Montes Jr. v. Albany County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CARLOS J. MONTES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:24-CV-985 (AMN/DJS)

ALBANY COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

Carlos Montes Jr.

Albany, New York 12201

Plaintiff, pro se

Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff pro se Carlos Montes Jr. commenced this action and asserted

claims of coercion, false imprisonment, improper documentation, a violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and kidnapping against Albany County, the Albany County Sheriff,

the Albany County Family Court Officers, Captain Guillermo Oliver, Sgt. Vincent Ballesher,

Officer Shevax Thomas, Officer Daniel Weaver, and Officer Thomas Muller. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff

did not pay the filing fee and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. No. 2. This

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart, who, on September 19, 2024, granted

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. No. 5.

Also on September 19, 2024, after conducting an initial review of the Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Magistrate Judge Stewart issued an Order and Report-Recommendation

(i) recommending that Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA be dismissed with leave to amend; and

(ii) recommending that Plaintiff’s claims under the New York Criminal Procedure, Penal, and

Corrections Law be dismissed with prejudice, and (iii) recommending that Plaintiff’s state and

federal claims for false arrest be permitted to proceed. Dkt. No. 6 (“Report-Recommendation”).

Magistrate Judge Stewart advised that under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties had fourteen days

within which to file written objections and that failure to object to the Report-Recommendation

within fourteen days would preclude appellate review. Dkt. No. 6 at 10.1

On October 2, 2024, prior to this Court ruling on the Report-Recommendation, Plaintiff

filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 7.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its

entirety. The Court also conducts an initial review of the Amended Complaint and finds that

Plaintiff’s ADA, deliberate indifference, procedural due process, and NYSHRL claims may

proceed, and directs Defendants to respond to them in accordance with this decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation

that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223,

228-29 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). If no specific objections have been filed, this

Court reviews a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation for clear error. See Petersen, 2 F.

Supp. 3d at 229 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition).

Similarly, if an objection simply rehashes arguments originally presented to the magistrate judge,

this Court reviews the relevant portions of the report-recommendation for clear error. See

1 Citations to court documents utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic

filing system.

Petersen, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 228-29 & n.6 (collecting cases). “When performing such a ‘clear error’

review, ‘the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in

order to accept the recommendation.’” Dezarea W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:21-CV-01138

(MAD/TWD), 2023 WL 2552452, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Canady v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-0367 (GTS/WBC), 2017 WL 5484663, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,

2017)).

“[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than

that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289,

295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (additional citations

omitted). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “make reasonable allowances

to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a

legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). That said, “even a

pro se party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at

particular findings in the magistrate’s proposal . . . .” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06-cv-13320, 2011

WL 3809920, at *2, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation omitted); accord Caldwell v. Petros, No.

22-cv-567, 2022 WL 16918287, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022). After appropriate review, “the

court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by

the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Report-Recommendation

Because neither party has filed any objections to the Report-Recommendation, the Court

reviews the Report-Recommendation for clear error.

Magistrate Judge Stewart construed the Complaint, in part, to assert various claims under

state criminal statutes and the N.Y. Correction Law § 137. Dkt. No. 6 at 4. Because the Complaint

“identifies no statutory basis for a private right of action under the alleged criminal statutes,” the

Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart’s recommendation to dismiss with prejudice such

claims. Id. at 4 (citing Jones v. Connecticut Superior Ct., 722 F. App’x 109, 110 (2d Cir. 2018))

(other citations omitted). Similarly, Plaintiff fails to show that a private right of action exists as to

N.Y. Correction Law § 137. See Correa v. Lynch, 20-CV-02875 (PMH), 2021 WL 2036697, at

*8 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2021) (“there is no right of action under [N.Y. Correction Law § 137]”).

Therefore, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that the claim pursuant to N.Y.

Correction Law § 137 should also be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. No. 6 at 7-8.

Magistrate Judge Stewart also construed the Complaint as asserting claims under the

Eighth Amendment and the ADA based on Plaintiff’s treatment upon his arrest. The Court agrees

with Magistrate Judge Stewart that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial detainees,

and thus, such a claim must be dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. No. 6 at 7 (citing Cuoco v.

Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Court also agrees with Magistrate Judge

Stewart’s assessment under the ADA and his conclusion that Plaintiff’s claim is precluded as a

result of his failure to allege interference with major life activities caused by either his epilepsy or

the pre-existing injury to his arms. Dkt. No. 7 at 6-7 (citing O’Hara v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs.,

S. Westchester, No. 18-CV-8502 (KMK), 2020 WL 1244474, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020))

(other citations omitted). The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart’s decision that Plaintiff

should be given an opportunity to replead his claim under the ADA. Dkt. No. 6 at 9.

Magistrate Judge Stewart also construed the Complaint to assert claims under the Fourth

Amendment and state law for false imprisonment. The Court agrees such claims should be

permitted to move forward and finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Stewart’s analysis. Id. at

8. In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was detained without legal basis and prior to

actual arrest, and that officers scrambled to add charges which could justify his arrest. Dkt. No. 1

at ¶¶ 16, 41. Such allegations are sufficient to advance at this stage.

Finally, Magistrate Judge Stewart concluded that Plaintiff failed to allege “an

unconstitutional policy that would support a claim of municipal liability.” Dkt. No. 6 at 8 (citing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The Court agrees and therefore

finds no clear error in the recommendation to dismiss the County of Albany as a Defendant.

Having reviewed the Report-Recommendation for clear error, and found none, the Court

adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

B. Sufficiency of the Amended Complaint

Because Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 7, in lieu of objecting to the

Report-Recommendation, the Court moves on to assess the sufficiency of the Amended Complaint

for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Magistrate Judge Stewart set forth the standard for assessing

the sufficiency of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) in the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No.

6 at 2-3, and the Court utilizes that same standard now.

i. Summary of the Complaint

In summary, the Amended Complaint alleges many of the same facts as the original

Complaint. Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to the ADA, the Fourteenth Amendment through 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) against

Albany County, the Albany County Sheriff’s Office, the Albany Family Court, and the same

individual Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 7 at 1, 3-4. Generally, Plaintiff

asserts that he has epilepsy and preexisting injuries, and that during the course of his interactions

with Defendants on July 11, 2024, Defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations for

his condition, exacerbated his medical condition, and demonstrated deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. Id. at 2.

On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that his petition for 50/50 custody of his daughter was

denied in Family Court, and afterwards, he told the male officers present that he would only leave

upon being removed physically. Id. at 4. The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Oliver,

Ballesher, and Thomas then restrained Plaintiff and escorted him to a secure area in the court,

where he was handcuffed behind his back despite Plaintiff disclosing to the officers that he had

epilepsy and had recently suffered injuries to his neck, shoulders, left knee, and left ankle. Id. at

5-7. Defendants Oliver, Ballesher, and Thomas allegedly refused to adjust the handcuffs after

Plaintiff made his medical condition known. Id. at 6-7.

Later, Plaintiff alleges that members of the Albany County Sheriff’s Office arrived, and

Plaintiff inquired as to whether the officers were using body cameras. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges

that he also reiterated his request for his handcuffs to be repositioned to the front of his body. Id.

Defendants Weaver and Muller allegedly refused. Id. at 10. Upon being transported to the

Sheriff’s office, Plaintiff alleges he heard one of the officers make the following remarks: “[y]ou

can’t forge his name” and “[w]e have to create the arrest records ourselves.” Id. Plaintiff alleges

these remarks are evidence of procedural irregularities and violations of his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process. Id.

Upon arrival at the Sheriff’s station, Plaintiff alleges that he was shackled to a bench with

his feet restrained and finally released from the handcuffs behind his back. Id. at 11. Plaintiff

alleges he was kept there for five to six hours and that he observed a group of officers, including

Defendants Weaver and Muller, discuss how to substantiate charges against him. Id. Finally,

Plaintiff alleges that officers twisted his arms in handcuffs while fingerprinting him, causing him

significant pain. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff was released and charged with obstruction of government

administration, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. Id. at 12. The charges were later

dismissed, allegedly due to the Sheriff’s office’s failure to file the necessary paperwork. Id.

ii. Analysis of the Complaint

Plaintiff most explicitly alleges violations of the ADA, deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment, and violations of the New York State Human

Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). Id. at 13-15.2 Plaintiff also mentions violations of his procedural due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court construes the Amended Complaint

to assert such a claim. Dkt. No. 7 at 8, 10. Plaintiff does not include a false arrest Fourth

Amendment claim in the Amended Complaint despite the Report-Recommendation’s

determination that such a claim could move forward. Dkt. No. 6 at 8. Therefore, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has abandoned his claim under the Fourth Amendment.

1. Claims Against Albany County and the Albany County

Sheriff’s Office

Plaintiff includes Defendant Albany County in the Amended Complaint and attempts to

rectify the shortcomings of the original Complaint regarding Monell liability. This time, Plaintiff

alleges Albany County is “sued for its policies, customs, and practices that were the moving force

behind the violation of Plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional rights.” Dkt. No. 7 at 3.

Additionally, Plaintiff vaguely refers to the “supervision, discipline, and training” conducted by

2 At certain points in his Complaint, Plaintiff also mentions his Fourteenth Amendment right to

equal protection and his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1-

2. However, it does not appear that Plaintiff intends to assert claims based on these rights. To the

extent such claims exists, the Court finds the allegations to be insufficient to warrant a response

from Defendants as to both the equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims and dismisses them

with prejudice. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Adirondack Park Agency, 662 F. Supp. 2d 243, 252-53

(N.D.N.Y. 2009) (requiring allegations of a similarly situated individual for equal protection

claims); see Dkt. No. 6 at 7 (dismissing with prejudice the Eighth Amendment claim).

the Sheriff’s Office. Id. The Amended Complaint also makes passing reference to officers’

possible lack of training regarding use of a fingerprinting machine. Id. at 11. Finally, Plaintiff’s

request for relief includes a request that the Defendants “implement and enforce policies,

procedures, and training designed to ensure full compliance with the ADA, particularly in the

treatment of detainees with known disabilities, including but not limited to epilepsy.” Id. at 16.

Though far from detailed, liberally construed, the Complaint appears to allege that Albany

County’s lack of training with respect to how to treat, handcuff, and fingerprint detainees with

epilepsy resulted in the harms Plaintiff experienced. Such allegations suffice to justify a response

from Albany County. See, e.g., Davis v. Stratton, 360 Fed. Appx. 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We

agree that lack of training can, in some circumstances, establish a policy under Monell”).

The Amended Complaint also makes claims against the Albany County Sheriff’s Office.

Under the law of the State of New York, “a department of a municipal entity is merely a

subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence.” Hoisington v. County of

Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Therefore, “the Sheriff’s Department [does

not] exist separate and apart from the County, and as a result, [] can[not] be sued.” Sagaria v.

Orange Cnty. Jail, No. 20-CV-2287, 2021 WL 4392422, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021) (citing

Gleeson v. County of Nassau, No. 15-CV-6487, 2019 WL 4754326, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,

2019)). Thus, the Court dismisses the Sheriff’s Office as a Defendant with prejudice.

2. Claims Against Albany Family Court3

In contrast, the Albany County Family Court is “part of the unified court system for the

state.” Bliven v. Hunt, 478 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing The Family Court Act §

3 Despite Plaintiff listing the “Albany Family Court” as a Defendant, the Court construes the

Amended Complaint as alleging claims against the Albany County Family Court.

113). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Albany County Family Court “are [generally] barred

by sovereign immunity” under the Eleventh Amendment. Wrobleski v. Bellevue Hosp., 13cv8736,

2015 WL 585817, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)); see also Gollump v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir.

2009) (finding that the New York State Unified Court system, which the Albany County Family

Court is a part of, is an “arm of the state” which is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).

“There are only three exceptions to the general rule that a State and its officers acting on

its behalf are immune from suit in federal court.” See Smith v. State University of New York, 1:00-

CV1454(FJS/RFT), 2003 WL 1937208, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003) (citation omitted). “These

exceptions are that (1) a State may waive its Eleventh Amendment defense, (2) Congress may

abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States by acting pursuant to a grant of constitutional

authority and (3) under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit

against a state official when that suit seeks ... prospective injunctive relief.” Id. (citing Winokur v.

Office of Court Admin., 190 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (E.D.N.Y.2002)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The Ex parte Young doctrine exception does not apply. Though under the Ex parte Young

doctrine, state officials can be sued in federal court in their official capacities where “the complaint

alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective,”

such allegations are absent here. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254–56

(2011)). Plaintiff’s “alleged injuries stem only from past conduct with no plausible threat of future

violations to [himself]”. See Walker v. NYS Justice Center for Protection of People with Special

Needs, 493 F. Supp. 3d 239, 246 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2020). Moreover, the Albany County Family

Court is not an official but a state entity.4

No other exception applies in suits alleging violations of the NYSHRL. Smith, 2003 WL

1937208, at *7 (“the Eleventh Amendment bars this Court from adjudicating Plaintiff’s New York

Human Rights Law claim” against official state entities). Similarly, no other exception applies for

claims under the Fourteenth Amendment made pursuant to Section 1983. See Walker, 493 F.

Supp. 3d at 246 (“Congress did not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity when it enacted §[]

1983 . . . and New York has not waived its immunity”) (citing Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F.

App'x 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010)). As such, the NYSHRL and Fourteenth Amendment claims against

the Albany County Family Court cannot be sustained.

However, the Second Circuit has ruled that suits against state entities under Section II of

the ADA can be sustained under certain circumstances pursuant to the second exception. Such

suits may only be sustained where the alleged Title II violation “was motivated by either

discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability.” Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of

Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001). Therefore, because Plaintiff has not alleged, and could

not reasonably suggest, that the Albany County Family Court officers’ conduct was motivated by

an animus toward people with epilepsy, the ADA claim may not be sustained against the Albany

County Family Court. Id.

Because none of the claims may be sustained against it pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment, the Court dismisses the Albany County Family Court from the case with prejudice.

4 To the extent that any of the individual Defendants are employees of the Albany County Family

Court, rather than the Albany County Sheriff’s Office, they may not be sued in their official

capacities for the same reasons. That such claims would be against state officials, rather than a

state entity, does not alter the fact that Plaintiff fails to allege facts capable of justifying such claims

under the Ex parte Young doctrine.

3. ADA

Plaintiff has properly amended his claim under the ADA in response to the Report-

Recommendation. As Magistrate Judge Stewart explained:

Title II of the ADA provides in relevant part that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or

be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A

“disability” is defined as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). In general, plaintiffs

who seek to state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA must establish

“that (1) they are ‘qualified individuals’ with a disability; (2) that the defendants

are subject to the ADA; and (3) that plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to

participate in or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or were

otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiffs’ disabilities.”

Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2003).

Dkt. No. 6 at 5. The ADA “[a]ppl[ies] to [p]olice [i]nteractions [a]t the [s]cene of an [a]rrest.”

Williams v. City of New York, 121 F. Supp. 3d 354, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “The only reasonable

interpretation of Title II [of the ADA] is that law enforcement officers who are acting in an

investigative or custodial capacity are performing ‘services, programs, or activities’ within the

scope of Title II.” Id. at 368.

Courts have found that “[t]here are two main scenarios in which an arrest made by an

officer of a covered agency can violate Title II of the ADA. First, failure to take account of a

person’s disability can result in wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a

disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity. Second, even

where an arrest is appropriate, officers may fail to provide reasonable accommodation, where they

fail to reasonably accommodate the person’s disability in the course of investigation or arrest,

causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.” Dkt.

No. 6 at 6 (citing Durr v. Slator, 558 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27-28 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)). Here, construed

liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations fit the second scenario: Plaintiff alleges that the individual

Defendants failed to accommodate his epilepsy and injury during the course of the arrest and

detainment. Such allegations are sufficient to warrant a response from Defendants.

Magistrate Judge Stewart recommended that the ADA claim in the original Complaint be

dismissed with leave to amend because “nowhere in his Complaint [did] Plaintiff allege which

major life activities [his] disability interfered with.” Dkt. No. 6 at 7. In the Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff has corrected his mistake as to epilepsy. He alleges his disability of epilepsy

“substantially limits [his] major life activities, including walking, standing, and maintaining

cognitive and physical function during seizures.” Dkt. No. 7 at 3. Such limitations qualify. See

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (listing walking, standing, lifting, etc.). Plaintiff has not alleged which

major life activities his other injuries impact. Thus, Plaintiff’s ADA claim allegations regarding

Plaintiff’s epilepsy, but not the other alleged injuries, are sufficient to warrant a response from

Defendants.5

4. Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff next asserts a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs under

Fourteenth Amendment due process, which governs such claims for pre-trial detainees. See

Yancey v. Robertson, 828 F. App'x 801, 803 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d

17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)). “There is both an objective and a subjective component involved in”

assessing such a claim. Jones v. Sheriff of Suffolk Cnty., 518 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.

10, 2021).

For the objective component, “Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he had a ‘sufficiently

serious need’ of medical treatment.” Id. (quoting Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29). Plaintiff must show

5 The ADA claim may only be sustained as to Albany County and the individuals in their official

capacities as municipal employees. Title II of the ADA does “not provide for individual capacity

suit.” Fera v. City of Albany, 568 F. Supp. 2d 248, 259 (N.D.N.Y. July 20, 2008).

his need had “a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.”

Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996). Though not specifically stated in his

Amended Complaint, the Court finds that the possibility of experiencing an epileptic seizure while

handcuffed with Plaintiff’s arms behind his back poses the risk of extreme pain. See Boomer v.

Lanigan, CIV5540 DLC, 2001 WL 1646725, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2001) (finding “[e]pilepsy,

or an epileptic seizure, is a serious condition” and that an injury resulting from an epileptic seizure

caused “excruciating pain” which sufficed for stating a deliberate indifference claim). At least one

court in this circuit has found that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to a serious medical

need where it is unclear whether the Plaintiff was “in the beginning stages of an epileptic fit.”

Williams v. M.C.C. Institution, 97 CIV. 5352(LAP), 1999 WL 179604, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,

1999). The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff informed Defendants of his epilepsy, not

that he was at risk of an imminent epileptic episode. However, the Amended Complaint also

references later “stress-induced” seizures in the aftermath of the events in question. Dkt. No. 7 at

8-9. At this early stage, and construing the allegations most favorably to Plaintiff, the Court finds

these allegations sufficient to require a response from Defendants.

For the subjective component, Plaintiff must show “the charged official [acted] with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553. “The subjective element requires

a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness; namely when the [] official ‘knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he repeatedly informed Defendants of his epilepsy. See, e.g., Dkt.

No. 7 at 6-7, 9-10. Again, these allegations are sufficient to require a response from Defendants.

5. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff also appears to assert a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural

due process. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Weaver and Muller made remarks suggesting that

they need to “create the arrest records ourselves.” Dkt. No. 7 at 10. Plaintiff also alleges officers

at the Sheriff’s station, including the Defendants responsible for his arrest, were openly

deliberating how to substantiate charges against him. Id. at 11.

At least one court in this circuit has found that where a plaintiff “alleges . . . [defendants]

deliberately delayed processing of paperwork in order to maximize the length of his detention,”

the Plaintiff has stated a procedural due process claim. Levantino v. Skala, 56 F.Supp.3d 191, 204

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding a “detention of fewer than 48 hours may [] be unreasonable if it is

unreasonably prolonged, for example, for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify

the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake”)

(citation omitted). Though far from thorough, the Amended Complaint, liberally construed,

alleges that Plaintiff’s detention might have been needlessly prolonged due to Defendant officers’

effort to substantiate the charges against him. These allegations are sufficient to require a response

from Defendants.

6. NYSHRL

Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim of discrimination under the NYSHRL. Dkt. No. 7 at 15.

“Protections afforded by the NYSHRL are construed coextensively with the ADA[.]” Williams v.

City of New York, 121 F. Supp.3d 354, 364 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Loeffler v. Staten Island

Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 277–78 (2d Cir.2009)). “If Plaintiff can satisfy [his] burden under the

ADA, [he] will also satisfy [his] burden under . . . the NYSHRL[.]” Id.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his rights under the NYSHRL during his arrest and

detainment at the Sheriff’s Office by failing to accommodate his medical condition. Dkt. No. 7 at

15. Here, as the Court has already ruled, the ADA (and by extension, the NYSHRL) “[a]pply to

[p]olice [i]nteractions [a]t the [s]cene of an [a]rrest.” Id. at 363. Thus, given the Court’s finding

that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are sufficient to require a response as to the ADA

claim, they are also sufficient to require a response as to the NYSHRL claim.6

iii. Leave to Amend

“[A] court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave

to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid

claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 5:14-CV-

0941 (GTS/DEP), 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927

F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)).

Plaintiff has already been afforded the chance to his amend his Complaint once. Moreover,

the deficiencies identified by this Court indicate that no valid claims might be stated against the

Albany County Sheriff’s Office and the Albany County Family Court. Therefore, the dismissal of

those Defendants from the case is with prejudice, as is the dismissal of the ADA claims against

Defendants in their personal capacities.

6 Unlike the ADA, however, NYSHRL claims can be made against individuals in their personal

capacities. See Bonaffini v. City University of New York, 20-cv-5118 (BMC), 2021 WL 2206736,

at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2021). Thus, the NYSHRL claims survive against the individual

Defendants in their personal capacities.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that the Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 6, is ADOPTED in its entirety; and

the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 7, states non-frivolous claims and

that the following claims SURVIVE initial review and require a response:

Against Albany County and Individual Defendants in their Official Capacity:

ADA, Deliberate Indifference, Procedural Due Process, and NYSHRL

Against Individual Defendants in their Personal Capacity: Deliberate

Indifference, Procedural Due Process, and NYSHRL; and the Court further

ORDERS that the remainder of the claims are DISMISSED from this case with prejudice;

and the Court further

ORDERS that Defendants Albany County Sheriff’s Office and the Albany Family Court

are DISMISSED from this case with prejudice; and the Court further

ORDERS that, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 7, is the operative complaint; and

the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the

Local Rules7; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk shall issue summonses and General Order # 25 and forward them,

along with copies of the Amended Complaint, to the United States Marshal for service upon the

Defendants; and the Court further

7 The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions herein.

ORDERS that all pleadings, motions and other documents relating to this action must bear

the case number assigned to this action and be filed with the Clerk of the United States District

Court. Plaintiff must comply with requests by the Clerk’s Office for any documents that are

necessary to maintain this action. All parties must comply with Local Rule 7.1 of the Northern

District of New York in filing motions; motions will be decided on submitted papers, without oral

argument, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Plaintiff is also required to promptly notify the

Clerk’s Office and all parties or their counsel, in writing, of any changes in his address; his failure

to do so will result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2024 Clune] V). Jay HA

Albany, New York Anne M. Nardacci

U.S. District Judge

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