Lewis v. Adirondack Medical Center

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SCOTT PHILLIP LEWIS,

Plaintiff, 1:24-cv-376 (BKS/TWD)

v.

ADIRONDACK MEDICAL CENTER d/b/a Adirondack

Health, LAKE PLACID SPORTS MEDICINE, PLLC,

CDPHP UNIVERSAL BENEFITS, INC., EUGENE

BYRNE, DANIEL P. BULLOCK, BARTLOMIEJ

SZCZECH, TRACEY VIOLA, and WILLIAM J. SMITH,

Defendants.

Appearances:

Plaintiff pro se:

Scott Phillip Lewis

Lake Placid, NY 12946

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Scott Phillip Lewis commenced this proceeding on March 19, 2024, alleging

violations of (1) Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et

seq., against Defendant Lake Placid Sports Medicine, PLLC, and (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against

Adirondack Medical Center d/b/a Adirondack Health, Lake Placid Sports Medicine, PLLC,

CDHP Universal Benefits, Inc., Eugene Byrne, Daniel P. Bullock, Bartlomiej Szczech, Tracey

Viola, and William J. Smith. (Dkt. No. 1).1 Plaintiff also sought leave to proceed in forma

1 Prior to commencing this proceeding, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging what appear to be certain overlapping facts

against Adirondack Medical Center only. See Complaint, Lewis v. Adirondack Med. Ctr., No. 8:24-cv-27 (N.D.N.Y.

Jan. 7, 2024). On April 17, 2024, this Court adopted the Report-Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Daniel J.

Stewart, recommending that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. See Lewis v. Adirondack Med.

pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2). This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge

Thérèse Wiley Dancks. (Id.). On May 10, Magistrate Judge Dancks granted Plaintiff’s

application to proceed IFP and issued a Report-Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff’s

complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 4). Any objections to the Report-

Recommendation were due May 28. (See id.). On May 29, Plaintiff filed a motion to extend his

deadline to file objections to July 4, (Dkt. No. 5), which was granted the following day, (Dkt.

No. 6). On July 24, Plaintiff filed a letter motion asking the Court to accept and consider his

objections that were not timely filed because of problems with accessing PACER, (Dkt. No. 7),

and separately filed his objections, (Dkt. No. 8). Plaintiff also sought permission to file

electronically, (Dkt. No. 9), which Magistrate Judge Dancks denied, (Dkt. No. 10). Plaintiff has

appealed this denial. (Dkt. No. 11). For the reasons set forth below, the Court accepts and

considers Plaintiff’s objections, adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety, and denies

Plaintiff’s appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v.

Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A proper objection

is one that identifies the specific portions of the [report-recommendation] that the objector

asserts are erroneous and provides a basis for this assertion.” Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd.,

976 F. Supp. 2d 290, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). Properly raised objections “must

be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the” report. Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch

Ctr, 2024 WL 1652458, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69676 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2024). Plaintiff has not subsequently filed

an amended complaint.

Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). “[E]ven a pro se party’s

objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular

findings in the magistrate’s proposal.” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 6-cv-13320, 2011 WL 3809920

at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95351, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation omitted). Findings

and recommendations as to which there was no properly preserved objection are reviewed for

clear error. Kruger, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (citation omitted).

A magistrate judge may issue orders regarding nondispositive pretrial matters, and the

district court reviews such orders under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “An order is clearly erroneous when the reviewing

court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. An order is

contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of

procedure.” Tompkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 70, 74 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this highly deferential standard,

magistrate judges are afforded broad discretion in resolving nondispositive disputes and reversal

is appropriate only if their discretion is abused.” Williams v. Rosenblatt Sec., Inc., 236 F. Supp.

3d 802, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Thai Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of Lao

People’s Democratic Republic, 924 F. Supp. 2d 508, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Report-Recommendation

In the Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Dancks outlined the procedural history

of this suit, described the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, and identified the Plaintiff’s

current claims and request for relief. (Dkt. No. 4, at 2–5). With respect to Plaintiff’s ADA claim

against Lake Placid Sports Medicine, LLC, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that Plaintiff had

“not plausibly alleged he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA,” and that Plaintiff had “not

pled Lake Placid Sports Medicine PLLC’s actions constituted discrimination under Title III of

the ADA or resulted in the discriminatory provision of services to Plaintiff.” (Id. at 8–9).

Additionally, Magistrate Judge Dancks explained that “Plaintiff only seeks monetary damages”

which are not available to a plaintiff under Title III of the ADA. (Id. at 9). In determining

Plaintiff also failed to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Magistrate Judge Dancks

found that Plaintiff’s complaint “contains only ‘conclusory, vague, or general allegations,’” that

Plaintiff “failed to adequately allege the necessary racial or other invidious discriminatory

animus,” and that Plaintiff had “not plausibly alleged an underlying violation of the ADA.” (Id.

at 11 (citations omitted)). She accordingly recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint with

leave to amend. (Id. at 12).

B. Objections to the Report-Recommendation

As previously indicated, Plaintiff’s objections to the Report-Recommendation were not

timely filed. (See Dkt. No. 8; see also Dkt. No. 6). Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure states that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may,

for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed

to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro

se, stated that he “had attempted to file objections [in this] matter on June 26, 2024,” and “had

been locked out of [his] US PACER account for some time and had been unable to see that [his]

submission was not received.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 1). The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated

good cause for his late filing and the Court will consider Plaintiff’s objections.

Plaintiff has not raised any objections to the facts or the legal framework set forth in the

Report-Recommendation. (See Dkt. No. 8). The Court therefore adopts Magistrate Judge

Dancks’s summary of the factual background and applicable law and presumes familiarity with

those matters for the purposes of this decision.

1. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Dancks’s recommendation that his ADA claim be

dismissed. (Dkt. No. 8, at 1–2). Plaintiff argues that he “properly outlined the discrimination he

has experienced,” that “Plaintiff properly detailed the fraudulent scheme used by Defendants to

take advantage of those with conditions such as Plaintiff,” and that “Plaintiff detailed how major

life activities were disrupted by such a fraudulent scheme to discriminate against those meeting

the definition of ‘disability.’” (Id.).

First, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Dancks’s assessment that “Plaintiff does

not allege Lake Placid Sports Medicine, PLLC took [the actions attributed to it in Plaintiff’s

complaint] for the purpose of discriminating against him because of an alleged disability.” (Dkt.

No. 4, at 9). Even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged a disability for purposes of the ADA, see

infra, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts indicating that Lake Placid Sports Medicine, PLLC

discriminated against Plaintiff “within the meaning of the ADA.” See Krist v. Kolombos Rest.

Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also Costin v. Glens Falls Hosp., 103

F.4th 946, 953 (2d Cir. 2024) (“To establish a prima facie violation under [Title III of the ADA],

it must be shown that . . . the plaintiff ‘was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit

from . . . services, programs, or activities’ or was ‘otherwise discriminated against’ on the basis

of disability.” (citing Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016))). While

Plaintiff alleges that he “was told they needed to complete ‘a nerve test,’” prior to being seen by

a physician, and that, after refusing the nerve test, he “was told that there were no physicians

available who would be able to treat his injuries,” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 30–31), nowhere in the

complaint does Plaintiff suggest he did not receive Lake Placid Sports Medicine, PLLC’s

services because of a disability or that he was otherwise discriminated against on this basis.

Indeed, Plaintiff’s description of the allegedly “fraudulent scheme” only indicates that it is “for

monetary incentives,” not that it targets those with disabilities. (See id. ¶ 32).

Second, Magistrate Judge Dancks also correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

disability. While Plaintiff objects that he “detailed how major life activities were disrupted by

such a fraudulent scheme,” (Dkt. No. 8, at 1–2), this misstates what Plaintiff must allege to plead

a disability under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining “disability” as: “(A) a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such

individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an

impairment.”). Plaintiff has stated he “was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity

disorder (“ADHD”) qualifying [him] as disabled,”2 (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 37; see also id. ¶ 16 (“Plaintiff

was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) in January 2022)), and

that he “exhibit[ed] symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)” and “was diagnosed

with PTSD in May 2023.” (Id. ¶ 16). Alleging such diagnoses, without any further factual detail,

is plainly insufficient to allege a disability under the ADA. See Zuckerman v. GW Acquisition

LLC, No. 20-cv-8742, 2021 WL 4267815, at *11, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178873, at *25

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021) (“[A] diagnosis, standing alone, establishes only that Plaintiff has an

impairment; it does not establish that any major life activity is limited by that impairment.”).

Lastly, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not object to Magistrate Judge Dancks’s

recommendation that his Title III claim, which “only seeks monetary damages,” be dismissed on

the ground that Title III of the ADA does not permit a plaintiff to receive monetary damages, but

rather only injunctive relief. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.; see also Dkt. No. 4, at 9). Therefore,

2 Plaintiff explicitly states that “Defendant was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”)

qualifying Defendant as disabled.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 37 (emphases added)). However, the Court assumes based on the

context that Plaintiff meant to allege that Plaintiff was diagnosed with ADHD, not any of the Defendants.

even if Plaintiff’s objections had merit, it would still be necessary to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim,

which does not seek injunctive relief, (see Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 46), on this basis. See e.g., Sandler v.

Benden, No. 15-cv-1193, 2016 WL 9944017, at *16, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193234, at *57

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2016) (“Since plaintiff seeks only monetary relief with respect to her ADA

claims . . . the amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under Title III of the

ADA.”)

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

Plaintiff also objects to Magistrate Judge Dancks’s recommendation that his claim

against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 8, at 2). Plaintiff

argues that he “properly detailed facts of the fraudulent scheme used by Defendant’s [sic] that

injured Plaintiff” and that the allegations in the complaint “are not conclusory, vague or general.”

(Id.).

First, as was stated in the Report-Recommendation, (Dkt. No. 4, at 11), Plaintiff has not

pled facts sufficient to allege the existence of a conspiracy. Here, “[n]one of the allegations in the

complaint plausibly allege that defendants made an agreement for the purpose of depriving

disabled individuals of their civil rights.” See Gropper v. Fine Arts Housing, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d

664, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). While Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants participated in a scheme to

maximize their financial interests while refusing to provide medical care to Plaintiff” and that

“Defendants conspired in a fraudulent scheme that provided financial incentives for all

Defendants but ultimately denied Plaintiff the equal protection of the laws,” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 42;

see also id. ¶ 32), such “references” to a scheme “are merely ‘naked assertions devoid of further

factual enhancement,’ and a court is not ‘bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.’” Gropper, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 671 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009)).

Additionally, Plaintiff did not object to Magistrate Judge Dancks’s other reasons for

finding Plaintiff had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (See generally Dkt. No. 8).

Even if Plaintiff had stated sufficient facts to allege the existence of a conspiracy, the Court notes

that the claim would still fail because Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating that the conspiracy

was “motived by some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus

behind the conspirators’ action,” see Martinez v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 999 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999)), and because, as

discussed supra, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged an underlying civil rights violation, see

O’Bradovich v. Village of Tuckahoe, 325 F. Supp. 2d 413, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In the absence

of any claim establishing a violation of civil rights, the court must also dismiss claims of

conspiracy brought under § 1985.” (citations omitted)).

Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Report-Recommendation that Plaintiff’s claims

pursuant to Title III of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) should be dismissed with leave to

amend.

C. Denial of Motion for Permission to File Electronically

On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for permission to file electronically.

(Dkt. No. 9). Magistrate Judge Dancks denied Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice and explained

that “[p]laintiff may reapply for electronic filing if the complaint or any amended complaint is

accepted” by the Court. (Dkt. No. 10). Plaintiff appeals the denial, arguing that “[f]iling under 28

U.S.C. § 1915 is irrelevant for permission to file electronically” and, relying on Rule 1 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that “[p]ermission to file electronically is to secure a just,

speedy and expensive determination of this action.” (Dkt. No. 11, at 2).

Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] person not represented by

an attorney . . . may file electronically only if allowed by court order or by local rule.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 5(d)(3)(B)(i). Under local rules, pro se litigants may not file electronically without

permission from the Court. Gen. Order 22, Rule 12.1. While Plaintiff states that he has been

disadvantaged by the inability to file electronically and “must manually search each case to see if

any activity has occurred,” no complaint has even been accepted for filing in this case. Cf.

Zuccarino v. Town of Hector, No. 19-cv-6370, 2020 WL 2319870, at *1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

82624, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2020) (denying motion for permission to use the electronic

filing system where the plaintiff did not “provide[] a persuasive reason for the Court to grant his

motion”). As Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Magistrate Judge Dancks’ decision is either

clearly erroneous or contrary to law, Plaintiff’s appeal is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to accept and consider his objections to the Report-

Recommendation, (Dkt. No. 7), is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Dancks’s Report-Recommendation, (Dkt. No. 8), is

ADOPTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Dkt. No. 1), is DISMISSED with leave to

amend; and it is further

ORDERED that any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days of the

date of this Order. Any amended complaint must be a complete pleading which will replace the

current complaint in total; and it is further

ORDERED that if Plaintiff files a timely amended complaint, it shall be referred to

Magistrate Judge Dancks for review; and if Plaintiff fails to file a timely amended complaint, the

Clerk is directed to close this case; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's appeal, (Dkt. No. 11), of the decision denying Plaintiff

permission to file electronically, (Dkt. No. 10), is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the

Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 9, 2024

Syracuse, New York

Brenda K. Sannes

Chief U.S. District Judge

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