Allah v. Yildiz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

KHA’SUN CREATOR ALLAH,

Plaintiff,

No. 22-CV-1854 (KMK)

v.

OPINION & ORDER

OSMAN YILDIZ, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Kha’Sun Creator Allah

Astoria, NY

Pro Se Plaintiff

Daniel Shay Kirschbaum, Esq.

Amanda Yoon, Esq.

Office of the New York State Attorney General

New York, NY

Counsel for Defendants

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

Kha’Sun Creator Allah (“Plaintiff” or “Allah”), proceeding pro se, brings this Action,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), against Osman Yildiz (“Yildiz”), Dr. Syed Mahmud

(“Mahmud”), and Carla Steinberg (“Steinberg,” together with Yildiz and Mahmud,

“Defendants”), employees of the New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”). (See

Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

Eighth Amendment rights when they discharged him from the Sullivan Correctional Facility

(“Sullivan”) Residential Crisis Treatment Program (RCTP), and then purportedly allowed the

New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) to transfer

him back to Upstate Correctional Facility (“Upstate”) after he stated that he would kill himself if

he was returned to Upstate. (Id.) Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Motion”), (see Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 36)). For the reasons stated herein,

Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the Parties’ statements pursuant to Local Rule 56.1,

(see Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“Defs.’ 56.1”) (Dkt. No. 42); Pl.’s Answer to Defs.’ Rule 56.1

Statement (“Pl.’s 56.1”) (Dkt. No. 48)), and the admissible evidence submitted by the Parties.

The facts are recounted “in the light most favorable to” the non-movant. Torcivia v. Suffolk

County, 17 F.4th 342, 354 (2d Cir. 2021). The facts as described below are in dispute only to the

extent indicated.1

In April 1999, Plaintiff was sentenced to seventeen to twenty-two years imprisonment.

(Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 1.) Between May 1999 and July 2019, when he was released, Plaintiff was

incarcerated in various New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision

1 Where the Parties “identify disputed facts but with semantic objections only or by

asserting irrelevant facts, which do not actually challenge the factual substance described in the

relevant paragraphs, the Court will not consider them as creating disputes of fact.” N.J. v. N.Y.C.

Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-6173, 2021 WL 965323, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021)

(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Nimkoff v.

Drabinsky, No. 17-CV-4458, 2021 WL 4480627, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (“[T]o the

extent a party’s Rule 56.1 statement improperly interjects arguments and/or immaterial facts in

response to facts asserted by the opposing party without specifically controverting those facts

[with admissible evidence], the [c]ourt has disregarded the statement.” (alteration adopted)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Baity v. Kralik, 51 F. Supp. 3d 414, 418

(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Many of [the] [p]laintiff’s purported denials—and a number of [the

plaintiff’s] admissions—improperly interject arguments and/or immaterial facts in response to

facts asserted by [the] [d]efendants, often speaking past [the] [d]efendants’ asserted facts without

specifically controverting those same facts. . . . [A] number of [the] [p]laintiff’s purported

denials quibble with [the] [d]efendants’ phraseology, but do not address the factual substance

asserted by [the] [d]efendants.”).

(DOCCS) prison facilities. (Id.) Defendant Mahmud was employed by OMH as a psychiatrist

treating incarcerated individuals at the Sullivan Correctional Facility (“Sullivan”), specifically its

Residential Crisis Treatment Program (RCTP), from about 2016 until his retirement in 2022.

(Id. ¶ 2.) Yildiz has worked for OMH as a social worker and RCTP Coordinator at the Sullivan

RCTP since about 2006, treating incarcerated individuals there. (Id. ¶ 3.) Steinberg worked for

OMH treating incarcerated individuals at Sullivan and at the Woodbourne Correctional Facility

from about 2005 until her retirement in 2022. (Id. ¶ 4.)

RCTPs are located at several DOCCS facilities throughout New York State and are

designed and equipped to temporarily house incarcerated individuals experiencing mental health

crises while they are treated and stabilized. (Id. ¶ 5.) After they are stabilized in an RCTP,

incarcerated individuals are discharged and receive mental health treatment at the prison where

they were previously housed. (Id. ¶ 6.)

While housed in the Upstate Correctional Facility (“Upstate”) Special Housing Unit

(SHU) between November 11 and 17, 2016, Plaintiff commenced a hunger and water strike, with

the stated intent of killing himself; he was accordingly transferred to the Sullivan RCTP. (Id.

7.) Yildiz first met with Plaintiff in the Sullivan RCTP on the afternoon of November 21, 201¶6,

and recorded his notes from that meeting on an “RCTP Observation/Dorm Initial Progress Note,”

per his usual practice. (Id. 8.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff informed Yildiz that he was

eating and sleeping well and¶ not feeling suicidal, and he exhibited no signs of anxiety or other

“abnormalities of behavior,” nor suicidal ideations or other warning signs of imminent suicide

risk. (Id. 9.) Plaintiff disputes this statement, stating that he “continuously informed

[D]efenda¶nts of how he suffered in Upstate and self-mutilated himself there and if returned there

he will kill himself.” (Pl.’s 56.1 9.) Plaintiff claims that Yildiz did not document what

¶

Plaintiff actually said, instead making false case notes, and did not address Plaintiff’s concerns.

(Id.)

Mahmud first met with Plaintiff on November 21, 2016; Mahmud recorded his

contemporaneous notes from that meeting in a “Psychiatric Progress Note” that Mahmud also

titled an “Admit Note.” (Defs.’ 56.1 10.) Defendants contend that Mahmud observed Plaintiff

to have a pleasant affect, and Plaintiff¶ informed Mahmud that he had been drinking and eating

but threatened to kill himself if sent back to the Upstate SHU. (Id. 11.) Plaintiff asserts that he

told Mahmud about the self-mutilation, that Plaintiff was down and¶ depressed, and that he

“would rather die than go back [to Upstate].” (Pl.’s 56.1 10, 11.) Plaintiff also claims that

Mahmud did not put these statements in his notes. (Id. ¶10¶.)

Yildiz saw Plaintiff again on November 22, 201¶6, to determine whether he still required

RCTP care and treatment. (Defs.’ 56.1 12.) Defendants aver that during the examination,

Plaintiff stated that he was feeling better¶, thinking clearly, not under acute stress, eating well,

sleeping better, no longer suicidal, had no plans for self-harm, and was ready to return to his

facility, attend vocational programs, and prepare to return to the outside community. (Id.) Yildiz

recorded these statements in a “RCTP Observation/Dorm Progress Note” that day. (Id. 13.)

Further, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff did not tell Yildiz on November 22, 2016, tha¶t if he

was returned to Upstate, he would kill himself. (Id. 14.) Based upon this examination Yildiz

determined that Plaintiff was no longer suicidal; he d¶iscerned no signs of risk for imminent

suicide and evaluated Plaintiff as having no signs of anxiety or behavioral abnormalities, as

being calm and stable, and as coping well with his situation. (Id. 15.) Yildiz noted that while

Plaintiff had multiple past suicidal gestures or attempts in order to¶ achieve goals like transferring

to another facility or avoiding the SHU, as of that date, he exhibited an optimistic mood and no

acute distress, denied suicidal ideation or intent, and had an overall seemingly normal affect. (Id.

16.)

¶ Plaintiff disputes these statements. Plaintiff contends that he reiterated his suicidal

statements to Yildiz, namely what transpired with him at Upstate, how he did not want to go

through that experience again, and that he would kill himself if he was returned to Upstate. (Pl.’s

56.1 12–16.) Plaintiff claims that Yildiz did not document what Plaintiff actually told him.

(Id.) ¶¶

On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff was also interviewed by Mahmud, who recorded his

notes from that meeting in another Psychiatric Progress Note, which he titled a “Termination

Note.” (Defs.’ 56.1 17.) Defendants claim that Plaintiff did not tell Mahmoud during that

meeting that he woul¶d try to kill himself if he was returned to Upstate—to the contrary, he

specifically denied any suicidal thoughts if he was sent back to his facility. (Id. 18.) Mahmud

also observed Plaintiff on camera eating & sleeping. (Id. 19.) Mahmud conclu¶ded that

Plaintiff was not exhibiting suicidal tendencies. (Id. 20.¶) Accordingly, Mahmud determined

that Plaintiff could be discharged from the RCTP tha¶t day, with instructions to continue his

medication and therapy. (Id. 21.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that he stated to

Mahmud that he would kill hi¶mself, if returned to Upstate, which Mahmud did not document in

his progress notes. (Pl.’s 56.1 17–21.)

Because Yildiz and Ma¶hmud concurred that Plaintiff was no longer in crisis, they agreed

that he should be released from the RCTP back to DOCCS custody. (Defs.’ 56.1 22.) Yildiz

accordingly completed a “Termination Transfer Progress Note” on November 22, ¶2016,

releasing Plaintiff back to the custody of the New York DOCCS to return to Upstate; Yildiz also

ordered a treatment plan of continued monthly therapy sessions. (Id. 23.) Plaintiff contends

¶

that Yildiz and Mahmud ignored Plaintiff’s cries for help even though he told them multiple

times that “he lost his mind in Upstate and tried to commit suicide there by self-mutilation and if

returned there he would kill himself.” (Pl.’s 56.1 22.) In addition, Plaintiff maintains that

Defendants did not document what Plaintiff was a¶ctually communicating to them and instead

falsified statements to justify releasing Plaintiff from RCTP to be returned to Upstate. (Id. 23.)

Defendants contend that neither Mahmoud nor Yildiz saw Plaintiff on November 23¶,

2016. (Defs.’ 56.1 24.) Plaintiff states that on November 23, 2016, Plaintiff was taken out of

his cell in the RCTP¶ and taken to be interviewed by Yildiz. (Pl.’s 56.1 24.)

For several days starting on November 23, 2016, Plaintiff was p¶laced in the Sullivan

SHU after his release from the Sullivan RCTP to await transportation to Upstate. (Defs.’ 56.1

25.) Steinberg saw Plaintiff on the morning of November 25, 2016. (Id. 26.) Defendants ¶

claim that Steinberg observed that Plaintiff exhibited no problems with de¶pression, orientation,

concentration and thought, and expressed no thoughts or intent of suicide, and that he had only

mild anxiety of being transferred. (Id. 27.) In addition, Defendants state that Plaintiff wanted

to know if he would be returned to Ups¶tate because his mental health status had been classified

as “Level 3,” and because Upstate has mental health services to treat Level 3 incarcerated

individuals. (Id.) Steinberg informed Plaintiff that she understood that DOCCS was returning

him to Upstate; Plaintiff then threatened to “do something” to himself if he was returned there.

(Id. 29.) Defendants state that incarcerated individuals frequently threaten self-harm to avoid

bein¶g placed in a SHU in any correctional facility, but especially at Upstate, where the SHU has

double bunking that is particularly disliked by many incarcerated individuals. (Id. 28.)

Plaintiff disputes these statements in the following way. Plaintiff asserts that on No¶vember 23,

2016, Plaintiff stopped Steinberg and showed her his self-mutilated scar that came from his

suicide attempt at the Upstate and told he is he return to Upstate he would kill himself. (Pl.’s

56.1 27.) Plaintiff claims that this interaction lasted about three minutes before Steinberg

walke¶d away. (Id. 27.) Plaintiff also maintains that that he was not just threatening self-harm,

as supported by his¶ history of self-harm, which is well documented. (Id. 28.)

Shortly after seeing Plaintiff, Steinberg told RCTP Unit Chief Jac¶kson Garrick what

Plaintiff had said, and then e-mailed Garrick, Mahmud, Yildiz, and another OMH social worker

Walter Krawec, informing them that Plaintiff did not want to return to Upstate and stated that he

“will do something to self” if sent there. (Defs.’ 56.1 30.) Yildiz and Mahmud concurred that

this did not warrant Plaintiff’s readmission to the RCT¶P. (Id. 31.) In response, Plaintiff claims

that Yildiz and Mahmud has no intention of treating Plaintiff. ¶ (Pl.’s 56.1 31.) Further,

Defendants claim that they had no control over where incarcerated individ¶uals are placed within

the DOCCS system after discharge from the RCTP. (Defs.’ 56.1 32.) Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants have control over deciding whether a prisoner is suita¶ble to return to a particular

facility for suicidal or mental health reasons. (Pl.’s 56.1 32.)

On or about November 25, 2016, Defendants sta¶te that Yildiz contacted the Upstate

mental health staff and warned them that an incarcerated individual who had threatened self-

harm if he was transferred to Upstate would be transferred to them imminently and

recommended that he be monitored upon arrival. (Defs.’ 56.1 33.) Plaintiff claims that Yildiz

never contacted Upstate mental health regarding Plaintiff and t¶hat there is no record of this

communication. (Pl.’s 56.1 33.)

Plaintiff did not attem¶pt to harm himself between November 23 and 29, 2016, while

awaiting transfer to Upstate. (Defs.’ 56.1 34.) Plaintiff was transported to Upstate on

November 29, 2016, four days after speaki¶ng with Steinberg. (Id. 35.) None of the

¶

Defendants had any involvement in Plaintiff’s treatment after he left Sullivan on November 29,

2016. (Id. 36.) Defendants claim that upon arrival at Upstate on November 29, 2016, Plaintiff

was placed ¶in the Upstate SHU, and as part of his intake there, he was given a routine suicide

prevention screening interview. (Id. 37.) During that screening, Plaintiff denied suicidal

ideation or thoughts. (Id. 38.) Plai¶ntiff disputes this fact, claiming that upon arrival at Upstate,

he was taken directly to th¶e cell and never received a suicide risk screening. (Pl.’s 56.1 37.)

On December 1, 2016, while in the Upstate SHU, Plaintiff obtained a contraband¶ razor

blade and swallowed it wrapped in paper. (Defs.’ 56.1 39.) Plaintiff was released from

DOCCS’ custody on or about July 11, 2019. (Id. 40.)¶

B. Procedural Background ¶

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 15, 2019, in the Northern District of New York.

(See Compl.) On August 12, 2019, that court issued an Order directing an administrative closure

of the case due to Plaintiff’s failure to properly commence the case. (See Dkt. No. 3.) In

addition, the Order stated that “if plaintiff desires to pursue this action, he must, within [thirty]

days of the filing date of this Order, either (1) pay the $400.00 filing fee in full; or (2) submit a

completed and signed [in forma pauperis (“IFP”)] application.” (Id.) The Order, which was

mailed to Plaintiff at Elmira Correctional Facility, was returned as undeliverable on August 16,

2019, because Plaintiff was released from the facility on July 11, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 4.) On

December 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter with the court requesting that his case be reopened and

providing a notice of change of address. (See Dkt. No. 5.) The court directed the Clerk to

reopen the case on December 22, 2021, (see Dkt. No. 6), however, it issued an Order on January

4, 2022, denying Plaintiff’s letter request and stating that “in the event Plaintiff wishes to

proceed with this action he must, within [thirty days] of the filing date of this Decision and

Order, either (1) pay the statutory filing fee of $402.00 in full or (2) submit an IFP Application

outlining his current financial condition and demonstrating economic need,” (Dkt. No. 7). The

Plaintiff filed his IFP application on February 1, 2022, (see Dkt. No. 8), which the court granted

on March 3, 2022, (see Dkt. No. 9). The case was transferred to this Court on March 4, 2022.

(See Dkt. No. 10.)

Following service of the summons and complaint and multiple extensions, (see Dkt. Nos.

16–18), on October 6, 2022, Defendants filed their Answer, (see Answer (Dkt. No. 25)).

Thereafter, the Parties engaged in discovery. (See Dkt. No. 27.) On December 21, 2023,

Defendants filed a letter with the court, requesting a pre-motion conference in anticipation of

their Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Dkt. No. 29.) In lieu of a conference, the Court set a

briefing schedule. (See Dkt. No. 30.)

Following one extension, the Defendants filed their Motion on February 21, 2024. (See

Not. of Mot.; Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 37);

Defs.’ 56.1; Declaration of Osman Yildiz (“Yildiz Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 38.); Declaration of Syed

Mahmud (“Mahmud Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 39.); Declaration of Carla Steinberg (“Steinberg Decl.”)

(Dkt. No. 43.); Declaration of Daniel S. Kirschbaum (“Kirschbaum Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 44.)).

After an extension, Plaintiff filed his Opposition. (See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs.’ Mot.

for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp.”) (Dkt. No. 48); Pl.’s 56.1; Declaration of Kha’Sun Creator Allah

(“Allah Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 47).) On April 30, 2024, Defendants filed their Reply. (See Defs.’

Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 49).)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (same); Truitt v.

Salisbury Bank & Tr. Co., 52 F.4th 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2022) (same); Cambridge Funding Source

LLC v. Emco Oilfield Servs. LLC, No. 22-CV-10741, 2023 WL 7405862, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

9, 2023) (same). “In deciding whether to award summary judgment, the court must construe the

record evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable

inferences in its favor.” Torcivia, 17 F.4th at 354; see also Horror Inc. v. Miller, 15 F.4th 232,

240 (2d Cir. 2021) (same). “The movant ‘bears the initial burden of showing that there is no

genuine dispute as to a material fact.’” McKinney v. City of Middletown, 49 F.4th 730, 738 (2d

Cir. 2022) (quoting Jaffer v. Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018)); see also LaFontant v. Mid-

Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Ctr., No. 18-CV-23, 2023 WL 6610764, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,

2023) (same); Red Pocket, Inc. v. Interactive Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., No. 17-CV-5670, 2020 WL

838279, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2020) (same).

“However, when the burden of proof at trial would fall on the non[-]moving party, it

ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an

essential element of the non[-]movant’s claim,” in which case “the non[-]moving party must

come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order

to avoid summary judgment.” CILP Assocs., L.P. v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d

114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for Reg. Holders of J.P. Morgan Chase Com. Mortg. Sec.

Corp., Multifamily Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2017-SB42 v. 160 Palisades Realty

Partners LLC, No. 20-CV-8089, 2022 WL 743928, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2022) (same).

Further, “[t]o survive a [summary judgment] motion . . . , [a non-movant] need[s] to create more

than a ‘metaphysical’ possibility that his allegations were correct; he need[s] to ‘come forward

with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,’” Wrobel v. County of Erie, 692

F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)); see also Jennifer Fung-Schwartz, D.P.M, LLC v.

Cerner Corp., No. 17-CV-233, 2023 WL 6646385, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2023) (same), “and

cannot rely on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings,” Guardian Life Ins. Co.

v. Gilmore, 45 F. Supp. 3d 310, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Kollias v. Univ. of Rochester, No. 18-CV-6566, 2023 WL 5608868, at *4

(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2023) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by

documents or other evidentiary materials, the party opposing summary judgment may not merely

rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading.” (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266

(2d Cir. 2009))).

“On a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Seward v. Antonini, No. 20-CV-9251, 2023 WL 6387180, at

*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (quoting Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep’t of Health &

Mental Hygiene, 746 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 2014)). “At this stage, ‘the role of the court is not to

resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.’”

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Amah, No. 21-CV-6694, 2023 WL 6386956, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

28, 2023) (alteration adopted) (quoting Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Therefore, “a court’s goal should be ‘to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.’”

Sullivan v. Nat’l Express LLC, No. 21-CV-5789, 2023 WL 6279255, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,

2023) (quoting Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir. 2004)

(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24)).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court should “consider only

evidence that would be admissible at trial.” Latimer v. Annucci, No. 21-CV-1275, 2023 WL

6795495, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2023) (citing Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am.,

Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1998)). “‘[W]here a party relies on affidavits or deposition

testimony to establish facts, the statements must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts

that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to

testify on the matters stated.’” Mozzochi v. Town of Glastonbury, No. 21-CV-1159, 2023 WL

3303947, at *3 (D. Conn. May 8, 2023) (quoting DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir.

2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c)(4))); see also E. Fishkill Fire Dist. v. Ferrara Fire

Apparatus, Inc., No. 20-CV-576, 2023 WL 6386821, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (“Rule 56

requires a motion for summary judgment to be supported with affidavits based on personal

knowledge . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); Baity, 51 F. Supp. 3d at 419 (disregarding

“statements not based on [the] [p]laintiff’s personal knowledge”); Flaherty v. Filardi, No. 03-

CV-2167, 2007 WL 163112, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2007) (“The test for admissibility is

whether a reasonable trier of fact could believe the witness had personal knowledge.” (internal

citation omitted)).

As a general rule, “district courts may not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of

witnesses at the summary judgment stage.” Martinez v. Pao’s Cleaning, Inc., No. 16-CV-6939,

2018 WL 6303829, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018) (quoting Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426

F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, although witness credibility is usually a question of

fact for the jury, Yu Zhang v. Sabrina USA Inc., No. 18-CV-12332, 2021 WL 1198932, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021), “[b]road, conclusory attacks on the credibility of a witness without

more [are] insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that would defeat a motion for

summary judgment,” Securities & Exchange Commission v. Airborne Wireless Network, No. 21-

CV-1772, 2023 WL 5938527, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2023) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see also Ezuma v. City Univ. of N.Y., 665 F. Supp. 2d 116, 128 (E.D.N.Y.

2009) (“If the moving party has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff may not respond simply with general attacks upon the defendant’s credibility.”

(alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As such, “when opposing

a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party may not respond simply with general

attacks upon the declarant’s credibility, but rather must identify affirmative evidence from which

a jury could find that the non-moving party has carried its burden of proof.” Moritz v. Town of

Warwick, No. 15-CV-5424, 2017 WL 4785462, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017) (alterations

adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Paul v. Postgraduate Ctr. for

Mental Health, 97 F. Supp. 3d 141, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“‘Although credibility assessments are

improper on a motion for summary judgment,’ a court may be justified in dismissing a claim

when the ‘plaintiff’s version of the events is in such discord with the record evidence as to be

wholly fanciful.’” (quoting Pulliam v. Lilly, No. 07-CV-1243, 2010 WL 935383, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 11, 2010))).

Finally, the Second Circuit has instructed that when a court considers a motion for

summary judgment, “special solicitude” should be afforded a pro se litigant, see Graham v.

Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988); accord Mercado v. Div. of N.Y.S Police, No. 96-CV-

235, 2001 WL 563741, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2001) (same), and a court should construe “the

submissions of a pro se litigant . . . liberally” and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments

that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (italics

omitted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Nonetheless, proceeding pro se does

not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se

party’s bald assertions unsupported by evidence . . . are insufficient to overcome a motion for

summary judgment.” Houston v. Teamsters Local 210, Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund-Vacation

Fringe Ben. Fund, 27 F. Supp. 3d 346, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (alterations adopted) (italics

omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Flores v. City of New York, No.

15-CV-2903, 2017 WL 3263147, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2017) (same)

B. Analysis

Plaintiff raises, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim against the Defendants. (See Compl.) Defendants have moved for summary

judgment, arguing that they were not deliberately indifferent to a serious mental health condition,

and alternatively that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (See Defs.’ Mem. 5–11.) In

addition, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s demand for declaratory relief must be dismissed.

(Id. at 11–12.) The Court considers the Parties’ arguments to the extent necessary to resolve the

instant Motion.

1. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his Eighth Amendment

rights when they discharged him from the Sullivan RCTP into DOCCS custody, after which he

was transferred back to Upstate, even though he stated to Defendants multiple times that he

would kill himself if he was returned to Upstate. (See Compl.)

“The Eighth Amendment forbids ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners[.]’” Spavone v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To state a claim of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff

must plausibly allege (1) “that he suffered a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation,” and

(2) that Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference.” Feliciano v. Anderson, No. 15-CV-

4106, 2017 WL 1189747, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017) (internal citations omitted).

“The first requirement is objective: the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must

be sufficiently serious.” Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In other words, “the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in

combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Walker v. Schult, 717

F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). Analyzing this objective requirement involves two inquiries:

“whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care,” Salahuddin v. Goord,

467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006), and “whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently

serious,” which in turn “requires the [C]ourt to examine how the offending conduct is inadequate

and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused or will likely cause the prisoner,” id. at 280.

“There is no settled, precise metric to guide a court in its estimation of the seriousness of a

prisoner’s medical condition.” Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless,

the Second Circuit has suggested the following non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when

evaluating an inmate’s medical condition: “(1) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would

perceive the medical need in question as ‘important and worthy of comment or treatment,’ (2)

whether the medical condition significantly affects daily activities, and (3) ‘the existence of

chronic and substantial pain.’” Id. (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir.

1998)).

“The second requirement is subjective: the charged officials must be subjectively reckless

in their denial of medical care.” Spavone, 719 F.3d at 138. This means that Defendants must

“appreciate the risk to which a prisoner was subjected,” and have a “subjective awareness of the

harmfulness associated with those conditions.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir.

2017); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Deliberate indifference is a

mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness,” and it “requires that the charged official act

or fail to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). A defendant’s awareness of the risk of serious

harm can be established through “inference from circumstantial evidence,” including “from the

very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). However,

“mere negligence” is insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Walker, 717 F.3d at

125 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“In the context of an inmate’s risk of suicide, the subjective [element] of the deliberate

indifference standard requires ‘a dual showing that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the

prisoner was at substantial risk of committing suicide; and (2) intentionally disregarded that

risk.’” McTerrell v. Koenigsmann, No. 18-CV-1028, 2021 WL 5772484, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.

19, 2021) (quoting Phillips v. Mitchell, No. 19-CV-383, 2021 WL 1175051, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.

Mar. 29, 2021)). In this setting, “deliberate indifference may exist pursuant to one of two broad

fact scenarios.” Randolph v. Kalies, No. 19-CV-383, 2021 WL 396441, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,

2021) (quoting Kelsey v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-5978, 2006 WL 3725543, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2006)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 392488 (N.D.N.Y.

Feb. 4, 2021). First, a “defendant ‘could be deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide by

failing to discover an individual’s suicidal tendencies[,]’” or second, a defendant “could have

discovered and [has] been aware of the suicidal tendencies, but could be deliberately indifferent

in the manner by which [he] respond[s] to the recognized risk of suicide.” Id. (quoting Kelsey,

2006 WL 3725543, at *5). “The second scenario focuses on the adequacy of preventive

measures. However, even if a medical defendant’s treatment decision was erroneous, deliberate

indifference cannot be inferred where the decision was not such a substantial departure from

accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person

responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Randolph v. Kalies, No. 19-CV-

1161, 2021 WL 5605557, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2021) (alteration adopted) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5596409

(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021).

Defendants do not seem to challenge that Plaintiff satisfies the first prong, in that

Defendants do not deny that suicidal ideation is an objectively serious medical condition. (See

generally Defs.’ Mem.)2 Thus, the Court proceeds to the subjective prong.

As explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff raises a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether Yildiz and Mahmud subjectively knew that Plaintiff was at substantial

2 Courts in the Second Circuit have held that an inmate exhibiting suicidal ideation is

viewed as suffering from a serious medical condition. See, e.g., Case v. Anderson, No. 16-CV-

983, 2017 WL 3701863, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017) (collecting cases); Young v. Choinski,

15 F. Supp. 3d 172, 184 (D. Conn. 2014) (noting that “case law within this Circuit recognizes

that depression combined with severe anxiety attacks or suicide attempts is a serious medical

need” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Barnes v. Ross, 926 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506

(W.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that propensity to harm oneself or attempt suicide is “undoubtedly a

serious medical condition”); Allah v. Kemp, No. 08-CV-1008, 2010 WL 1036802, at *6 & n.9

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2010) (holding that failure to provide plaintiff with a mental health

evaluation, notwithstanding his attempted suicide three days earlier, was enough to meet

“sufficiently serious” standard); Zimmerman v. Burge, No. 06-CV176, 2009 WL 3111429, at *8

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009) (collecting cases from other circuits holding that depression combined

with suicidal thoughts constituted “a sufficiently serious medical need”); Sims v. Daley, No. 95-

CV-3239, 1997 WL 33608, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1997) (holding that “hearing voices and

experiencing suicidal thoughts” with a history of mental illness was a serious medical need).

risk of committing suicide and intentionally disregarded that risk. However, with respect to

Steinberg, the Court determines that there is no material dispute that Steinberg did not

intentionally disregard Plaintiff’s risk of committing suicide.

a. Yildiz and Mahmud

Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not exhibit suicidal ideation during his evaluations

with Yildiz and Mahmud at the Sullivan RCTP. (See Defs.’ Mem. 5–9.) Specifically, they

assert that each of the two times that Yildiz met with Plaintiff, Plaintiff noted that he was eating

and sleeping well, was thinking clearly, and did not have plans for self-harm. (See Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶

9, 12, 14, 16.) As for Mahmud, Defendants contend that although Plaintiff threatened to kill

himself if sent back to the Upstate SHU during his first meeting with Mahmud, during the

second meeting, Plaintiff specifically denied any suicidal thoughts if he was sent back to his

facility. (Id. ¶ 11, 18.) Accordingly, Defendants argue that none of what Yildiz and Mahmud

heard and exhibited from Plaintiff can be reasonably classified as an imminent threat of self-

harm, and therefore, Yildiz and Mahmud were not deliberately indifferent when they decided

that Plaintiff could be released from the Sullivan RCTP. (See Defs.’ Mem. 3, 8.) Plaintiff,

however, disputes Defendants’ version of events. In particular, Plaintiff avers in his declaration

that during each of his first meetings with Yildiz and Mahmud, he informed them that “he

suffered a mental breakdown last time [he] was in Upstate” and that he would “kill himself if [he

was] returned there.” (Pl.’s Decl. 3.) During each of his second meetings with Yildiz and

Mahmud, Plaintiff “reiterated to th¶em that if [he is] returned . . . to Upstate [he would] kill

[him]self because [he] lost [his] mind last time [he] was there and self-mutilated [him]self in that

horrible place.” (Id. 4.) In addition, Plaintiff states that Yildiz and Mahmud were aware of

“what happened to [h¶im] in Upstate and [he] showed them the scar.” (Id.)

Based on this record, the Court concludes that there is a genuine dispute as to whether

Yildiz and Mahmud subjectively knew that Plaintiff was at substantial risk of committing

suicide, and if so, whether they intentionally disregarded that risk. See Bright v. Annucci, No.

18-CV-11111, 2021 WL 4461682, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2021) (finding triable question of

deliberate indifference where defendants discharged plaintiff from the RCTP despite his active

suicidal ideation); see also Engles v. Jones, No. 13-CV-6461, 2018 WL 6832085, at *6

(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2018) (finding that genuine issue of material fact existed where inmate

threatened suicide and correctional officer took no action); Young v. Choinski, 15 F. Supp. 3d

194, 205–06 (D. Conn. 2014) (denying summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim as to

correctional officer, where there was evidence that inmate told officer he was feeling suicidal

and asked to see mental health unit, but officer took no action).

Defendants’ various arguments to the contrary are unavailing. For instance, Defendants

argue that they did not have control over whether Plaintiff would be sent back to Upstate. (See

Defs.’ Mem. 8.) Such an argument is irrelevant. Defendants were responsible for deciding

whether Plaintiff would be released from RCTP. (See id. at 3.) If Plaintiff’s version of events is

true, then Defendants’ decision to release Plaintiff from RCTP custody, despite the fact that

Plaintiff communicated to Yildiz and Mahmud during their sessions at the RCTP that he was

suicidal, would satisfy a showing of deliberate indifference, as Yildiz and Mahmud failed to take

action to protect Plainitff. See Bright, 2021 WL 4461682, at *13; see also Barrett v. Livingston

County, No. 14-CV-6593, 2019 WL 1083027, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2019) (finding genuine

issue of material fact as to prison staff’s deliberate indifference where reasonable jury could infer

that officers were aware plaintiff was threatening suicide yet took no action in response).

Defendants also maintain that Plaintiff’s own testimony is insufficient to create a genuine

dispute of material fact. (See Defs.’ Mem. 8–9.) The Court disagrees. “[W]here a party relies

on affidavits . . . to establish facts, the statements ‘must be made on personal knowledge, set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is competent to testify

on the matters stated.’” DiStiso, 691 F.3d at 230 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)); see also

Parker v. Fantasia, 425 F. Supp. 3d 171, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (same). Here, the Plaintiff relies

on his own sworn declaration, made on personal knowledge, and contains substance that Plaintiff

is competent to testify on, namely his own mental health issues, previous suicide attempts, and

what he said during evaluation sessions with Yildiz and Mahmud at the RCTP. (See Pl.’s Decl.)

Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s reliance on his own sworn declaration to raise

material disputes of fact is proper. Parker, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 183 (“[E]ven if the non-movant’s

evidence is ‘thin, a non-movant’s own sworn statement is adequate to counter summary

judgment.’” (alteration adopted) (quoting Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 290–91 (2d Cir.

2003))).

To the extent Defendants argue that Yildiz’s and Mahmud’s decision to release Plaintiff

from the RCTP was properly based on their professional judgment because Plaintiff’s statements

were an attempt at manipulation and did not reflect an actual risk of suicide, (see Defs.’ Mem. 7–

8), this argument is misplaced. Defendants cannot make such an argument with regard to the

sessions they had with Plaintiff in the RCTP because Defendants deny that Plaintiff ever stated

that he was considering suicide during their sessions. (See id.) In other words, Defendants

cannot claim that Yildiz and Mahmud, in their professional opinions, found Plaintiff’s suicidal

statements to be illegitimate or insincere, when they are claiming that Plaintiff never made those

statements to them during their sessions with him. (Id.)3

In the alternative, Defendants assert that Yildiz and Mahmud are entitled to qualified

immunity. The Court disagrees.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[Qualified] immunity protects [the]

government’s ability to perform its traditional functions . . . by helping to avoid unwarranted

timidity in performance of public duties, ensuring that talented candidates are not deterred from

public service, and preventing the harmful distractions from carrying out the work of government

that can often accompany damages suits.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2012)

(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Qualified immunity shields

3 To be clear, the Court finds that, standing alone, the fact that Yildiz and Mahmud

decided not to readmit Plaintiff into the RCTP after Steinberg reported to them that Plaintiff,

while in DOCCS custody, stated that he would harm himself if returned to Upstate is a proper

professional judgment that does not amount to deliberate indifference alone. In that instance,

Yildiz and Mahmud were made aware of Plaintiff’s suicidal statement, evaluated it, but

ultimately determined, in their professional judgment, that it did not warrant Plaintiff’s return to

the Sullivan RCTP. Such a circumstance does not amount to deliberate indifference, even if the

Defendants’ ultimate conclusion was wrong. See Sims v. Gorman, No. 09-CV-6643, 2012 WL

566875, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2012) (“[E]ven if the . . . [d]efendants’ treatment decision was

erroneous, deliberate indifference cannot be inferred because the decision was not ‘such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to

demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such judgment.’” (quoting

Est. of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 262 (7th Cir. 1996))); id. at *5 (“[A]lthough

[plaintiff] disagreed with the . . . [d]efendants’ decision not to return him to RCTP for psychiatric

observation, this disagreement is not an actionable Eighth Amendment claim . . . .”). However,

this occurrence is different from the initial meetings Yildiz and Mahmud had with Plaintiff

because in those instances there is a material issue of fact as to whether the statements were

made in the first place.

a defendant from standing trial or facing other burdens of litigation “if either (a) the defendant’s

action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the

defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged

Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

As an initial matter, “it is axiomatic that the right that Plaintiff[] assert[s]—namely, [his]

right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as a result of a

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs—is clearly established.” Knight v. N.Y.S. Dep’t

of Corr., No. 18-CV-7172, 2022 WL 1004186, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022) (alteration

adopted) (quoting Bradway v. Town of Southampton, 826 F. Supp. 2d 458, 475 (E.D.N.Y.

2011)). “And, ‘for a right to be clearly established for purposes of a qualified immunity defense,

the precise conduct at issue need not previously have been ruled unlawful.’” Id. (quoting Zahrey

v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 357 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Brandon v. Royce, No. 16-CV-5552, 2019

WL 1227804, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019) (same).

Furthermore, as described above, the Court has determined that genuine issues of

material fact preclude the Court from concluding as a matter of law that this clearly established

right was not violated. “Thus, the critical question is whether it was objectively reasonable for

[Yildiz and Mahmud] to believe that they were not committing such a violation.” Knight, 2022

WL 1004186, at *18 (quoting Bradway, 826 F. Supp. 2d at 475). “[I]f ‘a jury could infer

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff[’s] serious medical need[], [Yildiz and Mahmud] are not

entitled to qualified immunity because it would not be objectively reasonable for them to believe

[that] their conduct did not violate Plaintiff[’s] rights.’” Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting

Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1994)). In fact, where, as here, “the objective

reasonableness of a[ defendant’s] actions depends on disputed facts, summary judgment based

on qualified immunity is properly denied.” Ruggiero v. Canfield, No. 14-CV-307, 2020 WL

7631890, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2020) (finding qualified immunity inappropriate where

genuine issue of material fact existed on the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical needs

claim), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 7625179 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2020); see also Harrison

v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding qualified immunity inappropriate where the

court denied summary judgment for deliberate indifference to medical needs claim); Cummings

v. Paterson, No. 12-CV-618S, 2021 WL 2550821, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021) (“Summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that

are material to a determination of reasonableness[.]” (quoting Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137,

143 (2d Cir. 1999))); Rodriguez v. Mercado, No. 00-CV-8588, 2002 WL 1997885, at *13

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (“[B]ecause there are factual issues which must be resolved in order to

determine whether similarly-situated officials would have understood that their actions violated

[the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, neither [defendant] is entitled to summary judgment on

qualified immunity grounds.”); Brandon, 2019 WL 1227804, at *10–11 (finding qualified

immunity inappropriate on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim where “there are genuine issues

of material fact regarding whether it was objectively reasonable for [the defendant] to believe

that his action did not violate [the] law”).

Therefore, Yildiz and Mahmud are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time.

b. Steinberg

With regard to Steinberg, Defendants claim that Steinberg observed that Plaintiff

exhibited no problems with depression, orientation, concentration and thought, and expressed no

thoughts or intent of suicide, and that he had only mild anxiety of being transferred. (Defs.’ 56.1

27.) In addition, Defendants state that Plaintiff wanted to know if he would be returned to

¶

Upstate because his mental health status had been classified as “Level 3,” and because Upstate

has mental health services to treat Level 3 incarcerated individuals. (Id.) Steinberg informed

Plaintiff that she understood that DOCCS was returning him to Upstate; Plaintiff then threatened

to “do something” to himself if he was returned there. (Id. 29.) Plaintiff disputes these

statements in the following way. Plaintiff asserts that on No¶vember 23, 2016, Plaintiff stopped

Steinberg and showed her his self-mutilated scar that came from his suicide attempt at Upstate

and told her that if he is returned to Upstate he would kill himself. (Pl.’s 56.1 27.) Plaintiff

claims that this interaction lasted about three minutes before Steinberg walked ¶away. It is

undisputed, however, that shortly after seeing Plaintiff, Steinberg told RCTP Unit Chief Jackson

Garrick what Plaintiff had said, and then e-mailed Garrick, Mahmud, Yildiz, and another OMH

social worker Walter Krawec, informing them that Plaintiff did not want to return to Upstate and

stated that he “will do something to [him]self” if sent there. (Defs.’ 56.1 30.)

Although Plaintiff disputes the exact details of his interaction with¶ Steinberg, he does not

dispute that Steinberg immediately escalated the incident. (See Pl.’s 56.1.) As such, the Court

determines that Steinberg was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical

condition, as she immediately escalated the issue to the appropriate parties, including Yildiz and

Mahmud, who treated Plaintiff at the RCTP, as well as the RCTP unit chief. See Case, 2017 WL

3701863, at *13 (“[O]ther Circuits [and this Circuit] have, in general, found deliberate

indifference lacking where officers take affirmative and reasonable steps to protect detainees

from suicide[.]” (quoting Kelsey v. City of New York, 306 F. App’x 700, 703 (2d Cir. 2009)));

see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk,

even if the harm ultimately was not averted. A prison official’s duty under the Eighth

Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));

Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 895–96 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that jail official was

not deliberately indifferent, where the record indicates the official responded immediately to

inmates’ complaints and took reasonable action by bringing information about inmates’

symptoms to the attention of his supervisor).

Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Steinberg.

2. Declaratory Relief

Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court “[i]ssue a declaratory judgment” that

“Defendants Yildiz, Mahmud, [and] Steinb[erg] owed [P]laintiff a duty of reasonable care” and

that Plaintiff “was harmed by the denial of treatment constituting deliberate indifference to [his]

need for a serious mental health need in violation of [the] Eighth Amendment,” and further, that

“Defendants Yildiz [and] Mahmud . . . breached that duty by willfully and maliciously returning

[P]laintiff to Upstate[] with the knowledge that such confinement would aggravate his mental

health [and that it] was so injurious to plaintiff that it amounts to a constitutional violation,

reflected deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment.” (Compl. 27–28.)

However, because Plaintiff has been released from prison (see Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 40; see also

Dkt.), Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief are moot. See Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477,

490 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The Court finds that, given that plaintiff . . . was released from prison . .

. , [plaintiff’s] claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief against DOCS are moot.”); see also

Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming holding that pro se prisoner’s

claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot after he was released during the pendency

of the action); Leckie v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-6719, 2023 WL 3168699, at *17

(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2023) (“As to [Plaintiff’s] request for declaratory and injunctive relief,” the

court noted “that injunctive relief is generally rendered moot when a prisoner is released from

incarceration, and that the same is true for claims of declaratory relief.” (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Cheatham v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-

2388, 2020 WL 207783, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020) (“Because [plaintiff] no longer resides at

Rikers Island, any claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief is dismissed.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion is denied with regard Plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claims against Yildiz and Mahmud, granted as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference

claim against Steinberg, and granted as to Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claim against all

Defendants. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending motion at Dkt.

No. 36.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Opinion to Plaintiff.

The Court will hold a telephonic status conference on July 15, 2024, at 10:30 AM.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2024

White Plains, New York

KENNETH M. KARAS

United States District Judge