The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Dannie Rainey, Case No. 3:22-cv-42
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Perkins Township Board of Trustees, et al.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Dannie Rainey has filed a motion for reconsideration of my June 21, 2024 Opinion
and Order denying his motion for injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 103; see Doc. No. 91). For the
reasons that follow, I deny his motion.
Rainey sued Perkins Township, its police department, Perkins Township police officers,
prosecutors for the city of Sandusky, prosecutors for Erie County, two Erie County judges, the Erie
County sheriff’s office, Erie County police officers, Yvette Thompson, and a number of John Does
for events arising out of Rainey’s arrest and prosecution on a gun possession charge. (See Doc. No.
51). A criminal case against Rainey for that gun possession charge is pending in the Erie County,
Ohio Court of Common Pleas. See generally State of Ohio v. Rainey, 2022 CR 0058 (Erie Cnty. Ct. Com.
Pl.). Rainey was previously charged in the Sandusky, Ohio Municipal Court for a similar offense,
and that case was dismissed before Rainey filed this lawsuit. See generally State of Ohio v. Rainey,
CRA2100870 (Sandusky Mun. Ct.).
Rainey filed a motion to enjoin the proceedings in the Erie County criminal case. (Doc. No.
87). I denied that motion on the grounds that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny
barred me from enjoining Rainey’s pending state criminal prosecution. (See Doc. No. 91 at 2).
Including this motion, Rainey has filed three motions seeking an injunction of the Erie County
criminal proceedings in a span of 18 days. (See Doc. Nos. 87, 97, 103). Rainey has also filed a notice
of appeal indicating he seeks review of my June 21, 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the
same Opinion and Order he asks me to reconsider now. (See Doc. No. 95). Most recently, the
Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Rainey’s attempt to force the judge presiding over his Erie County
case, Judge Roger Binette, to recuse. (See Doc. No. 103-8).
II. ANALYSIS
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly address motions for reconsideration
of interlocutory orders,” though district courts possess the power to consider them. Rodriguez v.
Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). Motions to reconsider
are “disfavored,” and a court should not grant one unless the movant shows there is “an argument
or controlling authority that was overlooked or disregarded in the original ruling, presents evidence
or argument that could not previously have been submitted, or successfully points out a manifest
error of fact or law.” Davie v. Mitchell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 573, 634 (N.D. Ohio 2003); see also Rodriguez,
89 F. App’x at 959. A motion to reconsider “is not designed to give an unhappy litigant an
opportunity to relitigate matters already decided; nor is it a substitute for appeal.” Turner v. City of
Toledo, 671 F. Supp. 2d 967, 968 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (citing Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV
Publishing, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal citation omitted).
Rainey makes three arguments. First, he argues Younger does not apply to this case at all
because the prosecution he seeks to enjoin in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas was initiated
after he filed this lawsuit. (Doc. No. 103 at 8-12). But Rainey has made this argument before, and I
rejected it in my June 21, 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See Doc. No. 91 at 2-3). While
Rainey disagrees with my conclusion on that point, he cites no new controlling authority that would
change the outcome and no pre-existing controlling authority I overlooked in my reasoning. (See
Doc. No. 103 at 8-12). So, I reject Rainey’s first argument.
Rainey’s two other arguments are new, and motions for reconsideration generally “may not
be used to raise issues that could have been raised in the previous motion.” Evanston Ins. Co. v.
Cogswell Properties LLC, 683 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2012). Therefore, I deny his motion as to these
two remaining arguments. But even if I considered them, these arguments would not entitle Rainey
to any relief.
Rainey invokes the “bad faith” exception to the Younger doctrine, arguing I should disregard
principles of abstention and enjoin the Erie County prosecution because “the State of Ohio”
committed due process and speedy trial violations. (Doc. No. 103 at 14-17).
“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that bad-faith prosecution of an individual may serve
as a proper exception to the Younger abstention doctrine.” Tindall v. Wayne Cnty. Friend of the Court,
269 F.3d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). But the application of the bad faith exception is
“exceedingly rare, particularly where a plaintiff seeking to defeat an abstention argument has failed
to avail himself first of state appellate processes before seeking relief in federal court.” Id. At a
minimum, the bad faith exception requires Rainey to show state officials have “initiate[d] repeated
prosecutions to harass an individual or deter his conduct, and [that] the officials have no intention of
following through on these prosecutions.” Ken–N.K., Inc. v. Vernon Twp., 18 F. App’x 319, 324–25
n.2 (6th Cir. 2001).
Rainey has not made this showing. First, he has not demonstrated he has been subject to
“repeated prosecutions” by Erie County prosecutors. He was previously charged in Sandusky
Municipal Court, and he is currently under indictment in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.
Compare State of Ohio v. Rainey, Minute Order, No. CRA2100870 (Sandusky Mun. Ct. May 10, 2021))
with State of Ohio v. Rainey, Indictment, No. 2022 CR 0058 (Erie Cnty. C.P. February 10, 2022).
Rainey acknowledges that two distinct entities—the city of Sandusky, Ohio, and the Erie County
Prosecutor’s Office—initiated these separate prosecutions. (See Doc. No. 51 at 9-10). He does not
explain how the existence of two prosecutions in different jurisdictions initiated by different local
government entities demonstrates that the Erie County case is a bad faith prosecution. See Lloyd v.
Doherty, No. 18-3552, 2018 WL 6584288 at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2018) (finding the “bad faith”
exception did not apply because “there have not been repeated prosecutions” of the plaintiff).
Further, Rainey has not shown the Erie County prosecutors “have no intention of following
through” on his prosecution. Ken–N.K., Inc., 18 F. App’x 319, 324–25 n.2. In fact, Rainey pled
guilty in the Erie County criminal case, and he is scheduled to be sentenced.1 And while Rainey
notes he has moved to withdraw his guilty plea, this does not indicate Erie County is unserious
about pursuing its prosecution of Rainey. Rainey has not offered any evidence that this is the
“exceedingly rare” case in which a bad faith prosecution justifies disregarding Younger. Tindall, 269
F.3d 533, 539.
Finally, Rainey invokes the “special circumstances” or “extraordinary need for relief”
exception to the Younger doctrine. (Doc. No. 103 at 20). This exception “is reserved for situations
where ‘the federal court concludes that the state proceedings are inadequate because there is no
1 The judge presiding over Rainey’s Erie County prosecution, Judge Roger Binette, has continued
Rainey’s sentencing twice, explaining the need to wait until Rainey’s “Federal Court case” and
“Affidavit of Disqualification in the Ohio Supreme Court . . . are resolved regarding the undersigned
Judge.” State of Ohio v. Rainey, No. 22-CR-58, Judgment Entry, (Erie Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. March 11,
2024); State of Ohio v. Rainey, No. 22-CR-58, Judgment Entry, (Erie Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl. May 10, 2024).
The Ohio Supreme Court denied Rainey’s Affidavit of Disqualification on July 2, 2024. (See Doc.
No. 103-8 at 1). This Opinion and Order denies Rainey’s motion to reconsider my previous opinion
and order refusing to enjoin the Erie County prosecution. Nothing in this Opinion and Order
should be construed to enjoin or otherwise limit the course of proceedings in Rainey’s Erie County
criminal case.
available state forum for the plaintiff’s constitutional claims . . . or the state judicial or administrative
officers have a conflict of interest or are biased.’” Goodwin v. Cnty. of Summit, Ohio, 45 F. Supp. 3d
692, 704 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Cmty. Treatment Ctrs., Inc. v. City of Westland, 970 F. Supp. 1197,
1225 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1975) and Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1973)).
Rainey does not argue there is no available state forum for his constitutional claims. (See
Doc. No. 103 at 20-23).2 Instead, he appears to argue that Judge Binette, who is overseeing his case
in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, is biased against him or has a conflict of interest
because Rainey is suing him in his individual capacity, because Judge Binette previously worked for
the Erie County Prosecutor’s Office, and because the Civil Division of that office “maintains an
attorney-client relationship” with Judge Binette. (Doc. No. 103 at 22).
But these are the same arguments Rainey made before the Supreme Court of Ohio in his
petition seeking Judge Binette’s recusal. (See Doc. No. 103-8 at 4). The Supreme Court of Ohio
squarely rejected those arguments. It concluded that Judge Binette’s status as a defendant in this
lawsuit and his relationship with the Erie County prosecutor’s office did not show Judge Binette
“has a conflict of interest” or “is biased or prejudiced against Rainey or in favor of the prosecutor’s
office.” (Doc. No. 103 at 9). In light of these findings, Rainey has failed to show “state
administrative officials have a conflict of interest or are biased” in his criminal case. Goodwin, 45 F.
Supp. 3d at 704.
2 Rainey does argue there have been Brady violations in the Erie County criminal case. But he does
not argue there is no state forum in which he may litigate these issues. (See Doc. No. 103 at 21). See,
e.g., Huth v. Hubble, No. 5:14–cv–1215, 2015 WL 966307 at *6-7 (N.D. Ohio March 4, 2015)
(explaining that a state criminal court generally provides an adequate forum to raise constitutional
issues related to a criminal case being tried in that court).
Because Rainey has failed to identify controlling authority I overlooked, has not pointed to
evidence he could not have submitted before, and has not shown I made a “manifest error of fact or
law,” he has not met his burden to justify the reconsideration of my June 21, 2024 Memorandum
Opinion and Order. Davie, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 634.3
Finally, this is the third time Rainey has asked me to enjoin the Erie County criminal case in
the last three weeks. (See Doc Nos. 87, 97, 103). I have denied each motion in a Memorandum
Opinion and Order. (See Doc. Nos. 91, 101). And Rainey has filed a Notice of Appeal of my June
21, 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order addressing these issues. (Doc. No. 95). I conclude any
further motions from Rainey requesting I enjoin the Erie County criminal case at this time would be
a waste of judicial resources. As my colleague United States District Judge James G. Carr has
written, “motions of reconsideration . . . [m]ost often . . . only express disagreement with my
analysis. The proper venue for that lament is the Court of Appeals. There is a cost to making me
listen to songs of that sort.” Younglove Constr., LLC v. PSD Dev., LLC, 767 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825
(N.D. Ohio 2011).
If Rainey files any additional requests for injunctive relief related to his Erie County criminal
case, whether denominated as motions for reconsideration, a stay, injunctive relief, or any other
similar language, he will be subject to sanctions, including summary denial of his motion and
potential monetary sanctions.
3 In the alternative, Rainey asks me to “grant his request to appeal these issues to the Sixth Circuit,”
to “issue an emergency injunction lifting all previous orders of the Erie County Common Pleas
Court related to” his criminal case and to “enjoin the Erie County Common Pleas Court from taking
any further action on” his criminal case pending the outcome of his current appeal. (Doc. No. 103
at 24; see Doc. No. 95). The latter two are the same relief he requested in his original motion for an
injunction (Doc. No. 87), and I have already explained why I will not grant Rainey’s motion to
reconsider my Memorandum Opinion and Order rejecting those requests. (See Doc. No. 91). The
former is functionally a request that I certify certain issues for appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). But Rainey has made no
attempt to show there is “no just reason for delay” as required by that Rule, so I deny his request.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I deny Rainey’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 103).
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge