Hannah v. Koman Holdings, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ERIN HANNAH,

Plaintiff, :

Case No. 2:23-cv-3439

v.

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A.

Jolson

KOMAN HOLDINGS, LLC, et

al., :

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Erin Hannah brought this action against KOMAN Holdings, LLC, and IMAQ

Resources, LLC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

the Rehabilitation Act, and Ohio common law. This matter is before the Court on

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Mot., ECF No. 19). For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part.

I. BACKGROUND

According to Ms. Hannah, KOMAN is a wholly owned subsidiary of the

Natives of Kodiak, Inc., which is an Alaska Native Corporation (“ANC”) based in

Kodiak, Alaska. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 13, ¶ 5; Affidavit of Melanie

Peire (“Peire Aff.”), ECF No. 19-1, ¶ 3.) In turn, IMAQ is a wholly owned subsidiary

of KOMAN.1 (FAC, ¶ 6.)

1 The affidavit in support of Defendants’ Motion provides that KOMAN and

IMAQ are both wholly owned subsidiaries of the Natives of Kodiak. (Peire Aff., ¶ 4.)

Ms. Hannah worked for Defendants from October 2021 until she was

terminated in June 2022.2 (FAC, ¶ 14.) Amanda Cascio, KOMAN’s Senior Director

of Human Resources, recruited her. (Id., ¶ 17.) After completing negotiations with

Ms. Cascio about the position, Ms. Hannah’s term of employment started well, as

evidenced by her receipt of a bonus and an “exceptional” performance review within

six months of her hiring. (Id., ¶¶ 18–24, 28.)

But in April 2022, Ms. Hannah began to experience mental health issues and

became concerned that she was becoming alcohol dependent. (FAC, ¶ 30.) When she

told her supervisor, Cheryl Shimko, that she was seeking treatment, Ms. Shimko

suggested that she could take a leave of absence if needed. (Id, ¶¶ 31–32.) Then, on

April 8, Ms. Hannah was hospitalized due to suicidal ideation. (Id., ¶ 33.) Matthew

Harisiades (Ms. Hannah’s Treatment Case Manager) emailed Ms. Cascio and Ms.

Shimko shortly thereafter to advise them that Ms. Hannah had been admitted to an

in-patient rehabilitation program and to request information to assist Ms. Hannah

in applying for a leave of absence. (Id., ¶¶ 34–35.)

KOMAN approved a leave of absence for Ms. Hannah from April 11 through

April 29, 2022. (FAC, ¶¶ 37–38.) When she sought to extend her leave until May 18,

Ms. Hannah met with Ms. Cascio and Mr. Harisiades via Zoom at Ms. Cascio’s

Defendants’ exact corporate structure is not dispositive of any issues raised in the

pending Motion.

2 IMAQ employed Ms. Hannah from October 2021 until her employment was

transferred to KOMAN in December 2021. (FAC, ¶ 27; Peire Aff., ¶ 8.) She

remained a KOMAN employee until her termination in June 2022. (Peire Aff., ¶ 8.)

request. (Id., ¶¶ 39–41.) During that Zoom meeting, Ms. Cascio raised performance

issues and insisted on receiving a medical release so that Defendants could obtain

summary notes about Ms. Hannah’s treatment. (Id., ¶ 44.) Ms. Hannah was also

asked how much longer she would be in treatment and was told that she needed to

participate in outpatient therapy. (Id., ¶¶ 45–46.)

After the Zoom meeting, Ms. Hannah discussed with Mr. Harisiades whether

she should return to her job and under what circumstances. (FAC, ¶ 48.) Mr.

Harisiades then wrote to Defendants to explain Ms. Hannah’s treatment and

progress, and he confirmed that she was planning to undergo outpatient treatment.

(Id., ¶¶ 49–50.) Mr. Harisiades requested that Defendants allow Ms. Hannah to

return to work part-time to re-acclimate to her position and in consideration of her

enrollment in outpatient therapy. (Id., ¶ 51.) Mr. Harisiades subsequently indicated

that the part-time accommodation would be needed for only three to four weeks.

(Id., ¶ 52.)

Ms. Cascio informed Ms. Hannah that she could not have a temporary part-

time position and instead offered her a permanent part-time position on the

condition that she sign a Last Chance Agreement. (FAC, ¶¶ 54, 56.) Ms. Cascio said

that Ms. Hannah could not return to her previous role because of her performance

issues and because the job was stressful and demanding. (Id., ¶ 55.) Unbeknownst

to Ms. Hannah, Defendants had hired a new employee to perform her duties while

she was in treatment. (Id., ¶ 64.)

Although she did not like the terms of the Last Chance Agreement and did

not agree with Ms. Cascio’s characterizations of her past performance or her

abilities, Ms. Hannah accepted the permanent part-time position, believing that she

would ultimately be restored to her previous position. (FAC, ¶¶ 56–60.) She

returned to work on May 23, 2022, and spent the next month training two

employees, including the person who had been hired to replace her. (Id., ¶¶ 65, 68.)

During that time, she successfully participated in outpatient treatment and

resumed many of her former work duties. (Id., ¶ 69.)

On June 22, 2022, Ms. Cascio informed Ms. Hannah that her position was

being eliminated due to budget cuts. (FAC, ¶ 72.) Ms. Hannah believes that she was

the only employee terminated. (Id., ¶ 74.)

After complying with the prerequisites for filing suit, Hannah brought this

action. (FAC, ¶ 76.) She asserts four claims against KOMAN, including disability

discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA (Counts I and II) and the

Rehabilitation Act (Counts III and IV). (Id., ¶¶ 77–106.) She also alleges a

promissory estoppel claim (Count V) against both Defendants. (Id., ¶¶ 107–122.)

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants seek dismissal of Ms. Hannah’s ADA claims pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over these claims. (Mot., PAGEID # 91.) They seek dismissal of Ms.

Hannah’s Rehabilitation Act and promissory estoppel claims under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that she has failed to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. (Id.)

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over ADA Claims

Defendants challenge the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over Ms.

Hannah’s ADA claims on the ground that KOMAN, as an ANC, is not a “covered

employer” under that statute and is thus exempt from its coverage. (Mot., PAGEID

# 99.) This argument is more appropriately addressed, however, under Rule

12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).

Federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction” that “possess only that

power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Relevant here, courts have

“federal question” jurisdiction over colorable claims “arising under” the Constitution

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Taborac v. NiSource, Inc.,

No. 2:11-CV-498, 2011 WL 5025214, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2011) (Economus, J.).

Some courts have approached the question of whether a defendant meets a federal

statute’s definition of “employer” as one implicating subject matter jurisdiction,

reasoning that there is no federal question if the defendant is not subject to suit

under the statute. See, e.g., Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assocs., Inc., 150 F.3d 604,

607–08 (6th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Thomas v. Miller, 489 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2007)

(where defendant is not an “employer” as defined under the FMLA, plaintiff’s claim

does not arise under federal law to confer subject matter jurisdiction). However, the

Supreme Court concluded that this reasoning “erroneously conflates subject-matter

jurisdiction with failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Arbaugh v.

Y & H Corporation, dba Moonlight Café, 546 U.S. 500, 511–14 (2006). In Arbaugh,

the defendant argued in response to the plaintiff’s Title VII claim that it did not

meet the Title VII definition of “employer” because the statute “limit[s] the

definition of ‘employer’ to include only those having ‘fifteen or more employees.’” Id.

at 503 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). Observing that this employee threshold

appears in a separate provision that “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer

in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts,” the Supreme Court held that

“when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional,

courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Id. at 516; see

also Gunter v. Bemis Co., Inc., 906 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted)

(“Congress must ‘clearly’ state that a provision creates a jurisdictional limitation

before we will treat it as one.”). Thus, Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement

“is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.” Id.

Since Arbaugh, lower courts have applied its reasoning to similar employee

threshold requirements in the ADA and the FMLA. See, e.g., Cobb v. Cont. Transp.,

Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2006); Reynolds v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 701 F.3d

143, 155 (4th Cir. 2012); Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc’ns, Inc., 447 F.3d 352, 357

n.29 (5th Cir. 2006). Courts have also applied Arbaugh in other contexts. See, e.g.,

Crawford v. United States, No. CIV.A. 3:04-CV-2619, 2006 WL 2167409, at *14

(N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

245 F. App’x 369 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding “the exclusion of the United States as a

covered entity under the ADA” to be a jurisdictional issue); Berry v. Univ. Sch. of

Nashville, No. 3:19-CV-00830, 2020 WL 3268732, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. June 17, 2020)

(question of whether defendant was a joint employer under the FMLA considered

jurisdictional).

In the context of this case, to determine whether Defendants’ objections are

properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must examine whether the

objections are “jurisdictional” in nature or whether they instead go to an essential

element of Ms. Hannah’s claim for relief. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–14. Inasmuch as

the ADA’s definition of “employer” appears in the ADA’s “definition” section (42

U.S.C. § 12111(5)) and does “not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to

the jurisdiction of the district courts,” Arbaugh compels the conclusion that the

instant Motion is not jurisdictional in nature. See Cobb, 452 F.3d at 549. Deciding

whether KOMAN qualifies as an “employer” is not a jurisdictional inquiry—rather,

this highly fact-specific determination goes to the merits of Ms. Hannah’s ADA

claim.

Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Hannah’s

ADA claims and will proceed to evaluate Defendants’ arguments under Rule

12(b)(6).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim

with sufficient specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal alteration and quotations omitted). A complaint that falls short of

the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent

with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must

include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a

cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court “construe[s] the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471,

476 (6th Cir. 2007).

C. Disability Discrimination (Count I) and Retaliation (Count II)

in Violation of the ADA

Defendants argue that KOMAN, as a subsidiary of an ANC, is not a “covered

employer” under the ADA. (Mot., PAGEID # 99.) Whether an ANC is exempt from

Title I of the ADA is relatively novel question—the Court’s and the parties’ research

identified only one court (the District of Delaware) to have directly addressed the

issue. This Court finds the Delaware court’s reasoning in Pearson v. Chugach Govt.

Services, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 467 (D. Del. 2009), to be persuasive and, for the

following reasons, concludes that Defendants are not exempt.

The Pearson court began its analysis by recognizing that its case was one of

first impression raising a “question [that] lies at the confluence of two powerful

federal interests.” Pearson, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 470.

On one hand, the federal government has recognized the quasi-

sovereignty of Native American tribes and tribal entities. Towards that

end, Congress and the Supreme Court have established exemptions

and immunities to provide social and political space for Native

American self-governance and self-determination. On the other hand,

Congress has recognized the obstacles and injustice of discrimination,

and promulgated an interlocking web of statutory prohibitions to

reduce and eliminate the harms of employment discrimination. From

the outset, the Court recognizes this opinion must reconcile these

competing federal mandates.

Id.

The Pearson court then considered the Title VII exemption for Native

American tribes and tribal entities—namely, whether Native American tribes are

excluded from Title VII’s definition of “employer.” Pearson, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 470

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). Similarly, the enabling statute for ANCs3 exempts

them from Title VII: “For the purposes of implementation of [Title VII], a Native

Corporation ... or affiliates [of] which the Native Corporation owns [at least 25

percent] shall be within the class of entities excluded from the definition of

3 ANCs were created after the implementation of Title VII by the 1971 Alaska

Native Claims Settlement Act (the “ANCSA”). Pearson, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 471

(citing Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 209 (4th Cir. 2007),

and Pub. L. 92–203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971), codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629a

(2009)).

‘employer’ [in Title VII].” Id. at 471 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1626(g)). As the Pearson

court summarized:

The purpose of the tribal exemption is tribal self-governance and

economic development … Towards this end, Congress condones a

Native American employment preference by carving out an exemption

from Title VII. As the Supreme Court has explained:

There are [ ] affirmative provisions in the 1964 Act excluding

coverage of tribal employment and of preferential treatment by

a business or enterprise on or near a reservation. 42 U.S.C. ss

2000e(b) and 2000e–2(i). [ ] These 1964 exemptions as to private

employment indicate Congress’ recognition of the longstanding

federal policy of providing a unique legal status to Indians in

matters concerning tribal or ‘on or near’ reservation

employment. The exemptions reveal a clear congressional

sentiment that an Indian preference in the narrow context of

tribal or reservation-related employment did not constitute

racial discrimination of the type otherwise proscribed.

Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547–48 (1974)). The rationale for the

ANC exemption is similar:

Like the federal policy supporting Title VII’s tribal exemption,

Congress established ANCs to further the “social and economic self-

determination” of Alaskan Natives by providing for the self-

management of their assets, AFL–CIO v. United States, 104 F. Supp.

2d 58, 72–73 (D.D.C. 2000). Similarly, the legislative history of

§ 1626(g) indicates that, like the Title VII tribal exemption, the ANC

exemption was necessary to permit ANCs to have a Native American

employment preference. See S. Rep. No. 100–201 at 26 (1987), U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News 1987, pp. 3269, 3276 (the primary purpose

of the ANCs’ Title VII exemption was to “facilitate Alaska Native

shareholder employment programs by resolving any uncertainty as to

the applicability of [Title VII] to certain business enterprises in which

[ANCs] participate”); Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d

927, 934 (D. Alaska 1999) (construing § 1626(g) to allow ANCs to

“discriminate in favor of Native Americans without violating Title VII,”

but also finding that it should not be construed to make “virtually

every community in Alaska” exempt from anti-discrimination law).

Id. at 471–72. These Title VII exemptions should be construed narrowly: “[c]ourts,

generally, have construed the tribal exemption narrowly and found tribal

organizations liable under generally applicable statutes, unless liability would

impinge upon the tribe’s self-governance. Id. at 473; see also Fox v. Portico Reality

Services Office, 739 F. Supp. 2d 912, 915 (E.D. Va. 2010) (recognizing that it is

appropriate to construe the ANC Title VII exemption narrowly).

The Pearson court then turned to the ADA, finding that public

accommodation cases were instructive: “Absent an explicit exemption, courts have

concluded that for-profit tribal enterprises that are involved in interstate commerce

fall within the scope of federal anti-discrimination law. Further, exposing employer

liability under such circumstances does not subvert the policy goals of tribal

exemptions because it does not interfere with the Native American employment

preference.” Pearson, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 475.

As with Title VII, Congress exempted Native American tribes from

employment claims brought under Title I of the ADA. Pearson, 669 F. Supp. 2d at

474 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i)). But ANCs are not expressly exempted;

rather, the enabling statute for ANCs “explicitly limits the scope of the ANC

exemption[:] … ‘the single-sentence exclusion for ANCs makes [it] clear twice’ that

the ‘exclusion[] is limited to … Title VII.’” Id. (citing § 1626(g) and Aleman, 485 F.3d

at 211).4 Both the nature of the tribal exemptions and by the ADA support this

difference:

Turning to the ADA, its broad language and legislative history

emphasize its sweeping authority and national scope. Title I of the

ADA lacks an ANC exemption; moreover, case law circumscribes its

tribal exemption to tribal organizations functioning in a governmental

role. While the boundary of the ADA’s tribal exemption is imprecise, it

is clear that for-profit tribal corporations operating in the ordinary

course of interstate commerce fall outside that boundary.

Finally, the growing role of ANCs as national commercial enterprises

militates against a broad interpretation of its Title VII exemption.

Defendants’ parent company, Chugach Alaskan Corporation, operates

“a traditional business, employing about 5,000 people in construction,

environmental services, informational technology, telecommunications,

and other areas.” Aleman, 485 F.3d at 209. Consequently, when an

ANC invokes immunity it is not promoting Native American

employment nor protecting tribal self-governance, but avoiding normal

anti-discrimination prohibitions having nothing to do with Native

American ethnicity or tribal governance. Clearly, a broad application of

the ANC exemption, under these circumstances, does not conform to

the legislative purpose of § 1626(g).

Id. at 476.5

Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the exemption of ANCs

from anti-discrimination laws, it recently ruled that ANCs are “Indian tribes” under

the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Yellen v. Confederated

Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv., 594 U.S. 338, 339 (2021). This ruling means that ANCs are

4 In Aleman, the Fourth Circuit recognized that ANCs are exempt from Title

VII claims but found that ANCs are appropriately subject to claims brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Aleman, 485 F.3d at 211.

5 Comparable to the defendant in Pearson, KOMAN does business throughout

the United States in various industries, including construction, property

management and security, environmental consulting and compliance, and electric

utilities, among others. (ECF No. 22-4, PAGEID # 157–59.)

eligible for funds provided by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security

(“CARES”) Act. Id. at 365–66. But the Supreme Court made clear that ANCs are

fundamentally different than federally recognized Indian tribes, even if some

statutes treat them similarly—“[a]s private companies incorporated under state

law, ANCs have never been ‘recognized’ by the United States in a sovereign

politician sense.” Id. at 345.

Therefore, this Court adopts the Pearson court’s conclusion that “the

statutory language, legislative history, analogous case law, and federal policy all

support one conclusion; under these facts, [ANCs] retain employer liability under

Title I of the American with Disabilities Act.” Pearson, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 476.

Defendants’ Motion is DENIED with respect to Ms. Hannah’s ADA claims.

D. Disability Discrimination (Count III) and Retaliation (Count

IV) in Violation of the Rehabilitation Act

Defendants argue that Ms. Hannah fails to state claims under the

Rehabilitation Act because KOMAN is not a “covered entity.” (Mot., PAGEID # 97.)

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified

individual with a disability in the United States ... shall solely by reason of his or

her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Defendants argue that they are not a

“program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”—even though they

acknowledge they did collect a “one-time receipt of funds” under the CARES Act.

(Mot., PAGEID # 98.)

Hannah alleges that KOMAN is a “program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance” and is a “program or activity conducted by an Executive

agency” as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. (FAC, ¶¶ 10, 11.) These allegations

are sufficient at this stage of the proceeding, and she may conduct discovery about

Defendants’ federal assistance and activities. After discovery, Defendants are free to

move for summary judgment if the evidence does not support her allegations.

E. Promissory Estoppel (Count V)

Any claim for promissory estoppel in the employment context is subject to

Ohio’s employment-at-will doctrine:

In general, under Ohio’s employment-at-will doctrine, “the

employment relationship between employer and employee is

terminable at the will of either; thus, an employee is subject to

discharge by an employer at any time, even without cause.” Wright v.

Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 571, 574, 653 N.E.2d

381, 384. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has established two

exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine: (1) the existence of

implied or express contractual provisions that alter the terms of

discharge and (2) the existence of promissory estoppel where

representations or promises have been made to an employee. Id., citing

Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 104–105, 19

OBR 261, 264–265, 483 N.E.2d 150, 154–155.

Robinson v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:21CV253, 2022 WL 2527906, at *2 (S.D. Ohio

July 7, 2022) (Barrett, J.) (citing Clark v. Collins Bus Corp., 736 N.E.2d 970, 972–73

(Ohio Ct. App. 2000)). To establish the promissory estoppel exception, a plaintiff

must show that (1) the employer made a promise clear and unambiguous to the

employee; (2) the employee relied on that promise; (3) the reliance was reasonable

and foreseeable; and (4) injury resulted from the reliance. Nealon v. Cleveland, 746

N.E.2d 694, 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted).

Ms. Hannah’s claim fails on the first element. “According to Ohio law, the

promise at a minimum not only must be sufficiently clear and unambiguous, but

also must promise ‘continued employment for a specific period.’” Rhodes v. R&L

Carriers, Inc., 491 Fed. App’x. 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Steele v. Mara Ents.,

Inc., No. 09AP–102, 2009 WL 3494847, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009)).

Although Ms. Hannah alleges that Ms. Cascio represented to her that “she could

count on retiring” from KOMAN (FAC, ¶ 24), an employer’s promise of continued

employment until some unspecified date, such as death or retirement, does not meet

the first element of the claim. Id.; see also Stewart v. Everyware Global, Inc., 68 F.

Supp. 3d 759, 766 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (Graham, J.) (a plaintiff “cannot rely on

nebulous representations by the employer”).

Accordingly, Ms. Hannah’s alleged reliance on a promise of employment until

retirement does not state a claim for promissory estoppel under Ohio law.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

in part, and Ms. Hannah’s promissory estoppel claim (Count V) is DISMISSED. In

all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE