Crawley v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

DARNELL D. CRAWLEY

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 2496-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER

MARCH 23, 1999

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY

Buford M. Parsons, Judge

Matthew P. Geary (Goodwin, Sutton, Duval &

Geary, on brief), for appellant.

H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,

on brief), for appellee.

Darnell D. Crawley (appellant) appeals from his bench trial

conviction for breaking and entering pursuant to Code § 18.2-91.

On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to prove

(1) that he was the person whose fingerprints were found at the

scene of the break-in and (2) that he acted with the requisite

intent to commit larceny, assault and battery or any felony

other than murder, rape or robbery. For the reasons that

follow, we reverse appellant's conviction on the first issue

and, therefore, do not reach the second issue.

Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible

therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358

S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, sitting

without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict

and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence

to support it. See id. The credibility of a witness, the

weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn

from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's

determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199,

379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).

Any element of a crime may be proved by circumstantial

evidence. See, e.g., Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507,

524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). Such evidence "is as competent

and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided

it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable

hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226

Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). However, "the

Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of

innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring

from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993).

Whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of

fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 290, 373

S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988).

On appeal, appellant divides into two parts his challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove identity. He

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contends the evidence was insufficient, first, because the

Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence through the officials

who prepared the Henrico County and Virginia State Police

fingerprint cards that appellant was the person from whom they

took the prints; and second, because Investigator Curran did not

take appellant's fingerprints and, therefore, could not match

them to the prints on the Henrico and State Police cards or to

the fingerprints taken from the scene of the break-in. The

Commonwealth contends that these arguments relate only to the

admissibility of the fingerprint cards. Because the cards were

admitted without objection, it contends, appellant waived any

right to challenge their authenticity. The Commonwealth also

argues that, even if the arguments relate to sufficiency, the

evidence of appellant's name, birth date, gender and race was

sufficient to prove appellant's identity as the perpetrator

beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with portions of both

arguments.

1.

ADMISSIBILITY OF FINGERPRINT CARDS

"It is a generally recognized rule that records and reports

prepared by public officials pursuant to duty imposed by

statute, or required by the nature of their offices, are

admissible as proof of the facts stated therein." Williams v.

Commonwealth, 213 Va. 45, 46, 189 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1972); see

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Code § 19.2-390 (requiring, in part, that every person arrested

for a felony be fingerprinted and the fingerprints filed with

the Central Criminal Records Exchange). However, this rule

applies only to those portions of such documents "relat[ing]

facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of

the recording official to which he could testify should he be

called as a witness." Williams, 213 Va. at 45-47, 189 S.E.2d at

379-80 (holding arrest report which contained arrestee's age as

reported by arrestee was inadmissible to prove arrestee's age

because age information was hearsay).

Because appellant registered no hearsay objection to the

admissibility of the cards, he waived the right to contest their

admissibility on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Woodson v.

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288-89, 176 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1970)

("A litigant may not, in a motion to strike, raise for the first

time a question of admissibility of evidence."). At trial,

appellant merely objected to the admission of the cards subject

to cross-examination, and he never conducted any

cross-examination, thereby waiving any objections to

admissibility. Therefore, for purposes of appeal, the evidence

establishes conclusively that the fingerprints on the Henrico

County and State Police cards were obtained from Darnell Devan

Crawley, a black male 5'8" tall and weighing 140 pounds, with a

tattoo on his right arm, a birth date of December 15, 1968, a

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Social Security number of XXX-XX-XXXX, and an address of 2828

Fairfield Avenue, Richmond, Virginia 23223, as of April 24,

1996.

2.

SUFFICIENCY OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE TO PROVE IDENTITY

Despite appellant's inability to challenge the proof that

the Henrico County and State Police fingerprint cards came from

a Darnell Devan Crawley with the above vital statistics, he

properly may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove

that he is the person whose fingerprints are contained on those

cards and were found at the scene of the break-in. Citing Cook

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 225, 230, 372 S.E.2d 780, 783

(1988), the Commonwealth contends that the evidence of identity

was sufficient to prove the fingerprints were appellant's

because the "[i]dentity of names carries with it a presumption

of identity of person." We reject the application of this

principle to the facts of this case.

Cook is distinguishable, first, because it was a

sentence-enhancement case which dealt with the admissibility of

certain documents and not their sufficiency to prove the

defendant's prior convictions. 1 For any type of evidence to be

1

The defendant in Cook did not challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence on appeal, and any statements in Cook regarding

sufficiency, therefore, are dicta.

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admissible, its offeror need only prove that it is

"material--tending to prove a matter . . . properly at issue in

the case--and relevant," Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.

598, 601, 347 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1986), or that "it has any

logical tendency, however slight, to prove a [matter at] issue."

Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178,

1186, 409 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1991). The standard for judging the

sufficiency of evidence to prove identity or any other key fact

in a criminal case is much higher--the Commonwealth must prove

that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Martin v.

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 529, 414 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1992)

(en banc); Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 533, 536, 159

S.E.2d 611, 613-14 (1968). Therefore, just because a particular

document is admissible does not mean it constitutes proof of a

disputed fact sufficient to support a conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt. Second, Cook is distinguishable because it

involved a document that "bore the defendant's exact name and

birth date." 7 Va. App. at 230, 372 S.E.2d at 783. Here,

although the Henrico County and State Police fingerprint cards

bore the same first and last names and identical birth dates, no

evidence in the record proved appellant's name or birth date.

As the Supreme Court previously has held, "[w]hen the

Commonwealth relies solely upon fingerprint evidence to identify

a criminal agent, it bears the burden of excluding every

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reasonable hypothesis of innocence . . . ." Tyler v.

Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 166, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1997).

Viewing the circumstantial evidence of identity here in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that it was

insufficient to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of appellant's

innocence. The evidence admitted established that a Darnell

Devan Crawley, a black male 5'8" tall, 140 pounds, and with a

tattoo on his right arm, a birth date of December 15, 1968, a

Social Security number of XXX-XX-XXXX, and an address at the

time of the break-in of 2828 Fairfield Avenue, Richmond,

Virginia 23223, which was located in the same vicinity as the

victim's apartment, broke the glass in the rear door of the

victim's apartment and was on the premises without permission.

However, the only evidence admitted at trial that linked

appellant to the break-in was that his gender, race and height

were the same as those of both the perpetrator, as proved by the

fingerprint cards, and the person seen fleeing the scene of the

crime. Assuming without deciding that appellant's statements

upon arraignment constituted evidence that he was Darnell D.

Crawley, 2 the indictment itself contained only his name and did

2

Appellant admitted during his arraignment that he was

Darnell D. Crawley, the person listed in the indictment, but

this statement was not formally admitted as evidence in the

case. Compare Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 454, 457, 418

S.E.2d 343, 345 (1992) (holding that defendant's arraignment

under a certain name was not evidence that it was, in fact, his

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not list any other identifying characteristics. We are unable

to conclude that the mere similarity of appellant's name with

the names on the two fingerprint cards and the fact that

appellant was of the same gender, race and approximate height as

the person fingerprinted and the person seen fleeing the

vicinity of the break-in proved that appellant was the person

whose prints were on the cards and in the victim's apartment.

The Commonwealth attempted to have Investigator Curran

fingerprint appellant during the trial so it could prove

appellant's prints matched the perpetrator's. However,

appellant objected, and the trial court denied the

Commonwealth's request. The Commonwealth objected to the

denial, recognizing that it had the burden of "prov[ing]

identification beyond a reasonable doubt," but it did not

proffer appellant's fingerprints and offered no other evidence

to prove appellant was the perpetrator. 3 Although the

name), with Sheffey v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 602, 602-04, 194

S.E.2d 897, 898-99 (1973) (in case challenging sufficiency of

evidence to prove identity, listing accused's arraignment as

John Henry Sheffey as part of evidence proving that he was same

John Henry Sheffey whom testifying officer arrested on

outstanding warrant and upon whom officer found heroin in a

search performed incident to that arrest). The arrest warrant

purported to list appellant's name, birth date, Social Security

number and address, but the warrant was neither offered nor

admitted as evidence, and the officer who arrested appellant on

that warrant did not testify regarding the arrest.

3

Code § 19.2-390 requires, in part, that every person

arrested for a felony be fingerprinted and the fingerprints

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circumstances were suspicious, they failed to exclude all

reasonable hypotheses of innocence and, therefore, did not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was inside the victim's

apartment.

For these reasons, we reverse appellant's conviction.

Reversed.

filed with the Central Criminal Records Exchange. Presumably,

therefore, appellant was fingerprinted upon his arrest for the

instant felony offense. However, the record provides no

indication that the Commonwealth attempted to offer these

fingerprint records into evidence.

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