Gibson v. Champlin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CARA GIBSON,

Administratrix of the Estate of

David Thomas Gibson,

:

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:21-cv-4588

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A.

Preston Deavers

:

MATT CHAMPLIN, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Tommy Gibson was booked into the Gallia County Jail on September 8, 2019.

On September 14, he hung himself from the bars of his cell with a County-issued

blanket. Tommy’s widow, Cara, filed suit seeking to hold the County liable for

Tommy’s death. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.)

The matter is now before the Court on three motions: a Motion for Summary

Judgment (Mot., ECF No. 63); a Motion for Leave to File Surreply (ECF No. 81);

and a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (ECF No. 84). The latter two

(ECF Nos. 81, 84) are GRANTED. The first requires more discussion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Tommy was booked into the Gallia County Jail.

David Thomas Gibson went by Tommy. By age 27, Tommy had a wife, two

children, and a drug addiction. He was arrested on September 8, 2019, after his wife

and mother filed complaints alleging that his drug abuse had led to violence. (See

ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 774–78, 804–06.)

Tommy was booked into the Jail by Officer Cheyenne Rucker. (Champlin

Dec., ECF No. 63-1, ¶ 6.) Officer Rucker completed a Medical Questionnaire that

asked about Tommy’s drug use and suicide risk. (ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 792; see

also id., PAGEID # 887.) According to the questionnaire, Tommy reported no drug

or alcohol use, no depression, no history of self-harm, and no suicidal thoughts. (Id.,

PAGEID # 792–93.)

The Jail has four housing units for male inmates: Blocks A, B, C, and D.

(Brumfield Dep., ECF No. 70, 40:11–13.) Tommy was initially housed in A Block.

Jonathan Sammut, another inmate in A Block, had gone to school with Tommy.

(Sammut Dep., ECF No. 69, 12:10–19.) According to Mr. Sammut, Tommy came into

the Jail with “emotions . . . running wild.” (Id., 15:14–25.) Tommy was also sick,

“sweating a lot,” “complaining of a headache,” and “in and out of the bathroom,

diarrhea.” (Id., 16:25–17:2.) Mr. Sammut testified that Tommy asked a “heavyset”

corrections officer1 “if he could get something for his head. He told him he’d see

what he could [get]. Never came back.” (Id., 17:12–15, 20:12.) After shift-change, he

1 Mr. Sammut described the first officer as heavyset with short, dark hair,

tattoos, glasses, and a mustache. (Sammut Dep., 20:12–21:4.) Ms. Gibson does not

argue that any of the Individual Defendants match this description.

recalls that Tommy asked a “thinner” officer2 for medicine for diarrhea, headache,

and depression. (Id., 17:17–22.) The thinner officer told Tommy

he didn’t know what to tell him, he didn’t have any medicine for him,

that there was no medicine listed on his file, so they wasn’t going to give

him anything.

(Id., 17:23–18:2.) Finally, Mr. Sammut testified that Tommy spoke with Officer

Brooklyn Stapleton3 about “getting him something at least for the diarrhea and the

vomiting. But it never came of anything.” (Id., 31:20–32:3.)

Mr. Sammut was released from Gallia County Jail on September 10, 2019.

For the two days that their detention overlapped, Mr. Sammut watched Tommy

suffer from illness and depression without aid. (Id., 33:18–24.)

B. Tommy’s mother raised alarms about his mental health on

September 13, 2019.

Around noon on September 13, 2019, Tommy called his mother, Sherry

Russell. (Russell Dep., ECF No. 57, 32:7.) Tommy admitted that he had been

abusing Suboxone and methamphetamine when he assaulted her days before. (Id.,

33:13–16.) Tommy’s mother is a nurse, and he told her that he had not been given

any withdrawal medications. (Id., 33:9–13.) Tommy also admitted to Ms. Russell

that he was contemplating self-harm. (Id., 34:10.) When Ms. Russell hung up the

phone, she called Sheriff Matt Champlin, with whom she had a long personal and

2 Mr. Sammut described the second officer as about 5’7” and built with dark

hair and tattoos on his arms. (Sammut Dep., 23:1–24.) Ms. Gibson does not argue

that any of the Individual Defendants match this description.

3 Officer Stapleton denies that this interaction occurred. (See Stapleton Dec.,

ECF No. 63-5¶ 15.)

professional relationship, and told him that Tommy was suicidal; she asked him to

help Tommy get medical attention. (Id., 36:3, 9–11.) Sheriff Champlin said he

would. (Id., 36:22–37:5.)

Sheriff Champlin then directed Lieutenant Kevin Werry to have Tommy

evaluated by the Jail’s mental health provider, Hopewell Health Centers.

(Champlin Dec., ¶ 12.) Lieutenant Werry, who was not on-site, called the Jail.

(Werry Dec., ECF No. 63-3, ¶ 7.) Officer Debra Smith received the call and arranged

an evaluation. (Smith Dep., ECF No. 55, 95:15–96:2.)

C. Tommy was evaluated by the Jail’s mental health provider,

Hopewell Health Centers.

By the time Officer Smith called Hopewell, Tommy had been moved to D

Block.4 (See Stapleton Dec., ¶¶ 9, 13.) “D Block is an isolation cell where [an inmate]

with a medical, behavioral, or mental health issue can be housed and monitored

more closely[.]” (Id., ¶ 16.) D Block includes a bed, a small table, and a toilet with a

sink. (Phillips Dec., ECF No. 77-2.) There are two doors to D Block: the first is a

solid metal door that opens into the hallway; the second is a door of metal bars. (Id.)

Between the two doors is a small vestibule with a surveillance camera facing the

inmate’s living quarters, but a belligerent inmate had recently broken D Block’s

camera and light fixture. (Id.; Bennett Dep., ECF No. 74, 87:9–19, 91:21–25.) So,

when Tommy was there, the only available light came from the fluorescent fixtures

4 Nothing in the record establishes who moved Tommy to D Block, when, or

why. This move should have been noted in the Jail logs. (Champlin Dep., ECF No.

68, 92:2–3.)

on the hallway ceiling. If the solid metal door leading to the hallway was closed,

Tommy would have been in complete darkness.

Officer Smith went to D Block to tell Tommy that someone from Hopewell

would be coming to speak with him. (Smith Dep., 96:3–6.) Tommy did not react,

“[h]e just looked at [her].” (Id., 107:12–16.) Officer Smith’s shift ended before anyone

from Hopewell arrived. (Id., 102:23–24.) She briefed Officer Stapleton before

departing. (Id., 102:24–25.)

Rebecca Ashburn, a Chemical Dependency Counselor Assistant for Hopewell

Health Centers, arrived at the Jail in the evening hours of September 13, 2019.

(Ashburn Dep., ECF No. 60, 31:1–3.) She was escorted to D Block, where she found

Tommy sitting on his bunk. (Id., 34:9.) Tommy told Ms. Ashburn that he was upset

that his family had not bonded him out. (Id., 35:13–14.) Ms. Ashburn observed that

Tommy was “a little agitated.” (Id., 35:6.) She described the 45-minute-long

evaluation in deposition:

He was very polite, very well-mannered young man. His biggest thing

was that he wanted his family back, and he knew that they—that he

had to get the help he needs. He denied any mental health treatment

before. He denied any substance abuse treatment, not the use, but he’s

never went to treatment before. He said he’d been in the jail for already

a week, could I please just call his mom and ask his mom to pay his bond

to get out.

. . . He did hold my hand and thank me for coming in and talking to him.

And at the time, when I seen him, he denied any suicidal thoughts,

denied any hearing voices or seeing things, denied having a plan. He

said he had them earlier but didn’t really narrow it down when they

were. And so we discussed a safety plan on, you know, if the thoughts

come back, let the [officers] know, I’ll come back and see you. And he—

at the end he shook my hand once again and thanked me very much for

coming and seeing him and stated that he felt better.

(Id., 37:25–38:24.)

Ms. Ashburn told the officers to “leave him in D Block because he was getting

a withdrawal pack[,]” and she planned to have the Hopewell on-call follow-up with

him the next day. (Id., 39:6–11.) She left a copy of her report at the Jail. It says:

Client is a 28 years old caucasin male being seen on emgerency at the

Gallia County Jail. Client states no mental health issues or family

history. Client substance use is subutex and marjuana. Not a good

relastionship with family right now do to his substance use. Client states

that he has had sucial thought but no plan at this time. Client states he

feels anxitiy and depressed to being in Jail. Client did receive a

withdraw packet for Jail N.P. Client state that he need to get out to get

help.

. . .

Client has commited to a stafey plan.

. . .

Leave in D Block for 24 hour for withdraw medication to work per jail

policy.

(ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 811 (reproduced as written).)

Jail policy provides that any inmate “identified as having the potential to

become suicidal while in custody” will be placed on Close Watch, with physical

checks every 15 minutes and clothes and blankets removed in favor of a suicide-

resistant vest. (ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 919-20; Werry Dec., ¶ 18.) But after he

was seen by Ms. Ashburn, Jail Officers believed that Tommy had been “cleared” and

did not require any special watch. (See, e.g., Rectenwald Dep., ECF No. 73, 23:22–

24:1; Bennett Dep., 104:17–20.) As a result, Tommy was treated like any other

inmate: they checked on him once every hour, he wore an orange jumpsuit, and he

had a blanket.

D. Tommy also began to receive withdrawal medications.

Tommy’s withdrawal pack was delivered to the Jail by Health Department

Medical Assistant Casey Roush. (Alvaro Dep., ECF No. 61, 50:19–24.) Officer

Michael Fink administered the first doses to Tommy at 5:00pm and 9:00pm on

September 13.5 (ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 817; see also Fink Dec., ECF No. 63-7,

¶ 12.)

E. In the early hours of September 14, 2019, Tommy asked to call

his wife.

Officer Andrew Rectenwald began his shift at 11:00pm on September 13,

2019. (Rectenwald Dec., ECF No. 63-2, ¶ 7.) Tommy was asleep in D Block and did

not appear to be in any distress. (Rectenwald Dep., 15:11–12.) Officer Rectenwald

testified:

About 1:30 in the morning, I do remember [Tommy] woke up and wanted

to make a phone call. I believe it was to his victim. I know he was in for

a domestic assault. And I advised him, no, that we don’t bring people out

to booking, you know, after business hours or whatever and we can’t be

making calls to a victim. And that was the only time that he was awake

the whole shift.

(Id., 15:13–21.) When asked how Tommy responded to his request being denied,

Officer Rectenwald said:

He wasn’t upset at all. He wasn’t in distress. He wasn’t upset. When I

told him no, he said, okay. He said, I understand. He laid back down in

his rack, and he covered back up and went back to sleep. When I checked

5 The Health Department medical records indicate that Tommy was

prescribed clonidine, ondansetron, hydroxyzine, and dicyclomine. (See ECF No. 63-

1, PAGEID # 815.) The Jail’s Medication Administration Record, however, shows

that Tommy was given clonidine, ondansetron, hydroxyzine, quetiapine, and

cyclobenzaprine. (Id., PAGEID # 817.)

on him a little bit later, he was alseep. He wasn’t mad. He didn’t throw

nothing. He didn’t get mad at me, cuss me out, nothing like that.

(Id., 18:23–19:7.)

But there is some indication that the night was not as peaceful as Officer

Rectenwald remembered. Deputy Amanda Brumfield testified that the now-

deceased Officer Carol Braley told her that Tommy was yelling through the night,

which caused someone to close the outer metal door to D Block with Tommy inside.

(Brumfield Dep., 57:3–13.) No other deponent recalled the outer door being closed.

(See, e.g., Rectenwald Dep., 20:4–17; Bennett Dep., 74:1–5; Stapleton Dep., 19:17–

25.)

F. Tommy attempted suicide on September 14, 2021. He later died

of his injuries.

The next morning, Tommy’s father, Chris, came to visit him at the Jail. (See

ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 976.) Officer Emerson Hunter Bennett escorted Tommy to

and from visitation. According to Officer Bennett, Tommy was polite and respectful.

(Bennett Dep., 71:22–72:1, 75:12–21.) But Mr. Gibson recalled that Tommy

appeared “haggard,” “angry and agitated” during the visit. (Gibson Dec., ECF No.

77-4, ¶ 4.) Tommy told his father “that he had been taken out of one hole and been

placed into a deeper, darker, hole.” (Id., ¶ 5.) Mr. Gibson understood the “darker

hole” as a reference to the light in D Block. (Id.) Mr. Gibson ended his visit early

because he did not want to cry in front of Tommy. (Id., ¶ 7.)

An hour after the visit with his father ended, Tommy was found hanging in

his cell. (ECF No. 63-1, PAGEID # 880.) He had twisted his blanket into a noose.

Officer Bennett put his arms through the cell bars to hold Tommy up to relieve

pressure on his neck. (Bennett Dec., ECF No. 63-9, ¶ 21.) An inmate ran for help.

(Id., ¶ 22.) Officer Braley used scissors to cut the blanket. (Id., ¶ 24.) Officer

Bennett performed chest compressions before Tommy was taken to the hospital.

Tommy died of his injuries.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Two years after his death, Cara Gibson filed suit on behalf of herself, her

children, and Tommy’s estate. (ECF No. 1.) The operative Amended Complaint

asserts federal constitutional and state-law claims against Gallia County and

several of its officials. (Am. Compl.) Before reaching the merits of the suit, several

claims and parties require attention.

A. Pseudonymous Defendants

The Amended Complaint names twenty-one pseudonymous Defendants: CO-

15, John/Jane Doe Supervisors #1–10, and John/Jane Doe Corrections Officers #1–

10. (Am. Compl.) Ms. Gibson has not moved to substitute the real names of those

Defendants, nor has she effected service upon them as required by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(m). Accordingly, all claims against CO-15 and the Doe Defendants

are DISMISSED for failure to timely effect service of process.

B. Officer Carol Braley

On July 27, 2023, Defendants notified the Court and all parties of the death

of Defendant Officer Carol Braley. (ECF No. 42.) The parties then had 90 days to

file a motion for substitution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). No such motion was filed, so

“the action . . . against the decedent must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Boyd v. Smith,

No. 2:12-CV-814, 2014 WL 1050080, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2014) (dismissing

claims against deceased defendant where “six months ha[d] passed since the filing

of the suggestion of death, and no motion for substitution ha[d] been filed”). All

claims against Officer Braley are thus DISMISSED.

C. Officer Christopher Queen

Finally, Ms. Gibson concedes that “the evidence compiled through discovery

does not create a genuine issue of material fact on” Officer Christopher Queen’s

involvement in the events surrounding Tommy’s death. (Resp., ECF No. 77,

PAGEID # 2202.) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is thus GRANTED

as to Officer Queen.

D. Official Capacity Claims

A lawsuit brought against a public official in his or her official capacity is

treated as a suit against the government entity — the real party in interest.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). To prove liability, then, a plaintiff

must prove that the entity’s policy or custom caused the constitutional injury. Id.

The same standard is used to prove municipal liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Courts regularly dismiss as

redundant claims against agents in their official capacities when the principal

entity is also named as a defendant in the suit.” Johnson v. Washington Cnty.

Career Ctr., No. 2:10-CV-076, 2010 WL 2570929, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2010)

(citing Von Herbert v. City of St. Clair Shores, 61 F. App’x 133, 140 (6th Cir. 2003));

see also Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x 322, 327 (6th Cir.

2013) (concluding that an official capacity suit against a township’s agent was

“superfluous” because the township was also named as a defendant). Because Ms.

Gibson names Gallia County as a Defendant, her official capacity claims against the

remaining County officials (Sheriff Champlin, Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy

Johnson, and Officers Fink, Clay, Stapleton, Rectenwald, and Bennett) are

redundant. Those official capacity claims are DISMISSED.6

* * *

After dismissing the pseudonymous defendants, the official capacity claims,

and Officer Braley, and granting summary judgment to Officer Queen, these claims

and defendants remain:

Count I: Deprivation of Due Process (U.S. CONST. amend XIV)

Deliberate Indifference Theory – Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy

Johnson, and Officers Fink, Clay, Stapleton, Rectenwald, and Bennett,

each in their individual capacity

Failure to Implement Policy/Train/Supervise Theory – Gallia County

Count II: Wrongful Death (Ohio Rev. Code § 2124.02)

Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy Johnson, and Officers Fink, Clay,

Stapleton, Rectenwald, and Bennett, each in their individual capacity

Count III: Gross Negligence (Ohio common law)

Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy Johnson, and Officers Fink, Clay,

Stapleton, Rectenwald, and Bennett, each in their individual capacity

Count IV: Loss of Consortium (Ohio common law)

Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy Johnson, and Officers Fink, Clay,

Stapleton, Rectenwald, and Bennett, each in their individual capacity

(Am. Compl.)

6 Because Sheriff Champlin was only sued in his official capacity, this

dismisses him from the action.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine

issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving

party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co.,

12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present “significant

probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir.

1993). In other words, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that

summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact

to find for the non-moving party).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Count I: Federal Constitutional Claim

In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Ms. Gibson alleges that Gallia County,

along with, in their individual capacities, Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy Johnson,

and Officers Fink, Clay, Stapleton, Rectenwald, and Bennett (the “Individual

Defendants”), violated Tommy’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by exhibiting

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

1. Ms. Gibson concedes that the Individual Defendants

(except Officer Rectenwald) are entitled to summary

judgment on Count I.

The Individual Defendants raise a qualified-immunity defense to Ms.

Gibson’s deliberate indifference claim. “When the defendant raises qualified

immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant is not

entitled to summary judgment.” Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir.

2008). Qualified immunity is intended to “give[] government officials breathing

room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Accordingly, “it protects ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

An official is entitled to qualified immunity so long as he has not violated a

“clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). The analysis is two-

pronged: Courts must determine first whether the facts make out a violation of a

constitutional right and, second, whether that right was clearly established at the

time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

“These two prongs may be addressed in any order. If either prong is not met, then

the government officer is entitled to qualified immunity.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882

F.3d 579, 604 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

Ms. Gibson contends that the Individual Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to Tommy’s serious medical condition while he was detained. Both

convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees have “a constitutional right to be free

from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs.” Howell v. NaphCare,

Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2023). For prisoners, this right arises under the

Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” Greene v.

Crawford Cnty., Mich., 22 F.4th 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. CONST.

amend. VIII). For pretrial detainees, the right derives from the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., Ky., 975 F.3d 554, 566

(6th Cir. 2020). For many years, this was a distinction without a difference—courts

in this circuit analyzed both pretrial detainees’ and prisoners’ deliberate

indifference claims “under the same rubric,” requiring a plaintiff to establish both

an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994); Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff needed to show an “objectively”

serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To meet the subjective component, a

plaintiff had to prove that an officer (i) subjectively knew of facts that created a

substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, (ii) subjectively concluded that the

substantial risk of serious harm existed, and (iii) responded unreasonably to that

risk. Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., 93 F.4th 919, 926–27 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); Campbell v. Riahi, No. 23-3793, 2024 WL 3565391, at *3

(6th Cir. July 29, 2024) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835).7

Then in 2015, the Supreme Court considered a similar framework in the

context of excessive force claims. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).

The Court concluded that, in that context, a pretrial detainee need demonstrate

“only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively

unreasonable,” while a prisoner must prove both objective and subjective

unreasonableness. Id. at 396–97, 400–02. The Sixth Circuit subsequently brought

Kingsley into the deliberate indifference rubric, thereby lowering the subjective

showing required to succeed on such claims brought by pretrial detainees. Brawner,

14 F.4th at 596 (“Given Kingsley’s clear delineation between claims brought by

convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment and claims brought by pretrial

detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, applying the same analysis to these

constitutionally distinct groups is no longer tenable.”). Now, a “pretrial detainee

must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin

to reckless disregard” to succeed on a deliberate indifference claim. Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted); Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., 60 F.4th 305, 316 (6th

Cir. 2023) (“Simply put, Brawner held that Kingsley required us to lower the

7 The Sixth Circuit recommended Campbell v. Riahi for publication; the

decision has not yet appeared in the Federal Reporter, 4th.

subjective component from actual knowledge to recklessness.”), cert. denied, 144 S.

Ct. 692 (2024).

But that is not the end of the story. Earlier this year, in Lawler v. Hardeman

County, Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit counseled that, until Brawner was decided,

Farmer was the “only clearly established law” applicable to a pretrial detainee’s

deliberate indifference claim. 93 F.4th at 927–28. As a result, for actions arising

before Brawner was decided in 2021, a court must apply the higher actual-

knowledge standard from Farmer to determine if an officer is entitled to qualified

immunity. Id.

The Sixth Circuit decided Lawler shortly after briefing on the instant Motion

closed. (See ECF No. 84.) In her Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Gibson “concedes that the Lawler

case supports granting summary judgment to” all remaining Individual Defendants

except Officer Rectenwald. (ECF No. 85, PAGEID # 2435.) Accordingly, Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the individual capacity claims

against Lieutenant Werry, Chief Deputy Johnson, and Officers Fink, Clay,

Stapleton, and Bennett, each in their individual capacity.

2. Officer Rectenwald is entitled to summary judgment on

Count I.

As a caveat to her concession, Ms. Gibson argues that Officer Rectenwald is

not entitled to qualified immunity, even under the higher Farmer standard. (Id.)

She asserts that Officer Rectenwald knew of facts that “made it ‘obvious’ that a

strong likelihood existed that [Tommy] would commit suicide.” (Id., PAGEID # 2436

(citing Lawler, 93 F.4th at 929 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)).) The record

shows that Officer Rectenwald knew that Tommy (i) was in D Block; (ii) was on

medications for withdrawal, even though he was not showing any signs or

symptoms of active withdrawal; (iii) had been evaluated by Hopewell, but was not

placed on suicide watch; and (iv) asked to call his wife (the victim of his charged

domestic assault offense) in the middle of the night. No reasonable jury could find

that this collection of facts made Tommy’s suicide an obvious risk.

Ms. Gibson argues that Officer Rectenwald knew about Ms. Russell’s report

to Sherriff Champlin, and had reason to doubt Hopewell’s assessment—in part

because Tommy admitted to Ms. Ashburn that he had, at one time, had a suicide

plan. (ECF No. 85, PAGEID # 2437.) But there is no evidence that Officer

Rectenwald knew about Ms. Russell’s report or the contents of Ms. Ashburn’s

assessment.8 See Greene, 22 F.4th at 607 (explaining that the subjective prong of

the deliberate indifference analysis must look at each defendant individually, such

that knowledge cannot be imputed from one defendant to another).

Officer Rectenwald is thus entitled to qualified immunity on Ms. Gibson’s

deliberate indifference claim; Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED to that extent.

8 Ms. Gibson also argues that Officer Rectenwald knew about the distressing

tenor of Tommy’s visit with his father because “the records or debriefings must have

included” that information. (ECF No. 85, PAGEID # 2437.) But Tommy’s father

visited the jail two hours after Officer Rectenwald’s shift ended on September 14.

(See Rectenwald Dep., 24:9–11; ECF No. 63-13, PAGEID # 976.)

3. Gallia County is also entitled to summary judgment on

Count I.

Counties may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of

their employees or agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A county can be held directly

liable only when “an officially executed policy, or the toleration of a custom . . . leads

to, causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.” Doe v.

Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–

91). Ms. Gibson bases her § 1983 claim against Gallia County on allegations that

Jail policy caused a failure to mitigate the risk of Tommy’s suicide. (Resp., PAGEID

# 2204–06.) Her Amended Complaint asserts that Gallia County (through Sheriff

Champlin and Lieutenant Werry) “fail[ed] to adopt policies, train, and/or supervise”

Jail officials in investigating, monitoring, and reporting on inmates’ medical

conditions, and transporting inmates for advanced medical care. (Am. Compl., ¶ 56.)

But Ms. Gibson seems to have abandoned the failure-to-train and supervisory-

liability theories in favor of a claim focused on liability for failure to adopt and

implement effective policies. (Resp., PAGEID # 2204–06.)

A county’s failure to act may be a basis for municipal liability when those

“failures amount[] to ‘a policy of deliberate indifference’ to [the plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights.” Campbell, 2024 WL 3565391, at *5 (quoting Claiborne Cnty.,

103 F.3d at 508). But “a municipality cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of

deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been

clearly established.” Campbell, 2024 WL 3565391, at *5 (quoting Arrington-Bey v.

City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 994–95 (6th Cir. 2017)). Because the

Individual Defendants did not violate a clearly established right, it follows that

their employer, Gallia County, was not deliberately indifferent to such a right. Id.

Gallia County is entitled to summary judgment on Count I.

B. Counts II, III, IV: State Law Claims

In Counts II, III, and IV, Ms. Gibson asserts wrongful death, gross

negligence, and loss of consortium claims against the Individual Defendants. Ohio

law generally shields municipal employees from such claims, with three exceptions.9

Relevant here, statutory immunity will not apply when the municipal employee’s

acts or omissions were “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or

reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b).

Ms. Gibson argues that the Individual Defendants acted in a reckless manner

and are thus not entitled to statutory immunity. As the Sixth Circuit recently

explained,

an officer acts in a reckless manner when she consciously disregards or

is indifferent towards “a known or obvious risk of harm to another that

is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater

than negligent conduct.” That definition creates “rigorous standards”

that are “difficult to establish[.]”

Campbell, 2024 WL 3565391, at *6 (quoting Argabrite v. Neer, 75 N.E.3d 161, 164

(Ohio 2016)). The question thus becomes whether any of the Individual Defendants

acted in a manner that “was so ‘perverse’ as to amount to ‘substantially greater

9 Ms. Gibson also argues that Gallia County is not entitled to statutory

immunity. However, Ms. Gibson did not assert any state-law claims against Gallia

County. (See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 57–62.) Even if she had, Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.60

does not expressly impose civil liability on political subdivisions themselves. See

Hale v. Toth, Nos. 112030, 2023 WL 5444109, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2023),

appeal denied, 223 N.E.3d 1260 (Table) (Ohio 2023).

than negligent conduct.’” Id. (quoting A.J.R. v. Lute, 168 N.E.3d 1157, 1161–62

(Ohio 2020)).

Ms. Gibson recites each Individual Defendant’s involvement in the

surrounding circumstances and argues that each perversely ignored the obvious

risk of Tommy’s suicide. But no reasonable jury could make such a finding.

Lieutenant Werry. On September 13, Ms. Russell called Sheriff Champlin and

told him that Tommy was depressed and suicidal. Sheriff Champlin then called

Lieutenant Werry and asked him to have Tommy evaluated by Hopewell.

Lieutenant Werry then called the Jail and directed Officer Smith to arrange the

evaluation. When Lieutenant Werry next spoke to the Jail, he was told that Tommy

had been evaluated and that Hopewell concluded that, while he was not suicidal, he

should stay in D Block.

It is unclear whether Lieutenant Werry told Officer Smith that there was a

specific concern that Tommy was suicidal. Even if he omitted that detail, the Court

cannot conclude that Lieutenant Werry acted recklessly—he directed Officer Smith

to have Tommy evaluated by the Jail’s mental health provider, who did not

recommend suicide watch. Howell, 67 F.4th at 315 (explaining that non-medically

trained officers can reasonably defer to a medical professional’s opinion, although

such deference is not absolute or indefinite).

Ms. Gibson further argues that Lieutenant Werry “condoned the use of a non-

medical screener and Defendants’ obliviousness to what she learned[,]” but there is

no evidence that Lieutenant Werry knew anything about Ms. Ashburn’s credentials

or the details of her assessment. Lieutenant Werry was, at most, negligent in failing

to learn those details.

Chief Deputy Johnson. Chief Deputy Troy Johnson performed CPR on Tommy

after his noose was severed. Ms. Gibson asserts that he was also responsible for the

Jail facilities, including the inoperable camera and light fixture in D Block.10 The

camera had broken on September 8, 2019, after an inmate struck it with a trash

can. The same inmate broke the light. Assuming that was his responsibility, Chief

Deputy Johnson was, at most, negligent in failing to repair those facilities more

quickly.

Officer Fink. Officer Fink worked from 3:00pm to 11:00pm on September 13,

2019. He knew that Tommy was in D Block, but did not know why. Although Officer

Fink was on duty when Tommy was evaluated by Ms. Ashburn, he did not speak

with about her assessment or conclusion. Officer Fink also administered Tommy’s

withdrawal packet, which had been hand-delivered by the Health Department.

Although the medications administered were not the medications prescribed, there

is no evidence that Officer Fink was aware of, let alone responsible for, the

discrepancy.

Officer Clay. Officer Misty Clay was not on duty when Tommy was booked or

when he attempted suicide. (Clay Dec., ECF No. 63-8, ¶¶ 6–7.) Officer Clay knew

that Tommy was in D Block for withdrawal, but she did not observe him in any

10 Chief Deputy Johnson’s Declaration states that he “do[es] not have any

involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Gallia County Jail.” (Johnson Dec.,

ECF No. 63-4, ¶ 6.) This dispute is not material to the resolution of the claim.

distress at any time. (Id., ¶¶ 12, 14.) Officer Clay conducted regular check-ins on

Tommy while he was in D Block, and she knew that the camera in D Block was not

operational. There is no basis to find that a corrections officer acts recklessly by

placing a detainee in an observation cell without a working camera when that

detainee is not visibly in distress and the corrections officer conducts regular

observations of the detainee.

Officer Stapleton. Officer Stapleton also knew that Tommy was in D Block—

she brought him dinner on September 13, 2019, and observed him lying down.

Although Officer Stapleton was on duty when Ms. Ashburn evaluated Tommy,

creating a possibility that she could have interrogated Ms. Ashburn’s assessment,

there is no evidence that Officer Stapleton facilitated the evaluation or interacted

with Ms. Ashburn in any way.

Officer Rectenwald. The Court has already concluded that Officer Rectenwald

did not act with conscious disregard. Ms. Gibson argues that Tommy’s mid-night

request to call her (his wife and victim of his domestic assault charges) should have

raised alarm bells for Officer Rectenwald. But without any other indicia of trouble,

the Court cannot conclude that Officer Rectenwald recklessly failed to recognize that

Tommy was suicidal. Cf. Cooper v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 222 F. App’x 459, 470–71

(6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an inmate’s outfit and housing assignment did not

make it obvious that inmate was on suicide watch when both the outfit and housing

assignment had an “explanation . . . besides the suicide watch explanation”).

Officer Bennett. Officer Bennett was on duty when Tommy attempted suicide.

At the beginning of his shift, he was told that Tommy was in D Block because he

was detoxing. Officer Bennett was also told that Tommy had been evaluated by

Hopewell, but had not been placed on suicide watch. Officer Bennett escorted

Tommy to and from the visitation bay. While escorting another inmate to visitation,

Officer Bennett found Tommy hanging in his cell. Officer Bennett reached through

the bars of the cell door to relieve pressure on Tommy’s neck and called for help.

When Tommy was cut down, Officer Bennett began chest compressions.

Ms. Gibson argues that Officer Bennett was willfully blind to an obvious

risk—that he “must have known” that the camera was not functioning, “the cell was

pitch black,” that “Tommy was only being sporadically monitored” even though he

was detoxing; and that he “must have observed the emotional fragility Tommy

had . . . displayed to his father” during their notably brief visit. (Resp., PAGEID

# 2201.) Officer Bennett admitted in deposition that he knew the camera was

broken, but explained that a camera is helpful only when an officer is able to

monitor the feed (which, that morning, he was not). (Bennett Dep., 95:1–18.) He

also knew that the light was broken, but testified that it was “not pitch dark” and

that he “had plenty of light to do what [he] needed to do, plenty of light to see

[Tommy]” and “plenty of light to cut him down.” (Id., 68:6–20.) Officer Bennett

followed Jail policy on the frequency of physical checks of Tommy. And, finally, he

found nothing remarkable about Tommy’s affect after visitation, except for how

“polite” and “respectful” Tommy was.

* * *

Ms. Gibson’s arguments, though cogent and moving, “come with the benefit of

hindsight, as well as a degree of reflection.” Campbell, 2024 WL 3565391, at *6. But

“the standard for proving recklessness is high,” and she cannot persuade a

reasonable jury that any of the Individual Defendants’ conduct “was so perverse as

to amount to recklessness under Ohio law.” Id. The Individual Defendants are thus

entitled to statutory immunity on Counts II, III, and IV.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Ms. Gibson’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply (ECF

No. 81) and Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority (ECF No.

84) are GRANTED. Ms. Gibson’s claims against Corrections Officers Doe #1-10,

Supervisors Doe #1-10, CO-15, and Officer Carol Braley are DISMISSED. Ms.

Gibson’s Official Capacity claims against the Individual Defendants are also

DISMISSED. Finally, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63) is

GRANTED as to all remaining claims.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE