“regardless of whether email notifications are received, parties continue to have a duty to monitor the court's docket.”
How later courts described this case
- “regardless of whether email notifications are received, parties continue to have a duty to monitor the court's docket.”
- holding county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued under Ohio law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
TRACIE M. HUNTER, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 1:21-cv-544
:
vs. : Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
:
HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S :
OFFICE, et al. :
:
Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Tracie M. Hunter (“Plaintiff” or “Hunter”), a former state Juvenile Court
judge for Hamilton County, Ohio, w ho is appearing in these proceedings, pro se or
representing herself, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related Ohio
state law against the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners1, the Hamilton County
Sheriff’s Office , and several of its employees John/Jane Doe Sheriff’s Deputies (together, the
“Sheriff’s Office”). This matter is before the Court on Sheriff’s Office’s Motion to Dismiss
(“Motion to Dismiss” or “Motion”) (Doc. 37), Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 43), the Sherriff
Office’s reply (Doc. 44), the Report and Recommendation issued by Chief Magistrate
Judge Litkovitz on January 8, 2024 (Doc. 45) (the “Report and Recommendation”), and
Plaintiff’s second Motion for Extension of Time to file Objections to the Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 48).
1 The Hamilton County Board of Commissioners was previously dismissed from this lawsuit. Doc. 49.
A. Background
As noted, Tracie Hunter is a former state Juvenile Court judge who after a historic
election sat in Cincinnati, Ohio. However, Hunter was later convicted in Ohio state court of
improperly using her elected office in connection with a public contract. Doc. 2, PageID 46.
This lawsuit arises from events that occurred during Hunter’s sentencing hearing and
subsequent incarceration related to that conviction. Plaintiff brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law claiming that the Sheriff’s Office engaged in negligent
hiring, training, supervision, and retention, and assault and battery.
The Sheriff’s Office asks this Court to dismiss the claims Hunter brought against them
on two bases. First, the Sheriff’s Office contends that Ohio law governs the limitations periods
for Plaintiff’s state and federal claims, and that those claims are therefore subjected to the
procedural rules related to those limitation period, including Rule 3(A) of the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure (“Ohio’s Commencement Rule”). Second, the Sheriff’s Office argues that it
should be dismissed as a defendant from these proceedings because it is not a legal entity
capable of being sued under Ohio law.
On January 8, 2024, Magistrate Judge Litkovitz issued a Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 45), which recommends that this Court grant in part and deny in part the Sheriff‘s
Office’s Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge recommends that (1) the
Motion be denied as to Plaintiff‘s § 1983 claims, which are not subject to Ohio’s
Commencement Rule; and that (2) the Motion be granted as to Plaintiff’s state-law claims,
which are time-barred; and (3) that Sheriff‘s Office be dismissed as a defendant because it is
not sui juris under Ohio law. See Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App’x 426, 435 (6th Cir.
2014) (holding county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued under Ohio
law).
The Report and Recommendation further advised the parties that failure to file specific
written objections within fourteen days could result in forfeiture of any rights they may
possess on appeal. Doc. 45. Plaintiff failed to timely file objections to the Report and
Recommendation. Eleven days after the objection deadline had passed, Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Leave to File (“Motion for Leave”), seeking a thirty-day extension of time to file
her objections. Doc. 46. In her Motion for Leave, Hunter indicated that she traveled abroad
two days after the Report and Recommendation was issued, and, despite returning to the
country one week before her objection was due, she failed to monitor the docket and did not
learn of the Report and Recommendation until February 1, 2024. Id. On March 27, 2024, the
Court granted Plaintiff’s request for additional time. Doc. 47. Though more than thirty days
had passed, Plaintiff still failed to file objections to the Report and Recommendation while
her Motion for Leave was pending. Nonetheless, the Court granted Plaintiff an additional
seven days to file her objections. Id. Plaintiff again failed to file her objections within the time
prescribed. Instead, on the day the objections were due, Plaintiff filed yet another motion
seeking an extension this time for an additional thirty to forty-five days to file her objections.
Doc. 48. Plaintiff again asserted that she did not see the Order granting her Motion to Leave
until the day before the extended deadline. Id. This motion has remained under advisement.
In the intervening months, Plaintiff has not filed objections.
B. Analysis
1. Extension of Time
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) provides that the court may grant an extension
for good cause before the deadline, or after the deadline has passed if the party failed to act
because of excusable neglect. The Court finds that no good cause exists to provide another
extension of the objection deadline. Hunter’s failure to check the docket does not amount to
good cause for an extension. The Sixth Circuit has reiterated repeatedly that parties have an
affirmative duty to monitor the docket and keep apprised of filing deadlines in their cases. See
Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2012) (“regardless of whether email
notifications are received, parties continue to have a duty to monitor the court's docket.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time to File Objections (Doc. 48) is DENIED.
2. Report and Recommendation
Because no objections have been filed and the time for filing such objections under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) has expired, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation for
clear error. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) advisory committee notes (“When no timely objection is
filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.”); Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-CV-445, 2021 WL 4771259,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation and determined that it does
not contain clear error. Therefore, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in
its entirety.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time to File Objections (Doc. 48) is DENIED.
2. The Sheriff Office’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 37) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as explained in the Report and Recommendation (Doc.
45).
3. The Sheriff Office is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
4. Plaintiff's state law claims (Counts VI and VII) are hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that an appeal of this Order
would not be taken in good faith. The Court accordingly DENIES Plaintiff leave to appeal in
forma pauperis. In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5), Plaintiff remains free to file a
motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999),
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2024 a Ba LA he
on. ery/P. Hopkitis
United States District Judge