgment motions filed in

this case. As a result of this Court’s rulings, summary judgment was granted on all

of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Officer Jussely Canada, Michael Meeks, and

Phillip Vogt. Additionally, summary judgment was granted on the claim against

Defendant City of Ada for the failure to train based in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Summary

City of Ada for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault

and battery, negligent hiring, training, and retention, and an Open Records Act

violation because of factual questions which remained on the actions of Defendant

Officer Marcus Beale. Summary judgment was also granted on the claim for

excessive force based in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Marcus Beale. The

remaining claims against Defendant Beale survived summary judgment for the

warrantless entry based in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the claims based in Oklahoma state

law for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and

battery, as questions of fact precluded a determination.

Through the pending motions to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e),

Defendants City of Ada and Officer Marcus Beale assert (1) a reasonable jury could

not conclude that Office Beale’s warrantless and possibly unjustified entry into

decedent Jeffrey Peterson’s (“Peterson”) apartment could not be the proximate cause

of his damages arising from his shooting death by Officer Beale; (2) Peterson’s

actions in fighting the officers when they entered his apartment constituted a

superseding cause of his damages over the warrantless entry by Officer Beale which

would preclude liability on both the constitutional claims and Oklahoma state law

claims asserted against by Officer Beale and the City of Ada; (3) the Open Records

Act claim against the City of Ada should be dismissed because it has produced

everything in its possession in response to the request for information provided by

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff first challenges whether the moving Defendants may rely upon Rule

59(e) to seek the relief requested. Rule 59(e) only applies only to final judgments.

Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2003).

An order denying summary judgment is generally not a final order. Bass v.

Richards, 308 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 2002). A court's decision that does not

adjudicate all the claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties is generally not

considered a final judgment; rather, such a judgment is generally considered

interlocutory and is subject to revision at any time. Raytheon, 368 F.3d at 1217;

Wagoner v. Wagoner, 938 F.2d 1120, 1122 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1991)(a motion for

reconsideration on a court's decision denying a motion for partial summary judgment

“was nothing more than an interlocutory motion invoking the district court's general

discretionary authority to review and revise interlocutory rulings prior to entry of

final judgment”).

If, however, a court denies summary judgment because of “purely legal

challenges to the denial” of qualified immunity, the determination is considered

“final” for appellate purposes. Bass, 308 F.3d at 1086. “When the defendants are

public officials asserting a qualified immunity defense and the appealed issue is

whether a given set of facts establishes that defendants violated clearly established

law,” the order denying summary judgment is final and the appellate court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.; See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

530 (1985)(“[A] district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent

that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”). If,

however, the court denied qualified immunity based on a purely factual question,

then appellate courts lack jurisdiction. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319–20

(1995)(holding that a defendant asserting a qualified immunity defense “may not

appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines

whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial”).

This Court denied Office Beale’s claim to qualified immunity based upon a

dispute in the facts which required the assessment and verdict of a jury as the trier

of fact. As a result, the Opinion and Order on qualified immunity is not final until

all claims and parties have been addressed. Moreover, the same Opinion and Order

which denied some of the claims brought against the City of Ada are not final.

Accordingly, Rule 59(e) is not the moving Defendants’ appropriate avenue for relief

under the circumstances presented.

This does not leave Defendants without relief. Rule 54(b) provides, in

pertinent part

. . . any order or other decision, however designated, that

adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and

liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the

action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised

at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all

the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

A court can alter its interlocutory orders even where the more stringent

requirements applicable to a motion to alter or amend a final judgment under Rule

59(e) or a motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) are not

satisfied. Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887

F.3d 1003, 1024 (10th Cir. 2018). While the standard is broad and entirely

discretionary on its face, the court may look to the standard used to review a motion

made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for guidance. As

recognized by the moving Defendants, these standards include: “(1) an intervening

change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the

need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of the Paraclete

v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).

The moving Defendants concentrate on the third basis - “preventing manifest

injustice.” “Although the Tenth Circuit has not specifically defined ‘manifest

injustice’ in the Rule 59(e) context, other courts have defined manifest injustice as

‘more than just a clear and certain prejudice to the moving party, but also a result

that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.’” Thymes v. Verizon

Wireless, Inc., 2016 WL 9777487, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 2016) (unpublished)

(quoting Smith v. Lynch, 115 F. Supp. 3d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2015); and In re Green

Goblin, Inc., 2012 WL 1971143, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 31, 2012) (unpublished)

(“In order for a court to reconsider a decision due to ‘manifest injustice,’ the record

presented must be so patently unfair and tainted that the error is manifestly clear to

all who view it.”)).

In this case, Officer Beale contends that Peterson’s actions represent a

superseding cause which he defines as “one that is not within the scope of the risk

created by the actor’s conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B (1965).

The City of Ada offers a similar argument in contending that it cannot be

demonstrated that Officer Beale’s actions were the proximate cause of Peterson’s

damages. The question then turns upon whether Peterson’s actions were

foreseeable to Officer Beale, thereby relieving him of a constitutional violation.

Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2006). While this issue was not

raised in the original summary judgment motion, this Court will consider it in order

to insure “manifest injustice” to Officer Beale does not occur in this case.

This Court determined that a factual dispute existed as to whether Officer

Beale had a right to make a warrantless entry into the apartment in stating

The fact remains that the disputed claim that Officer

Beale violated Peterson’s constitutional right to be free of

a warrantless search could be found to have lead to the

death of Peterson and the resulting damages. Such

disputes are in the exclusive province of the jury as

factfinder and not appropriately resolved on summary

judgment under the facts presented in this case.

Opinion and Order, Docket Entry No. 120 at

p. 25.

Foreseeability is the touchstone of any assertion of superseding cause.

Brown v. Montoya, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1300 (D.N.M. 2014) citing Miller v. Shell

Oil Co., 345 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1965). In this case, the evidence presented

on summary judgment indicated that Peterson “told officers that he was going to

treat [them] as intruders if [they] went into the residence”. A reasonable jury could

conclude that this statement created a reasonably foreseeable circumstance where if

Officer Beale made a warrantless and possibly constitutionally violative entry the

apartment, violence and injury was likely to occur. Again, as this Court stated in

the Opinion and Order on summary judgment, no emergent situation was present

unless the jury would conclude that Peterson caused an assault upon Officer Beale

by closing the door upon his arm. Therefore, the same reasonable jury could

conclude that Peterson’s actions did not constitute a superseding cause precluding

recovery for the damages he sustained in the entry and subsequent struggle. Again,

this Court concludes that a question of fact exists on several fronts which precluded

summary judgment on proximate cause and superseding cause as well as qualified

immunity. As a result, this Court declines to alter the Opinion and Order in any

respect on this issue.

The City of Ada also contends that the Open Records Act claim should be

denied, stating it turned over all the records it possessed in response to Plaintiff’s

request. As noted in the Opinion and Order, this claim was not addressed in the

City of Ada’s original summary judgment motion. Opinion and Order, Docket

Entry No. 120, p. 33. This Court declines to do this in the first instance on

reconsideration.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Motion to Reconsider filed by

Defendant Marcus Beale (Docket Entry #121) and the Motion to Reconsider filed

by Defendant City of Ada (Docket Entry #122) are hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of September, 2024.

___________________________________

JASON A. ROBERTSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE