Young v. Monroe County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAMES OLIVER YOUNG,

Plaintiff, AMENDED* DECISION

AND ORDER

v.

6:20-CV-06640 EAW

MONROE COUNTY, SHERIFF TODD BAXTER,

UNDERSHERIFF KOREY BROWN,

JAIL SUPERINTENDENT MATT VANDUZEE,

CAPTAINS (JOHN DOE 1), MAJORS (JOHN DOE 2),

LIEUTENANTS (JOHN DOE 3), SERGEANTS

(JOHN DOE 4), CORPORALS (JOHN DOE 5),

DEPUTIES (JOHN DOE 6), MAILROOM STAFF

(JOHN DOE 7), and JAIL ATTORNEY KIM HINCKLEY,

Defendants.1

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff James Oliver Young (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Monroe County, Sheriff Todd Baxter, Undersheriff Korey Brown,

Jail Superintendent Matt Vanduzee, John Does 1-7, and Jail Attorney Kim Hinckley

(collectively, “Defendants”). (See Dkt. 11). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, through an

official policy or custom, deprived him of access to counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. (See id. at 7-8).

* The Court has amended this Decision and Order to correct a typographical error that

originally appeared on the final page.

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as it appears above.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt.

88), as well as Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 96). Because

Plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court sua

sponte dismisses the case without prejudice. The pending motions are denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s Rule 56 statements

(Dkt. 96-1; Dkt. 98-1), as well as the exhibits submitted by the parties. Unless otherwise

noted, these facts are undisputed.

Between April 2020 and January 2023, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee housed at

the Monroe County Jail (“MCJ”). (Dkt. 96-1 at ¶ 1; Dkt. 98-1 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff met with

counsel in his federal criminal case several times during his time at the MCJ. (Dkt. 96-1

at ¶ 5; see Dkt. 96-6 at 147-48, 175). Those meetings “took place in a no-contact meeting

[booth] where [Plaintiff] would talk on a phone receiver [to counsel] through a window,

and [that] w[as] separated from other [no-contact meeting] booths by plexiglass walls.”

(Dkt. 96-1 at ¶ 4; see Dkt. 98-1 at ¶ 4). But those meetings were not entirely private, as

MCJ deputies patrolled the public meeting area in which the booths were located. (Dkt.

96-1 at ¶¶ 7-9; see Dkt. 98-1 at ¶¶ 4, 9).

Plaintiff could speak with his attorney by phone and by tablet as well. (See Dkt. 96-

1 at ¶¶ 11-12; Dkt. 98-1 at ¶ 12; see also Dkt. 96-6 at 147-48, 150-60). But incoming calls

from Plaintiff’s attorney were routed to a single phone shared by the entire MCJ population

and subject to an initial 15-minute time limit. (See Dkt. 96-1 at ¶ 10; Dkt. 98-1 at ¶¶ 11-

12). Plaintiff also could call out to his attorney using a phone located in his residence area,

but those calls were subject to the same initial 15-minute time limit. (See Dkt. 96-1 at ¶ 12;

Dkt. 98-1 at ¶ 11). And while Plaintiff could call out to his attorney using an assigned

tablet, he experienced technical difficulties doing so several times. (See Dkt. 96-1 at ¶ 12;

Dkt. 98-1 at ¶¶ 11-12; see also Dkt. 96-6 at 162, 207-08).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 26, 2020. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff also moved for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. 2). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion

to proceed IFP (Dkt. 3) and administratively terminated the case on September 25, 2020

(Dkt. 4). Plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to proceed IFP (Dkt. 5), as well as an

amended complaint (Dkt. 8). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, screened

his complaint, and granted him leave to file a second amended complaint. (See Dkt. 10).

On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, alleging interference

with mail, access to courts, and access to counsel claims. (See Dkt. 11).2 Upon screening

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

interference with mail and access to courts claims with prejudice, but allowed his access to

counsel claims to proceed to service. (Dkt. 16).

Following discovery, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on October 10,

2023. (Dkt. 88). Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 95), and they also cross-

2 On January 3, 2022, Plaintiff submitted another filing that was identical to pages 1

through 12 of the second amended complaint, except that pages 7 and 8 were inadvertently

flipped. (See Dkt. 13). As previously stated in the order dated April 12, 2022, the Court

construes Plaintiff’s filing at Docket 13 to be a partial courtesy copy and the filing at

Docket 11 to be the second amended complaint. (See Dkt. 16 at 1 n.1).

moved for summary judgment (Dkt. 96). Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ cross-motion

(see Dkt. 98),3 and Defendants filed a reply (Dkt. 100).4

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment

should be granted if the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds that no rational jury could

find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).

“The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as

to any material fact. . . .” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 486

(2d Cir. 2014). “Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the

party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the evidentiary

materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the

3 Although docketed as a cross-motion for summary judgment, the Court construes

Plaintiff’s filing at Docket 98 as a response to Defendants’ cross-motion for summary

judgment.

4 On January 16, 2024, Defendants submitted an additional Rule 56 statement (Dkt.

102), in which they responded to the “Conclusion of Undisputed Facts” found at the end

of Plaintiff’s memorandum of law (see Dkt. 98-2 at 17-20). Because Plaintiff’s filing at

Docket 98 is not a separate motion, the Court need not consider Defendants’ filing at

Docket 102.

non-movant’s burden of proof at trial.” Johnson v. Xerox Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103

(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not

rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra

Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Specifically, the non-moving party “must come forward with specific evidence

demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly &

Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011). Indeed, “the mere existence of some alleged factual

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphases in original).

In addition, “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants generally are entitled to a liberal

construction of their pleadings, which should be read to raise the strongest arguments that

they suggest.” Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (italics in original)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Despite this liberal approach, allegations

unsupported by admissible evidence “do not create a material issue of fact” and cannot

overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Weinstock v. Columbia

Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Defendants

employed three policies or customs at the MCJ that violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. (See Dkt. 88 at 2-12).5 Those policies were: (1) the initial 15-minute time limit

for attorney calls; (2) the routing of all incoming attorney calls to a singular phone shared

by the entire MCJ population; and (3) the use of the Securus phone system to facilitate

outgoing calls from the incarcerated individuals’ tablets. (See id. at 2-3).

Defendants make several arguments for summary judgment in their favor. (See Dkt.

96-5 at 3-10). First, they argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

(See id. at 3-5).6 Second, they argue that Plaintiff had reasonable access to his attorney

while housed at the MCJ. (See id. at 5-7). Third, they argue that Plaintiff has failed to

allege or show the personal involvement of any individual defendant in the alleged

constitutional violations. (See id. at 7-8). Fourth, they argue that the individual defendants

5 Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on his interference with mail claims that

were previously dismissed by the Court with prejudice. (See Dkt. 88 at 6-10). Plaintiff’s

motion for partial summary judgment with respect to those claims therefore is denied. See,

e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, No. 9:20-CV-659 (DNH/CFH), 2023 WL 3727447, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.

May 3, 2023) (“[W]hen a court has previously dismissed certain claims, [it] will not

consider those claims at the summary judgment stage.” (also collecting cases)), adopted,

2023 WL 3722137 (N.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023).

6 If the Court reached the issue of administrative exhaustion, it would deny

Defendants’ motion on that ground because while submitting the MCJ’s inmate handbook

from 2015 and 2022, Defendants failed to provide a copy of the 2020 handbook or its

grievance procedures, and the Court cannot infer the grievance procedures in effect during

the entire duration of Plaintiff’s stay at the MCJ. Defendants must establish those

procedures, and the gap in their evidence submitted in support of summary judgment does

not meet that burden.

are entitled to qualified immunity. (See id. at 8-9). Fifth and finally, Defendants argue that

the claims against Monroe County and Sheriff Baxter in his official capacity must be

dismissed because Plaintiff has not established that the any of the challenged policies

violated his constitutional rights. (See id. at 9-10).

While not raised by either party, Plaintiff’s access to counsel claims are barred by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the

Supreme Court held that:

[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.

Id. at 486-87 (emphasis omitted). In other words, if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

[in the § 1983 action] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,”

then “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. The Heck bar applies to

both state and federal criminal convictions, see Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d

121, 124 (2d Cir. 2014), and it is jurisdictional, see, e.g., Benjamin v. United States, No.

6:23-CV-06512 EAW, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2024 WL 3821726, at *2-4 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.

15, 2024).

Plaintiff’s access to counsel claims are barred by Heck because success on those

claims would necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction in United States v. Young,

No. 6:21-cr-06025-FPG-MJP, Dkt. 156 (W.D.N.Y. April 28, 2023). Plaintiff was charged

in federal court on April 21, 2020, id. at Dkt. 1, and sentenced on April 28, 2023, to 444

months in prison, id. at Dkt. 156, after being convicted by a jury on March 23, 2022, of

several charges involving enticement of a minor and child pornography, id. at Dkt. 109.

Plaintiff testified at his deposition to issues he had concerning access to and

communications with his counsel in his federal criminal case. (See, e.g., Dkt. 96-6 at 171-

74 (Plaintiff’s testimony that his visits with counsel in his federal criminal case, Matt

Lembke, Esq., violated his right of access)).7 A finding that MCJ’s policies with respect

to inmate access to their attorneys between 2020 and 2023 deprived Plaintiff of effective

assistance of counsel, would necessarily implicate the validity of his federal criminal

conviction. See D.S. v. City of New York, 736 F. App’x 284, 287 (2d Cir. 2018)

(“[A]sserting that D.S. was . . . denied effective counsel in violation of constitutional rights

advanced under § 1983 necessarily implies that his assault conviction was unlawfully

obtained.”); Zarro v. Spitzer, 274 F. App’x 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] ruling in

7 During his deposition testimony Plaintiff also asserted he was denied access to his

counsel for related charges brought against him in state court. (See Dkt. 96-6 at 171-74

(indicating that he was represented on the state charges by Mr. Lembke and another

attorney, Matt Rich)). Plaintiff was convicted in Monroe County Court of state felonies

related to the same offense involved in the federal court criminal proceeding, and sentenced

in March 2022, to 25 years to life in prison. See United States v. Young, No. 6:21-cr-06025-

FPG-MJP, Dkt. 156 at 2 (April 28, 2023) (running federal sentence concurrent to sentence

imposed in Monroe County Court). Plaintiff has apparently pursued an appeal of that

conviction with the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. See Young v. Monroe County

et al., No. 6:20-cv-06931-EAW, Dkt. 10 (Sept. 11, 2023). There have been no decisions

issued from the Fourth Department concerning that appeal, and there is no information

before the Court suggesting that the state charges or any convictions resulting therefrom

were reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.

Plaintiff’s favor as to Counts 2 and 7, which raise questions about Plaintiff’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel . . . would also implicate the validity of his conviction.”). The

fact that Plaintiff had not yet been convicted when he filed this action does not change the

conclusion. See Smalls v. Collins, 10 F.4th 117, 137 (2d Cir. 2021) (discussing the

Supreme Court’s extension of Heck to ongoing criminal proceedings), abrogated on other

grounds by Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022); Rech v. Siragusa, No. 6:23-CV-

6039 EAW, 2023 WL 2559409, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023). Nor does the Court’s

decision to raise the Heck issue sua sponte. See, e.g., Zarro, 274 F. App’x at 34-35

(affirming the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment

claims as Heck-barred); Harris v. Ammerman, No. 19-CV-1569V(F), 2022 WL 1516709,

at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022) (concluding that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by

Heck, and therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider them), adopted,

2022 WL 1134482 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2022); see also Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co.

v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not

waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte.”).

For that reason, Plaintiff’s access to counsel claims must be dismissed without

prejudice under Heck. See Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Disposition

of the case on Heck grounds, however, warrants only dismissal without prejudice . . . .”

(emphasis in original)). If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must first demonstrate

that his conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. He

has not done so at this juncture. As such, the Court sua sponte dismisses the case based on

Heck, and the pending motions are denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s claims

without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 88) and

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 96) are denied as moot. The Clerk

of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and to close this case.

The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal from

this Order would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as

a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). Any

request to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

________________________________

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD

Chief Judge

United States District Court

Dated: September 25, 2024

Rochester, New York