Stadmire v. Henderson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

RICHARD L. STADMIRE, CASE NO. 3:24 CV 115

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

WARDEN KIM HENDERSON, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Currently pending before the Court in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is

Defendants Warden Kim Henderson and Interested Party State of Ohio’s1 Motion to Dismiss.

(Doc. 7). Also pending are two additional related motions. See Doc. 8 (Plaintiff’s “Motion to

Amend Complaint to Exclude All Non-relevant Parties”) and Doc. 12 (Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Docs. 10, 11, and Attached Exhibits.”). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For

the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 8) as moot and

construes the motion as Plaintiff’s opposition brief; grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc.

12); and grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated at the Toledo Correctional Institution, brings this case

asserting civil rights claims arising from an incident on January 18, 2022. See Doc. 1, at 3. He

1. The State of Ohio indicates Plaintiff has yet to perfect service on Defendant John Barker and

the John Doe Defendants. It appears as an interested party pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §

109.361 and notes that it does not waive personal service or any other defenses on behalf of the

unserved Defendants.

asserts Defendant Correctional Officer Barker and Correctional Officer John Doe 1 stopped at

his cell during a “round check.” Id. He asserts Barker “went in and did a cell search” while Doe

1 stayed at the door. Id. at 3-4.

Upon returning to his cell, Plaintiff discovered his cell “was tore up”. Id. at 4. He

requested a “white shirt” to see the condition of his cell, but Defendants refused to call one. Id.

Plaintiff then told the officers they were “going to have to call a Signal 14 [be]cause [he] wasn’t

going in” until he saw someone. Id. Barker told Plaintiff “again to lock-up” and Plaintiff told him

“to follow the protocol and call a Signal 14.” Id.

Barker “then tried to grab” Plaintiff’s elbow and lead him in into his cell; Plaintiff pulled

away, walked to his cell door, put his cup in the doorway, stood at the doorway, and stated he

“wasn’t going in” and not to touch him again. Id. Barker then pushed Plaintiff into his cell and

Plaintiff “returned a punch at him”. Id. Barker and Doe 1 “rush[ed] into Plaintiff’s cell, trying to

take him to the ground. Id. Two to three minutes later, Correctional Officers John Does #2-5

arrived and “began to punch and hit” Plaintiff with their batons. Id. During that time, Plaintiff

and two officers “fell on the range”; Plaintiff was then handcuffed and taken to medical. Id.

Once at medical, he states, the nurses requested to know who the supervisor was

“because they wanted to know why [Plaintiff] was hit several times on [his] head with . . .

batons.” Id. at 5. A doctor was called; he requested Plaintiff be sent to an outside hospital for an

examination of his head and “because of the fact [he] was suffering from a mild concussion.” Id.

Plaintiff received three stitches in his head, surgical glue above his left eye, and other medical

care. Id.

To his Complaint, Plaintiff attaches: (1) a Conduct Report regarding the incident

authored by Defendant Barker (Doc. 1-4); (2) a Rules Infraction Board disposition finding

Plaintiff violated Rule 4 and imposing disciplinary action including restrictive housing (Doc. 1-

5); (3) Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to the Classification Committee (Doc. 1-6); (4) the

Committee’s determination that placement in restrictive housing was appropriate and the denial

of Plaintiff’s appeal (Docs. 1-7, 1-8); and (5) two Kites sent to the Warden in February and

March 2022 (Docs. 1-9, 1-10).

Plaintiff seeks two million dollars for pain and suffering, two million dollars for

violations of his civil rights, and two million dollars “for punitive damages or injunctive relief.”

Id. at 6.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court tests the complaint’s

legal sufficiency. The Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

accepts all factual allegations as true, and determines whether the complaint contains “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it requires

more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Id. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A

complaint is to be dismissed “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of

facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984).

DISCUSSION

Defendant Warden Henderson and Interested Party State of Ohio move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint, arguing: (1) any claims against Henderson must be dismissed because

respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under § 1983 and Plaintiff has not alleged direct,

personal involvement; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive

force against any Defendant; (3) the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s official capacity

claims; and (4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s individual capacity

claims. In reply, Defendants further contend Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of

limitations. (Doc. 9). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion as to

any official capacity claims and any claims as to Defendant Henderson, but denies it as to the

individual capacity claims against the individual Correctional Officers.

Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 8)

Following the filing of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a document entitled

“Motion to Amend Complaint to Exclude All Non-Relevant Parties.” (Doc. 8). However, nothing

within the text of the document indicates it seeks amendment, and it rather contains arguments in

response to Defendant’s motion. See Doc. 8. As such, the Court denies the motion as moot and

construes it as Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Motion to Strike (Doc. 12).

After Defendant’s reply brief was filed on June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document

entitled “Motion Opposing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” on June 28, 2024. (Doc. 10).

Approximately one week later, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend and Add to / Motion to

Oppose Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” (Doc. 11). Defendants then moved to strike both

motions and their attached exhibits (Doc. 12); Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike (Doc. 13),

and Defendants replied (Doc. 14).

The Court’s rules provide for a motion, opposition, and reply; no further briefing is

authorized. See Local Civ. R. 7.1; see also Eberhard v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2014 WL

12756822, at *2 (N.D. Ohio) (“[C]ourts agree that neither local rules . . . nor the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure authorize a non-moving party to file a sur-reply, and that to file a sur-reply the

party must obtain leave of the court.”) (collecting cases). Because Plaintiff did not seek leave of

Court, his additional filing is not properly before the Court. And, even if the additional filing

were construed as Plaintiff’s first response to the motion to dismiss (rather than his “Motion to

Amend Complaint”, referenced above), it would be untimely. See Local Civ. R. 7.1(d) (requiring

opposition brief to be filed within 30 days). The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to

strike Plaintiff’s unauthorized and untimely filings. (Doc. 12).

Official Capacity Claims

Although Plaintiff’s complaint is not clear as to whether he intends to bring his claims

against Defendants in their official or individual capacities, Defendants correctly point out that

they are immune from any official capacity claims.

A suit against a state official operates as an action against the State itself. Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). The State of Ohio has not waived its

sovereign immunity, nor has it consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Mixon v. Ohio, 193

F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, any official capacity claims are barred by sovereign

immunity. WCI, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 18 F.4th 509, 513-14 (6th Cir. 2021).2

2. Defendants cite Eleventh Amendment immunity rather than sovereign immunity. The Sixth

Circuit recently explained that although “courts have often treated Eleventh Amendment

immunity and sovereign immunity as interchangeable . . . as a matter of original meaning, the

Claims Against Warden Henderson

Defendants further move to dismiss all claims against Warden Henderson because

respondeat superior is not a basis for liability in § 1983 actions and Plaintiff has not alleged any

personal involvement by Henderson. The Court agrees.

Respondeat superior is not an available theory of liability under § 1983. Polk Cnty. v.

Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445, 453 (1981). Rather, to plead a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff

must plead two elements: “(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty.

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty.

Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006)). To sufficiently plead the second element, a plaintiff

must allege “personal involvement.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted); see also Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015) (“To

establish a § 1983 . . . claim against a public official in his personal capacity, a plaintiff must

show that the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or

implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct

of an offending subordinate.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through

the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).

two are conceptually distinct.” WCI, Inc., 18 F.4th at 513. It distinguished immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment as sounding in subject-matter jurisdiction and containing a diversity

requirement from sovereign immunity which “refers to a state’s right ‘not to be amenable to the

suit of an individual without its consent’ ”, sounds in personal jurisdiction, and does not require

diversity. Id. at 514 (citing The Federalist No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961) (emphasis omitted)). Here, Plaintiff is housed in an Ohio prison and sues Ohio prison

officials. Therefore “[b]ecause the parties are not diverse, sovereign immunity applies, and the

Eleventh Amendment, by its plain terms, does not.” Id.

The only factual allegation in Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Henderson is that she “is the

present warden” at Toledo Correctional Institution. (Doc. 1, at 3). Plaintiff has thus not pled

Henderson’s personal involvement in any alleged constitutional violation, and the claims against

her must be dismissed.

Eighth Amendment

After the above, what remains is Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

against Defendants Barker and John Does 1-4. Interested Party State of Ohio moves for dismissal

on the basis that Plaintiff has not adequately pled the subjective component of an Eighth

Amendment claim and that the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity because no

clearly established law informed them that their actions were unconstitutional.

The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary

functions from liability where their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This defense “can be raised at various stages of the litigation including at

the pleading stage in a motion to dismiss.” English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1089 (6th Cir. 1994).

However, although “insubstantial claims against government officials should be resolved

as early in the litigation as possible, preferably prior to discovery,” Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d

649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth Circuit has also “cautioned that ‘it is generally inappropriate

for a district court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.’”

Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wesley v.

Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2015)). Thus, “[a]lthough an [official’s] entitlement to

qualified immunity is a threshold question to be resolved at the earliest possible point, that point

is usually summary judgment and not dismissal under Rule 12.” Wesley, 779 F.3d at 433-34

(internal marks and citations omitted). The reason for this “general preference” is that “[a]bsent

any factual development beyond the allegations in a complaint, a court cannot fairly tell whether

a case is ‘obvious’ or ‘squarely governed’ by precedent, which prevents [the court] from

determining whether the facts of this case parallel a prior decision or not” for purposes of

determining whether a right is clearly established. Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 917 (6th Cir.

2019) (quoting Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d

223, 235 (6th Cir. 2005)) (Sutton, J., concurring) (brackets omitted). Nonetheless, dismissal

based on qualified immunity at the pleadings stage may be appropriate under some

circumstances. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2017).

An inmate’s post-conviction excessive force claim arises under the Eighth Amendment's

cruel and unusual punishment clause. Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (6th Cir.

1995). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, inmates “must satisfy both an objective and

subjective component.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). “The objective

component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim centers

around the prison official’s state of mind. Id. This component requires the court to consider

“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously

and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6

(1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).

The maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected

to physical contact actionable as assault under common law; however, “a violation of the Eighth

Amendment will nevertheless occur if the offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Pelfrey, 43 F.3d at 1037 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

To determine whether the use of force was “wanton and unnecessary”, courts are to consider

factors including the extent of injury suffered by an inmate, “the need for application of force,

the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived

by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful

response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).

While it is beyond debate that an individual has a general right to be free from excessive

force, whether a reasonable official would have understood that Defendants’ actions here

violated that right depends on the specific facts. See Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir.

2016) (“[I]f the qualified immunity questions presented are fact-intensive, the record may not be

adequately developed to evaluate the defense at the pleading stage under Rule 12(b)(6).”). And

the Court is mindful of the Sixth Circuit's “general preference”, Guertin, 912 F.3d at 917, that

the question of qualified immunity be resolved at the summary judgment stage, rather than the

pleadings stage. See Wesley, 779 F.3d at 433-34.

In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Complaint alleges several correctional officers

punched and hit him with their batons, including in the head, resulting in a mild concussion and

requiring stitches on his head and surgical glue above his left eye. (Doc. 1, at 4-5). Defendants

are correct that the Complaint also asserts Plaintiff was being non-compliant during the

interaction and even punched a correctional officer. However, under these facts, the Court finds

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an excessive force claim sufficient to survive Defendants’ motion

to dismiss based on qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. Should the case proceed,

Defendants are free to, and may well succeed on, an assertion of qualified immunity again at the

summary judgment stage following a fuller development of the facts.

Statute of Limitations

In reply, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations because his Complaint should not be deemed “filed” until the filing fee is paid or the

litigant is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 9). At the outset, this argument was

not raised in Defendants’ original motion to dismiss and is arguably not properly before the

Court. Nevertheless, even if it were properly before the Court, it would not succeed. The Sixth

Circuit has held that the statute of limitations is tolled while an in forma pauperis request is

pending. See Truitt v. Cnty. of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998).

Here, the Court received Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

on January 19, 2024; Plaintiff mailed his Complaint from prison on January 17, 2024. See Doc.

1-10 (envelope postmarked January 17, 2024); see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270

(1988) (under the “prison mailbox rule”, a pleading is “filed” by a pro se prisoner when it is

given to a prison official for mailing).3

The statute of limitations remained tolled during the time Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis

application was pending, and as such, the Complaint was timely filed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Henderson and Interested Party State of Ohio’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 7) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as

set forth herein. The individual capacity claims against the individual correctional officers may

proceed at this stage.

3. Somewhat confusingly, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff did not file his Complaint once [the

IFP motion was] granted.” (Doc. 9, at 2). Plaintiff was not required to re-file his Complaint after

he was granted pauper status.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 20, 2024