Opinion

Bonwick v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Aug 23, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.7%

“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DONALD C. BONWICK, CASE NO. 4:24-cv-294

Plaintiff, DISTRICT JUDGE

DAVID A. RUIZ

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SECURITY, JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

Defendant.

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Donald C. Bonwick filed a complaint against the Commissioner

of Social Security seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

denying disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Doc.

1. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The Court

referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for the

preparation of a Report and Recommendation. Following review, and for the

reasons stated below, I recommend that the District Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Procedural Background

In October 2021, Bonwick filed applications for both disability insurance

benefits and social security income, alleging a disability onset date in October

2019.1 Tr. 262, 269. Bonwick alleged disability relating to depression, ADHD,

learning disability, snapping hip syndrome,2 bursitis,3 lumbar4 disc

1 “Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the

onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x

422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).

2 Snapping hip syndrome, the common name for the medical condition

“coxa saltans,” is a hip disorder that causes a snapping feeling or sound when

individuals move their hip joint. It may cause inflammation and, in serious

conditions, can cause pain and affect movement. Snapping Hip Syndrome,

What is snapping hip syndrome?. Healthline, Health Conditions,

https://www.healthline.com/health/snapping-hip-syndrome

[https://perma.cc/7DMS-J4NX].

3 Bursitis is a condition that affects the cushioning around bones,

tendons, and muscles near joints. It occurs when the bursae, the small fluid-

filled sacs that provide cushioning, become inflamed. With proper treatment,

bursitis pain can resolve within a few weeks, but it may recur or flare-up.

Bursitis, Diseases & Conditions, Mayo Clinic,

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/bursitis/symptoms-causes/syc-

20353242 [https://perma.cc/E9ZN-XGPB].

4 Vertebrae in a person’s spine are given letter and number designations

according to their location. The neck—the cervical spine—has seven vertebrae

designated as C1 through C7. See Thomas Scioscia, MD, Vertebrae in the

Vertebral Column, Spine-health Resources, https://www.spine-

health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/vertebrae-vertebral-column

[https://perma.cc/R9MM-TBZT]. The twelve vertebrae compromising the

upper spine—the thoracic spine—are labeled at T1 through T12. Id. The five

vertebrae in the lower spine—the lumbar spine—are L1 through L5. Id. The

five vertebrae at the bottom of the spine—in the sacrum—are labeled as S1

through S5. Thomas Scioscia, MD, Sacrum (Sacral Region), Spine-health

Resources, https://www.spine-health.com/conditions/spine-anatomy/sacrum-

sacral-region [https://perma.cc/S2BR-RBTB]. Conditions referring to

lumbar or sacral, refer to conditions affecting these areas of the spine.

degeneration, lumbar sacral neuritis,5 lumbosacral spondylosis,6 and

lumbago.7 Tr. 89, 100. The Commissioner denied Bonwick’s application

initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 112, 122.

In April 2022, Bonwick requested a hearing. Tr. 170. Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mary Lohr held a telephonic hearing in February 2023. Tr.

38. Bonwick appeared, testified, and was represented by counsel at the

hearing. Id. Qualified vocational expert Gail Klier also testified. Tr. 58. In April

2023, the ALJ issued a written decision, which found that Bonwick was not

entitled to benefits. Tr. 14.

In May 2023, Bonwick appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals

Counsel. Tr. 233. In December 2023, the Appeals Counsel denied Bonwick’s

appeal, Tr. 1, making the ALJ’s April 2023 decision the final decision of the

Commissioner, Tr. 14–37; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

5 Neuritis, or neuropathic pain, is a nerve pain that occurs from a

malfunction in or damage to the nervous system. It can be caused by a number

of other conditions, including diabetes and spinal nerve compression or

inflammation. See Neuropathic Pain, Cleveland Clinic Health Library,

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/15833-neuropathic-pain

[https://perma.cc/K2NX-ETPB].

6 Spondylolysis is the medical term for a small crack or break between

two vertebrae in the spine. It most commonly affects the lower, or lumbar,

spinal region. Spondylolysis, Cleveland Clinic Health Library,

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/10303-spondylolysis

[https://perma.cc/DW7M-JUUY].

7 Lumbago is a nonmedical term for any pain in the lower back. See

Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1062 (33rd ed. 2020).

Evidence8

1. Age, Education, and Vocational History

Bonwick was 37 years old on the alleged onset date. Tr. 89. He has at

least a high school education. Tr. 30, 45. Bonwick has reported past work as a

general laborer, store laborer, maintenance carpenter. Tr. 29–30.

2. Medical Evidence

Since at least September 2019, Bonwick has received mental health

treatment primarily at the Serenity Center of Youngstown. See Tr. 360–465;

808–878; 883-–902; 907–998. In September 2019, at an initial appointment

with Francine McDaniel, FNP-C,9 Bonwick reported that he sought services

because he needed a new provider and had been taken off of his medications

“cold turkey.” Tr. 432. Bonwick reported anxiety and difficulty focusing at work

but he stated that his most recent medication regimen was effective. Id. He

described some depression and generalized anxiety that occurred a few times

8 The recitation of evidence and testimony is not intended to be exhaustive

and is generally limited to that cited in the parties’ briefs. Because Bonwick

has not included any summary of the medical evidence, or otherwise provided

record citations beyond the ALJ’s decision and hearing testimony, the Court

has generally limited its recitation of medical evidence to the evidence cited in

the Commissioner’s briefing.

9 The initials FNP-C refers to a Family Nurse Practitioner certified by the

American Academy of Nurse Practitioners. FNP-C vs FNP-BC: Which Family

Nurse Practitioner Certification Do I Need?, Nurse. Org.,

https://nurse.org/education/fnpc-vs-fnpbc/#:~:text=FNP-

C%20is%20a%20medical%20abbreviation%20for%20the%20Family,all%20eli

gibility%20requirements%20and%20pass%20a%20competency-

based%20exam. [https://perma.cc/5BJQ-93P6].

per month. Tr. 433–34. Bonwick also reported attention difficulties, including

periods of “zoning out” and trouble listening when spoken to directly. Tr. 434.

Nurse Practitioner McDaniel reported that Bonwick presented as calm,

friendly, attentive, communicative, and relaxed. Tr. 437. She noted that his

speech was normal, his language skills were intact, and his mood and affect

were normal. Tr. 437. She also wrote that Bonwick’s short-term memory was

also intact and there were no signs of hyperactive or attention difficulties. Tr.

437. Nurse Practitioner McDaniel diagnosed Bonwick with generalized anxiety

disorder, dysthymic disorder, and ADHD. Tr. 437. She prescribed Effexor for

anxiety, Adderall for ADHD, and Trazadone for insomnia. Tr. 438.

One week later, Bonwick denied anxiety or ADHD symptoms, reported

that he was happy with his medication and that he was doing well. Tr. 439. He

also appeared calm, friendly, attentive, communicative, and relaxed. Tr. 439.

His mood was normal with no signs of depression and his memory was intact.

Tr. 439. There were no reported signs of anxiety at this appointment. Tr. 439.

During later visits to Serenity Center from late 2019 through January

2021, Bonwick sometimes reported or exhibited difficulties with attention or

remaining focused. See Tr. 404, 442. At other times, he denied inattentiveness

or ADHD symptoms. See Tr. 384, 394, 427. On several occasions, Bonwick

exhibited a normal attention span, no signs of attention difficulties or

hyperactivity, and denied inattentive symptoms. Tr. 362, 380, 384, 390, 394,

414, 427, 452, 457. He also frequently exhibited a euthymic mood,10 intact

memory, logical thinking, or normal articulation and speech. See, e.g., Tr. 367,

374, 380, 384, 390, 395, 399, 409, 413, 427, 452, 456, 457.

In July 2020, Bonwick sought emergency treatment for a left ankle

injury after twisting it at a water park. Tr. 505.

From February 2021 through November 2021, Bonwick continued to

report in appointments at the Serenity Center that his medications were

working well and that he wished to continue them. Tr. 808, 815, 854, 868, 872.

Sometimes, Bonwick reported or displayed anxiety or attention difficulties and

did not seem to listen when spoken to. Tr. 839, 843, 844, 855. But at other

times, he denied or did not display anxiety, depression, or inattentiveness. Tr.

809, 815, 816, 823. Bonwick also often exhibited appropriate behavior, normal

attention span, intact memory, logical thinking, normal insight and social

judgment, appropriate affect, or a euthymic mood. See, e.g., Tr. 809, 816, 823,

829, 833, 834, 839, 850, 860, 866, 873.

Bonwick continued to be treated at Serenity Center between December

2021 and February 2022. Tr. 883–902. During this time, Bonwick continued to

report anxiety or depression but he also expressed that his medications worked

well. Tr. 883, 890, 891, 897. Bonwick also displayed intact memory, normal

attention, normal social judgment, and a euthymic mood. Tr. 884, 891, 898.

10 A euthymic [mood/affect] is tranquil, neither depressed nor manic. See

Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 647 (33rd ed. 2020).

In a March 2022 examination at the Serenity Center, Bonwick stated

that he was “doing good,” although he continued to experience anxiety and

depression symptoms. Tr. 907. And in an April 2022 examination, he asserted

that his medications were working well, denied any side effects, and expressed

that he wished to continue on his current medications. Tr. 913. In June and

July 2022, Bonwick stated, respectively, that his depression and anxiety were

manageable, Tr. 935, and that his ADHD symptoms were well controlled with

Adderall, Tr. 975. At an October 2022 appointment at the Serenety Center,

Bonwick remarked that his symptoms were management and that he worked

at the “Scare Grounds” for Halloween and was enjoyed it. Tr. 953.

3. State Agency Consultants

In December 2021, state agency psychological consultant, Courtney

Zeune, Psy.D, found that Bonwick could perform short cycle work tasks in a

setting with flexible pace and production requirements. Tr. 108. Dr. Zeune also

found that Bonwick was not significantly limited or had no evidence of

limitation in various areas of social interaction. Tr. 108. In March 2022, state

agency psychological consultant on reconsideration, Kristen Haskins, Psy.D,

generally agreed with Dr. Zeune’s determinations but slightly modified her

findings to include that Bonwick could perform short cycle work tasks in a

setting with no fast-paced demand. Tr. 118–19.

4. Hearing Testimony

Bonwick testified that he lived with his twin sister, her family, and his

parents. Tr. 44. He stated that he had a driver’s license but did not drive often

as it caused him pain. Tr. 45. Bonwick testified that he graduated high school.

Tr. 45. He described that he stopped working in October 2019 when pain in his

hip and groin worsened and prevented him from being able to “do [his job] at

100 percent.” Tr. 52. Bonwick stated that he was recommended for hip

replacement surgery but has to lose weight first, because doctors could not

perform the surgery on a person with a BMI above 40. Tr. 53. Bonwick testified

that he would not be able to perform seated work because it also hurt his hip

and that his alternatives to sitting or standing include lying down in bed or in

a recliner with his legs up. Tr. 54. He said that he cannot put weight on his

right leg and has fallen over when he has done so. Tr. 54. Bonwick also testified

that he took the medication Effexor as prescribed for his anxiety and that he

participated in telehealth counseling. Tr. 55.

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act (the

“Act”) through December 31, 2024. This

finding departs from that of the previous

decision, a reflection of the claimant’s

acquiring additional “quarters of coverage”

from work activity.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since October 1, 2019, the

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.,

416.971 et seq.). Except that this finding

reflects the alleged onset date for the present

claim, it adheres to that of the previous

decision.

3. The claimant has the following severe

impairments: obesity, degenerative disc

disease of the lumbar spine, status-post

facture of the left ankle, degenerative joint

disease/arthritis of the hip, dysthymic

disorder, generalized anxiety disorder,

attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, and

insomnia, unspecified. (20 CFR 404.1520(c)

and 416.920(c)). This finding departs from

that of the previous decision, in order to

reflect severe impairments documented in the

current evidence.

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or

medically equals the severity of one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),

404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and

416.926). This finding adheres to that of the

previous decision.

5. After careful consideration of the entire

record, the undersigned finds that the

claimant has the residual function capacity to

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that the

claimant may stand and/or walk, with normal

breaks, for up to four hours in an eight-hour

workday; the claimant may frequently

balance, may occasionally stoop, kneel,

crouch, crawl, climb ramps and stairs, but

may never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

the claimant must avoid all exposure to

unprotected heights and moving mechanical

parts; the claimant is limited to the

performance of simple, routine, repetitive

tasks, conducted in a setting free of

production-rate pace [as is found in assembly

line work]. This finding departs from that of

the previous decision, in order to

accommodate the present state of the

impairments documented in the current

evidence.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past

relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and

416.965). This finding adheres to that of the

previous decision, including consideration of

the job of maintenance carpenter, identified

as past relevant work since the previous

decision.

7. The claimant was born on May 31, 1982 and

was 37 years old, which is defined as a

younger individual age 18–49, on the alleged

disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and

416.963). This finding departs from that of the

previous decision, owing to the claimant’s

attainment of greater chronological age.

8. The claimant has at least a high school

education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

This finding adheres to that of the previous

decision.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to

the determination of disability because using

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework

supports a finding that the claimant is “not

disable,” whether or not the claimant has

transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). This

finding departs from that of the previous

decision, in order to establish the appropriate

grounds for the finding for a claimant with

semi-skilled or skilled work.

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education,

work experience, and residual functional

capacity, there are jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy

that the claimant can perform (20 CFR

404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.696, and 416.969a).

This finding adheres to that of the previous

decision.

11. The claimant has not been under a disability,

as defined in the Social Security Act, from

October 1, 2019, through the date of this

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

Except that this finding recites the alleged

onset date for the present claim, it adheres to

that of the previous decision.

Tr. 20–31 .

Standard for Disability

Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence

of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).

An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a

disability determination:

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

2. Does the claimant have a medically

determinable impairment, or a combination of

impairments, that is “severe”? If not, the

claimant is not disabled.

3. Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal

one of the listed impairments and meet the

duration requirement? If so, the claimant is

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

4. What is the claimant’s residual functional

capacity and can the claimant perform past

relevant work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next

step.

5. Can the claimant do any other work

considering the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work

experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.

If not, the claimant is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d

417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the

burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden

shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The

claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional

capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the

duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).

Standard of review

A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it

determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has

made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”

Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which

“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains

‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek

v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial

evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than

a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citations

omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by

substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at

99.

A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or

decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.

2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence

supports a claimant’s position, a reviewing court cannot overturn the

Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the

conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,

477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”

the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Discussion

As an initial matter, before proceeding to the substance of Bonwick’s

argument, the Court notes that Bonwick’s brief contains no citation to the

medical record, and only a very brief summary of Bonwick’s vocational history,

level of educational, and testimony. See Doc. 8, at 1–9. The Court’s initial order

states: “All facts relevant to the legal issues and discussion must be set forth

in the Facts section.” Doc. 5, at 3. Bonwick even recognizes that “[i]n order to

determine an RFC, the adjudicator is instructed to base the assessment on ‘all

of the relevant medical and other evidence.’ 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.45(a)(3),

416.945(a)(3).” Doc. 8, at 5. Yet, Bonwick’s brief contains no citation to the

record of medical evidence, instead opting to cite only the ALJ’s written

decision and Bonwick’s hearing testimony. So, Bonwick is not off to a strong

start.

Proceeding to the substance of Bonwick’s single issue presented, it is

meritless. For starters, as stated above, Bonwick has not cited to any medical

evidence that the ALJ allegedly failed to consider in crafting Bonwick’s RFC.

See generally Doc. 8. This is problematic because the questions before the Court

are whether the ALJ complied with applicable regulations and whether the

ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. See Bass, 499 F.3d at

509. So without citation to the record to show that the ALJ’s failed to consider

certain evidence or symptoms, the Court is left only with Bonwick’s opinion.

Additionally, Bonwick has not clearly alleged that the ALJ failed to comply

with any particular regulation. See Doc. 8, at 5–7. Instead, Bonwick generally

cites regulations describing the process to reach an RFC determination,

admits that the RFC does include some limitations, and claims generally that

the limitations included were insufficient. Doc. 8, at 5–7.

Bonwick admits that the RFC did include “some mental limitations,” but

he “argues that the RFC is not sufficient to accommodate each of Plaintiff’s

impaired functional abilities.” Doc. 8, at 6. Specifically, Bonwick baldly claims

that the RFC limitations included “do not reflect a limitation which

corresponds to his reduced ability to adapt and manage.” Doc. 8, at 7. But

Bonwick omits any mention of evidence to support the idea that he has

“impaired functional abilities.” Indeed, other than citing the ALJ’s decision,

Bonwick offers no record basis to conclude that he has any impairments at all.

So without more, his argument is simply an expression of Bonwick’s opinion

that the ALJ should have provided greater limitations. And, as the

Commissioner notes, despite Bonwick’s assertion that greater limitations

should have been included, he does not make any argument as to what those

limitations should have been. See Doc. 10, at 13. This sort of argument does

not provide the Court with any basis for remand.

Bonwick makes two additional arguments, neither of which are clearly

related to his sole captioned argument that the ALJ failed to properly consider

each of his mental impairments in crafting his RFC. Doc. 8, at 4. First, Bonwick

cites the DOT11 sections for each job the vocational expert opined a

hypothetical individual with Bonwick’s RFC could perform. Doc. 8, at 7–8. He

then asks the Court to conclude that “those jobs would clearly cause an

individual who decompensates under stressors to struggle with job

performance.” Doc. 8, at 7–8. This argument is both confusing and unavailing.

As best as the Court can discern, Bonwick is arguing that the jobs the

vocational expert opined an individual with his RFC could perform are not jobs

that he could actually perform. Bonwick, however, does not directly challenge

the vocational expert’s testimony and he cites nothing in the record—whether

medical evidence or otherwise—for his opinions that he could not perform

those jobs. Bonwick also does not cite any legal authority to show that the

vocational expert or ALJ erred by concluding that these jobs were available to

Bonwick. And because Bonwick’s single argument heading includes no

indication that he challenges the vocational expert’s testimony, the Court need

not consider it.12

Second, and finally, Bonwick cites training material from a continuing

education program entitled “Four Keys to B Criteria,” Doc. 8, at 8–9, in support

11 DOT stands for the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. It is a standard

classification of occupations established by the Social Security Administration.

The DOT includes descriptions of the physical demands, environmental

factors, and skill levels for various occupations.

12 The Court’s Initial Order provides that “[e]ach introductory heading in

the Argument or Analysis section of a brief must correspond to the argument

presented under the heading. Failure to comply with this Requirement may

result in … waiver of the arguments[.]” Doc. 5, at 3–4.

of his apparent argument that the ALJ did not adequately explain the RFC

determination. As an initial matter, this material does not represent

controlling legal authority and Bonwick does not claim otherwise. Additionally,

this argument is confusing because Bonwick does not assert that the ALJ erred

when considering each of the four paragraph B criteria,13 and review of the

ALJ’s decision would contradict any such argument. See Tr. 21–22. In fact,

Bonwick admits that the ALJ need not specifically include limitations based

on each paragraph B criteria into a final RFC determination. See Doc. 8, at 5

(citing Shinlever v. Berryhill, No. 3:15-cv-371-CCS, 2017 WL 2937607, at *46

(E.D. Tenn. Jul. 10, 2017) and recognizing that “an ALJ is not necessarily

required to include mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC solely because she

found mild limitations in the paragraph B criteria for Step Two”). Despite this

recognition, Bonwick asks the Court to find that the ALJ committed reversable

error by failing to explain why certain paragraph B limitations were not

included in the final RFC determination. Doc. 8, at 8–9.

This argument is flawed. Bonwick admits both that there is no

requirement that Paragraph B limitations be included and that some mental

limitations were included in his RFC. See Doc. 8, at, 6, 8–9. Additionally,

13 To meet or equal paragraph B, an individual’s mental disorder must

result in an extreme limitation of one, or a marked limitation of two, of the four

areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying

information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(b).

Bonwick citations nothing to substantiate his assertion the RFC was not

supported by substantial evidence. So he’s forfeited the argument. See

McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[I]ssues adverted

to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed

argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention

a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh

on its bones.”) (internal citations omitted). Bonwick’s final argument is, thus,

contradicted by his earlier arguments and otherwise provides no basis for

remand.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court affirm the

Commissioner’s decision.

Dated: August 23, 2024

/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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