Brown v. RXR Soyo Exalta, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARLA BROWN,

Plaintiff,

24-CV-4250 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER

RXR SOYO EXALTA, LLC (SAWYER

PLACE),

Defendant.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging

that Defendant is violating her “civil/sovereign” rights with respect to eviction proceedings in the

Yonkers City Court.1 Named as Defendant is RXR Soyo Exalta, LLC (Sawyer Place), which

Plaintiff describes as a “Fictitious, Foreign entity” (ECF 1, at 9), and which appears to be her

landlord. On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Motion Emergency” requesting

preliminary injunctive relief in the form of an order staying a judgment in Plaintiff’s eviction

proceedings in the Yonkers City Court. (ECF 5.)

BACKGROUND

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on December 1, 2023, she entered into a “trust

deed” with Defendant to take possession of an apartment unit in Yonkers. On December 15,

2024, Plaintiff “submitted a Notice of Recission deducting liability to pay on behalf of the

obligor, as the agreement was entered into fraudulently or due to a mistake.” (ECF 1, at 9.)

Defendant “did not respond or rebut [the] Notice.” (Id.) On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff received a

1 Plaintiff brings her claims using the courts’ general complaint form, which refers the

court to an attached complaint that is captioned for the “9th JD – Supreme & County Court of

Westchester County.” (See ECF 1.)

notice from Defendant “stating that her beneficial interest in the property would be terminated

due to ‘non-payment of fees[.]’” (Id. at 10.) On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff “provided a Bonded Bill

of Exchange in the amount of $12,463.03,” but Defendant “did not return the draft with

Certificate of Protest/Notice of Dishonor, respond nor rebut.” (Id.) On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff

sent Defendant “a Notice and Failure to Respond” that gave Defendant three days to respond,

and stated that “failure to do so shall mean . . . that the facts stated therein are true and that

[Defendant] Agree[s] that they have ledgered the Account, thereby closing and settling the

matter.” (Id.) On March 19, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Nonpayment Petition in the

Yonkers City Court alleging that Plaintiff was in “default of the retail installment agreement.”

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that she was therefore “left with no choice but to file this lawsuit seeking

relief for breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful termination of her beneficial interest in the property,

and seeking an accounting for all income and profits generated from the property.” (Id.) In the

complaint, Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, a declaration that she has “the right to live & enjoy

peaceful enjoyment of my domicile free from outside interference and the threat of forceful

eviction.” (Id.)

In her motion for emergency relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue a stay of the

judgment entered by the Yonkers City Court on April 18, 2024, pending the outcome of this

action. (ECF 5, at 1.) Plaintiff attaches to the motion a May 22, 2024 “14 Day Notice of

Eviction” issued by Chief Marshal of the City of Yonkers, directing Plaintiff to vacate her

apartment by June 7, 2024. (ECF 5-1, at 1.)

DISCUSSION

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show: (1) that she is likely to suffer

irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits of her case or

(b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and

a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in her favor. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W.V. Univ.

Hosps., Inc., 660 F. 3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2000). Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary

and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries

the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s submissions do not demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, or

(2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and

a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in her favor. Specifically, neither the complaint nor the

motion alleges facts suggesting that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s

claims. Moreover, depending on whether Plaintiff’s state court eviction proceedings are ongoing

or final, the relief she seeks – federal court intervention in her state court eviction proceedings –

is likely barred by either the Younger abstention doctrine2 or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.3

2 The Younger abstention doctrine cautions federal courts against enjoining or otherwise

interfering in ongoing state proceedings. See Sprint Comms., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S 69, 77-78

(2013) (defining “Younger’s scope”); see generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971).

When a plaintiff “seek[s] injunctive relief relating to the same property that is the subject matter

of the underlying state court action[,]” Younger abstention applies. Abbatiello v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-4210, 2015 WL 5884797, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2015); see Clark v.

Bloomberg, No. 10-CV-1263, 2010 WL 1438803, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2010) (holding that

Younger abstention doctrine precludes federal district court from staying pending state-court

foreclosure and eviction proceedings because “both concern the disposition of real property and

hence implicate important state interests, and there is no reason to doubt that the state

proceedings provide [the plaintiff] with an adequate forum to make the arguments he seeks to

raise in this court”).

3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine – created by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) – precludes federal district courts from reviewing final judgments

of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)

(holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF 5) is denied. The Court

will address the claims in Plaintiff’s complaint in due course.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s request for an order to show cause (ECF 5) is denied.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant

demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge