GREEN v. PALEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL S. GREEN, : Case No. 2:24-cv-3459

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge James L. Graham

vs. : Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

:

EILEEN PALEY, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner housed at the Franklin County Correctional Center, has filed a civil

rights action alleging violations of the United States Constitution1 and Ohio State law. (Doc. 1).

By separate Order, the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint to

determine whether the Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a

Defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

1The Court understands Plaintiff's constitutional claims to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Chapman v.

Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 624 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Section 1983 provides a private

cause of action for the deprivation, under color of state law, of ‘rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws.’ ”)

(footnote omitted). The Court also understands Plaintiff to be bringing civil rights conspiracy claims, which the Court

will consider under both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Screening of the Complaint

I. Initial Screening Standard

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to conduct an

initial screening of his Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss the

Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. Id.

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim

with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29

(1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no

arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation

of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no

arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or

“wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.

The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in

reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

A complaint must also be dismissed if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). The Court must construe the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a

complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In the interest of justice, this Court is also required to construe a pro se complaint

liberally and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)

and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) [now (e)]). Even with such a liberal construction, a pro se

complaint must still adhere to the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential

allegations respecting all the material elements’ to recover under some viable legal theory.”

Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d

712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)).

II. Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that his civil rights are being violated in a state criminal case—No. 23

CR 2927—currently pending in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, where he faces

charges of strangulation or suffocation, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.18, and domestic

violence, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25. 2 Plaintiff brings his claims against Franklin

2In his Complaint, Plaintiff provides only the court in which he has been charged. (See generally Doc. 1). The case

number is taken from Plaintiff’s related 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus action. See Green v. Paley, et al., No. 2:24-

cv-3236 (S.D. Ohio) (Doc. 1). The nature of the charges is taken from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

website. Viewed at

County Court of Common Pleas Judges Eileen Paley and Bill A. Sperlazza, former appointed

defense counsel Gary Salter and Sean Thivener, and Franklin County Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney Trenten3 Grohe. (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Salter, his former appointed counsel, failed to follow

Plaintiff’s choices in handling the case. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result, “an indictment

enhance[ed] a misdemeanor into a felony.” (Doc. 1, at PageID 5). According to Plaintiff, Salter

realized his mistake and tried to have the indictment rescinded. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, when

he “expose[d]” Salter’s alleged ineffectiveness, Judge Paley, the then-presiding judge, sent

Plaintiff outside of the courtroom and held a sidebar. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that when Judge

Paley reconvened the proceedings, she told Plaintiff that he could appeal the indictment. (Doc.

1, at PageID 6).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thivener was then appointed to represent him4 and was

supposed to assist Plaintiff in filing the appeal. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges, however, that Thivener

refused, at the direction of his supervisor, who is not named as a defendant, to obtain the

transcript and told Plaintiff that he did not “hav[e] the right to appeal.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges

that he “now know[s]” that Thivener “also failed to file multiple motions on [his] part like a

motion to suppress[.]” (Id.).

Plaintiff also alleges that he has “on numerous occasions tried to be present in open court

only to have Mr. Thivener fraudulently waive [Plaintiff’s] right to speedy trial.” (Doc. 1, at

https://fcdcfcjs.co.franklin.oh.us/CaseInformationOnline/caseSearch?hwXAEySFUx7nEmzPwNcz under Plaintiff’s

name and Case No. 23 CR 2927. This Court may take judicial notice of court records that are available online to

members of the public. See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004).

3In his Complaint, Plaintiff mistakenly spells this Defendant’s first name “Trenton.” (Doc. 1, at PageID 1). Filings

in Plaintiff’s Franklin County case reveal that the correct spelling is “Trenten” Grohe. The Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to update the docket record to reflect this change.

4Filings in Plaintiff’s Franklin County case reveal that Defendant Thivener withdrew as counsel on March 6, 2024,

and the trial court appointed Plaintiff’s current attorney, Stephen Wolfe, who is not named as a defendant in this

matter.

PageID 6). Plaintiff further alleges that he has been held in Jail in lieu of bond the entirety of his

pretrial detention. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that the “trial court[]” and Defendant Franklin County

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Grohe5 have denied him his “Sixth Amendment right to face [his]

accuser on numerous occasions” and have denied him the right to be present at depositions.

(Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that on February 28, 2024, Defendant Judge Sperlazza, who is now

presiding over Plaintiff’s case, refused to allow Plaintiff to inform him that his right to a speedy

trial had been violated. (Doc. 1, at PageID 7). Plaintiff states that Defendant Thivener “took it

upon himself off the record to violate attorney-client privilege and reveal to Judge Sperlazza his

own rendition of what was supposed to be for [Plaintiff] to be on the record . . . therefore

creating a bias and not allowing [Plaintiff] to be on the record as [Plaintiff] should have been.”

(Id.).

Plaintiff claims that his speedy trial rights have been violated since February 7, 2024,

“when the complete violation of (284) two-hundred eighty-four days took effect,” and that the

criminal proceedings have “cost [him] not only [his] freedom but also his livelihood and so much

more.” (Doc. 1, at PageID 7).6 He alleges, without elaboration, that the Defendants are delaying

his trial “for monetary gain and furthering their career” (id., at PageID 8), and that “[t]he

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas has not done this singularly, but on numerous

occasions to numerous defendants.” (Id. at PageID 7).

For relief, Plaintiff seeks “freedom from pretrial detention” and money damages. (Doc.

1, at PageID 5).

5Filings in Plaintiff’s Franklin County case reveal that a substitution of counsel was filed on February 26, 2024, and

that Franklin County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Madeline F. Holvey is now assigned to Plaintiff’s case.

6It appears from the trial court docket that Plaintiff’s case is set for trial on January 6, 2025.

III. Analysis

Liberally construing the above allegations, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, the Court

understands Plaintiff to assert the following claims: (1) violation of the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution under § 1983 for the alleged denial of his right to a speedy trial and

his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution under § 1983 for alleged judicial and prosecutorial misconduct in

Plaintiff’s pending criminal matter; (3) conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to

§§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged monetary and personal gain; and (4) violation of the Ohio State

Constitution. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for the reasons

below.

Section 1983 Claims against Judges Paley and Sperlazza

Plaintiff does not state a claim for which relief can be granted against Judges Paley and

Sperlazza under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff sues these Defendants in their individual

capacities, judicial officers are absolutely immune from liability. See Barnes v. Winchell, 105

F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). A plaintiff can

overcome the application of judicial immunity only where: 1) the judge’s acts were clearly non-

judicial in nature and therefore outside the scope of the judge’s judicial capacity; or 2) the

judge’s actions were taken in the absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12

(1991). The factors that are relevant to whether an act is judicial in nature are: 1) “the nature of

the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge”; and 2) “whether [the

parties] dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id.

Our sister Court in the Northern District has explained:

A judge’s acts do not become non-judicial simply because they are erroneous or “in

excess of his authority”; if that were the case, then “any mistake of a judge in excess

of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an improper or

erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge.” [Mireles, 502

U.S.] at 12.

Luna v. Zouhary, No. 3:18-CV-01932, 2018 WL 5295875, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2018).

Furthermore,

An allegation of conspiracy is insufficient to defeat judicial immunity. See

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A]llegations that a

conspiracy produced a certain decision should no more pierce the actor’s immunity

than allegations of bad faith, personal interest or outright malevolence.”); Dorman

v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).

Id.

The alleged actions of Judges Paley and Sperlazza arise from the adjudication of

Plaintiff’s state criminal case and concerns actions normally performed by a judge. As such,

Judges Paley and Sperlazza are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983

claims against them in their individual capacities.

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims against Judges Paley and Sperlazza in their

official capacities, such claims are essentially claims against the Franklin County Court of

Common Pleas and are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Williams v. Parikh, __

F.Supp.3d __, 2023 WL 8824845, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2023) (Cole, J.) (“For § 1983

purposes, the courts of common pleas and their employees are deemed entities under the control

of the state government, not the county government, because they derive governmental authority

directly from the Ohio Constitution.”) (footnote omitted), appeal filed, No. 24-3059 (6th Cir.

Jan. 22, 2024). Judges Paley and Sperlazza are therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity to the extent Plaintiff sues them in their official capacities.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Paley and Sperlazza should be dismissed.

Section 1983 Claims against Franklin County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Grohe

Plaintiff’s allegations also fail to state a claim for relief against Franklin County Assistant

Prosecuting Attorney Grohe. “Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct

‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Manetta v. Macomb Cty.

Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 430 (1976)). This includes a county prosecutor’s initiation of a prosecution and

presentation of the State’s case at trial. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. See also Coffey v. Vermont, No.

2:21-CV-50, 2022 WL 1250901, at *7 (D. Vt. Mar. 2, 2022), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 2:21-CV-00050, 2022 WL 872570 (D. Vt. Mar. 24, 2022)

(“Discovery claims such as these are also barred by absolute immunity because discovery is

clearly within the scope of a prosecutor’s duties”) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1446 (6th Cir. 1997) (deciding to file a criminal

complaint and seeking issuance of an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity).

Such “absolute prosecutorial immunity is not defeated by a showing that a prosecutor

acted wrongfully or even maliciously.” Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151 F.3d 493, 498 n.7 (6th Cir.

1998) (citing Grant, 870 F.2d at 1138). And such absolute prosecutorial immunity “presents a

complete bar” to a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for conspiracy. Smith v. Rybek, No. 2:11-CV-777,

2012 WL 3025102, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2012). Accordingly, Defendant Grohe is entitled to

absolute prosecutorial immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against him in his individual

capacity.

Plaintiff’s claims also fail against Defendant Grohe to the extent that Plaintiff sues Grohe

in an official capacity.

The Sixth Circuit has determined that city [and county] prosecutors are state actors

when prosecuting violations of Ohio law. See, e.g., Pusey [v. City of Youngstown],

11 F.3d [652,] 657 [(6th Cir. 1993)] (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1901.34(C) and 309.08

establish that city [and county] prosecutors in Ohio are state actors when

prosecuting violations of Ohio law). Thus, claims against prosecutors in their

official capacity are claims against the state and are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. See id. at 658; see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983

claims against the states because the state is not a “person”).

Smith, 2012 WL 3025102, at *3–4. See also Helfrich v. State of Ohio, No. 2:15-CV-1646, 2016

WL 759836, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2016) (“Therefore, because the Licking County

Prosecutor has acted as a state agent when prosecuting state criminal charges, the suit against

him in his official capacity is to be treated as a suit against the state.”) (citing Pusey, 11 F.3d at

657). Defendant Grohe is therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent

Plaintiff sues him in his official capacity.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Grohe should be dismissed.

Section 1983 Claims against Appointed Defense Counsel Salter and Thivener

Nor can Plaintiff state a claim against his former appointed attorneys because they were

not acting under the color of state law not acting under the color of state law within the meaning

of § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-25 (1981). It is firmly established that a

defense attorney, regardless of whether he is a public defender or a private attorney, is not a state

actor for purposes of § 1983. Id. at 325 (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state

law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding.”); Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] lawyer

representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of

state law within the meaning of § 1983.”).

Additionally, while defense counsel are generally not immune from § 1983 liability for

conspiracies to deprive clients of their constitutional rights, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914

(1984), Plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th

Cir. 1987); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Cf. Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App’x 773, 775–76

(6th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim against attorney who represented the

plaintiff in a parole revocation hearing given the lack of any “factual support or evidence upon

which a conspiracy [with state officials] could be based”).

Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Salter and Thivener should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1985 Conspiracy Claim

Additionally, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint to include a conspiracy

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, his claims are still subject to dismissal. The judicial and

prosecutorial immunity principles discussed above also apply to conspiracy claims under § 1985.

See Kanu v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:19-CV-156, 2021 WL 779078, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1,

2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-156, 2021 WL 3036722 (S.D. Ohio

July 19, 2021) (county prosecutors). See also Strickland v. Mullins, No. 23-12687, 2023 WL

8101839, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023) (“Judges are also entitled to such immunity from

suits brought pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 1985 . . . .”).

Moreover, § 1985 prohibits conspiracies to deprive persons of certain civil rights on

account of their membership in a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3). Plaintiff does

not allege Defendants’ actions were motivated by racial animus or were class-based. Rather,

Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants’ alleged interference with his right to a speedy trial

and other actions were motivated by a desire for monetary gain and furthering their careers. His

§ 1985 claims are therefore subject to dismissal.

Younger Abstention

Next, while the Court should dismiss this civil rights action for the reasons stated above,

the Undersigned also reiterates that Plaintiff’s criminal case remains ongoing in state court. (See

n.2, supra). Absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts may not interfere with pending

state criminal proceedings in order to entertain constitutional challenges to the state proceedings.

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger, the federal court must abstain where

“(1) state proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve an important state interest;

and (3) the state proceeding will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his

constitutional claims.” Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Nilsson v.

Ruppert, Bronson & Chicarelli Co., 888 F.2d 452, 454 (6th Cir. 1989)). See also Pennzoil Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1975).

Extraordinary circumstances barring abstention include “great and immediate” irreparable injury,

state law that is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,” or “bad

faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.”

Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53, 54. See Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996).

All three factors supporting Younger abstention are present in this case. Because

plaintiff’s criminal case remains pending in state court, the first Younger factor is satisfied.

Second, the criminal case implicates an important state interest as state criminal prosecutions

have traditionally been considered an arena in which federal courts decline to interfere. See

Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45. Third, there is no evidence that the state criminal proceedings

cannot provide an opportunity for plaintiff to raise his constitutional claims. Regarding this

factor, the federal court must presume that the state courts are able to protect the interests of a

federal plaintiff. Kelm, 44 F.3d at 420 (citing Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 15). Plaintiff possess an

adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional issues in his pending state court action or in a

subsequent appeal. Because plaintiff has failed to allege facts suggesting the existence of

extraordinary circumstances barring abstention, abstention under Younger is appropriate.7

Generally, “where a plaintiff brings § 1983 claims for damages in federal court but the

federal court finds that Younger applies, federal courts . . . favor a stay of the federal proceedings

over dismissal.” Carter v. Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 3:22-CV-00247, 2023 WL

2027804, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2023) (citing cases). Here, however, a stay under Younger

would be inappropriate, as Plaintiff’s claims are otherwise subject to dismissal for the reasons

stated herein. See Wheat v. Pub. Defs. Off., No. 5:15-CV-0294, 2015 WL 4877236, at *2 (M.D.

Ga. Aug. 14, 2015) (citing cases).

Allegations against the Office of the Public Defender and the Franklin County Court of

Common Pleas

Finally, Plaintiff includes allegations against the Defendant Thivener’s supervisor in the

Public Defender’s Office and the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. (See Doc. 1, at

PageID 6-7). Because neither Thivener’s supervisor nor the Franklin County Court of Common

Pleas is named as a Defendant in this case, the Undersigned need not analyze Plaintiff’s

statements with respect to these non-defendants.

However, for the same reason that Thivener is not a proper party defendant, his

supervisor is likewise not a proper party defendant. See Ray v. State Pub. Defs. Off., No. 3:15-

CV-0072, 2015 WL 500181, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 3, 2015) (“The complaint therefore fails to

state a claim against attorney Engle or the public defender's office.”). Further, as noted above,

7To the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of his right to a speedy trial, relief for such a violation would be

available only through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and only after he exhausted his available state

remedies. See Williams v. Kentucky, No. 5:20-CV-450-GFVT, 2020 WL 7249033, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2020). As

noted above in footnote 2, Plaintiff has filed a separate § 2241 action in this Court.

“for § 1983 purposes, the courts of common pleas . . . are deemed entities under the control of

the state government, not the county government, because they derive governmental authority

directly from the Ohio Constitution.” Williams, 2023 WL 8824845, at *3. Any claim against the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas would therefore be barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

As such, any purported claims with respect to Thivener’s supervisor or the Franklin

County Court of Common Pleas should be dismissed.

Remaining State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s Complaint also includes allegations of state-law violations. (See, e.g., Doc. 1,

at PageID 6-7). Having recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims, the

Undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s state-law claims and dismiss such claims without prejudice. See Harper v.

AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) (although the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a matter of discretion, when a court dismisses all federal

claims before trial, it generally should dismiss the state law claims as well).

Accordingly, in sum, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS with

prejudice Plaintiff's federal claims against Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Further, having recommended that the

Court dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the

Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims and

DISMISS such claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Harper, 392 F.3d at 210.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket record to reflect the proper

spelling of Defendant Trenton Grohe’s first name as Trenten.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

2. The Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

remaining state-law claims and DISMISS such claims without prejudice.

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing

reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in

good faith. See McGore v. 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on

timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected

to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report

and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

August 21, 2024 s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

United States Magistrate Judge